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PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.

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PLATO,

AND THE

OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.

BY

GEORGE GROTE

AUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'.

A NEW EDITION.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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In the present Edition, with a view to the distribution into four volumes, there is a slight transposition of the author's arrangement. His concluding chapters (XXXVIII., XXXIX.), entitled "Other Companions of Sokrates," and "Xenophon," are placed in the First Volume, as chapters III. and IV. By this means each volume is made up of nearly related subjects, so as to possess a certain amount of unity.

Volume First contains the following subjects :— Speculative Philosophy in Greece before Sokrates ; Growth of Dialectic ; Other Companions of Sokrates ; Xenophon ; Life of Plato ; Platonic Canon ; Platonic Compositions generally ; Apology of Sokrates ; Kriton ; Euthyphron.

Volume Second comprises:—Alkibiades I. and II. ; Hippias Major —Hippias Minor ; Hipparchus—Minos ; Theages ; Erastæ or Anterastæ—Rivales ; Ion ; Laches ; Charmides ; Lysis ; Euthydemus ; Menon ; Protagoras ; Gorgias ; Phædon.

Volume Third :—Phædrus—Symposion ; Parmenides ; Theætetus ; Sophistes ; Politikus ; Kratylus ; Philebus ; Menexenus ; Kleitophon.

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PREFACE.

THE present work is intended as a sequel and supplement to my History of Greece. It describes a portion of Hellenic philosophy: it dwells upon eminent individuals, enquiring, theorising, reasoning, confuting, &c., as contrasted with those collective political and social manifestations which form the matter of history, and which the modern writer gathers from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon.

Both Sokrates and Plato, indeed, are interesting characters in history as well as in philosophy. Under the former aspect, they were described by me in my former work as copiously as its general purpose would allow. But it is impossible to do justice to either of them—above all, to Plato, with his extreme variety and abundance—except in a book of which philosophy is the principal subject, and history only the accessory.

The names of Plato and Aristotle tower above all others in Grecian philosophy. Many compositions from both have been preserved, though only a small proportion of the total number left by Aristotle. Such preservation must be accounted highly fortunate, when we read in Diogenes Laertius and others, the long list of works on various topics of philosophy, now irrecoverably lost, and known by little except their titles. Respecting a few of them, indeed, we obtain some partial indications from fragmentary extracts and comments of later critics. But none of these once celebrated philosophers, except Plato and Aristotle, can be fairly appreciated upon evidence furnished by themselves. The Platonic dialogues, besides the extraordinary genius which

they display as compositions, bear thus an increased price (like the Sibylline books) as the scanty remnants of a lost philosophical literature, once immense and diversified.

Under these two points of view, I trust that the copious analysis and commentary bestowed upon them in the present work will not be considered as unnecessarily lengthened. I maintain, full and undiminished, the catalogue of Plato's works as it was inherited from antiquity and recognised by all critics before the commencement of the present century. Yet since several subsequent critics have contested the canon, and set aside as spurious many of the dialogues contained in it,—I have devoted a chapter to this question, and to the vindication of the views on which I have proceeded.

The title of these volumes will sufficiently indicate that I intend to describe, as far as evidence permits, the condition of Hellenic philosophy at Athens during the half century immediately following the death of Sokrates in 399 B.C. My first two chapters do indeed furnish a brief sketch of Pre-Sokratic philosophy: but I profess to take my departure from Sokrates himself, and these chapters are inserted mainly in order that the theories by which he found himself surrounded may not be altogether unknown. Both here, and in the sixty-ninth chapter of my History, I have done my best to throw light on the impressive and eccentric personality of Sokrates: a character original and unique, to whose peculiar mode of working on other minds I scarcely know a parallel in history. He was the generator, indirectly and through others, of a new and abundant crop of compositions —the "Sokratic dialogues": composed by many different authors, among whom Plato stands out as unquestionable coryphæus, yet amidst other names well deserving respectful mention as seconds, companions, or opponents.

It is these Sokratic dialogues, and the various companions of Sokrates from whom they proceeded, that the present work is intended to exhibit. They form the dramatic manifestation

of Hellenic philosophy—as contrasted with the formal and systematising, afterwards prominent in Aristotle.

But the dialogue is a process containing commonly a large intermixture, often a preponderance, of the negative vein: which was more abundant and powerful in Sokrates than in any one. In discussing the Platonic dialogues, I have brought this negative vein into the foreground. It reposes upon a view of the function and value of philosophy which is less dwelt upon than it ought to be, and for which I here briefly prepare the reader.

Philosophy is, or aims at becoming, reasoned truth: an aggregate of matters believed or disbelieved after conscious process of examination gone through by the mind, and capable of being explained to others: the beliefs being either primary, knowingly assumed as self-evident—or conclusions resting upon them, after comparison of all relevant reasons favourable and unfavourable. "Philosophia" (in the words of Cicero), "ex rationum collatione consistit." This is not the form in which beliefs or disbeliefs exist with ordinary minds: there has been no conscious examination—there is no capacity of explaining to others—there is no distinct setting out of primary truths assumed—nor have any pains been taken to look out for the relevant reasons on both sides, and weigh them impartially. Yet the beliefs nevertheless exist as established facts generated by traditional or other authority. They are sincere and often earnest, governing men's declarations and conduct. They represent a cause in which sentence has been pronounced, or a rule made absolute, without having previously heard the pleadings.[1]

Now it is the purpose of the philosopher, first to bring this omission of the pleadings into conscious notice—next to discover, evolve, and bring under hearing the matters omitted,

[1] Napoléon, qui de temps en temps, au milieu de sa fortune et de sa puissance, songeait à Robespierre et à sa triste fin—interrogeait un jour son archi-chancelier Cambacérès sur le neuf Thermidor. "*C'est un procès jugé et non plaidé*," répondait Cambacérès, avec la finesse d'un jurisconsulte courtisan.—(Hippolyte Carnot—Notice sur Barère, p. 109; Paris, 1842.)

as far as they suggest themselves to his individual reason. He claims for himself, and he ought to claim for all others alike, the right of calling for proof where others believe without proof—of rejecting the received doctrines, if upon examination the proof given appears to his mind unsound or insufficient —and of enforcing instead of them any others which impress themselves upon his mind as true. But the truth which he tenders for acceptance must of necessity be *reasoned truth;* supported by proofs, defended by adequate replies against preconsidered objections from others. Only hereby does it properly belong to the history of philosophy: hardly even hereby has any such novelty a chance of being fairly weighed and appreciated.

When we thus advert to the vocation of philosophy, we see that (to use the phrase of an acute modern author[1]) it is by necessity polemical: the assertion of independent reason by individual reasoners, who dissent from the unreasoning belief which reigns authoritative in the social atmosphere around them, and who recognise no correction or

[1] Professor Ferrier, in his instructive volume, 'The Institutes of Metaphysic,' has some valuable remarks on the scope and purpose of Philosophy. I transcribe some of them, in abridgment.

(Sections 1-8)—"A system of philosophy is bound by two main requisitions: it ought to be true—and it ought to be reasoned. Philosophy, in its ideal perfection, is a body of reasoned truth. Of these obligations, the latter is the more stringent. It is more proper that philosophy should be reasoned, than that it should be true: because, while truth may perhaps be unattainable by man, to reason is certainly his province and within his power. . . . A system is of the highest value only when it embraces both these requisitions—that is, when it is both true, and reasoned. But a system which is reasoned without being true, is always of higher value than a system which is true without being reasoned. The latter kind of system is of no value: because philosophy is the attainment of truth *by the way of reason.* That is its definition. A system, therefore, which reaches the truth but not by the way of reason, is not philosophy at all, and has therefore no scientific worth. Again, an unreasoned philosophy, even though true, carries no guarantee of its truth. It may be true, but it cannot be certain. On the other hand, a system, which is reasoned without being true, has always some value. It creates reason by exercising it. It is employing the proper means to reach truth, though it may fail to reach it." (Sections 38-41)—"The student will find that the system here submitted to his attention is of a very polemical character. Why! Because philosophy exists only to correct the inadvertencies of man's ordinary thinking. She has no other mission to fulfil. If man naturally thinks aright, he need not be taught to think aright. If he is already in possession of the truth, he does not require to be put in possession of it. The occupation of philosophy is gone: her office is superfluous. Therefore philosophy assumes

refutation except from the counter-reason of others. We see besides, that these dissenters from the public will also be, probably, more or less dissenters from each other. The process of philosophy may be differently performed by two enquirers equally free and sincere, even of the same age and country: and it is sure to be differently performed, if they belong to ages and countries widely apart. It is essentially relative to the individual reasoning mind, and to the medium by which the reasoner is surrounded. Philosophy herself has every thing to gain by such dissent; for it is only thereby that the weak and defective points of each point of view are likely to be exposed. If unanimity is not attained, at least each of the dissentients will better understand what he rejects as well as what he adopts.

The number of individual intellects, independent, inquisitive, and acute, is always rare everywhere; but was comparatively less rare in these ages of Greece. The first topic, on which such intellects broke loose from the common consciousness of the world around them, and struck out new points of view for themselves, was in reference to the Kosmos or the Universe. The received belief, of a multitude of unseen divine persons bringing about by volitions all the different phenomena of nature, became unsatisfactory to men like Thales, Anaximander, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras. Each of these volunteers, following his own independent inspirations, struck out a new hypothesis, and endeavoured

and must assume that man does not naturally think aright, but must be taught to do so: that truth does not come to him spontaneously, but must be brought to him by his own exertions. If man does not naturally think aright, he must think, we shall not say wrongly (for that implies malice prepense) but inadvertently: the native occupant of his mind must be, we shall not say falsehood (for that too implies malice prepense) but error. The original dowry then of universal man is inadvertency and error. This assumption is the ground and only justification of the existence of philosophy. The circumstance that philosophy exists only to put right the oversights of common thinking—renders her polemical not by choice, but by necessity. She is controversial as the very tenure and condition of her existence: for how can she correct the slips of common opinion, the oversights of natural thinking, except by controverting them?"

Professor Ferrier deserves high commendation for the care taken in this volume to set out clearly Proposition and Counter-Proposition: the thesis which he impugns, as well as that which he sustains.

to commend it to others with more or less of sustaining reason. There appears to have been little of negation or refutation in their procedure. None of them tried to disprove the received point of view, or to throw its supporters upon their defence. Each of them unfolded his own hypothesis, or his own version of affirmative reasoned truth, for the adoption of those with whom it might find favour.

The dialectic age had not yet arrived. When it did arrive, with Sokrates as its principal champion, the topics of philosophy were altered, and its process revolutionised. We have often heard repeated the Ciceronian dictum—that Sokrates brought philosophy down from the heavens to the earth: from the distant, abstruse, and complicated phenomena of the Kosmos—in respect to which he adhered to the vulgar point of view, and even disapproved any enquiries tending to rationalise it—to the familiar business of man, and the common generalities of ethics and politics. But what has been less observed about Sokrates, though not less true, is, that along with this change of topics he introduced a complete revolution in method. He placed the negative in the front of his procedure; giving to it a point, an emphasis, a substantive value, which no one had done before. His peculiar gift was that of cross-examination, or the application of his Elenchus to discriminate pretended from real knowledge. He found men full of confident beliefs on these ethical and political topics—affirming with words which they had never troubled themselves to define—and persuaded that they required no farther teaching: yet at the same time unable to give clear or consistent answers to his questions, and shown by this convincing test to be destitute of real knowledge. Declaring this false persuasion of knowledge, or confident unreasoned belief, to be universal, he undertook, as the mission of his life, to expose it: and he proclaimed that until the mind was disabused thereof and made pain-

fully conscious of ignorance, no affirmative reasoned truth could be presented with any chance of success.

Such are the peculiar features of the Sokratic dialogue, exemplified in the compositions here reviewed. I do not mean that Sokrates always talked so; but that such was the marked peculiarity which distinguished his talking from that of others. It is philosophy, or reasoned truth, approached in the most polemical manner; operative at first only to discredit the natural, unreasoned intellectual growths of the ordinary mind, and to generate a painful consciousness of ignorance. I say this here, and I shall often say it again throughout these volumes. It is absolutely indispensable to the understanding of the Platonic dialogues; one half of which must appear unmeaning, unless construed with reference to this separate function and value of negative dialectic. Whether readers may themselves agree in such estimation of negative dialectic, is another question: but they must keep it in mind as the governing sentiment of Plato during much of his life, and of Sokrates throughout the whole of life: as being moreover one main cause of that antipathy which Sokrates inspired to many respectable orthodox contemporaries. I have thought it right to take constant account of this orthodox sentiment among the ordinary public, as the perpetual drag-chain, even when its force is not absolutely repressive, upon free speculation.

Proceeding upon this general view, I have interpreted the numerous negative dialogues in Plato as being really negative and nothing beyond. I have not presumed, still less tried to divine, an ulterior affirmative beyond what the text reveals—neither *arcana cœlestia*, like Proklus and Ficinus,[1] nor any other *arcanum* of terrestrial character. While giving such an analysis of each dialogue as my space permitted and

[1] F. A. Wolf, Vorrede, Plato, Sympos. p. vi.

"Ficinus suchte, wie er sich in der Zueignungsschrift seiner Version ausdrückt, im Platon allenthalben *arcana coelestia*: und da er sie in seinem Kopfe mitbrachte, so konnte es ihm nicht sauer werden, etwas zu finden, was freilich jedem andern verborgen bleiben muss."

as will enable the reader to comprehend its general scope and peculiarities—I have studied each as it stands written, and have rarely ascribed to Plato any purpose exceeding what he himself intimates. Where I find difficulties forcibly dwelt upon without any solution, I imagine, not that he had a good solution kept back in his closet, but that he had failed in finding one: that he thought it useful, as a portion of the total process necessary for finding and authenticating reasoned truth, both to work out these unsolved difficulties for himself, and to force them impressively upon the attention of others.[1]

Moreover, I deal with each dialogue as a separate composition. Each represents the intellectual scope and impulse of a peculiar moment, which may or may not be in harmony with the rest. Plato would have protested not less earnestly than Cicero,[2] against those who sought to foreclose debate, in the grave and arduous struggles for searching out reasoned truth—and to bind down the free inspirations of his intellect in one dialogue, by appealing to sentence already pronounced

[1] A striking passage from Bentham illustrates very well both the Sokratic and the Platonic point of view. (Principles of Morals and Legislation, vol. ii. ch. xvi. p. 57, ed. 1823.)

"Gross ignorance descries no difficulties. Imperfect knowledge finds them out and struggles with them. It must be perfect knowledge that overcomes them."

Of the three different mental conditions here described, the first is that against which Sokrates made war, *i.e.* real ignorance, and false persuasion of knowledge, which therefore descries no difficulties.

The second, or imperfect knowledge struggling with difficulties, is represented by the Platonic negative dialogues.

The third—or perfect knowledge victorious over difficulties—will be found in the following pages marked by the character τὸ δύνασθαι λόγον διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι. You do not possess "perfect knowledge," until you are able to answer, with unfaltering promptitude and consistency, all the questions of a Sokratic cross-examiner—and to administer effectively the like cross-examination yourself, for the purpose of testing others. Ὅλως δὲ σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστιν. (Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 981, b. 8.)

Perfect knowledge, corresponding to this definition, will not be found manifested in Plato. Instead of it, we note in his latter years the lawgiver's assumed infallibility.

[2] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 11, 33.

The collocutor remarks that what Cicero says is inconsistent with what he (Cicero) had written in the fourth book De Finibus. To which Cicero replies:—

"Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum, et testificaris, quid dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. Cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus impositis disputant. Nos in diem vivimus: quodcunque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus: itaque soli sumus liberi."

in another preceding. Of two inconsistent trains of reasoning, both cannot indeed be true—but both are often useful to be known and studied: and the philosopher, who professes to master the theory of his subject, ought not to be a stranger to either. All minds athirst for reasoned truth will be greatly aided in forming their opinions by the number of points which Plato suggests, though they find little which he himself settles for them finally.

There have been various critics, who, on perceiving inconsistencies in Plato, either force them into harmony by a subtle exegêsis, or discard one of them as spurious.[1] I have not followed either course. I recognise such inconsistencies, when found, as facts—and even as very interesting facts—in his philosophical character. To the marked contradiction in the spirit of the Leges, as compared with the earlier Platonic compositions, I have called special attention. Plato has been called by Plutarch a mixture of Sokrates with Lykurgus. The two elements are in reality opposite, predominant at different times: Plato begins his career with the confessed ignorance and philosophical negative of Sokrates: he closes it with the peremptory, dictatorial, affirmative of Lykurgus.

To Xenophon, who belongs only in part to my present work, and whose character presents an interesting contrast with Plato, I have devoted a separate chapter. To the other less celebrated Sokratic Companions also, I have endeavoured to do justice, as far as the scanty means of knowledge permit:

[1] Since the publication of the first edition of this work, there have appeared valuable commentaries on the philosophy of the late Sir William Hamilton, by Mr. John Stuart Mill, and Mr. Stirling and others. They have exposed inconsistencies, both grave and numerous, in some parts of Sir William Hamilton's writings as compared with others. But no one has dreamt of drawing an inference from this fact, that one or other of the inconsistent trains of reasoning must be spurious, falsely ascribed to Sir William Hamilton.

Now in the case of Plato, this same fact of inconsistency is accepted by nearly all his commentators as a sound basis for the inference that both the inconsistent treatises cannot be genuine: though the dramatic character of Plato's writings makes inconsistencies much more easily supposable than in dogmatic treatises such as those of Hamilton.

to them, especially, because they have generally been misconceived and unduly depreciated.

The present volumes, however, contain only one half of the speculative activity of Hellas during the fourth century B.C. The second half, in which Aristotle is the hero, remains still wanting. If my health and energies continue, I hope one day to be able to supply this want: and thus to complete from my own point of view, the history, speculative as well as active, of the Hellenic race, down to the date which I prescribed to myself in the Preface of my History near twenty years ago.

The philosophy of the fourth century B.C. is peculiarly valuable and interesting, not merely from its intrinsic speculative worth—from the originality and grandeur of its two principal heroes—from its coincidence with the full display of dramatic, rhetorical, artistic genius—but also from a fourth reason not unimportant—because it is purely Hellenic; preceding the development of Alexandria, and the amalgamation of Oriental veins of thought with the inspirations of the Academy or the Lyceum. The Orontes[1] and the Jordan had not yet begun to flow westward, and to impart their own colour to the waters of Attica and Latium. Not merely the real world, but also the ideal world, present to the minds of Plato and Aristotle, were purely Hellenic. Even during the century immediately following, this had ceased to be fully true in respect to the philosophers of Athens: and it became less and less true with each succeeding century. New foreign centres of rhetoric and literature—Asiatic and Alexandrian Hellenism—were fostered into importance by regal encouragement. Plato and Aristotle are thus the special representatives of genuine Hellenic philosophy. The remarkable intellectual ascendancy acquired by them in their own day, and maintained over succeeding centuries, was

[1] Juvenal iii. 62:—
"Jampridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes," &c.

one main reason why the Hellenic vein was enabled so long to maintain itself, though in impoverished condition, against adverse influences from the East, ever increasing in force. Plato and Aristotle outlasted all their Pagan successors—successors at once less purely Hellenic and less highly gifted. And when Saint Jerome, near 750 years after the decease of Plato, commemorated with triumph the victory of unlettered Christians over the accomplishments and genius of Paganism—he illustrated the magnitude of the victory, by singling out Plato and Aristotle as the representatives of vanquished philosophy.[1]

[1] The passage is a remarkable one, as marking both the effect produced on a Latin scholar by Hebrew studies, and the neglect into which even the greatest writers of classical antiquity had then fallen (about 400 A.D.).

Hieronymus—Comment. in Epist. ad Galatas, iii. 5, p. 486-487, ed. Venet. 1769 :—

"Sed omnem sermonis elegantiam, et Latini sermonis venustatem, stridor lectionis Hebraicæ sordidavit. Nostis enim et ipsæ" (*i.e.* Paula and Eustochium, to whom his letter is addressed) "quod plus quam quindecim anni sunt, ex quo in manus meas nunquam Tullius, nunquam Maro, nunquam Gentilium literarum quilibet Auctor ascendit : et si quid forte inde, dum loquimur, obrepit, quasi antiqua per nebulam somnii recordamur. Quod autem profecerim ex linguæ illius infatigabili studio, aliorum judicio derelinquo : *ego quid in meâ amiserim, scio* . . . Si quis eloquentiam quærit vel declamationibus delectatur, habet in utrâque linguâ Demosthenem et Tullium, Polemonem et Quintilianum. Ecclesia Christi non de Academiâ et Lyceo, sed de vili plebeculâ congregata est. . . . Quotusquisque nunc Aristotelem legit? Quanti Platonis vel libros novêre vel nomen? Vix in angulis otiosi eos senes recolunt. Rusticanos vero et piscatores nostros totus orbis loquitur, universus mundus sonat."

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CHAPTER I.

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PLATO.

PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY IN GREECE, BEFORE AND IN THE TIME OF SOKRATES.

The life of Plato extends from 427-347 B.C. He was born in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, and he died at the age of 80, about the time when Olynthus was taken by the Macedonian Philip. The last years of his life thus witnessed a melancholy breach in the integrity of the Hellenic world, and even exhibited data from which a far-sighted Hellenic politician might have anticipated something like the coming subjugation, realised afterwards by the victory of Philip at Chæroneia. But during the first half of Plato's life, no such anticipations seemed even within the limits of possibility. The forces of Hellas, though discordant among themselves, were superabundant as to defensive efficacy, and were disposed rather to aggression against foreign enemies, especially against a country then so little formidable as Macedonia. It was under this contemplation of Hellas self-acting and self-sufficing—an aggregate of cities, each a political unit, yet held together by strong ties of race, language, religion, and common feelings of various kinds—that the mind of Plato was both formed and matured.

Change in the political condition of Greece during the life of Plato.

In appreciating, as far as our scanty evidence allows, the circumstances which determined his intellectual and speculative

character, I shall be compelled to touch briefly upon the various philosophical theories which were propounded anterior to Sokrates—as well as to repeat some matters already brought to view in the sixteenth, sixty-seventh, and sixty-eighth chapters of my History of Greece.

Early Greek mind, satisfied with the belief in polytheistic personal agents as the real producing causes of phenomena.

To us, as to Herodotus, in his day, the philosophical speculation of the Greeks begins with the theology and cosmology of Homer and Hesiod. The series of divine persons and attributes, and generations presented by these poets, and especially the Theogony of Hesiod, supplied at one time full satisfaction to the curiosity of the Greeks respecting the past history and present agencies of the world around them. In the emphatic censure bestowed by Herakleitus on the poets and philosophers who preceded him, as having much knowledge but no sense—he includes Hesiod, as well as Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hekatæus: upon Homer and Archilochus he is still more severe, declaring that they ought to be banished from the public festivals and scourged.[1] The sentiment of curiosity as it then existed was only secondary and derivative, arising out of some of the strong primary or personal sentiments—fear or hope, antipathy or sympathy,—impression of present weakness,—unsatisfied appetites and longings,—wonder and awe under the presence of the terror-striking phenomena of nature, &c. Under this state of the mind, when problems suggested themselves for solution, the answers afforded by Polytheism gave more satisfaction than could have been afforded by any other hypothesis. Among the indefinite multitude of invisible, personal, quasi-human, agents, with different attributes and dispositions, some one could be found to account for every perplexing phenomenon. The question asked was, not What are the antecedent conditions or causes of rain, thunder, or earthquakes, but Who rains and thunders? Who produces earthquakes?[2] The Hesiodic Greek was satisfied when informed that it was Zeus or Poseidon. To be told of physical agencies would have appeared to him not merely

[1] Diogen. Laert. ix. 1. Πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει· (οὐ φύει, ap. Proclum in Platon. Timæ. p. 31 F., p. 72, ed. Schneider), Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον· τόν θ' Ὅμηρον ἔφασκεν ἄξιον εἶναι ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι, καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον ὁμοίως.

[2] Aristophanes, Nubes, 368, Ἀλλὰ τίς ὕει; Herodot. vii. 129.

unsatisfactory, but absurd, ridiculous, and impious. It was the task of a poet like Hesiod to clothe this general polytheistic sentiment in suitable details: to describe the various Gods, Goddesses, Demigods, and other quasi-human agents, with their characteristic attributes, with illustrative adventures, and with sufficient relations of sympathy and subordination among each other, to connect them in men's imaginations as members of the same brotherhood. Okeanus, Gæa, Uranus, Helios, Selênê,—Zeus, Poseidon, Hades—Apollo and Artemis, Dionysus and Aphroditê—these and many other divine personal agents, were invoked as the producing and sustaining forces in nature, the past history of which was contained in their filiations or contests. Anterior to all of them, the primordial matter or person, was Chaos.

Hesiod represents the point of view ancient and popular (to use Aristotle's expression [1]) among the Greeks, from whence all their philosophical speculation took its departure; and which continued throughout their history, to underlie all the philosophical speculations, as the faith of the ordinary public who neither frequented the schools nor conversed with philosophers. While Aristophanes, speaking in the name of this popular faith, denounces and derides Sokrates as a searcher, alike foolish and irreligious, after astronomical and physical causes—Sokrates himself not only denies the truth of the allegation, but adopts as his own the sentiment which dictated it; proclaiming Anaxagoras and others to be culpable for prying into mysteries which the Gods intentionally kept hidden.[2] The repugnance felt by a numerous public, against scientific explanation—as eliminating the divine agents and substituting in their place irrational causes,[3]—was a permanent fact of which philosophers were always obliged to take account, and

Belief in such agency continued among the general public, even after the various sects of philosophy had arisen.

[1] Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 8, p. 989, a. 10. Φησὶ δέ καὶ Ἡσίοδος τὴν γῆν πρώτην γενέσθαι τῶν σωμάτων· οὕτως ἀρχαίαν καὶ δημοτικὴν συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν ὑπόληψιν.

Again, in the beginning of the second book of the Meteorologica, Aristotle contrasts the ancient and primitive theology with the "human wisdom" which grew up subsequently: Οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καὶ διατρίβοντες περὶ τὰς θεολογίας—οἱ σοφώτεροι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν (Meteor. ii. i. p. 353, a.).

[2] Xenophon, Memor. iv. 7, 5; i. 1, 11-15. Plato, Apolog. p. 26 E.

[3] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23. Οὐ γὰρ ἠνείχοντο τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τότε καλουμένους, ὡς εἰς αἰτίας ἀλόγους καὶ δυνάμεις ἀπρονοήτους καὶ κατηναγκασμένα πάθη διατρίβοντας τὸ θεῖον.

which modified the tone of their speculations without being powerful enough to repress them.

Thales, the first Greek who propounded the hypothesis of physical agency in place of personal. Water, the primordial substance, or ἀρχή.

Even in the sixth century B.C., when the habit of composing in prose was first introduced, Pherekydes and Akusilaus still continued in their prose the theogony, or mythical cosmogony, of Hesiod and the other old poets: while Epimenides and the Orphic poets put forth different theogonies, blended with mystical dogmas. It was, however, in the same century, and in the first half of it, that Thales, of Miletus (620-560 B.C.), set the example of a new vein of thought. Instead of the Homeric Okeanus, father of all things, Thales assumed the material substance, Water, as the primordial matter and the universal substratum of everything in nature. By various transmutations, all other substances were generated from water; all of them, when destroyed, returned into water. Like the old poets, Thales conceived the surface of the earth to be flat and round; but he did not, like them, regard it as stretching down to the depths of Tartarus: he supposed it to be flat and shallow, floating on the immensity of the watery expanse or Ocean.[1] This is the main feature of the Thaletian hypothesis, about which, however, its author seems to have left no writing. Aristotle says little about Thales, and that little in a tone of so much doubt,[2] that we can hardly confide in the opinions and discoveries ascribed to him by others.[3]

The next of the Ionic philosophers, and the first who pub-

[1] Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 3, p. 983, b. 21. De Cœlo, ii. 13, p. 294, a. 29. Θαλῆς, ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας, &c. Seneca, Natural. Quæst. vi. 6.

Pherekydes, Epimenides, &c., were contemporary with the earliest Ionic philosophers (Brandis, Handbuch der Gesch. der Gr.-Röm. Phil., s. 23).

According to Plutarch (Aquæ et Ignis Comparatio, p. 955, init.), most persons believed that Hesiod, by the word Chaos, meant Water. Zeno the Stoic adopted this interpretation (Schol. Apollon. Rhod. i. 498). On the other hand, Bacchylides the poet, and after him Zenodotus, called Air by the name Chaos (Schol. Hesiod. Theogon. p. 392, Gaisf.). Hermann considers that the Hesiodic Chaos means empty space (see note, Brandis, Handb. d. Gesch. d. Gr.-Röm. Phil., vol. i., p. 71).

[2] See two passages in Aristotle De Animâ, i. 2, and i. 5.

[3] Cicero says (De Naturâ Deorum, i. 10), "Thales—aquam dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aquâ cuncta fingeret." That the latter half of this Ciceronian statement, respecting the doctrines of Thales, is at least unfounded, and probably erroneous, is recognised by Preller, Brandis, and Zeller. Preller, Histor. Philos. Græc. ex Fontium Locis Contexta, sect. 15; Brandis, Handbuch der Gr.-R. Philos. sect. 31, p. 118; Zeller, Die Philos. der Griechen, vol. i., p. 151, ed. 2.

It is stated by Herodotus that Thales foretold the year of the memorable solar

lished his opinions in writing, was Anaximander, of Miletus, the countryman and younger contemporary of Thales (570-520 B.C.). He too searched for an Ἀρχή, a primordial Something or principle, self-existent and comprehending in its own nature a generative, motive, or transmutative force. Not thinking that water, or any other known and definite substance fulfilled these conditions, he adopted as the foundation of his hypothesis a substance which he called the Infinite or Indeterminate. Under this name he conceived Body simply, without any positive or determinate properties, yet including the fundamental contraries, Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, &c., in a potential or latent state, including farther a self-changing and self-developing force,[1] and being moreover immortal and indestructible.[2] By this inherent force, and by the evolution of one or more of these dormant contrary qualities, were generated the various definite substances of nature—Air, Fire, Water, &c. But every determinate substance thus generated was, after a certain time, destroyed and resolved again into the Indeterminate mass. "From thence all substances proceed, and into this they relapse: each in its turn thus making atonement to the others, and suffering the penalty of injustice."[3] Anaximander conceived separate existence (determinate and particular existence, apart from the indeterminate and universal) as an unjust privilege, not to be tolerated

Anaximander—laid down as ἀρχή the Infinite or indeterminate—generation of the elements out of it, by evolution of latent fundamental contraries—astronomical and geological doctrines.

eclipse which happened during the battle between the Medes and the Lydians (Herod. i. 74). This eclipse seems to have occurred in B.C. 585, according to the best recent astronomical enquiries by Professor Airy.

[1] See Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. i. p. 157, seq., ed. 2nd.

Anaximander conceived τὸ ἄπειρον as *infinite matter*; the Pythagoreans and Plato conceived it as a distinct nature by itself—as a subject, not as a predicate (Aristotel. Physic. iii. 4, p. 203, a. 2).

About these fundamental contraries, Aristotle says (Physic. i. 4, init.): οἱ δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐνούσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐκκρίνεσθαι, ὥσπερ Ἀναξίμανδρός φησι. Which Simplikius explains, ἐναντιότητές εἰσι, θερμὸν, ψυχρὸν, ξηρὸν, ὑγρὸν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι, &c.

Compare also Schleiermacher, "Ueber Anaximandros," in his Vermischte Schriften, vol. ii. p. 178, seq. Deutinger (Gesch. der Philos. vol. i. p. 165, Regensb. 1852) maintains that this ἔκκρισις of contraries is at variance with the hypothesis of Anaximander, and has been erroneously ascribed to him. But the testimony is sufficiently good to outweigh this suspicion.

[2] Anaximander spoke of his ἄπειρον as ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον (Aristotel. Physic. iii. 4, 7, p. 203, b. 15).

[3] Simplikius ad Aristotel. Physic. fol. 6 a. apud Preller, Histor. Philos. Græco-Rom. § 57, ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταὐτὰ γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ τίσιν καὶ δίκην ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. Simplikius remarks upon the poetical character of this phraseology, ποιητικωτέροις ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων.

except for a time, and requiring atonement even for that. As this process of alternate generation and destruction was unceasing, so nothing less than an Infinite could supply material for it. Earth, Water, Air, Fire, having been generated, the two former, being cold and heavy, remained at the bottom, while the two latter ascended. Fire formed the exterior circle, encompassing the air like bark round a tree : this peripheral fire was broken up and aggregated into separate masses, composing the sun, moon, and stars. The sphere of the fixed stars was nearest to the earth : that of the moon next above it : that of the sun highest of all. The sun and moon were circular bodies twenty-eight times larger than the earth : but the visible part of them was only an opening in the centre, through which[1] the fire or light behind was seen. All these spheres revolved round the earth, which was at first semi-fluid or mud, but became dry and solid through the heat of the sun. It was in shape like the section of a cylinder, with a depth equal to one-third of its breadth or horizontal surface, on which men and animals live. It was in the centre of the Kosmos; it remained stationary because of its equal distance from all parts of the outer revolving spheres ; there was no cause determining it to move upward rather than downward or sideways, therefore it remained still.[2] Its exhalations nourished the fire in the peripheral regions of the Kosmos. Animals were produced from the primitive muddy fluid of the earth : first, fishes and other lower animals—next, in process of time man, when circumstances permitted his development.[3] We

[1] Origen. Philosophumen. p. 11, ed. Miller; Plutarch ap. Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8, xv. 23-46-47 ; Stobæus Eclog. i. p. 510. Anaximander supposed that eclipses of the sun and moon were caused by the occasional closing of these apertures (Euseb. xv. 50-51). The part of the sun visible to us was, in his opinion, not smaller than the earth, and of the purest fire (Diog. Lært. ii. 1).

Eudêmus, in his history of astronomy, mentioned Anaximander as the first who had discussed the magnitudes and distances of the celestial bodies (Simplikius ad Aristot. De Cœlo, ap. Schol. Brand. p. 497, a. 12).

[2] Aristotel. Meteorol. ii. 2, p. 355, a. 21, which is referred by Alexander of Aphrodisias to Anaximander ; also De Cœlo, ii. 13, p. 295, b. 12.

A doctrine somewhat like it is ascribed even to Thales. See Alexander's Commentary on Aristotel. Metaphys. i. p. 983, b. 17.

The reason here assigned by Anaximander why the Earth remained still, is the earliest example in Greek philosophy of that fallacy called the principle of the Sufficient Reason, so well analysed and elucidated by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, book v., ch. 3, sect. 5.

The remarks which Aristotle himself makes upon it are also very interesting, when he cites the opinion of Anaximander. Compare Plato, Phædon, p. 109, c. 132, with the citations in Wyttenbach's note.

[3] Plutarch, Placit. Philos. v. 19.

learn farther respecting the doctrines of Anaximander, that he proposed physical explanations of thunder, lightning, and other meteorological phenomena :[1] memorable as the earliest attempt of speculation in that department, at a time when such events inspired the strongest religious awe, and were regarded as the most especial manifestations of purposes of the Gods. He is said also to have been the first who tried to represent the surface and divisions of the earth on a brazen plate, the earliest rudiment of a map or chart.[2]

Anaximenes—adopted Air as ἀρχή—rise of substances out of it, by condensation and rarefaction.

The third physical philosopher produced by Miletus, seemingly before the time of her terrible disasters suffered from the Persians after the Ionic revolt between 500-494 B.C., was Anaximenes, who struck out a third hypothesis. He assumed, as the primordial substance, and as the source of all generation or transmutation, Air, eternal in duration, infinite in extent. He thus returned to the principle of the Thaletian theory, selecting for his beginning a known substance, though not the same substance as Thales. To explain how generation of new products was possible (as Anaximander had tried to explain by his theory of evolution of latent contraries), Anaximenes adverted to the facts of condensation and rarefaction, which he connected respectively with cold and heat.[3] The Infinite Air, possessing and exercising an inherent generative and developing power, perpetually in motion, passing from dense to rare or from rare to dense, became in its utmost rarefaction, Fire and Æther ; when passing through successive stages of increased condensation it became first cloud, next water, then earth, and, lastly, in its

[1] Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iii. 3 ; Seneca, Quæst. Nat. ii. 18-19.

[2] Strabo, i. p. 7. Diogenes Laertius (ii. 1) states that Anaximander affirmed the figure of the earth to be spherical ; and Dr. Whewell, in his History of the Inductive Sciences, follows his statement. But Schleiermacher (Ueber Anaximandros, vol. ii. p. 204 of his Sämmtliche Werke) and Gruppe (Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen, p. 38) contest this assertion, and prefer that of Plutarch (ap. Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8, Placit. Philos. iii. 10), which I have adopted in the text. It is to be remembered that Diogenes himself, in another place (ix. 3, 21), affirms Parmenides to have been the first who propounded the spherical figure of the earth. See the facts upon this subject collected and discussed in the instructive dissertation of L. Oettinger, Die Vorstellungen der Griechen und Römer ueber die Erde als Himmelskörper, p. 38 ; Freiburg, 1850.

[3] Origen. Philosophumen. c. 7 ; Simplikius in Aristot. Physic. f. 32; Brandis, Handb. d. Gesch. d. Gr.-R. Phil. p. 144.

Cicero, Academic. ii. 37, 118. "Anaximenes infinitum aera, sed ea, quæ ex eo orirentur, definita."

The comic poet Philemon introduced in one of his dramas, of which a short fragment is preserved (Frag. 2, Mei-

utmost density, stone.[1] Surrounding, embracing, and pervading the Kosmos, it also embodied and carried with it a vital principle, which animals obtained from it by inspiration, and which they lost as soon as they ceased to breathe.[2] Anaximenes included in his treatise (which was written in a clear Ionic dialect) many speculations on astronomy and meteorology, differing widely from those of Anaximander. He conceived the Earth as a broad, flat, round plate, resting on the air.[3] Earth, Sun, and Moon were in his view condensed air, the Sun acquiring heat by the extreme and incessant velocity with which he moved. The Heaven was not an entire hollow sphere encompassing the Earth below as well as above, but a hemisphere covering the Earth above, and revolving laterally round it like a cap round the head.[4]

The general principle of cosmogony, involved in the hypothesis of these three Milesians—one primordial substance or Something endued with motive and transmutative force, so as to generate all the variety of products, each successive and transient, which our senses witness—was taken up with more or less modification by others, especially by Diogenes of Apollonia, of whom I shall speak presently. But there were three other men who struck out different veins of thought—Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Herakleitus: the two former seemingly contemporary with Anaximenes (550-490 B.C.), the latter somewhat later.

Pythagoras—his life and career—Pythagorean brotherhood, great political influence

Of Pythagoras I have spoken at some length in the thirty-seventh chapter of my History of Greece. Speculative originality was only one among many remarkable features in his character. He was an inquisitive traveller, a religious reformer or innovator, and the founder of a powerful and active brotherhood, partly ascetic, partly political, which stands without parallel in Grecian history. The immortality of the soul, with its transmigration (metempsychosis) after death into other bodies, either

neke, p. 840), the omnipresent and omniscient Air, to deliver the prologue:

—— οὗτός εἰμ' ἐγὼ
Ἀήρ, ὃν ἄν τις ὀνομάσειε καὶ Δία.
ἐγὼ δ', ὃ θεοῦ 'στιν ἔργον, εἰμὶ πανταχοῦ—
πάντ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οἶδα, πανταχοῦ παρών.

[1] Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, p. 947; Plutarch, ap. Euseb. P. E. i. 8.

[2] Plutarch, Placit. Philosophor. i. 3, p. 878.

[3] Aristotel. De Cœlo, ii. 13; Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iii. 10, p. 895.

[4] Origen. Philosophum. p. 12, ed. Miller: ὡσπερεὶ περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν κεφαλὴν στρέφεται τὸ πιλίον.

of men or of other animals—the universal kindred thus recognised between men and other animals, and the prohibition which he founded thereupon against the use of animals for food or sacrifice—are among his most remarkable doctrines: said to have been borrowed (together with various ceremonial observances) from the Egyptians.[1] After acquiring much celebrity in his native island of Samos and throughout Ionia, Pythagoras emigrated (seemingly about 530 B.C.) to Kroton and Metapontum in Lower Italy, where the Pythagorean brotherhood gradually acquired great political ascendancy: and from whence it even extended itself in like manner over the neighbouring Greco-Italian cities. At length it excited so much political antipathy among the body of the citizens,[2] that its rule was violently put down, and its members dispersed about 509 B.C. Pythagoras died at Metapontum.

which it acquired among the Greco-Italian cities—incurred great enmity, and was violently put down.

Though thus stripped of power, however, the Pythagoreans still maintained themselves for several generations as a social, religious, and philosophical brotherhood. They continued and extended the vein of speculation first opened by the founder himself. So little of proclaimed individuality was there among them, that Aristotle, in criticising their doctrine, alludes to them usually under the collective name Pythagoreans. Epicharmus, in his comedies at Syracuse (470 B.C.) gave occasional utterance to various doctrines of the sect; but the earliest of them who is known to have composed a book, was Philolaus,[3] the contemporary of Sokrates. Most of the opinions ascribed to the Pythagoreans originated probably among the successors of Pythagoras; but the basis and principle upon which they proceed seems undoubtedly his.

The Pythagoreans continue as a recluse sect, without political power.

The problem of physical philosophy, as then conceived, was

[1] Herodot. ii. 81; Isokrates, Busirid. Encom. s. 28.

[2] Polybius, ii. 39; Porphyry, Vit Pythag. 54, seq.

[3] Diogen. Laert. viii. 7-15-78-85.

Some passages of Aristotle, however, indicate divergences of doctrine among the Pythagoreans themselves (Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, a. 22). He probably speaks of the Pythagoreans of his own time when dialectical discussion had modified the original orthodoxy of the order. Compare Gruppe, Ueber die Fragmente des Archytas, cap. 5, p. 61-63. About the gradual development of the Pythagorean doctrine, see Brandis, Handbuch der Gr.-R. Philos. s. 74, 75.

Doctrine of the Pythagoreans—Number the Essence of Things.

to find some primordial and fundamental nature, by and out of which the sensible universe was built up and produced; something which co-existed always underlying it, supplying fresh matter and force for generation of successive products. The hypotheses of Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, to solve this problem, have been already noticed: Pythagoras solved it by saying, That the essence of things consisted in Number. By this he did not mean simply that all things were numerable, or that number belonged to them as a predicate. Numbers were not merely predicates inseparable from subjects, but subjects in themselves: substances or magnitudes, endowed with active force, and establishing the fundamental essences or types according to which things were constituted. About water,[1] air, or fire, Pythagoras said nothing.[2] He conceived that sensible phenomena had greater resemblance to numbers than to any one of these substrata assigned by the Ionic philosophers. Number was (in his doctrine) the self-existent reality—the fundamental material and in-dwelling force pervading the universe. Numbers were not separate from things[3] (like the Platonic Ideas), but *fundamenta* of things—their essences or determining principles: they were moreover conceived as having magnitude and active force.[4] In the movements of the celestial bodies, in works of human art, in musical harmony—measure and number are the producing and directing agencies. According to the Pythagorean Philolaus, "the Dekad, the full and perfect number, was of supreme and universal efficacy as the guide and principle of life, both to the

[1] Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 985, b. 27. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ἐδόκουν θεωρεῖν ὁμοιώματα πολλὰ τοῖς οὖσι καὶ γιγνομένοις, μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν πυρὶ καὶ γῇ καὶ ὕδατι, &c. Cf. N. 3, p. 1090, a. 21.

[2] Aristotel. Metaph. A 9, p. 990, a. 16. Διὸ περὶ πυρὸς ἢ γῆς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν εἰρήκασιν, &c. (the Pythagoreans); also N. 3.

[3] Physic. iii. 4, p. 203, a. 6. Οὐ γὰρ χωριστὸν ποιοῦσι (the Pythagoreans) τὸν ἀριθμόν, &c. Metaphys. M. 6, p. 1080, b. 19: τὰς μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν μέγεθος. M. 8, p. 1083, b. 17: ἐκεῖνοι (the Pythagoreans) τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ὄντα λέγουσιν· τὰ γοῦν θεωρήματα προσάπτουσι τοῖς σώμασιν ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνων ὄντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν.

[4] An analogous application of this principle (Number as the fundamental substance and universal primary agent) may be seen in an eminent physical philosopher of the nineteenth century, Oken's Elements of Physio-Philosophy, translated by Tulk. Aphorism 57:—"While numbers in a mathematical sense are positions and negations of nothing, in the philosophical sense they are positions and negations of the Eternal. Every thing which is real, posited, finite, has become this, out of numbers; or more strictly speaking, every Real is absolutely nothing else than a number. This must be the sense entertained of numbers in the Pythagorean doctrine

Kosmos and to man. The nature of number was imperative and lawgiving, affording the only solution of all that was perplexing or unknown; without number all would be indeterminate and unknowable."[1]

The first principle or beginning of Number, was the One or Monas—which the Pythagoreans conceived as including both the two fundamental contraries—the Determining and the Indeterminate.[2] All particular numbers, and through them all things, were compounded from the harmonious junction and admixture of these two fundamental contraries.[3] All numbers being either odd or even, the odd numbers were considered as analogous to the Determining, the even numbers to the Indeterminate. In One or the Monad, the Odd and Even were supposed to be both contained, not yet separated: Two was the first indeterminate even number; Three, the first odd and the first determinate number, because it included beginning, middle, and end. The sum of the first four numbers—One,

The Monas —Ἀρχή, or principle of Number— geometrical conception of number— symbolical attributes of the first ten numbers, especially of the Dekad.

—namely, that every thing, or the whole universe, had arisen from numbers. This is not to be taken in a merely quantitative sense, as it has hitherto been erroneously; but in an intrinsic sense, as implying that all things are numbers themselves, or the acts of the Eternal. The essence in numbers is nought else than the Eternal. The Eternal only is or exists, and nothing else is when a number exists. There is therefore nothing real but the Eternal itself; for every Real, or every thing that is, is only a number and only exists by virtue of a number."

Ibid., Aphorism 105-107:—"Arithmetic is the science of the second idea, or that of time or motion, or life. It is therefore the first science. Mathematics not only begin with it, but creation also, with the becoming of time and of life. Arithmetic is, accordingly, the truly absolute or divine science; and therefore every thing in it is also directly certain, because every thing in it resembles the Divine. Theology is arithmetic personified."——"A natural thing is nothing but a self-moving number. An organic or living thing is a number moving itself out of itself or spontaneously: an inorganic thing, however, is a number moved by another thing: now as this other thing is also a real number, so then is every inorganic thing a number moved by another number, and so on *ad infinitum*. The movements in nature are only movements of numbers by numbers: even as arithmetical computation is none other than a movement of numbers by numbers; but with this difference—that in the latter, this operates in an ideal manner, in the former after a real."

[1] Philolaus, ed. Boeckh, p. 139, seqq. Θεωρεῖν δεῖ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰν ἐσσίαν (οὐσίαν) τῶ ἀριθμῶ καττὰν δύναμιν, ἅτις ἐντὶ ἐν τᾷ δεκάδι· μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελὴς καὶ παντοεργὸς καὶ θείω καὶ οὐρανίω βίω καὶ ἀνθρωπίνω ἀρχὰ καὶ ἀγεμὼν . . . ἄνευ δὲ ταύτας πάντα ἄπειρα καὶ ἄδηλα καὶ ἀφανῆ· νομικὰ γὰρ ἁ φύσις τῶ ἀριθμῶ καὶ ἀγεμονικὰ καὶ διδασκαλικὰ τῶ ἀπορουμένω παντὸς καὶ ἀγνοουμένω παντί. Compare the Fr. p. 58, of the same work.

According to Plato, as well as the Pythagoreans, number extended to ten, and not higher: all above ten were multiples and increments of ten. (Aristot. Physic. iii. 6, p. 203, b. 30).

[2] See the instructive explanations of Boeckh, in his work on the Fragments of Philolaus, p. 54 seq.

[3] Philolaus, Fr., p. 62, Boeckh.—Diogen. L. viii. 7, 85.

By ἁρμονία, Philolaus meant the

Two, Three, Four = Ten (1 + 2 + 3 + 4) was the most perfect number of all.[1] To these numbers, one, two, three, four, were understood as corresponding the fundamental conceptions of Geometry—Point, Line, Plane, Solid. *Five* represented colour and visible appearance: *Six*, the phenomenon of Life: *Seven*, Health, Light, Intelligence, &c.: *Eight*, Love or Friendship.[2] Man, Horse, Justice and Injustice, had their representative numbers: that corresponding to Justice was a square number, as giving equal for equal.[3]

Pythagorean Kosmos and Astronomy—geometrical and harmonic laws guiding the movements of the cosmical bodies.

The Pythagoreans conceived the Kosmos, or the universe, as one single system, generated out of numbers.[4] Of this system the central point—the determining or limiting One—was first in order of time, and in order of philosophical conception. By the determining influence of this central constituted One, portions of the surrounding Infinite were successively attracted and brought into system: numbers, geometrical figures, solid substances, were generated. But as the Kosmos thus constituted was composed of numbers, there could be no continuum: each numerical unit was distinct and separated from the rest by a portion of vacant space, which was imbibed, by a sort of inhalation, from the infinite space or spirit without.

musical octave: and his work included many explanations and comparisons respecting the intervals of the musical scale. (Boeckh, p. 65 seq.)

[1] Aristotel. De Cœlo, i. 1, p. 268, a. 10. *καθάπερ γάρ φασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρίσιν ὥρισται τελευτὴ γὰρ καὶ μέσον καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχει τὸν τοῦ παντὸς, ταῦτα δὲ τὸν τῆς τριάδος. Διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰληφότες ὥσπερ νόμους ἐκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀγιστείας χρώμεθα τῶν θεῶν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ* (i. e. three). It is remarkable that Aristotle here adopts and sanctions, in regard to the number Three, the mystic and fanciful attributes ascribed by the Pythagoreans.

[2] Strümpell, Geschichte der theoretischen Philosophie der Griechen, s. 78. Brandis, Handbuch der Gr.-Röm. Phil., sect. 80, p. 467 seq.

The number Five also signified marriage, because it was a junction of the first masculine number Three with the first feminine Two. Seven signified also *καιρὸς* or Right Season. See Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 985, b. 26, and M. 4, p. 1078, b. 23, compared with the commentary of Alexander on the former passage.

[3] Aristotel. Ethica Magna, i. 1.

[4] Aristot. Metaph. M. 6, p. 1080, b. 18. *τὸν γὰρ ὅλον οὐρανον κατασκευάζουσιν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν.* Compare p. 1075, b. 37, with the Scholia.

A poet calls the tetraktys (consecrated as the sum total of the first four numbers 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10) *πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώματ' ἔχουσαν.* Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. 94.

[5] Philolaus, ed. Boeckh, p. 91-95. *τὸ πρᾶτον ἁρμοσθὲν, τὸ ἓν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τῆς σφαίρας ἑστία καλεῖται—βωμὸν τε καὶ συνοχὴν καὶ μέτρον φύσεως—πρῶτον εἶναι φύσει τὸ μέσον.*

Aristot. Metaph. N. 3, p. 1091, a. 15. *φανερῶς γὰρ λέγουσιν* (the Pythagoreans) *ὡς τοῦ ἑνὸς συσταθέντος—εὐθὺς τὸ ἔγγιστα τοῦ ἀπείρου ὅτι εἴλκετο καὶ ἐπεραίνετο ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος.*

Aristot. Physic. iv. 6, p. 213, b. 21.

The central point was fire, called by the Pythagoreans the Hearth of the Universe (like the public hearth or perpetual fire maintained in the prytaneum of a Grecian city), or the watch-tower of Zeus. Around it revolved, from West to East, ten divine bodies, with unequal velocities, but in symmetrical movement or regular dance.[1] Outermost was the circle of the fixed stars, called by the Pythagoreans Olympus, and composed of fire like the centre. Within this came successively,—with orbits more and more approximating to the centre,—the five planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury: next, the Sun, the Moon, and the Earth. Lastly, between the Earth and the central fire, an hypothetical body, called the Antichthon or Counter-Earth, was imagined for the purpose of making up a total represented by the sacred number Ten, the symbol of perfection and totality. The Antichthon was analogous to a separated half of the Earth; simultaneous with the Earth in its revolutions, and corresponding with it on the opposite side of the central fire.

The inhabited portion of the Earth was supposed to be that which was turned away from the central fire and towards the Sun, from which it received light. But the Sun itself was not self-luminous: it was conceived as a glassy disk, receiving and concentrating light from the central fire, and reflecting it upon the Earth, so long as the two were on the same side of the central fire. The Earth revolved, in an orbit obliquely intersecting that of the Sun, and in twenty-four hours, round the central fire, always turning the same side towards that fire. The alternation of day and night was occasioned by the Earth being during a part of such revolution on the same side of the central fire with the Sun, and thus receiving light reflected from him: and during the remaining part of her revolution on the side opposite to him, so that she received no light at all from him. The Earth, with the Antichthon, made this revolution in one day: the Moon, in

Εἶναι δ' ἔφασαν καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι κενόν, καὶ ἐπεισιέναι αὐτὸ τῷ οὐράνῳ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου πνεύματος, ὡς ἀναπνέοντι· καὶ τὸ κενόν, ὃ διορίζει τὰς φύσεις, ὡς ὄντος τοῦ κενοῦ χωρισμοῦ τινος τῶν ἐφεξῆς καὶ τῆς διορίσεως, καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς· τὸ γὰρ κενὸν διορίζειν τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν. Stobæus (Eclog. Phys. i. 18, p. 381, Heer.) states the same, referring to the lost work of Aristotle on the Pythagorean philosophy.

Compare Preller, Histor. Philos. Gr. ex Font. Loc. Context., sect. 114-115.

[1] Philolaus, p. 94. Boeckh. περὶ δὲ τοῦτο δέκα σώματα θεῖα χορεύειν, &c. Aristot. De Cœlo, ii. 13. Metaphys. A. 5.

one month:[1] the Sun, with the planets, Mercury and Venus, in one year: the planets, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, in longer periods respectively, according to their distances from the centre: lastly, the outermost circle of the fixed stars (the Olympus, or the Aplanes), in some unknown period of very long duration.[2]

Music of the Spheres.

The revolutions of such grand bodies could not take place, in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, without producing a loud and powerful sound; and as their distances from the central fire were supposed to be arranged in musical ratios,[3] so the result of all these separate sounds was full and perfect harmony. To the objection—Why were not these sounds heard by us?—they replied, that we had heard them constantly and without intermission from the hour of our birth; hence they had become imperceptible by habit.[4]

Ten was, in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, the perfection

[1] The Pythagoreans supposed that eclipses of the moon took place, sometimes by the interposition of the earth, sometimes by that of the Antichthon, to intercept from the moon the light of the sun (Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. 27, p. 560. Heeren). Stobæus here cites the history (ἱστορίαν) of the Pythagorean philosophy by Aristotle, and the statement of Philippus of Opus, the friend of Plato.

[2] Aristot. de Cœlo, ii. 13. Respecting this Pythagorean cosmical system, the elucidations of Boeckh are clear and valuable. Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon, Berlin, 1852, p. 99-102; completing those which he had before given in his edition of the fragments of Philolaus.

Martin (in his Études sur le Timée de Platon, vol. ii. p. 107) and Gruppe (Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen, ch. iv.) maintain that the original system proposed by Pythagoras was a geocentric system, afterwards transformed by Philolaus and other Pythagoreans into that which stands in the text. But I agree with Boeckh (Ueber das Kosmische System des Platon, p. 89 seqq.), and with Zeller (Phil. d. Griech., vol. i. p. 308, ed. 2), that this point is not made out. That which Martin and Gruppe (on the authority of Alexander Polyhistor, Diog. viii. 25, and others) consider to be a description of the original Pythagorean system as it stood before Philolaus, is more probably a subsequent transformation of it; introduced after the time of Aristotle, in order to suit later astronomical views.

[3] Playfair observes (in his dissertation on the Progress of Natural Philosophy, p. 87) respecting Kepler—"Kepler was perhaps the first person who conceived that there must be always a law capable of being expressed by arithmetic or geometry, which connects such phenomena as have a physical dependence on each other". But this seems to be exactly the fundamental conception of the Pythagoreans: or rather a part of their fundamental conception, for they also considered their numbers as active forces bringing such law into reality. To illustrate the determination of the Pythagoreans to make up the number of Ten celestial bodies, I transcribe another passage from Playfair (p. 98). Huygens, having discovered one satellite of Saturn, "believed that there were no more, and that the number of the planets was now complete. The planets, primary and secondary, thus made up twelve—the double of six, the first of the perfect numbers."

[4] Aristot. De Cœlo, ii. 9; Pliny, H.N. ii. 20.

See the Pythagorean system fully set forth by Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, vol. i. p. 302-310, ed. 2nd.

and consummation of number. The numbers from One to Ten were all that they recognised as primary, original, generative. Numbers greater than ten were compounds and derivatives from the decad. They employed this perfect number not only as a basis on which to erect a bold astronomical hypothesis, but also as a sum total for their list of contraries. Many Hellenic philosophers[1] recognised pairs of opposing attributes as pervading nature, and as the fundamental categories to which the actual varieties of the sensible world might be reduced. While others laid down Hot and Cold, Wet and Dry, as the fundamental contraries, the Pythagoreans adopted a list of ten pairs. 1. Limit and Unlimited; 2. Odd and Even; 3. One and Many; 4. Right and Left; 5. Male and Female; 6. Rest and Motion; 7. Straight and Curve; 8. Light and Darkness; 9. Good and Evil; 10. Square and Oblong.[2] Of these ten pairs, five belong to arithmetic or to geometry, one to mechanics, one to physics, and three to anthropology or ethics. Good and Evil, Regularity and Irregularity, were recognised as alike primordial and indestructible.[3]

Pythagorean list of fundamental Contraries—Ten opposing pairs.

The arithmetical and geometrical view of nature, to which such exclusive supremacy is here given by the Pythagoreans, is one of the most interesting features of Grecian philosophy. They were the earliest cultivators of mathematical science,[4] and are to be recognised as having paved the way for Euclid and Archimedes, notwithstanding the symbolical and mystical fancies

[1] Aristot. Metaphys. Γ. 2, p. 1004, b. 30. *τὰ δ' ὄντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἐξ ἐναντίων σχεδὸν ἅπαντες συγκεῖσθαι.*

[2] Aristot. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, a. 22. He goes on to say that Alkmæon, a semi-Pythagorean and a younger contemporary of Pythagoras himself, while agreeing in the general principle that "human affairs were generally in pairs," (*εἶναι δύο τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων*), laid down pairs of fundamental contraries at random (*τὰς ἐναντιότητας τὰς τυχούσας*)—black and white, sweet and bitter, good and evil, great and little. All that you can extract from these philosophers is (continues Aristotle) the general axiom, that "contraries are the principia of existing things"—*ὅτι τἀνάντια ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων.*

This axiom is to be noted as occupying a great place in the minds of the Greek philosophers.

[3] Theophrast. Metaphys. 9. Probably the recognition of one dominant antithesis—Τὸ Ἕν—ἡ ἀόριστος Δυάς—is the form given by Plato to the Pythagorean doctrine. Eudorus (in Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. fol. 39) seems to blend the two together.

[4] Aristot. Metaph. A. 5, p. 985, b. 23. *οἱ Πυθαγορεῖοι τῶν μαθημάτων ἁψάμενοι πρῶτοι ταῦτα προήγαγον, καὶ ἐντραφέντες ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰς τούτων ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὰς ᾠήθησαν εἶναι πάντων.*

with which they so largely perverted what are now regarded as the clearest and most rigorous processes of the human intellect. The important theorem which forms the forty-seventh Proposition of Euclid's first book, is affirmed to have been discovered by Pythagoras himself: but how much progress was made by him and his followers in the legitimate province of arithmetic and geometry, as well as in the applications of these sciences to harmonics,[1] which they seem to have diligently cultivated, we have not sufficient information to determine with certainty.

Eleatic Philosophy —Xenophanes.

Contemporary with Pythagoras, and like him an emigrant from Ionia to Italy, was Xenophanes of Kolophon. He settled at the Phokæan colony of Elea, on the Gulf of Poseidonia; his life was very long, but his period of eminence appears to belong (as far as we can make out amidst conflicting testimony) to the last thirty years of the sixth century B.C. (530-500 B.C.). He was thus contemporary with Anaximander and Anaximenes, as well as with Pythagoras, the last of whom he may have personally known.[2] He composed, and recited in person, poems—epic, elegiac, and iambic—of which a very few fragments remain.

His censures upon the received Theogony and religious rites.

Xenophanes takes his point of departure, not from Thales or Anaximander, but from the same ancient theogonies which they had forsaken. But he follows a very different road. The most prominent feature in his poems (so far as they remain), is the directness and asperity with which he attacks the received opinions respecting the Gods—and the poets Hesiod and Homer, the popular exponents of those opinions. Xenophanes not only condemns these poets for having ascribed to the Gods discreditable exploits, but even calls in question the existence of the Gods, and ridicules the anthropomorphic conception which pervaded the Hellenic faith. "If horses or lions could paint, they would delineate their Gods in form like themselves. The Ethiopians conceive their Gods as black, the Thracians conceive theirs as fair and with reddish hair."[3] Dissatisfied with much of the

[1] Concerning the Pythagorean doctrines on Harmonics, see Boeckh's Philolaus, p. 60-84, with his copious and learned comments.

[2] Karsten. Xenophanis Fragm., s. 4, p. 9, 10.

[3] Xenophanis Fragm. 5-6-7, p. 39 seq. ed. Karsten; Clemens Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 601; vii. p. 711.

customary worship and festivals, Xenophanes repudiated divination altogether, and condemned the extravagant respect shown to victors in Olympic contests,[1] not less than the lugubrious ceremonies in honour of Leukothea. He discountenanced all Theogony, or assertion of the birth of Gods, as impious, and as inconsistent with the prominent attribute of immortality ascribed to them.[2] He maintained that there was but one God, identical with, or a personification of, the whole Uranus. "The whole Kosmos, or the whole God, sees, hears, and thinks." The divine nature (he said) did not admit of the conception of separate persons one governing the other, or of want and imperfection in any way.[3]

His doctrine of Pankosmism, or Pantheism —The whole Kosmos is Ens Unum or God—Ἓν καὶ Πᾶν. Non-Ens inadmissible.

Though Xenophanes thus appears (like Pythagoras) mainly as a religious dogmatist, yet theogony and cosmogony were so intimately connected in the sixth century B.C., that he at the same time struck out a new philosophical theory. His negation of theogony was tantamount to a negation of cosmogony. In substituting one God for many, he set aside all distinct agencies in the universe, to recognise only one agent, single, all-pervading, indivisible. He repudiated all genesis of new reality, all actual existence of parts, succession, change, beginning, end, etc., in reference to the universe, as well as in reference to God. "Wherever I turned my mind (he exclaimed) everything resolved itself into One and the same: all things existing came back always and everywhere into one similar and permanent nature."[4] The fundamental tenet of Xenophanes was partly religious, partly philosophical, Pantheism, or Pankosmism: looking upon the universe as one real all-comprehensive Ens, which he would not call either finite or infinite,

[1] Xenophan. Fragm. 19, p. 60, ed. Karsten; Cicero, Divinat. i. 3, 5.

[2] Xenophanis Fragment. 34-35, p. 85, ed. Karsten; Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii. 23; Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, b. 19.

[3] Xenoph. Frag. 1-2, p. 35.

Οὖλος ὁρᾷ, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δέ τ' ἀκούει.

Plutarch ap. Eusebium, Præp. Evang. i. 8; Diogen. Laert. ix. 19.

[4] Timon, fragment of the Silli ap. Sext. Empiric. Hypot. Pyrrh. i. 33, sect. 224.

ὅππη γὰρ ἐμὸν νόον εἰρύσαιμι,
εἰς ἓν ταὐτό τε πᾶν ἀνελύετο, πᾶν δὲ ὂν αἰεὶ
πάντῃ ἀνελκόμενον μίαν εἰς φύσιν ἴσταθ' ὁμοίαν.

Αἰεὶ here appears to be more conveniently construed with ἴσταθ', not (as Karsten construes it, p. 118) with ὄν.

It is fair to presume that these lines are a reproduction of the sentiments of Xenophanes, if not a literal transcript of his words.

either in motion or at rest.[1] Non-Ens he pronounced to be an absurdity—an inadmissible and unmeaning phrase.

Scepticism of Xenophanes—complaint of philosophy as unsatisfactory.

It was thus from Xenophanes that the doctrine of Pankosmism first obtained introduction into Greek philosophy, recognising nothing real except the universe as an indivisible and unchangeable whole. Such a creed was altogether at variance with common perception, which apprehends the universe as a plurality of substances, distinguishable, divisible, changeable, &c. And Xenophanes could not represent his One and All, which excluded all change, to be the substratum out of which phenomenal variety was generated—as Water, Air, the Infinite, had been represented by the Ionic philosophers. The sense of this contradiction, without knowing how to resolve it, appears to have occasioned the mournful complaints of irremediable doubt and uncertainty, preserved as fragments from his poems. "No man (he exclaims) knows clearly about the Gods or the universe: even if he speak what is perfectly true, he himself does not know it to be true: all is matter of opinion."[2]

Nevertheless while denying all real variety or division in the universe, Xenophanes did not deny the variety of human perceptions and beliefs. But he allowed them as facts belonging to man, not to the universe—as subjective or relative, not as objective or absolute. He even promulgated opinions of his own respecting many of the physical and cosmological subjects treated by the Ionic philosophers.

His conjectures on physics and astronomy.

Without attempting to define the figure of the Earth, he considered it to be of vast extent and of infinite depth;[3] including, in its interior cavities, prodigious reservoirs both of fire and water. He thought that it had at one time been covered with water, in proof of which he

[1] Theophrastus ap. Simplikium in Aristotel. Physic. f. 6, Karsten, p. 106; Arist. Met. A. 5, p. 986, b. 21: Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων ἐνίσας, ὁ γὰρ Παρμενίδης τούτου λέγεται μαθητής,—εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἓν εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν.

[2] Xenophan. Fragm. 14, p. 51, ed. Karsten.

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ γένετ' οὐδέ τις ἔσται
εἰδώς, ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

Compare the extract from the Silli of Timon in Sextus Empiricus—Pyrrhon. Hypot. i. 224; and the same author, adv. Mathemat. vii. 48-52.

[3] Aristot. De Cœlo, ii. 13.

noticed the numerous shells found inland and on mountain tops, together with the prints of various fish which he had observed in the quarries of Syracuse, in the island of Paros, and elsewhere. From these facts he inferred that the earth had once been covered with water, and even that it would again be so covered at some future time, to the destruction of animal and human life.[1] He supposed that the sun, moon, and stars were condensations of vapours exhaled from the Earth, collected into clouds, and alternately inflamed and extinguished.[2]

Parmenides continues the doctrine of Xenophanes—Ens Parmenideum, self-existent, eternal, unchangeable, extended,—Non-Ens, an unmeaning phrase.

Parmenides, of Elea, followed up and gave celebrity to the Xenophanean hypothesis in a poem, of which the striking exordium is yet preserved. The two veins of thought, which Xenophanes had recognised and lamented his inability to reconcile, were proclaimed by Parmenides as a sort of inherent contradiction in the human mind—Reason or Cogitation declaring one way, Sense (together with the remembrances and comparisons of sense) suggesting a faith altogether opposite. Dropping that controversy with the popular religion which had been raised by Xenophanes, Parmenides spoke of many different Gods or Goddesses, and insisted on the universe as one, without regarding it as one God. He distinguished Truth from matter of Opinion.[3] Truth was knowable only by pure mental contemplation or cogitation, the object of which was Ens or Being, the Real or Absolute: here the Cogitans and the Cogitatum were identical, one and the same.[4] Parmenides conceived Ens not simply as existent, but as

[1] Xenophan. Fragm. p. 178, ed. Karsten; Achilles Tatius, Εἰσαγωγὴ in Arat. Phænom. p. 128, τὰ κάτω δ' ἐς ἄπειρον ἱκάνει.

This inference from the shells and prints of fishes is very remarkable for so early a period. Compare Herodotus (ii. 12), who notices the fact, and draws the same inference, as to Lower Egypt: also Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. c. 40, p. 367; and Strabo, i. p. 49-50, from whom we learn that the Lydian historian Xanthus had made the like observation, and also the like inference, for himself. Straton of Lampsakus, Eratosthenes, and Strabo himself, approved what Xanthus said.

[2] Xenophanes Frag. p. 161 seq., ed. Karsten.

Compare Lucretius, v. 458.

"per rara foramina, terræ
Partibus erumpens primus se sustulit æther
Ignifer et multos secum levis abstulit ignis . . . .
Sic igitur tum se levis ac diffusilis æther
Corpore concreto circumdatus undique flexit: . . . .
Hunc exordia sunt solis lunæque secuta."

[3] Parmenides Frag. v. 29.

[4] Parm. Frag. v. 40, 52-56.

τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι.
Ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα,

self-existent, without beginning or end,[1] as extended, continuous, indivisible, and unchangeable. The Ens Parmenideum comprised the two notions of Extension and Duration:[2] it was something Enduring and Extended; Extension including both space, and matter so far forth as filling space. Neither the contrary of Ens (Non-Ens), nor anything intermediate between Ens and Non-Ens, could be conceived, or named, or reasoned about. Ens comprehended all that was Real, without beginning or end, without parts or difference, without motion or change, perfect and uniform like a well-turned sphere.[3]

In this subject Ens, with its few predicates, chiefly negative, consisted all that Parmenides called Truth. Everything else belonged to the region of Opinion, which embraced all that was phenomenal, relative, and transient: all that involved a reference to man's senses, apprehension, and appreciation, all the indefinite diversity of observed facts and inferences. Plurality, succession, change, motion, generation, destruction, division of parts, &c., belonged to this category. Parmenides did not deny that he and other men had perceptions and beliefs corresponding to these terms, but he denied their application to the Ens or the self-existent. We are conscious of succession, but the self-existent has no succession: we perceive change of colour and other sensible qualities, and change of place or motion, but Ens neither changes nor moves. We talk of things generated or destroyed—things coming into being or going out of being—but this phrase can have no application to the self-existent Ens, which *is* always and cannot properly be called either past or future.[4]

He recognises a region of opinion, phenomenal and relative, apart from Ens.

μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουὴν
καὶ γλῶσσαν· κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.

[1] Parm. Frag. v. 81.

αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν
ἐστὶν, ἀναρχον, ἄπαυστον, &c.

[2] Zeller (Die Philosophie der Griech., i. p. 403, ed. 2) maintains, in my opinion justly, that the Ens Parmenideum is conceived by its author as extended. Strümpell (Geschichte der theor. Phil. der Griech., s. 44) represents it as unextended: but this view seems not reconcilable with the remaining fragments.

[3] Parm. Frag. v. 102.

[4] Parmenid. Fr. v. 96.

—— ἐπεὶ τό γε μοῖρ' ἐπέδησεν
Οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθειν τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' εἶναι,
Ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο, πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐκὶ,
καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν, διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀμείβειν·

v. 75:—

Nothing is really generated or destroyed, but only in appearance to us, or relatively to our apprehension.[1] In like manner we perceive plurality of objects, and divide objects into parts. But Ens is essentially One, and cannot be divided.[2] Though you may divide a piece of matter you cannot divide the extension of which that matter forms part: you cannot (to use the expression of Hobbes[3]) pull asunder the first mile from the second, or the first hour from the second. The milestone, or the striking of the clock, serve as marks to assist you in making a mental division, and in considering or describing one hour and one mile apart from the next. This, however, is your own act, relative to yourself: there is no real division of extension into miles, or of duration into hours. You may consider the same space or time as one or as many, according to your convenience: as one hour or as sixty minutes, as one mile or eight furlongs. But all this is a process of your own mind and thoughts; another man may divide the same total in a way different from you. Your division noway modifies the reality without you, whatever that may be—the Extended and Enduring Ens—which remains still a continuous one, undivided and unchanged.

The Ens of Parmenides thus coincided mainly with that which (since Kant) has been called the Noumenon—the Thing in itself—the Absolute; or rather with that which, by a frequent illusion, passes for the absolute—no notice being taken of the cogitant and believing mind, as if cogitation and belief, *cogitata* and *credita*, would be had without it. By Ens was understood

Parmenidean ontology stands completely apart from phenomenology.

εἴ γε γένοιτ', οὐκ ἔστ' · οὐδ' εἴ πότε μέλλει ἔσεσθαι ·
τῶς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται, καὶ ἄπιστος ὄλεθρος.

[1] Aristotel. De Cœlo, iii. 1. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὅλως ἀνεῖλον γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν · οὐθὲν γὰρ οὔτε γίγνεσθαί φασιν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν · οἷον οἱ περὶ Μέλισσον καὶ Παρμενίδην, &c.

[2] Parm. Frag. v. 77.
Οὐδὲ διαίρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ὅμοιον,
οὐδέ τι τῇ μᾶλλον τό κεν εἴργοι μιν ξυνέχεσθαι,
οὐδέ τι χειρότερον · πᾶν δὲ πλέον ἐστὶν ἐόντος ·
τῷ ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστίν · ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.
Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, b. 29, with the Scholia, and Physic. i. 2, 3. Simplikius Comm. in Physic. Aristot. (apud Tennemann Geschichte der Philos. b. i. s. 4, vol. i. p. 170) πάντα γάρ φησι (Παρμενίδης) τὰ ὄντα, καθὸ ὄντα, ἓν ἐστίν. This chapter, in which Tennemann gives an account of the Eleatic philosophy, appears to me one of the best and most instructive in his work.

[3] "To make parts,—or to part or divide, Space or Time,—is nothing else but to consider one and another within the same: so that if any man divide

the remnant in his mind, after leaving out all that abstraction, as far as it had then been carried, could leave out. It was the minimum indispensable to the continuance of thought; you cannot think (Parmenides says) without thinking of Something, and that Something Extended and Enduring. Though he and others talk of this Something as an Absolute (*i.e.* apart from or independent of his own thinking mind), yet he also uses some juster language (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι), showing that it is really relative: that if the Cogitans implies a Cogitatum, the Cogitatum also implies no less its correlative Cogitans: and that though we may divide the two in words, we cannot divide them in fact. It is to be remarked that Parmenides distinguishes the Enduring or Continuous from the Transient or Successive, Duration from Succession (both of which are included in the meaning of the word Time), and that he considers Duration alone as belonging to Ens or the Absolute—to the region of Truth—setting it in opposition or antithesis to Succession, which he treats as relative and phenomenal. We have thus (with the Eleates) the first appearance of Ontology, the science of Being or Ens, in Grecian philosophy. Ens is everything, and everything is Ens. In the view of Parmenides, Ontology is not merely narrow, but incapable of enlargement or application; we shall find Plato and others trying to expand it into numerous imposing generalities.[1]

space or time, the diverse conceptions he has are more, by one, than the parts which he makes. For his first conception is of that which is to be divided—then, of some part of it—and again of some other part of it: and so forwards, as long as he goes in dividing. But it is to be noted, that here, by *division*, I do not mean the severing or pulling asunder of one space or time from another (for does any man think that one hemisphere may be separated from the other hemisphere, or the first hour from the second?), but *diversity of consideration:* so that division is not made by the operation of the hands, but of the mind."—Hobbes, First Grounds of Philosophy, chap. vii. 5, vol. i. p. 96, ed. Molesworth.

"Expansion and duration have this farther agreement, that though they are both considered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not separable one from another, not even in thought; though the parts of bodies from which we take our measure of the one—and the parts of motion, from which we take the measure of the other—may be interrupted or separated."—Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, book ii. ch. 15, s. 11.

In the Platonic Parmenides, p. 156 D., we find the remarkable conception of what he calls τὸ ἐξαίφνης, ἀτοπός τις φύσις—a break in the continuity of duration, an extra-temporal moment.

[1] Leibnitz says, Réponse à M. Foucher, p. 117, ed. Erdmann, "Comment seroit il possible qu'aucune chose existât, si l'être même, ipsum Esse, n'avoit l'existence? Mais bien au contraire ne pourrait on pas dire avec beaucoup plus de raison, qu'il n'y a que lui qui existe véritablement, les êtres particuliers n'ayant rien de permanent? Semper generantur, et nunquam sunt."

Apart from Ontology, Parmenides reckons all as belonging to human opinions. These were derived from the observations of sense (which he especially excludes from Ontology) with the comparisons, inferences, hypothesis, &c., founded thereupon: the phenomena of Nature generally.[1] He does not attempt (as Plato and Aristotle do after him) to make Ontology serve as a principle or beginning for anything beyond itself,[2] or as a premiss from which the knowledge of nature is to be deduced. He treats the two—Ontology and Phenomenology, to employ an Hegelian word—as radically disparate, and incapable of any legitimate union. Ens was essentially one and enduring: Nature was essentially multiform, successive, ever changing and moving relative to the observer, and different to observers at different times and places. Parmenides approached the study of Nature from its own start-

Parmenidean phenomenology—relative and variable.

[1] Karsten observes that the Parmenidean region of opinion comprised not merely the data of sense, but also the comparisons, generalisations, and notions, derived from sense.

"Δοξαστὸν et νοητὸν vocantur duo genera inter se diversa, quorum alterum complectitur res externas et fluxas, *notionesque quæ ex his ducuntur*—alterum res æternas et à conspectu remotas," &c. (Parm. Fragm. p. 148-149).

[2] Marbach (Lehrbuch der Gesch. der Philos., s. 71, not. 3), after pointing out the rude philosophical expression of the Parmenidean verses, has some just remarks upon the double aspect of philosophy as there proclaimed, and upon the recognition by Parmenides of that which he calls the "illegitimate" vein of enquiry along with the "legitimate."

"Learn from me (says Parmenides) the opinions of mortals, brought to your ears in the deceitful arrangement of my words. This is not philosophy (Marbach says): it is Physics. We recognise in modern times two perfectly distinct ways of contemplating Nature: the philosophical and the physical. Of these two, the second dwells in plurality, the first in unity: the first teaches everything as infallible truth, the second as multiplicity of different opinions. We ought not to ask why Parmenides, while recognising the fallibility of this second road of enquiry, nevertheless undertook to march in it,—any more than we can ask, Why does not modern philosophy render physics superfluous?"

The observation of Marbach is just and important, that the line of research which Parmenides treated as illegitimate and deceitful, but which he nevertheless entered upon, is the analogon of modern Physics. Parmenides (he says) indicated most truly the contrast and divergence between Ontology and Physics; but he ought to have gone farther, and shown how they could be reconciled and brought into harmony. This (Marbach affirms) was not even attempted, much less achieved, by Parmenides: but it was afterwards attempted by Plato, and achieved by Aristotle.

Marbach is right in saying that the reconciliation was attempted by Plato; but he is not right (I think) in saying that it was achieved by Aristotle—nor by any one since Aristotle. It is the merit of Parmenides to have brought out the two points of view as radically distinct, and to have seen that the phenomenal world, if explained at all, must be explained upon general principles of its own, raised out of its own data of facts—not by means of an illusory Absolute and Real. The subsequent philosophers, in so far as they hid and slurred over this distinction, appear to me to have receded rather than advanced.

ing point, the same as had been adopted by the Ionic philosophers—the data of sense, or certain agencies selected among them, and vaguely applied to explain the rest. Here he felt that he relinquished the full conviction, inseparable from his intellectual consciousness, with which he announced his few absolute truths respecting Ens and Non-Ens, and that he entered upon a process of mingled observation and conjecture, where there was great room for diversity of views between man and man.

Yet though thus passing from Truth to Opinions, from full certainty to comparative and irremediable uncertainty,[1] Parmenides does not consider all opinions as equally true or equally untrue. He announces an opinion of his own—what he thinks most probable or least improbable—respecting the structure and constitution of the Kosmos, and he announces it without the least reference to his own doctrines about Ens. He promises information respecting Earth, Water, Air, and the heavenly bodies, how they work, and how they came to be what they are.[2] He recognises two elementary principles or beginnings, one contrary to the other, but both of them positive—Light, comprehending the Hot, the Light, and the Rare—Darkness, comprehending the Cold, the Heavy, and the Dense.[3] These two elements, each endued with active and vital properties, were brought into junction and commixture by the

Parmenides recognises no truth, but more or less of probability, in phenomenal explanations.—His physical and astronomical conjectures.

[1] Parmen. Fr. v. 109.

ἐν τῷ σοὶ παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα
ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
μάνθανε, κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων.

[2] Parm. Frag. v. 132-142.

[3] Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 5, p. 987, a. 1) represents Parmenides as assimilating one of his phenomenal principles (Heat) to Ens, and the other (Cold) to Non-Ens. There is nothing in the fragments of Parmenides to justify this supposed analogy. Heat as well as Cold belongs to Non-Ens, not to Ens, in the Parmenidean doctrine. Moreover Cold or Dense is just as much a positive principle as Hot or Rare, in the view of Parmenides; it is the female to the male (Parm. Fragm. v. 129; comp. Karsten, p. 270). Aristotle conceives Ontology as a substratum for Phenomenology; and his criticisms on Parmenides imply (erroneously in my judgment) that Parmenides did the same. The remarks which Brucker makes both on Aristotle's criticism and on the Eleatic doctrine are in the main just, though the language is not very suitable.

Brucker, Hist. Philosoph., part ii. lib. ii. ch. xi. tom. 1, p. 1152-3, about Xenophanes:—"Ex iis enim quæ apud Aristotelem ex ejus mente contra motum disputantur, patet Xenophanem motûs notionem aliam quam quæ in physicis obtinet, sibi concepisse; et ad verum motum progressum a nonente ad ens ejusque existentiam requisivisse. Quo sensu notionis hujus semel admisso, sequebatur (cum illud impossibile sit, ut ex nihilo fiat aliquid) universum esse immobile, adeoque et partes ejus non ita moveri, ut ex statu nihili procederent ad statum existentiæ. Quibus admissis, de rerum tamen mutationibus disserere poterat,

influence of a Dea Genitalis analogous to Aphroditê,[1] with her first-born son Eros, a personage borrowed from the Hesiodic Theogony From hence sprang the other active forces of nature, personified under various names, and the various concentric circles or spheres of the Kosmos. Of those spheres, the outermost was a solid wall of fire—"flammantia mœnia mundi"—next under this the Æther, distributed into several circles of fire unequally bright and pure—then the circle called the Milky Way, which he regarded as composed of light or fire combined with denser materials—then the Sun and Moon, which were condensations of fire from the Milky Way—lastly, the Earth, which he placed in the centre of the Kosmos.[2] He is said to have been the first who pronounced the earth to be spherical, and even distributed it into two or five zones.[3] He regarded it as immovable, in consequence of its exact position in the centre. He considered the stars to be fed by exhalation from the Earth. Midway between the Earth and the outer flaming circle, he supposed that there dwelt a Goddess—Justice or Necessity—who regulated all the movements of the Kosmos, and maintained harmony between its different parts. He represented the human

quas non alterationes, generationes, et extinctiones, rerum naturalium, sed modificationes, esse putabat: hoc nomine indignas, eo quod rerum universi natura semper maneret immutabilis, soliusque materiæ æternum fluentis particulæ varie inter se modificarentur. Hâc ratione si Eleaticos priores explicemus de motu disserentes, rationem facile dabimus, quî de rebus physicis disserere et phenomena naturalia explicare, salvâ istâ hypothesi, potuerint. Quod tamen de iis negat Aristoteles, *conceptum motûs metaphysicum ad physicum transferens:* ut, more suo, Eleatico systemate corrupto, eò vehementius illud premeret."

[1] Parmenides, ap. Simplik. ad Aristot. Physic. fol. 9 a.

ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων Δαιμων, ἣ πάντα κυβερνᾷ, &c.

Plutarch, Amator, 13.

[2] See especially the remarkable passage from Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. 23. p. 482, cited in Karsten, Frag. Parm. p. 241, and Cicero, De Natur. Deor, i. 11, s. 28, with the Commentary of Krische, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie, viii. p. 98, seqq.

It is impossible to make out with any clearness the Kosmos and its generation as conceived by Parmenides. We cannot attain more than a general approximation to it.

[3] Diogen. Laert. ix. 21, viii. 48; Strabo, ii. p. 93 (on the authority of Poseidonius). Plutarch (Placit. Philos. iii. 11) and others ascribe to Parmenides the recognition not of five zones, but only of two. If it be true that Parmenides held this opinion about the figure of the earth, the fact is honourable to his acuteness; for Leukippus, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Diogenes the Apolloniate, and Demokritus, all thought the earth to be a flat, round surface, like a dish or a drum: Plato speaks about it in so confused a manner that his opinion cannot be made out: and Aristotle was the first who both affirmed and proved it to be spherical. The opinion had been propounded by some philosophers earlier than Anaxagoras, who controverted it. See the dissertation of L. Oettinger, Die Vorstellungen der Griechen über die Erde als Himmelskörper, Freiburg, 1850, p. 42-46.

race as having been brought into existence by the power of the sun,[1] and he seems to have gone into some detail respecting animal procreation, especially in reference to the birth of male and female offspring. He supposed that the human mind, as well as the human body, was compounded of a mixture of the two elemental influences, diffused throughout all Nature: that like was perceived and known by like: that thought and sensation were alike dependent upon the body, and upon the proportions of its elemental composition: that a certain limited knowledge was possessed by every object in Nature, animate or inanimate.[2]

Before we pass from Parmenides to his pupil and successor Zeno, who developed the negative and dialectic side of the Eleatic doctrine, it will be convenient to notice various other theories of the same century: first among them that of Herakleitus, who forms as it were the contrast and antithesis to Xenophanes and Parmenides.

Herakleitus of Ephesus, known throughout antiquity by the denomination of the Obscure, comes certainly after Pythagoras and Xenophanes and apparently before Parmenides. Of the two first he made special mention, in one of the sentences, alike brief and contemptuous, which have been preserved from his lost treatise:—"Much learning does not teach reason: otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hekatæus." In another passage Herakleitus spoke of the "extensive knowledge, cleverness, and wicked arts" of Pythagoras. He declared that Homer as well as Archilochus deserved to be scourged and expelled from the public festivals.[3] His thoughts were all embodied in one single treatise, which he is said to have deposited in the temple of the Ephesian Artemis. It was composed in a style most perplexing and difficult to understand, full of metaphor, symbolical illustration, and anti-

Herakleitus—his obscure style, impressive metaphors, confident and contemptuous dogmatism.

[1] Diogen. Laert. ix. 22.

[2] Parmen. Frag. v. 145; Theophrastus, De Sensu, Karsten, pp. 268, 270. Parmenides (according to Theophrastus) thought that the dead body, having lost its fiery element, had no perception of light, or heat, or sound; but that it had perception of darkness, cold, and silence—καὶ ὅλως δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἔχειν τινα γνῶσιν.

[3] Diogen. L. ix. 1. Πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεα καὶ Ἑκαταῖον, &c. Ib. viii. 1, 6. Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων, καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποίησεν ἑωυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην.

thesis: but this very circumstance imparted to it an air of poetical impressiveness and oracular profundity.[1] It exercised a powerful influence on the speculative minds of Greece, both in the Platonic age and subsequently: the Stoics especially both commented on it largely (though with many dissentient opinions among the commentators), and borrowed with partial modifications much of its doctrine.[2]

The expositors followed by Lucretius and Cicero conceived Herakleitus as having proclaimed Fire to be the universal and all-pervading element of nature;[3] as Thales had recognised water, and Anaximenes air. This interpretation was countenanced by some striking passages of Herakleitus: but when we put together all that remains from him, it appears that his main doctrine was not physical, but metaphysical or ontological: that the want of adequate general terms induced him to clothe it in a multitude of symbolical illustrations, among which fire was only one, though the most prominent and most significant.[4] Xenophanes and the Eleates had recognised, as the only objective reality, One extended Substance or absolute Ens, perpetual, infinite, indeterminate, incapable of change or modification. They denied the objective reality of motion, change, generation, and destruction—considering all these to be purely relative and phenomenal. Herakleitus on the contrary denied

Doctrine of Herakleitus—perpetual process of generation and destruction—everything flows, nothing stands—transition of the elements into each other backwards and forwards.

[1] Diogen. Laert. ix. 1-6. Theophrastus conceived that Herakleitus had left the work unfinished, from eccentricity of temperament (ὑπὸ μελαγχολίας). Of him, as of various others, it was imagined by some that his obscurity was intentional (Cicero, Nat. Deor. i. 26, 74, De Finib. 2, 5). The words of Lucretius about Herakleitus are remarkable (i. 641):—

Clarus ob obscuram linguam magis inter inanes
Quamde graves inter Græcos qui vera requirunt:
Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque
Inversis quæ sub verbis latitantia cernunt.

Even Aristotle complains of the difficulty of understanding Herakleitus, and even of determining the proper punctuation (Rhetoric, iii. 5).

[2] Cicero, Nat. Deor., iii. 14, 35.

[3] To some it appeared that Herakleitus hardly distinguished Fire from Air. Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. 127-129, ix. 360.

[4] Zeller's account of the philosophy of Herakleitus in the second edition of his Philosophie der Griechen, vol. i. p. 450-496, is instructive. Marbach also is useful (Gesch. der Phil. s. 46-49); and his (Hegelian) exposition of Herakleitus is further developed by Ferdinand Lassalle (Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen, published 1858). This last work is very copious and elaborate, throwing great light upon a subject essentially obscure and difficult.

everything in the nature of a permanent and perpetual substratum: he laid down nothing as permanent and perpetual except the process of change—the alternate sequence of generation and destruction, without beginning or end—generation and destruction being in fact coincident or identical, two sides of the same process, since the generation of one particular state was the destruction of its antecedent contrary. All reality consisted in the succession and transition, the coming and going, of these finite and particular states: what he conceived as the infinite and universal, was the continuous process of transition from one finite state to the next—the perpetual work of destruction and generation combined, which terminated one finite state in order to make room for a new and contrary state.

Variety of metaphors employed by Herakleitus, signifying the same general doctrine.

This endless process of transition, or ever-repeated act of generation and destruction in one, was represented by Herakleitus under a variety of metaphors and symbols—fire consuming its own fuel—a stream of water always flowing—opposite currents meeting and combating each other—the way from above downwards, and the way from below upwards, one and the same—war, contest, penal destiny or retributive justice, the law or decree of Zeus realising each finite condition of things and then destroying its own reality to make place for its contrary and successor. Particulars are successively generated and destroyed, none of them ever arriving at permanent existence:[1] the universal process of generation and destruction alone continues. There is no Esse, but a perpetual Fieri: a transition from Esse to Non-Esse, from Non-Esse to Esse, with an intermediate temporary halt between them: a ceaseless meeting and confluence of the stream of generation with the opposite stream of destruction: a rapid and instant succession, or rather coincidence and coal-

[1] **Plato, Kratylus, p. 402, and Theætet. p. 152, 153.**

Plutarch, De Ei apud Delphos, c. 18, p. 392. Ποταμῷ γὰρ οὔκ ἐστιν ἐμβῆναι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, οὐδὲ θνητῆς οὐσίας δὶς ἅψασθαι κατὰ ἕξιν· ἀλλ' ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς σκίδνησι καὶ πάλιν συνάγει, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ πάλιν οὐδὲ ὕστερον, ἀλλ' ἅμα συνίσταται καὶ ἀπολείπει, πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισι. Ὅθεν οὐδ' εἰς τὸ εἶναι περαίνει τὸ γιγνόμενον αὐτῆς, τῷ μηδέποτε λήγειν μηδ' ἵστασθαι τὴν γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ σπέρματος ἀεὶ μεταβάλλουσαν—τὰς πρώτας φθείρουσαν γενέσεις καὶ ἡλικίας ταῖς ἐπιγιγνομέναις.

Clemens Alex. Strom. v. 14, p. 711. Κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτ' ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν· ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα. Compare also Eusebius, Præpar. Evang. xiv. 3, 8; Diogen. L. ix. 8.

escence, of contraries. Living and dead, waking and sleeping, light and dark, come into one or come round into each other: everything twists round into its contrary: everything both is and is not.[1]

The universal law, destiny, or divine working (according to Herakleitus), consists in this incessant process of generation and destruction, this alternation of contraries. To carry out such law fully, each of the particular manifestations ought to appear and pass away instantaneously—to have no duration of its own, but to be supplanted by its contrary at once. And this happens to a great degree, even in cases where it does not appear to happen: the river appears unchanged, though the water which we touched a short time ago has flowed away:[2] we and all around us are in rapid movement, though we appear stationary: the apparent sameness and fixity is thus a delusion. But Herakleitus does not seem to have thought that his absolute universal force was omnipotent, or accurately carried out in respect to all particulars. Some positive and particular manifestations, when once brought to pass, had a certain measure of fixity, maintaining themselves for more or less time before they were destroyed. There was a difference between one particular and another, in this respect of comparative durability: one was more durable, another less.[3] But according to the universal law or destiny, each particular ought simply to make its appearance, then to be supplanted and re-absorbed; so that the time during which it continued on the scene was, as it were, an unjust usurpation, obtained by en-

Nothing permanent except the law of process and implication of contraries—the transmutative force. Fixity of particulars is an illusion for the most part: so far as it exists, it is a sin against the order of Nature.

[1] Plato, Sophist. p. 242 E. *Διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἀεὶ ξυμφέρεται.*

Plutarch. Consolat. ad Apollonium c. 10, p. 106. *Πότε γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος; καὶ ᾗ φησιν Ἡράκλειτος, ταὐτό τ' ἐνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός, καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι, κἀκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα.*

Pseudo-Origenes, Refut. Hær. ix. 10. *Ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη, εὐφρόνη—χείμων, θέρος—πόλεμος, εἰρήνη—κόρος, λιμός, &c.*

[2] Aristot. De Cœlo, iii. 1, p. 298, b. 30; Physic. viii. 3, p. 253, b. 9. *Φασί τινες κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀεὶ, ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν τοῦτο τὴν ἡμετέραν αἴσθησιν*—which words doubtless refer to Herakleitus. See Preller, Hist. Phil. Græc. Rom. s. 47.

[3] Lassalle, Philosophie des Herakleitos, vol. i. pp. 54, 55. "Andrerseits bieten die sinnlichen Existenzen *graduelle* oder *Mass-Unterschiede* dar, je nachdem in ihnen das Moment des festen Seins über die Unruhe des Werdens vorwiegt oder nicht; und diese Graduation wird also zugleich den Leitfaden zur Classification der verschiedenen Existenz-formen bilden."

croaching on the equal right of the next comer, and by suspending the negative agency of the universal. Hence arises an antithesis or hostility between the universal law or process on one side, and the persistence of particular states on the other. The universal law or process is generative and destructive, positive and negative, both in one: but the particular realities in which it manifests itself are all positive, each succeeding to its antecedent, and each striving to maintain itself against the negativity or destructive interference of the universal process. Each particular reality represented rest and fixity: each held ground as long as it could against the pressure of the cosmical force, essentially moving, destroying, and renovating. Herakleitus condemns such pretensions of particular states to separate stability, inasmuch as it keeps back the legitimate action of the universal force, in the work of destruction and renovation.

Illustrations by which Herakleitus symbolized his perpetual force, destroying and generating.

The theory of Herakleitus thus recognised no permanent substratum, or Ens, either material or immaterial—no category either of substance or quality—but only a ceaseless principle of movement or change, generation and destruction, position and negation, immediately succeeding, or coinciding with each other.[1] It is this principle or everlasting force which he denotes under so many illustrative phrases—"the common (τὸ ξυνὸν),

[1] Aristot. De Cœlo, iii. 1, p. 298, b. 30. Οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαί τέ φασι καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐδέν, ἓν δέ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν· ὅπερ ἐοίκασιν βούλεσθαι λέγειν ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος. See the explanation given of this passage by Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 21, 39, 40, founded on the comment of Simplikius. He explains it as an universal law or ideal force—die reine Idee des Werdens selbst (p. 24), and "eine unsinnliche Potenz" (p. 25). Yet, in i. p. 55 of his elaborate exposition, he does indeed say, about the theory of Herakleitus, "Hier sind zum erstenmale die sinnlichen Bestimmtheiten zu bloss verschiedenen und absolut in einander übergehenden Formen eines identischen, ihnen zu Grunde liegenden, *Substrats* herabgesetzt". But this last expression appears to me to contradict the whole tenor and peculiarity of Lassalle's own explanation of the Herakleitean theory. He insists almost in every page (compare ii. p. 156) that "das Allgemeine" of Herakleitus is "reines Werden; reiner, steter, erzeugender, Prozess". This process cannot with any propriety be called a *substratum*, and Herakleitus admitted no other. In thus rejecting any substratum he stood alone. Lassalle has been careful in showing that Fire was not understood by Herakleitus as a substratum (as water by Thales), but as a symbol for the universal force or law. In the theory of Herakleitus no substratum was recognised—no τόδε τι or οὐσία—in the same way as Aristotle observes about τὸ ἄπειρον (Physic. iii. 6, a. 22-31) ὥστε τὸ ἄπειρον οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν ὡς τόδε τι, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἢ οἰκίαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ἡμέρα λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἀγών, οἷς τὸ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς οὐσία τις γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐν γενέσει ἢ φθορᾷ, εἰ καὶ πεπερασμένον, ἀλλ' ἀεί γε ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον.

the universal, the all-comprehensive (*τὸ περιέχον*), the governing, the divine, the name or reason of Zeus, fire, the current of opposites, strife or war, destiny, justice, equitable measure, Time or the Succeeding," &c. The most emphatic way in which this theory could be presented was, as embodied, in the coincidence or co-affirmation of contraries. Many of the dicta cited and preserved out of Herakleitus are of this paradoxical tenor.[1] Other dicta simply affirm perpetual flow, change, or transition, without express allusion to contraries: which latter, however, though not expressed, must be understood, since change was conceived as a change from one contrary to the other.[2] In the Herakleitean idea, contrary forces come simultaneously into action: destruction and generation always take effect together: there is no negative without a positive, nor positive without a negative.[3]

Such was the metaphysical or logical foundation of the philosophy of Herakleitus: the idea of an eternal process of change, manifesting itself in the perpetual destruction and renovation of particular realities, but having itself no reality apart from these particulars, and existing only in them as an immanent principle or condition. This principle, from the want of appropriate abstract terms, he expressed in a variety of symbolical and metaphorical

Water—intermediate between Fire (Air) and Earth

[1] Aristotle or Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo, c. 5, p. 396, b. 20. *Ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῷ σκοτεινῷ λεγόμενον Ἡρακλειτῷ: "συνάψειας οὖλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὖλα, συμφερόμενον καὶ διαφερόμενον, συνᾷδον καὶ διᾷδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα."* Heraclid. Allegor. ap. Schleiermacher (Herakleitos, p. 529), *ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰμέν*: Plato, Sophist. p. 242, E., *διαφέρομενον ἀεὶ ξυμφέρεται*: Aristotle, Metaphys. iii. 7, p. 1012, b. 24, *ἔοικε δ' ὁ μὲν Ἡρακλείτου λόγος, λέγων πάντα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἅπαντα ἀληθῆ ποιεῖν*: Aristot. Topic. viii. 5, p. 155, b., *οἷον ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι ταὐτὸν, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν*: also Aristot. Physic. i. 2, p. 185, b. Compare the various Herakleitean phrases cited in Pseudo-Origen. Refut. Hæres. Fragm. ix. 10; also Krische, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie, vol. i. p. 370-468.

Bernays and Lassalle (vol. i. p. 81) contend, on reasonable grounds (though in opposition to Zeller, p. 495), that the following verses in the Fragments of Parmenides refer to Herakleitus:

οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόμισται
κοὐ ταὐτὸν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.

The commentary of Alexander Aphrodis. on the Metaphysica says, "Heraclitus ergo cum diceret omnem rem esse et non esse et opposita simul consistere, contradictionem veram simul esse statuebat, et omnia dicebat esse vera" (Lassalle, p. 83).

One of the metaphors by which Herakleitus illustrated his theory of opposite and co-existent forces, was the pulling and pushing of two sawyers with the same saw. See Bernays, Heraclitea, part i. p. 16; Bonn, 1848.

[2] Aristot. Physic. viii. 3, p. 253, b. 30, *εἰς τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις*: also iii. 5, p. 205, a. 6, *πάντα γὰρ μεταβάλλει ἐξ ἐναντίου εἰς ἐναντίον, οἷον ἐκ θερμοῦ εἰς ψυχρόν.*

[3] Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. i. p. 323.

phrases, among which Fire stood prominent.[1] But though Fire was thus often used to denote the principle or ideal process itself, the same word was also employed to denote that one of the elements which formed the most immediate manifestation of the principle. In this latter sense, Fire was the first stage of incipient reality: the second stage was water, the third earth. This progression, fire, water, earth, was in Herakleitean language "the road downwards," which was the same as "the road upwards," from earth to water and again to fire. The death of fire was its transition into water: that of water was its transition partly into earth, partly into flame. As fire was the type of extreme mobility, perpetual generation and destruction—so earth was the type of fixed and stationary existence, resisting movement or change as much as possible.[2] Water was intermediate between the two.

Sun and Stars—not solid bodies, but meteoric aggregations dissipated and renewed—Eclipses—*ἐκπύρωσις*, or destructions of the Kosmos by fire.

Herakleitus conceived the sun and stars, not as solid bodies, but as meteoric aggregations perpetually dissipated and perpetually renewed or fed, by exhalation upward from the water and earth. The sun became extinguished and rekindled in suitable measure and proportion, under the watch of the Erinnyes, the satellites of Justice. These celestial lights were contained in troughs, the open side of which was turned towards our vision. In case of eclipses the trough was for the time reversed, so that the dark side was turned towards us; and the different phases of the moon were occasioned by the gradual turning round of the trough in which

[1] See a striking passage cited from Gregory of Nyssa by Lassalle (vol. i. p. 287), illustrating this characteristic of fire; the flame of a lamp appears to continue the same, but it is only a succession of flaming particles, each of which takes fire and is extinguished in the same instant:—*ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς θρυαλλίδος πῦρ τῷ μὲν δοκεῖν ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται—τὸ γὰρ συνεχὲς ἀεὶ τῆς κινήσεως ἀδιάσπαστον αὐτὸ καὶ ἠνωμένον πρὸς ἑαυτὸ δείκνυσι—τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ πάντοτε αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ διαδεχόμενον, οὐδέποτε τὸ αὐτὸ μένει—ἡ γὰρ ἐξελκυσθεῖσα διὰ τῆς θερμότητος ἰκμὰς ὁμοῦ τε ἐξεφλογώθη καὶ εἰς λιγνὺν ἐκκαυθεῖσα μετεποιήθη*, &c.

[2] Diogen. Laert. ix. 9; Clemens Alexand. Strom. v. 14, p. 599, vi. 2, p. 624. *Πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα, θαλάττης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ γῆ, τὸ δ' ἥμισυ πρηστήρ.* A full explanation of the curious expression *πρηστήρ* is given by Lassalle (Herakl. vol. ii. p. 87-90). See Brandis (Handbuch der Gr. Philos. sect. xliii. p. 164), and Plutarch (De Primo Frigido, c. 17, p. 952, F.).

The distinction made by Herakleitus, but not clearly marked out or preserved, between the *ideal fire* or universal process, and the *elementary fire* or first stage towards realisation, is brought out by Lassalle (Herakleitos, vol. ii. p. 25-29).

her light was contained. Of the phenomena of thunder and lightning also, Herakleitus offered some explanation, referring them to aggregations and conflagrations of the clouds, and violent currents of winds.[1] Another hypothesis was often ascribed to Herakleitus, and was really embraced by several of the Stoics in later times—that there would come a time when all existing things would be destroyed by fire (*ἐκπύρωσις*), and afterwards again brought into reality in a fresh series of changes. But this hypothesis appears to have been conceived by him metaphysically rather than physically. Fire was not intended to designate the physical process of combustion, but was a symbolical phrase for the universal process; the perpetual agency of conjoint destruction and renovation, manifesting itself in the putting forth and re-absorption of particulars, and having no other reality except as immanent in these particulars.[2] The determinate Kosmos of the present moment is perpetually destroyed, passing into fire or the indeterminate: it is perpetually renovated or passes out of fire into water, earth—out of the indeterminate, into the various determinate modifications. At the same time, though Herakleitus seems to have mainly employed these symbols for the purpose of signifying or typifying a metaphysical conception, yet there was no clear apprehension, even in his own mind, of this generality, apart from all symbols: so that the illustration came to count as a physical fact by itself, and has been so understood by many.[3] The line between what he meant as the ideal or metaphysical process, and the elementary or physical process, is not easy to draw, in the fragments which now remain.

[1] Aristot. Meteorol. ii. e. p. 355, a. Plato, Republ. vi. p. 498, c. 11; Plutarch, De Exilio, c. 11, p. 604 A.; Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. c. 48, p. 370, E.; Diogen. L. ix. 10; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 17-22-24-28, p. 889-891; Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. p. 594.

About the doctrine of the Stoics, built in part upon this of Herakleitus, see Cicero, Natur. Deor. ii. 46; Seneca, Quæst. Natur. ii. 5, vi. 16.

[2] Aristot. or Pseudo-Aristot., De Mundo, *ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.*

[3] See Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. ii. s. 26-27, p. 182-258.

Compare about the obscure and debated meaning of the Herakleitean *ἐκπύρωσις*, Schleiermacher, Herakleitos, p. 103; Zeller, Philos. der Griech. vol. i. p. 477-479.

The word *διακόσμησις* stands as the antithesis (in the language of Herakleitus) to *ἐκπύρωσις*. A passage from Philo Judæus is cited by Lassalle illustrating the Herakleitean movement from ideal unity into totality of sensible particulars, forwards and backwards—*ὁ δὲ γονορρυὴς* (λόγος) *ἐκ κόσμου πάντα καὶ εἰς κόσμον ἀνάγων, ὑπὸ θεοῦ δὲ μηδὲν οἰόμενος, Ἡρακλειτείου δόξης ἑταῖρος, κόρον καὶ χρησμοσύνην, καὶ ἓν τὸ πᾶν καὶ πάντα ἀμοιβῇ*

His doctrines respecting the human soul and human knowledge. All wisdom resided in the Universal Reason—individual Reason is worthless.

The like blending of metaphysics and physics—of the abstract and notional with the concrete and sensible—is to be found in the statements remaining from Herakleitus respecting the human soul and human knowledge. The human soul, according to him, was an effluence or outlying portion of the Universal[1]—the fire—the perpetual movement or life of things. As such, its nature was to be ever in movement: but it was imprisoned and obstructed by the body, which represented the stationary, the fixed, the particular—that which resisted the universal force of change. So long as a man lived, his soul or mind, though thus confined, participated more or less in the universal movement: but when he died, his body ceased to participate in it, and became therefore vile, "fit only to be cast out like dung". Every man, individually considered, was irrational;[2] reason belonged only to the universal or the whole, with which the mind of each living man was in conjunction, renewing itself by perpetual absorption, inspiration or inhalation, vaporous transition, impressions through the senses and the pores, &c. During sleep, since all the media of communication, except only those through respiration, were suspended, the mind became stupefied and destitute of memory. Like coals when the fire is withdrawn, it lost its heat and tended towards extinction.[3] On waking, it recovered its full communication with the great source of intelligence without—the universal all-comprehensive process of life and movement. Still, though this was

εἰσάγων—where *κόρος* and *χρησμοσύνη* are used to illustrate the same ideal antithesis as *διακόσμησις* and *ἐκπύρωσις* (Lassalle, vol. i. p. 232).

[1] Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. vii. 130. *ἡ ἐπιξενωθεῖσα τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῖρα.*

Plutarch, Sympos., p. 644. *νεκύες κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι.*

Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i. 23, p. 884. *Ἡράκλειτος ἠρεμίαν καὶ στάσιν ἐκ τῶν ὅλων ἀνῄρει· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν νεκρῶν.*

[2] See Schleiermacher, Herakleitos, p. 522; Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem. viii. 286.

[3] The passage of Sextus Empiricus (adv. Mathem. vii. 127-134) is curious and instructive about Herakleitus.

Ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ φυσικῷ (Herakleitus) *το περιέχον ἡμᾶς λογικόν τε ὂν καὶ φρενῆρες—τοῦτον δὴ τὸν θεῖον λόγον, καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, δι' ἀναπνοῆς σπάσαντες νοεροὶ γινόμεθα, καὶ ἐν μὲν ὕπνοις ληθαῖοι, κατὰ δὲ ἔγερσιν πάλιν ἔμφρονες. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνοις μυσάντων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων χωρίζεται τῆς πρὸς τὸ περιέχον συμφυΐας ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς, μονῆς τῆς κατὰ ἀναπνοὴν προσφύσεως σωζομένης οἱονεί τινος ῥίζης, χωρισθείς τε ἀποβάλλει ἣν πρότερον εἶχε μνημονικὴν δύναμιν. ἐν δὲ ἐγρηγορόσι πάλιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων ὥσπερ διὰ τινῶν θυρίδων προκύψας καὶ τῷ περιέχοντι συμβάλλων λογικὴν ἐνδύεται δύναμιν.* Then follows the simile about coals brought near to, or removed away from, the fire.

The Stoic version of this Herakleitean doctrine, is to be seen in Marcus Antoninus, viii. 54. *Μηκέτι μόνον*

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the one and only source of intelligence open to all waking men, the greater number of men could neither discern it for themselves, nor understand it without difficulty even when pointed out to them. Though awake, they were not less unconscious or forgetful of the process going on around them, than if they had been asleep.[1] The eyes and ears of men with barbarous or stupid souls, gave them false information.[2] They went wrong by following their own individual impression or judgment: they lived as if reason or intelligence belonged to each man individually. But the only way to attain truth was, to abjure all separate reason, and to follow the common or universal reason. Each man's mind must become identified and familiar with that common process which directed and transformed the whole: in so far as he did this, he attained truth: whenever he followed any private or separate judgment of his own, he fell into error.[3] The highest pitch of this severance of the individual judgment was seen during sleep, at which time each man left the common world to retire into a world of his own.[4]

By this denunciation of the mischief of private judgment, Herakleitus did not mean to say that a man ought to think like his neighbours or like the public. In his view the public were wrong, collectively as well as

By Universal Reason, he did not mean the

συμπνεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ συμφρονεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοερῷ. Οὐ γὰρ ἧττον ἡ νοερὰ δύναμις πάντη κέχυται καὶ διαπεφοίτηκε τῷ σπᾶσαι βουλομένῳ, ἥπερ ἡ ἀερώδης τῷ ἀναπνεῦσαι δυναμένῳ.

The Stoics, who took up the doctrine of Herakleitus with farther abstraction and analysis, distinguished and named separately matters which he conceived in one and named together—the physical inhalation of air—the metaphysical supposed influx of intelligence—*inspiration* in its literal and metaphorical senses. The word τὸ περιέχον, as he conceives it, seems to denote, not any distinct or fixed local region, but the rotatory movement or circulation of the elements, fire, water, earth, reverting back into each other. Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 119-120; which transition also is denoted by the word ἀναθυμίασις in the Herakleitean sense—cited from Herakleitus by Aristotle. De Animâ, i. 2, 16.

[1] Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math. vii. 132) here cites the first words of the treatise of Herakleitus (compare also Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 5). λόγου τοῦδε ἐόντος ἀξύνετοι γίγνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον·—τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν ὥκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

[2] Sext. Empiric. ib. vii. 126, a citation from Herakleitus.

[3] Sext. Emp. ib. vii. 133 (the words of Herakleitus) διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ ξυνῷ·—τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ, ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν· ἡ δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἀλλ' ἐξήγησις τοῦ τρόπου τῆς τοῦ πάντος διοικήσεως· διὸ καθ' ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ τῆς μνήμης κοινωνήσωμεν, ἀληθεύομεν, ἃ δὲ ἂν ἰδιάσωμεν, ψευδόμεθα.

[4] Plutarch, De Superstit. c. 3, p. 166, C. See also the passage in Clemens Alexandr. Strom. iv. 22, about the comparison of sleep to death by Herakleitus.

Reason of most men as it is, but as it ought to be.

individually. The universal reason to which he made appeal, was not the reason of most men as it actually is, but that which, in his theory, ought to be their reason :[1] that which formed the perpetual and governing process throughout all nature, though most men neither recognised nor attended to it, but turned away from it in different directions equally wrong. No man was truly possessed of reason, unless his individual mind understood the general scheme of the universe, and moved in full sympathy with its perpetual movement and alternation or unity of contraries.[2] The universal process contained in itself a sum-total of particular contraries which were successively produced and destroyed : to know the universal was to know these contraries in one, and to recognise them as transient, but correlative and inseparable, manifestations, each implying the other—not as having each a separate reality and each excluding its contrary.[3] In so far as a man's mind maintained its kindred nature and perpetual conjoint movement with the universal, he acquired true knowledge ; but the individualising influences arising from the body usually overpowered this kindred with the universal, and obstructed the continuity of this movement, so that most persons became plunged in error and illusion.

[1] Sextus Empiricus misinterprets the Herakleitean theory when he represents it (vii. 134) as laying down —*τὰ κοινῇ φαινόμενα, πιστὰ, ὡς ἂν τῷ κοινῷ κρινόμενα λόγῳ, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἰδίαν ἑκάστῳ, ψευδῆ.* Herakleitus denounces mankind generally as in error. Origen. Philosophum. i. 4 ; Diog. Laert. ix. 1.

[2] The analogy and sympathy between the individual mind and the cosmical process—between the knowing and the known—was reproduced in many forms among the ancient philosophers. It appears in the Platonic Timæus, c. 20, p. 47 C.

Τὸ κινούμενον τῷ κινουμένῳ γιγνώσκεσθαι was the doctrine of several philosophers. Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2. Plato, Kratylus, p. 412 A : *καὶ μὴν ἥ γε ἐπιστήμη μηνύει ὡς φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἑπομένης τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀξίας λόγου, καὶ οὔτε ἀπολειπομένης οὔτε προθεούσης.* A remarkable passage from the comment of Philoponus (on the treatise of Aristotle De Animâ) is cited by Lassalle, ii. p. 339, describing the Herakleitean doctrine, *διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως αὐτὴν ἔλεγεν* (Herakleitus)· *τῶν γὰρ πραγμάτων ἐν κινήσει ὄντων δεῖν καὶ τὸ γίνωσκον τὰ πράγματα ἐν κινήσει εἶναι, ἵνα συμπαράθεον αὐτοῖς ἐφάπτηται καὶ ἐφαρμόζῃ αὐτοῖς.* Also Simplikius ap. Lassalle, p. 341 : *ἐν μεταβολῇ γὰρ συνεχεῖ τὰ ὄντα ὑποτιθέμενος ὁ Ἡράκλειτος, καὶ τὸ γνωσόμενον αὐτὰ τῇ ἐπαφῇ γίνωσκον, συνέπεσθαι ἐβούλετο ὡς ἀεὶ εἶναι κατὰ τὸ γνωστικὸν ἐν κινήσει.*

[3] Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. p. 58 ; and the passage of Philo Judæus, cited by Schleiermacher, p. 437 ; as well as more fully by Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 265-267 (Quis rerum divinar. hæres, p. 503, Mangey): *ἐν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τῶν ἐναντίων, οὗ τμηθέντος γνώριμα τὰ ἐναντία. Οὗ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ φασιν Ἕλληνες τὸν μέγαν καὶ ἀοίδιμον παρ' αὐτοῖς Ἡράκλειτον, κεφαλαῖον τῆς αὐτοῦ προστησάμενον φιλοσοφίας, αὐχεῖν ὡς εὑρέσει καινῇ ; παλαιὸν γὰρ εὕρημα Μωύσεώς ἐστιν.*

The absolute of Herakleitus stands thus at the opposite pole as compared with that of Parmenides: it is absolute movement, change, generation and destruction — negation of all substance and stability,[1] except as a temporary and unbecoming resistance of each successive particular to the destroying and renewing current of the universal. The Real, on this theory, was a generalisation, not of substances, but of facts, events, changes, revolutions, destructions, generations, &c., determined by a law of justice or necessity which endured, and which alone endured, for ever. Herakleitus had many followers, who adopted his doctrine wholly or partially, and who gave to it developments which he had not adverted to, perhaps might not have acknowledged.[2] It was found an apt theme by those who, taking a religious or poetical view of the universe, dwelt upon the transitory and contemptible value of particular existences, and extolled the grandeur or power of the universal. It suggested many doubts and debates respecting the foundations of logical evidence, and the distinction of truth from falsehood; which debates will come to be noticed hereafter, when we deal with the dialectical age of Plato and Aristotle.

Herakleitus at the opposite pole from Parmenides.

After Herakleitus, and seemingly at the same time with

[1] The great principle of Herakleitus, which Aristotle states in order to reject (Physic. viii. 3, p. 253, b. 10, *φασί τινες κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀεὶ· ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν τοῦτο τὴν ἡμετέραν αἴσθησιν*) now stands averred in modern physical philosophy. Mr. Grove observes, in his instructive Treatise on the Correlation of Physical Forces, p. 22:

"Of absolute rest, Nature gives us no evidence. All matter, as far as we can discern, is ever in movement: not merely in masses, as in the planetary spheres, but also molecularly, or throughout its intimate structure. Thus every alteration of temperature produces a molecular change throughout the whole substance heated or cooled: slow chemical or electrical forces, actions of light or invisible radiant forces, are always at play; so that, as a fact, we cannot predicate of any portion of matter, that it is absolutely at rest."

[2] Many references to Herakleitus are found in the recently published books of the Refutatio Hæresium by Pseudo-Origen or Hippolytus—especially Book ix. p. 279-283, ed. Miller. To judge by various specimens there given, it would appear that his juxta-positions of contradictory predicates, with the same subject, would be recognised as paradoxes merely in appearance, and not in reality, if we had his own explanation. Thus he says (p. 282) "the pure and the corrupt, the drinkable and the undrinkable, are one and the same." Which is explained as follows: "The sea is most pure and most corrupt: to fish, it is drinkable and nutritive; to men, it is undrinkable and destructive." This explanation appears to have been given by Herakleitus himself, *θάλασσα, φησὶν*, &c.

These are only paradoxes in appearance—the relative predicate being affirmed without mention of its correlate. When you supply the correlate to each predicate, there remains no contradiction at all.

Empedokles —his doctrine of the four elements, and two moving or restraining forces.

Parmenides, we arrive at Empedokles (about 500-430 B.C.) and his memorable doctrine of the Four Elements. This philosopher, a Sicilian of Agrigentum, and a distinguished as well as popular-minded citizen, expounded his views in poems, of which Lucretius[1] speaks with high admiration, but of which few fragments are preserved. He agreed with Parmenides, and dissented from Herakleitus and the Ionic philosophers, in rejecting all real generation and destruction.[2] That which existed had not been generated and could not be destroyed. Empedokles explained what that was, which men mistook for generation and destruction. There existed four distinct elements—Earth, Water, Air, and Fire — eternal, inexhaustible, simple, homogeneous, equal, and co-ordinate with each other. Besides these four substances, there also existed two moving forces, one contrary to the other—Love or Friendship, which brought the elements into conjunction—Enmity or Contest, which separated them. Here were alternate and conflicting agencies, either bringing together different portions of the elements to form a new product, or breaking up the product thus formed and separating the constituent elements. Sometimes the Many were combined into One ; sometimes the One was decomposed into Many. Generation was simply this combination of elements already existing separately—not the calling into existence of anything new : destruction was in like manner the dissolution of some compound, not the termination of any existent simple substance. The four simple substances or elements (which Empedokles sometimes calls by names of the popular Deities — Zeus, Hêrê, Aidoneus, &c.), were the roots or foundations of everything.[3]

From the four elements—acted upon by these two forces,

[1] Lucretius, i. 731.

Carmina quin etiam divini pectoris ejus
Vociferantur, et exponunt præclara reperta :
Ut vix humanâ videatur stirpe creatus.

[2] Empedokles, Frag. v. 77-83, ed. Karsten, p. 96 :

φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἁπάντων
θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανατοῖο τελευτὴ,
ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων
ἐστι, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν. . . . .

Φύσις here is remarkable, in its primary sense, as derivative from φύομαι, equivalent to γένεσις. Compare Plutarch adv. Koloten, p. 1111, 1112.

[3] Emp. Fr. v. 55. Τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ῥιζώματα.

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abstractions or mythical personifications — Empedokles showed how the Kosmos was constructed. He supposed both forces to be perpetually operative, but not always with equal efficacy: sometimes the one was predominant, sometimes the other, sometimes there was equilibrium between them. Things accordingly pass through a perpetual and ever-renewed cycle. The complete preponderance of Love brings all the elements into close and compact unity, Enmity being for the time eliminated. Presently the action of the latter recommences, and a period ensues in which Love and Enmity are simultaneously operative; until at length Enmity becomes the temporary master, and all union is for the time dissolved. But this condition of things does not last. Love again becomes active, so that partial and increasing combination of the elements is produced, and another period commences—the simultaneous action of the two forces, which ends in renewed empire of Love, compact union of the elements, and temporary exclusion of Enmity.[1]

Construction of the Kosmos from these elements and forces—action and counter action of love and enmity. The Kosmos alternately made and unmade.

This is the Empedoklean cycle of things,[2] divine or predestined, without beginning or end: perpetual substitution of new for old compounds—constancy only in the general principle of combination and dissolution. The Kosmos which Empedokles undertakes to explain, takes its commencement from the period of complete empire of Love, or compact and undisturbed union of all the elements. This he conceives and divinises under the name of Sphærus—as One sphere, harmonious, uniform, and universal, having no motion, admitting no parts or separate existences within it, exhibiting

Empedoklean predestined cycle of things—complete empire of Love—Sphærus—Empire of Enmity—disengagement or separation of the ele-

[1] Zeller, Philos. der Griech., vol. i. p. 525-528, ed. 2nd.

[2] Emp. Frag. v. 96, Karst., p. 98:

Οὕτως ᾗ μὲν ἓν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι,
ἠδὲ πάλιν διαφυντὸς ἑνὸς πλέον' ἐκτελέθουσι,
τῇ μὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὔ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών·
ᾗ δὲ τάδ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
ταύτῃ δ' αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητα κατὰ κύκλον.

Also:—

καὶ γὰρ καὶ παρὸς ἦν τε καὶ ἔσσεται οὐδέ ποτ', οἴω,
τούτων ἀμφοτέρων (Love and Discord) κεινώσεται ἄσπετος αἰών.

These are new Empedoklean verses, derived from the recently published fragments of Hippolytus (Hær. Refut.) and printed by Stein, v. 110, in his collection of the Fragments of Empedokles, p. 43. Compare another passage in the same treatise of Hippolytus, p. 251.

ments—astronomy and meteorology.

no one of the four elements distinctly, "instabilis tellus, innabilis unda"—a sort of chaos.[1] At the time prescribed by Fate or Necessity, the action of Enmity recommenced, penetrating gradually through the interior of Sphærus, "agitating the members of the God one after another,"[2] disjoining the parts from each other, and distending the compact ball into a vast porous mass. This mass, under the simultaneous and conflicting influences of Love and Enmity, became distributed partly into homogeneous portions, where each of the four elements was accumulated by itself—partly into compounds or individual substances, where two or more elements were found in conjunction. Like had an appetite for Like—Air for Air, Fire for Fire, and so forth: and a farther extension of this appetite brought about the mixture of different elements in harmonious compounds. First, the Air disengaged itself, and occupied a position surrounding the central mass of Earth and Water: next, the Fire also broke forth, and placed itself externally to the Air, immediately in contact with the outermost crystalline sphere, formed of condensed and frozen air, which formed the wall encompassing the Kosmos. A remnant of Fire and Air still remained embodied in the Earth, but the great mass of both so distributed themselves, that the former occupied most part of one hemisphere, the latter most part of the other.[3] The rapid and uniform rotation of the Kosmos, caused by the exterior

[1] Emped. Fr. v. 59, Karsten:

Οὕτως ἁρμονίης πυκινῷ κρυφῷ ἐστήρικται
σφαῖρος κυκλοτέρης, μονιῇ περιηγέϊ γαίων.

Plutarch, De Facie in Orbe Lunæ, c. 12.

About the divinity ascribed by Empedokles to Sphærus, see Aristot. Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1000, a. 29. ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐκ τούτου (νείκους) τἄλλά ἐστι πλὴν ὁ θεός (i. e. Sphærus).—Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν τὸ νεῖκος ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, ἓν ἂν ἦν ἅπαντα, ὡς φησίν (Empedokles). See Preller, Hist. Philos. ex Font. Loc. Contexta, sect. 171, 172, ed. 3.

The condition of things which Empedokles calls Sphærus may be illustrated (translating his Love and Enmity into the modern phraseology of *attraction* and *repulsion*) from an eminent modern work on Physics:—

"Were there only atoms and attraction, as now explained, the whole material of creation would rush into close contact, and the universe would be one huge solid mass of stillness and death. There is heat or caloric, however, which directly counteracts attraction, and singularly modifies the results. It has been described by some as a most subtile fluid pervading all things, as water does a sponge: others have accounted it merely a vibration among the atoms. The truth is, that we know little more of heat as a cause of repulsion, than of gravity as a cause of attraction: but we can study and classify the phenomena of both most accurately." (Dr. Arnott, Elements of Physics, vol. i. p. 26.)

[2] Emp. Fr. v. 66-70, Karsten:

πάντα γὰρ ἐξείης πελεμίζετο γυῖα θεοῖο.

[3] Plutarch ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8, 10; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 6, p. 887; Aristot. Ethic. Nic. viii. 2.

Fire, compressed the interior elements, squeezed the water out of the earth like perspiration from the living body, and thus formed the sea. The same rotation caused the earth to remain unmoved, by counterbalancing and resisting its downward pressure or gravity.[1] In the course of the rotation, the light hemisphere of Fire, and the comparatively dark hemisphere of Air, alternately came above the horizon: hence the interchange of day and night. Empedokles (like the Pythagoreans) supposed the sun to be not self-luminous, but to be a glassy or crystalline body which collected and reflected the light from the hemisphere of Fire. He regarded the fixed stars as fastened to the exterior crystalline sphere, and revolving along with it, but the planets as moving free and detached from any sphere.[2] He supposed the alternations of winter and summer to arise from a change in the proportions of Air and Fire in the atmospheric regions: winter was caused by an increase of the Air, both in volume and density, so as to drive back the exterior Fire to a greater distance from the Earth, and thus to produce a diminution of heat and light: summer was restored when the Fire, in its turn increasing, extruded a portion of the Air, approached nearer to the Earth, and imparted to the latter more heat and light.[3] Empedokles farther supposed (and his contemporaries, Anaxagoras and Diogenes, held the same opinion) that the Earth was round and flat at top and bottom, like a drum or tambourine: that its surface had been originally horizontal, in reference to the rotation of the Kosmos around it, but that it had afterwards tilted down to the south and upward towards the north, so as to lie aslant instead of horizontal. Hence he explained the fact that the north pole of the heavens now appeared obliquely elevated above the horizon.[4]

From astronomy and meteorology Empedokles[5] proceeded to

[1] Emped. Fr. 185, Karsten. *αἰθὴρ σφίγγων περὶ κύκλον ἅπαντα.* Aristot. De Cœlo, ii. 13, 14; iii. 2, 2. *τὴν γῆν ὑπὸ τῆς δίνης ἠρεμεῖν*, &c. Empedokles called the sea *ἱδρωτα τῆς γῆς.* Emp. Fr. 451, Karsten; Aristot. Meteor. ii. 3.

[2] Plutarch, Placit. Phil. ii. 20, p. 890.

[3] Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 532-535, 2nd ed.: Karsten—De Emped. Philos. p. 424-431.

The very imperfect notices which remain, of the astronomical and meteorological doctrines of Empedokles, are collected and explained by these two authors.

[4] Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 8; Schaubach, Anaxag. Fragm. p. 175. Compare the remarks of Gruppe (Ueber die Kosmichen Systeme der Griechen, p. 98) upon the obscure Welt-Gebäude of Empedokles.

[5] Hippokrates—*Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς*—c. 20, p. 620, vol. i. ed. Littré. *καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἢ ἄλλοι οἱ περὶ φύσιος*

Formation of the Earth, of Gods, men, animals, and plants.

describe the Earth, its tenants, and its furniture; how men were first produced, and how put together. All were produced by the Earth: being thrown up under the stimulus of Fire still remaining within it. In its earliest manifestations, and before the influence of Discord had been sufficiently neutralized, the Earth gave birth to plants only, being as yet incompetent to produce animals.[1] After a certain time she gradually acquired power to produce animals, first imperfectly and piecemeal, trunks without limbs and limbs without trunks; next, discordant and monstrous combinations, which did not last, such as creatures half man half ox; lastly, combinations with parts suited to each other, organizations perfect and durable, men, horses, &c., which continued and propagated.[2] Among these productions were not only plants, birds, fishes, and men, but also the "long-lived Gods".[3] All compounds were formed by intermixture of the four elements, in different proportions, more or less harmonious.[4] These elements remained unchanged: no one of them was transformed into another. But the small particles of each flowed into the pores of the others, and the combination was more or less intimate, according as the structure of these pores was more or less adapted to receive them. So intimate did the mixture of these fine particles become, when the effluvia of one and the pores of another were in symmetry, that the constituent ingredients, like colours compounded together by the painter,[5] could not be dis-

γεγράφασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον, καὶ ὅπως ξυνεπάγη.

This is one of the most ancient allusions to Empedokles, recently printed by M. Littré, out of one of the MSS. in the Parisian library.

[1] Emp. Fr. v. 253, Kar. τοὺς μὲν πῦρ ἀνεπεμπ' ἔθελον πρὸς ὅμοιον ἱκέσθαι, &c.

Aristot., or Pseudo-Aristot. De Plantis, i. 2. εἶπε πάλιν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ὅτι τὰ φυτὰ ἔχουσι γένεσιν ἐν κόσμῳ ἠλαττωμένῳ, καὶ οὐ τελείῳ κατὰ τὴν συμπλήρωσιν αὐτοῦ· ταύτης δὲ συμπληρουμένης (while it is in course of being completed), οὐ γεννᾶται ζῷον.

[2] Emp. Frag. v. 132, 150, 233, 240, ed. Karst. Ver. 238:—

πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφιπρόσωπα καὶ ἀμφίστερν' ἐφύοντο,
βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα, &c. Ver. 251:—
Οὐλοφυεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον, &c.

Lucretius, v. 834; Aristotel. Gen. Animal. i. 18, p. 722, b. 20; Physic. ii. 8, 2, p. 198, b. 32; De Cœlo, iii. 2, 5, p. 300, b. 29; with the commentary of Simplikius ap. Schol. Brand. b. 512.

[3] Emp. Fr. v. 135, Kar.

[4] Plato, Menon. p. 76 A.; Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 324, b. 30 seq.

[5] Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐξ ἀμεταβλήτων τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων ἡγεῖτο γίγνεσθαι τὴν τῶν συνθέτων σωμάτων φύσιν, οὕτως ἀναμεμιγμένων ἀλλήλοις τῶν πρώτων, ὡς εἴ τις λειώσας ἀκριβῶς καὶ χνοώδη ποιήσας ἰὸν καὶ χαλκῖτιν καὶ καδμείαν καὶ μίσυ μίξειεν, ὡς μηδὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίσασθαι χωρὶς ἑτέρου.

Galen, Comm. in Hippokrat. De Homin. Nat. t. iii. p. 101. See Kar-

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cerned or handled separately. Empedokles rarely assigned any specific ratio in which he supposed the four elements to enter into each distinct compound, except in the case of flesh and blood, which were formed of all the four in equal portions; and of bones, which he affirmed to be composed of one-fourth earth, one-fourth water, and the other half fire. He insisted merely on the general fact of such combinations, as explaining what passed for generation of new substances—without pointing out any reason to determine one ratio of combination rather than another, and without ascribing to each compound a distinct ratio of its own. This omission in his system is much animadverted on by Aristotle.

Physiology of Empedokles—Procreation—Respiration—movement of the blood.

Empedokles farther laid down many doctrines respecting physiology. He dwelt on the procreation of men and animals, entered upon many details respecting gestation and the fœtus, and even tried to explain what it was that determined the birth of male or female offspring. About respiration, alimentation, and sensation, he also proposed theories: his explanation of respiration remains in one of the fragments. He supposed that man breathed, partly through the nose, mouth, and lungs, but partly also through the whole surface of the body, by the pores wherewith it was pierced, and by the internal vessels connected with those pores. Those internal vessels were connected with the blood vessels, and the portion of them near the surface was alternately filled with blood or emptied of blood, by the flow outwards from the centre or the ebb inwards towards the centre. Such was the movement which Empedokles considered as constantly belonging to the blood: alternately a projection outwards from the centre and a recession backwards towards the centre. When the blood thus receded, the extremities of the vessels were

sten, De Emped. Phil. p. 407, and Emp. Fr. v. 155.

Galen says, however (after Aristot. Gen. et Corr. ii. 7, p. 334, a. 30), that this mixture, set forth by Empedokles, is not mixture properly speaking, but merely close proximity. Hippokrates (he says) was the first who propounded the doctrine of real mixture. But Empedokles seems to have intended a real mixture, in all cases where the structure of the pores was in symmetry with the inflowing particles. Oil and water (he said) would not mix together, because there was no such symmetry between them—ὅλως γὰρ ποιεῖ (Empedokles) τὴν μίξιν τῇ συμμετρίᾳ τῶν πόρων· διόπερ ἔλαιον μὲν καὶ ὕδωρ οὐ μίγνυσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὑγρὰ καὶ περὶ ὅσων δὴ καταριθμεῖται τὰς ἰδίας κράσεις (Theophrastus, De Sensu et Sensili, s. 12, vol. i. p. 651, ed. Schneider).

left empty, and the air from without entered: when the outward tide of blood returned, the air which had thus entered was expelled.[1] Empedokles conceived this outward tide of blood to be occasioned by the effort of the internal fire to escape and join its analogous element without.[2]

Doctrine of effluvia and pores—explanation of perceptions—Intercommunication of the elements with the sentient subject—like acting upon like.

The doctrine of pores and effluvia, which formed so conspicuous an item in the physics of Empedokles, was applied by him to explain sensation. He maintained the general doctrine (which Parmenides had advanced before him, and which Plato retained after him), that sensation was produced by like acting upon like: Herakleitus before him, and Anaxagoras after him, held that it was produced by unlike acting upon unlike. Empedokles tried (what Parmenides had not tried) to apply his doctrine to the various senses separately.[3] Man was composed of the same four elements as the universe around him: and since like always tended towards like, so by each of the four elements within himself, he perceived and knew the like element without. Effluvia from all bodies entered his pores, wherever they found a suitable channel: hence he perceived and knew earth by earth, water by water, and so forth.[4] Empedokles, assuming perception and knowledge to be produced by such intercommunication of the four elements, believed that not man

[1] Emp. Fr. v. 275, seqq. Karst.

The comments of Aristotle on this theory of Empedokles are hardly pertinent: they refer to respiration by the nostrils, which was not what Empedokles had in view (Aristot. De Respirat. c. 3).

[2] Karsten, De Emp. Philosoph. p. 480.

Emp. Fr. v. 307—*τό τ' ἐν μήνιγξιν ἐργμένον ὠγύγιον πῦρ—πῦρ δ' ἔξω διαθρῴσκον*, &c.

Empedokles illustrates this influx and efflux of air in respiration by the klepsydra, a vessel with one high and narrow neck, but with a broad bottom pierced with many small holes. When the neck was kept closed by the finger or otherwise, the vessel might be plunged into water, but no water would ascend into it through the holes in the bottom, because of the resistance of the air within. As soon as the neck was freed from pressure, and the air within allowed to escape, the water would immediately rush up through the holes in the bottom.

This illustration is interesting. It shows that Empedokles was distinctly aware of the pressure of the air as countervailing the ascending movement of the water, and the removal of that pressure as allowing such movement. Vers. 286:—

οὐδέ τ' ἐς ἄγγος δ' ὄμβρος ἐσέρχεται, ἀλλά μιν εἴργει ἀέρος ὄγκος ἔσωθε πεσὼν ἐπὶ τρήματα πυκνά, &c.

This dealing with the klepsydra seems to have been a favourite amusement with children.

[3] Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 2, p. 647, Schneid.

[4] Emp. Frag. Karst. v. 267, seq.

γνῶθ', ὅτι πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορῥοαὶ ὅσσ' ἐγένοντο, &c.

ib. v. 321:

γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,

and animals only, but plants and other substances besides, perceived and knew in the same way. Everything possessed a certain measure of knowledge, though less in degree than man, who was a more compound structure.[1] Perception and knowledge was more developed in different animals in proportion as their elementary composition was more mixed and varied. The blood, as the most compound portion of the whole body, was the principal seat of intelligence.[2]

In regard to vision, Empedokles supposed that it was operated mainly by the fire or light within the eye, though aided by the light without. The interior of the eye was of fire and water, the exterior coat was a thin layer of earth and air. Colours were brought to the eye as effluvia from objects, and became apprehended as sensations by passing into the alternate pores or ducts of fire and water: white colour was fitted to (or in symmetry with) the pores of fire, black colour with those of water.[3] Some animals had the proportions of fire and water in their eyes better adjusted, or more conveniently located, than others: in some, the fire was in excess, or too much on the outside, so as to obstruct the pores or ducts of water: in others, water was in excess, and fire in defect. The latter were the

Sense of vision.

αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον,
στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ.

Theophrastus, De Sensu, c. 10, p. 650, Schneid.

Aristotle says that Empedokles regarded each of these six as a *ψυχὴ* (*soul, vital principle*) by itself. Sextus Empiricus treats Empedokles as considering each of the six to be a *κριτήριον ἀληθείας* (Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2; Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 116).

[1] Emp. Fr. v. 313, Karst. ap. Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem. viii. 286; also apud Diogen. L. viii. 77.

πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἶσαν.

Stein gives (Emp. Fr. v. 222-231) several lines immediately preceding this from the treatise of Hippolytus; but they are sadly corrupt.

Parmenides had held the same opinion before—*καὶ ὅλως πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἔχειν τινὰ γνῶσιν*—ap. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 4.

Theophrastus, in commenting upon the doctrine of Empedokles, takes as one of his grounds of objection—That Empedokles, in maintaining sensation and knowledge to be produced by influx of the elements into pores, made no difference between animated and inanimate substances (Theophr. De Sens. s. 12-23). Theophrastus puts this as if it were an inconsistency or oversight of Empedokles: but it cannot be so considered, for Empedokles (as well as Parmenides) appears to have accepted the consequence, and to have denied all such difference, except one of degree, as to perception and knowledge.

[2] Emp. Frag. 316, Karst. *αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.* Comp. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 11.

[3] Emp. Frag. v. 301-310, Karst. *τό τ' ἐν μήνιγξιν ἐερμένον ὠγύγιον πῦρ*, &c. Theophr. De Sensu, s. 7, 8; Aristot. De Sensu, c. 3; Aristot. De Gen. et Corrupt. i. 8.

animals which saw better by day than by night, a great force of external light being required to help out the deficiency of light within: the former class of animals saw better by night, because, when there was little light without, the watery ducts were less completely obstructed—or left more free to receive the influx of black colour suited to them.[1]

Senses of hearing, smell, taste.

In regard to hearing, Empedokles said that the ear was like a bell or trumpet set in motion by the air without; through which motion the solid parts were brought into shock against the air flowing in, and caused the sensation of sound within.[2] Smell was, in his view, an adjunct of the respiratory process: persons of acute smell were those who had the strongest breathing: olfactory effluvia came from many bodies, and especially from such as were light and thin. Respecting taste and touch, he gave no further explanation than his general doctrine of effluvia and pores: he seems to have thought that such interpenetration was intelligible by itself, since here was immediate and actual contact. Generally, in respect to all the senses, he laid it down that pleasure ensued when the matter which flows in was not merely fitted in point of structure to penetrate the interior pores or ducts (which was the condition of all sensation), but also harmonious with them in respect to elementary mixture.[3]

Empedokles declared that justice absolutely forbade the killing of anything that had life. His belief in the metempsychosis. Sufferings of

Empedokles held various opinions in common with the Pythagoreans and the brotherhood of the Orphic mysteries—especially that of the metempsychosis. He represented himself as having passed through prior states of existence, as a boy, a girl, a shrub, a bird, and a fish. He proclaims it as an obligation of justice, absolute and universal, not to kill anything that had life: he denounces as an abomination the sacrificing or eating of an animal, in whom perhaps might dwell

[1] Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 7, 8.

[2] Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 9-21.

Empedokles described the ear under the metaphor of σάρκινον ὄζον, "the fleshy branch."

[3] Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 9, 10.

The criticisms of Theophrastus upon this theory of Empedokles are extremely interesting, as illustrating the change in the Grecian physiological point of view during a century and a half, but I reserve them until I come to the Aristotelian age. I may remark, however, that Theophrastus, disputing the doctrine of sensory effluvia generally, disputes the existence of the olfactory effluvia not less than the rest (s. 20).

the soul of a deceased friend or brother.[1] His religious faith, however, and his opinions about Gods, Dæmons, and the human soul, stood apart (mostly in a different poem) from his doctrines on kosmology and physiology. In common with many Pythagoreans, he laid great stress on the existence of Dæmons (of intermediate order and power between Gods and men), some of whom had been expelled from the Gods in consequence of their crimes, and were condemned to pass a long period of exile, as souls embodied in various men or animals. He laments the misery of the human soul, in himself as well as in others, condemned to this long period of expiatory degradation, before they could regain the society of the Gods.[2] In one of his remaining fragments, he announces himself almost as a God upon earth, and professes his willingness as well as ability to impart to a favoured pupil the most wonderful gifts—powers to excite or abate the winds, to bring about rain or dry weather, to raise men from the dead.[3] He was in fact a man of universal pretensions; not merely an expositor of nature, but a rhetorician, poet, physician, prophet, and conjurer. Gorgias the rhetor had been personally present at his magical ceremonies.[4]

Life are an expiation for wrong done during an antecedent life. Pretensions to magical power.

None of the remaining fragments of Empedokles are more remarkable than a few in which he deplores the impossibility of finding out any great or comprehensive truth, amidst the distraction and the sufferings of our short life. Every man took a different road, confiding only in his own accidental experience or

Complaint of Empedokles on the impossibility of finding out truth.

[1] Emp. Frag. v. 380-410, Karsten; Plutarch, De Esu Carnium, p. 997-8.

Aristot. Rhetoric. i. 13, 2: *ἐστὶ γὰρ, ὃ μαντεύονταί τι πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, κἂν μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾖ, μηδὲ συνθήκη—ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμψυχον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον, τισὶ δ' οὐ δίκαιον,*

Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τ' εὐρυμέδοντος
Αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται διά τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.

Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. ix. 127.

[2] Emp. Frag. v. 5-18, Karst.; compare Herod. ii. 123; Plato, Phædrus, 55, p. 246 C.; Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. c. 26.

Plutarch observes in another place on the large proportion of religious mysticism blended with the philosophy of Empedokles—*Σωκράτης, φασμάτων καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ἁπλέω φιλοσοφίαν ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δεξάμενος, εὖ μάλα βεβακχευμένην*, &c. (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 580 C.)

See Fr. Aug. Ukert, Ueber Daemonen, Heroen, und Genien, p. 151.

[3] Emp. Fr. v. 390-425, Karst.

[4] Diog. Laert. viii. 59.

particular impressions; but no man could obtain or communicate satisfaction about the whole.[1]

Anaxagoras of Klazomenæ, a friend of the Athenian Perikles, and contemporary of Empedokles, was a man of far simpler and less ambitious character: devoted to physical contemplation and geometry, without any of those mystical pretentions common among the Pythagoreans. His doctrines were set forth in prose, and in the Ionic dialect.[2] His theory, like all those of his age, was all-comprehensive in its purpose, starting from a supposed beginning, and shewing how heaven, earth, and the inhabitants of earth, had come into those appearances which were exhibited to sense. He agreed with Empedokles in departing from the point of view of Thales and other Ionic theorists, who had supposed one primordial matter, out of which, by various transformations, other sensible things were generated—and into which, when destroyed, they were again resolved. Like Empedokles, and like Parmenides previously, he declared that generation, understood in this sense, was a false and impossible notion: that no existing thing could have been generated, or could be destroyed, or could undergo real transformation into any other thing different from what it was.[3] Existing things were what they were, possessing their several inherent properties: there could be no generation except the putting together of these things in various compounds, nor any destruction except the breaking up of such compounds, nor any transformation except the substitution of one compound for another.

Theory of Anaxagoras—denied generation and destruction—recognises only mixture and severance of pre-existing kinds of matter.

But Anaxagoras did not accept the Empedoklean four elements as the sum total of first substances. He reckoned all the different sorts of matter as original and primæval

Homœomeries—small

[1] Emp. Fr. v. 34, ed. Karst., p. 88.

παῦρον δὲ ζώης ἀβίου μέρος ἀθλήσαντες
ὠκύμοροι, κάπνοιο δίκην ἀρθέντες, ἀπέπταν,
αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος,
πάντοσ' ἐλαυνόμενοι· τὸ δὲ οὖλον ἐπεύχεται εὑρεῖν
αὔτως. οὔτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ' ἀνδράσιν οὔτ' ἐπακουστὰ
οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά.

[2] Aristotel. Ethic. Eudem. i. 4, 5; Diogen. Laert. ii. 10.

[3] Anaxagor. Fr. 22, p. 135, ed. Schaubach.—τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς νομίζουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες. Οὐδὲν γὰρ χρῆμα γίνεται, οὐδὲ ἀπόλλυται, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἐόντων χρημάτων συμμίσγεταί τε καὶ διακρίνεται· καὶ οὕτως ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖεν τό τε γίνεσθαι συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι διακρίνεσθαι.

existences: he supposed them all to lie ready made, in portions of all sizes, whereof there was no greatest and no least.[1] Particles of the same sort he called Homœomeries: the aggregates of which formed bodies of like parts; wherein the parts were like each other and like the whole. Flesh, bone, blood, fire,[2] earth, water, gold, &c., were aggregations of particles mostly similar, in which each particle was not less flesh, bone, and blood, than the whole mass.

particles of diverse kinds of matter, all mixed together.

But while Anaxagoras held that each of these Homœomeries[3] was a special sort of matter with its own properties, and each of them unlike every other: he held farther the peculiar doctrine, that no one of them could have an existence apart from the rest. Everything was mixed with everything: each included in itself all the others: not one of them could be obtained pure and unmixed. This was true of any portion however small. The visible and tangible bodies around us affected our senses, and received their denominations according to that one peculiar matter of which they possessed a decided preponderance and prominence. But each of them included in itself all the other matters, real and inseparable, although latent.[4]

In the beginning (said Anaxagoras) all things (all sorts of

[1] Anaxag. Fr. 5, ed. Schaub, p. 94.

Τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ are the primordial particles themselves: ὁμοιομέρεια is the abstract word formed from this concrete —existence in the form or condition of ὁμοιομερῆ. Each distinct substance has its own ὁμοιομερῆ, little particles like each other, and each possessing the characteristics of the substance. But the state called ὁμοιομέρεια pervades all substances (Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, s. 53, note 3).

[2] Lucretius, i. 830:

Nunc et Anaxagoræ scrutemur Homœomerian,
Quam Graï memorant, nec nostrâ dicere linguâ
Concedit nobis patrii sermonis egestas.

Lucretius calls this theory Homœomeria, and it appears to me that this name must have been bestowed upon it by its author. Zeller and several others, after Schleiermacher, conceive the name to date first from Aristotle and his physiological classification. But what other name was so natural or likely for Anaxagoras himself to choose?

[3] Anaxag. Fr. 8; Schaub. p. 101; compare p. 113. ἕτερον δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ὅμοιον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ. Ἀλλ' ὅτεῳ πλεῖστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν.

[4] Lucretius, i. 876:

Id quod Anaxagoras sibi sumit, ut omnibus omnes
Res putet inmixtas rebus latitare, sed illud
Apparere unum cujus sint plurima mixta,
Et magis in promptu primâque in fronte locata.

Aristotel. Physic. i. 4, 3. Διό φασι πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μεμίχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἑώρων γιγνόμενον· φαίνεσθαι δὲ διαφέροντα καί προσαγορεύεσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, ἐκ τοῦ μάλιστα ὑπερέχοντος, διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων· εἰλικρινῶς μὲν γὰρ ὅλον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ σάρκα ἢ ὀστοῦν, οὐκ εἶναι· ὅτου δὲ πλεῖστον ἕκαστον ἔχει, τοῦτο δοκεῖν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος. Also Aristot. De Cœlo, iii. 3; Gen. et Corr. i. 1.

First condition of things—all the primordial varieties of matter were huddled together in confusion. Nous, or Reason, distinct from all of them, supervened and acted upon this confused mass, setting the constituent particles in movement.

matter) were together, in one mass or mixture. Infinitely numerous and infinite in diversity of magnitude, they were so packed and confounded together that no one could be distinguished from the rest: no definite figure, or colour, or other property, could manifest itself. Nothing was distinguishable except the infinite mass of Air and Æther (Fire), which surrounded the mixed mass and kept it together.[1] Thus all things continued for an infinite time in a state of rest and nullity. The fundamental contraries—wet, dry, hot, cold, light, dark, dense, rare,—in their intimate contact neutralised each other.[2] Upon this inert mass supervened the agency of Nous or Mind. The characteristic virtue of mind was, that it alone was completely distinct, peculiar, pure in itself, unmixed with anything else: thus marked out from all other things which were indissolubly mingled with each other. Having no communion of nature with other things, it was noway acted upon by them, but was its own master or autocratic, and was of very great force. It was moreover the thinnest and purest of all things; possessing complete knowledge respecting all other things. It was like to itself throughout—the greater manifestations of mind similar to the less.[3]

But though other things could not act upon mind, mind could act upon them. It first originated movement in the

[1] Anaxag. Frag. 1; Schaub. p. 65; a. 25; and De Cœlo, iii. 301. a. 12, ἐξ ἀκινήτων γὰρ ἅρχεται (Anaxagoras) κοσμοποιεῖν. Ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν, ἄπειρα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότητα. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ σμικρὸν ἄπειρον ἦν. Καὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων οὐδὲν εὔδηλον ἦν ὑπὸ σμικρότητος. Πάντα γὰρ ἀὴρ τε καὶ αἰθὴρ κατείχεν, ἀμφότερα ἄπειρα ἐόντα. Ταῦτα γὰρ μέγιστα ἐνεστιν ἐν τοῖς συμπᾶσι καὶ πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει.

The first three words—ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα—were the commencement of the Anaxagorean treatise, and were more recollected and cited than any other words in it. See Fragm. 16, 17, Schaubach, and p. 66-68. Aristotle calls this primeval chaos τὸ μίγμα.

[2] Anax. Frag. 6, Schaub. p. 97; Aristotel. Physic. i. 4, p. 187, a, with the commentary of Simplikius ap. Scholia, p. 335; Brandis also, iii. 203,

[3] Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 100, Schaub. Τὰ μεν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν ἔχει, νοῦς δέ ἐστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ ἐστιν. Εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλά τεῳ ἐμέμικτο ἄλλῳ, μετεῖχεν ἂν ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμικτό τεῳ . . . . Καὶ ἀνεκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμιγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως, ὡς καὶ μόνον ἐόντα ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ. Ἐστὶ γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον, καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει, καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον.

Compare Plato, Kratylus, c. 65, p. 413, c. νοῦν αὐτοκράτορα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον (ὃ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας).

quiescent mass. The movement impressed was that of rotation, which first began on a small scale, then gradually extended itself around, becoming more efficacious as it extended, and still continuing to extend itself around more and more. Through the prodigious velocity of this rotation, a separation was effected of those things which had been hitherto undistinguishably huddled together.[1] Dense was detached from rare, cold from hot, dark from light, dry from wet.[2] The Homœomeric particles congregated together, each to its like; so that bodies were formed—definite and distinguishable aggregates, possessing such a preponderance of some one ingredient as to bring it into clear manifestation.[3] But while the decomposition of the multifarious mass was thus carried far enough to produce distinct bodies, each of them specialised, knowable, and regular—still the separation can never be complete, nor can any one thing be "cut away as with a hatchet" from the rest. Each thing, great or small, must always contain in itself a proportion or trace, latent if not manifest, of everything else.[4] Nothing except mind can be thoroughly pure and unmixed.

Movement of rotation in the mass originated by Nous on a small scale, but gradually extending itself. Like particles congregate together—distinguishable aggregates are formed.

Nevertheless other things approximate in different degrees to purity, according as they possess a more or less decided preponderance of some few ingredients over the remaining multitude. Thus flesh, bone, and other similar portions of the animal organism, were (according to Anaxagoras) more nearly pure (with one constituent more thoroughly preponderant and all other coexistent natures more thoroughly subordinate and

Nothing (except Noῦς) can be entirely pure or unmixed, but other things may be comparatively pure.

[1] Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 100, Sch. Καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν. Καὶ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ σμικροῦ ἤρξατο περιχωρῆσαι, ἔπειτεν πλεῖον περιχωρέει, καὶ περιχωρήσει ἐπὶ πλέον. Καὶ τὰ συμμισγόμενά τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα, πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς. Also Fr. 18, p. 129; Fr. 21, p. 134, Schau.

[2] Anaxag. Fr. 8-19, Schaubach.

[3] Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 101, Schaub. ὅτεῳ πλεῖστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν. Pseudo-Origen. Philosophumen. 8. κινήσεως δε μετέχειν τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ κινούμενα, συνελθεῖν τε τὰ ὅμοια, &c. Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. i. p. 188, a. 13 (p. 337, Schol. Brandis).

[4] Aristotel. Physic. iii. 4, 5, p. 203, a. 23, ὁτιοῦν τῶν μορίων εἶναι μιγμα ὁμοίως τῷ πάντι, &c. Anaxag. Fr. 16, p. 126, Schaub.

Anaxag. Fr. 11, p. 119, Schaub. οὐ κεχώρισται τὰ ἐν ἑνὶ κόσμῳ, οὐδὲ ἀποκέκοπται πελέκει, &c. Frag. 12, p. 122. ἐν παντὶ πάντα, οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι.—Fr. 15, p. 125.

Flesh, Bone, &c., are purer than Air or Earth.

latent) than the four Empedoklean elements, Air, Fire, Earth, &c.; which were compounds wherein many of the numerous ingredients present were equally effective, so that the manifestations were more confused and complicated. In this way the four Empedoklean elements formed a vast seed-magazine, out of which many distinct developments might take place, of ingredients all pre-existing within it. Air and Fire appeared to generate many new products, while flesh and bone did not.[1] Amidst all these changes, however, the infinite total mass remained the same, neither increased nor diminished.[2]

Theory of Anaxagoras

In comparing the theory of Anaxagoras with that of Empedokles, we perceive that both of them denied not only the generation of new matter out of nothing (in

[1] Aristotle, in two places (De Cœlo, iii. 3, p. 302, a. 28, and Gen. et Corr. i. 1, p. 314, a. 18) appears to state that Anaxagoras regarded flesh and bone as simple and elementary: air, fire, and earth, as compounds from these and other Homœomeries. So Zeller, Philos. d. Griech., v. i. p. 670, ed. 2), with Ritter, and others, understand him. Schaubach (Anax. Fr. p. 81, 82) dissents from this opinion, but does not give a clear explanation. Another passage of Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 3, p. 984. a. 11) appears to contradict the above two passages, and to put fire and water, in the Anaxagorean theory, in the same general category as flesh and bone: the explanatory note of Bonitz, who tries to show that the passage in the Metaphysica is in harmony with the other two above named passages, seems to me not satisfactory.

Lucretius (i. 835, referred to in a previous note) numbers flesh, bone, fire, and water, all among the Anaxagorean Homœomeries; and I cannot but think that Aristotle, in contrasting Anaxagoras with Empedokles, has ascribed to the former language which could only have been used by the latter. Ἐναντίως δὲ φαίνονται λέγοντες οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τοῖς περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα. Ὁ μὲν γάρ (Emp.) φησι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν στοιχεῖα τέσσαρα καὶ ἁπλᾶ εἶναι, μᾶλλον ἢ σάρκα καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν. Οἱ δὲ (Anaxag.) ταῦτα μὲν ἁπλᾶ καὶ στοιχεῖα, γῆν δὲ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα σύνθετα· πανσπερμίαν γὰρ εἶναι τούτων. (Gen. et Corr. i. 1.) The last words (πανσπερμίαν) are fully illustrated by a portion of the other passage, De Cœlo, iii. 3, ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ μίγμα τούτων (the Homœomeries, such as flesh and blood) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σπερμάτων πάντων· εἶναι γὰρ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀοράτων ὁμοιομερῶν πάντων ἠθροισμένων· διὸ καὶ γίγνεσθαι πάντα ἐκ τούτων.

Now it can hardly be said that Anaxagoras recognised one set of bodies as simple and elementary, and that Empedokles recognised another set of bodies as such. Anaxagoras expressly denied *all simple bodies*. In his theory, all bodies were compound: *Nous* alone formed an exception. Everything existed in everything. But they were compounds in which particles of one sort, or of a definite number of sorts, had come together into such positive and marked action, as practically to nullify the remainder. The generation of the Homœomeric aggregate was by disengaging these like particles from the confused mixture in which their agency had before lain buried (γένεσις, ἔκφανσις μόνον καὶ ἔκκρισις τοῦ πρὶν κρυπτομένου. Simplikius ap. Schaub. Anax. Fr. p. 115). The Homœomeric aggregates or bodies were infinite in number: for ingredients might be disengaged and recombined in countless ways, so that the result should always be some positive and definite manifestations. Considered in reference to the Homœomeric body, the constituent particles might in a certain sense be called elements.

[2] Anaxag. Fr. 14, p. 125, Schaub.

which denial all the ancient physical philosophers concurred), but also the transformation of one form of matter into others, which had been affirmed by Thales and others. Both of them laid down as a basis the existence of matter in a variety of primordial forms. They maintained that what others called generation or transformation, was only a combination or separation of these pre-existing materials, in great diversity of ratios. Of such primordial forms of matter Empedokles recognised only four, the so-called Elements ; each simple and radically distinct from the others, and capable of existing apart from them, though capable also of being combined with them. Anaxagoras recognised primordial forms of matter in indefinite number, with an infinite or indefinite stock of particles of each ; but no one form of matter (except Nous) capable of being entirely severed from the remainder. In the constitution of every individual body in nature, particles of all the different forms were combined ; but some one or a few forms were preponderant and manifest, all the others overlaid and latent. Herein consisted the difference between one body and another. The Homœomeric body was one in which a confluence of like particles had taken place so numerous and powerful, as to submerge all the coexistent particles of other sorts. The majority thus passed for the whole, the various minorities not being allowed to manifest themselves, yet not for that reason ceasing to exist : a type of human society as usually constituted, wherein some one vein of sentiment, ethical, æsthetical, religious, political, &c., acquires such omnipotence as to impose silence on dissentients, who are supposed not to exist because they cannot proclaim themselves without ruin.

compared with that of Empedokles.

The hypothesis of multifarious forms of matter, latent yet still real and recoverable, appears to have been suggested to Anaxagoras mainly by the phenomena of animal nutrition.[1] The bread and meat on which we feed nourishes all the different parts of our body—blood, flesh, bones, ligaments, veins, trachea, hair, &c. The nutriment must contain in itself different matters homogeneous with all these tissues and organs ; though we cannot see such matters, our

Suggested partly by the phenomena of animal nutrition.

[1] See a remarkable passage in Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. i. 3.

reason tells us that they must be there. This physiological divination is interesting from its general approximation towards the results of modern analysis.

Chaos, common to both Empedokles and Anaxagoras: moving agency, different in one from the other theory.

Both Empedokles and Anaxagoras begin their constructive process from a state of stagnation and confusion tantamount to Chaos; which is not so much active discord (as Ovid paints it), as rest and nullity arising from the equilibrium of opposite forces. The chaos of Anaxagoras is in fact almost a reproduction of the Infinite of Anaximander.[1] But Anaxagoras as well as Empedokles enlarged his hypothesis by introducing (what had not occurred or did not seem necessary to Anaximander) a special and separate agency for eliciting positive movement and development out of the negative and stationary Chaos. The Nous or Mind is the Agency selected for this purpose by Anaxagoras: Love and Enmity by Empedokles. Both the one and the other initiate the rotatory cosmical motion; upon which follows as well the partial disgregation of the chaotic mass, as the congregation of like particles of it towards each other.

Nous, or mind, postulated by Anaxagoras—how understood by later writers—how intended by Anaxagoras himself.

The Nous of Anaxagoras was understood by later writers as a God;[2] but there is nothing in the fragments now remaining to justify the belief that the author himself conceived it in that manner—or that he proposed it (according to Aristotle's expression[3]) as the cause of all that was good in the world, assigning other agencies as the causes of all evil. It is not characterised by him as a person—not so much as the Love and Enmity of Empedokles. It is not one but multitudinous, and all its separate manifestations are alike, differing only as greater or less. It is in fact identical with the soul, the vital principle, or vitality, belonging not only to all men and animals, but to all plants also.[4] It is one substance, or form of

[1] This is a just comparison of Theophrastus. See the passage from his φυσικὴ ἱστορία, referred to by Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. i. p. 187, a. 21 (p. 335, Schol. Brand.).

[2] Cicero, Academ. iv. 37; Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, ix. 6, τὸν μὲν νοῦν, ὃς ἐστι κατ' αὐτὸν θεὸς, &c.

Compare Schaubach, Anax. Frag. p. 153.

[3] Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 984, b. 17. He praises Anaxagoras for this, οἷον νήφων παρ' εἰκῆ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον, &c.

[4] Aristoteles (or Pseudo-Aristot.) De Plantis, i. 1.

matter among the rest, but thinner than all of them (thinner than even fire or air), and distinguished by the peculiar characteristic of being absolutely unmixed. It has moving power and knowledge, like the air of Diogenes the Apolloniate : it initiates movement ; and it knows about all the things which either pass into or pass out of combination. It disposes or puts in order all things that were, are, or will be ; but it effects this only by acting as a fermenting principle, to break up the huddled mass, and to initiate rotatory motion, at first only on a small scale, then gradually increasing. Rotation having once begun, and the mass having been as it were unpacked and liberated the component Homœomeries are represented as coming together by their own inherent attraction.[1] The Anaxagorean Nous introduces order and symmetry into Nature, simply by stirring up rotatory motion in the inert mass, so as to release the Homœomeries from prison. It originates and maintains the great cosmical fact of rotatory motion ; which variety of motion, from its perfect regularity and sameness, is declared by Plato also to be the one most consonant to Reason and Intelligence.[2] Such rotation being once set on foot, the other phenomena of the universe are supposed to be determined by its influence, and by their own tendencies and properties besides : but there is no farther agency of Nous, which only *knows* these phenomena as and when they occur. Anaxagoras tried to explain them as well as he could ; not by reference to final causes, nor by assuming good purposes of Nous which each combination was intended to answer—but by physical analogies, well or ill chosen, and especially by the working of the grand cosmical rotation.[3]

Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2, 65-6-13.

Aristotle says that the language of Anaxagoras about νοῦς and ψυχὴ was not perfectly clear or consistent. But it seems also from Plato De Legg. xii. p. 967, B, that Anaxagoras made no distinction between νοῦς and ψυχή. Compare Plato, Kratylus, p. 400 A.

[1] Anaxag. Fr. 8, and Schaubach's Comm. p. 112-116.

"Mens erat id, quod movebat molem homœomeriarum : hâc ratione, per hunc motum à mente excitatum, secretio facta est . . . . Materiæ autem propriæ insunt vires : proprio suo pondere hæc, quæ mentis vi mota et secreta sunt, feruntur in eum locum, quo nunc sunt."

Compare Alexand. Aphrod. ap. Scholia ad Aristot. Physic. ii. p. 194, a. (Schol. p. 348 a. Brandis); Marbach, Lehrbuch der Gesch. Philos. s. 54, note 2, p. 82; Preller, Hist. Phil. ex Font. Loc. Contexta, s. 53, with his comment.

[2] Plato, Phædo, c. 107, 108, p. 98; Plato, De Legg. xii. p. 967 B; Aristot. Metaphys. A. 4, p. 985, b. 18; Plato, Timæus, 34 A. 88 E.

[3] Aristoph. Nub. 380, 828. αἰθέριος Δῖνος—Δῖνος βασιλεύει, τὸν Δί' ἐξελαλακώς—the sting of which applies to Anaxagoras and his doctrines.

This we learn from Plato and Aristotle, who blame Anaxagoras for inconsistency in deserting his own hypothesis, and in invoking explanations from physical agencies, to the neglect of Nous and its supposed optimising purposes. But Anaxagoras, as far as we can judge by his remaining fragments, seems not to have committed any such inconsistency. He did not proclaim his Nous to be a powerful extra-cosmical Architect, like the Demiurgus of Plato—nor an intra-cosmical, immanent, undeliberating instinct (such as Aristotle calls Nature), tending towards the production and renewal of regular forms and conjunctions, yet operating along with other agencies which produced concomitants irregular, unpredictable, often even obstructive and monstrous. Anaxagoras appears to conceive his Nous as one among numerous other real agents in Nature, material like the rest, yet differing from the rest as being powerful, simple, and pure from all mixture,[1] as being endued with universal cognizance, as being the earliest to act in point of time, and as furnishing the primary condition to the activity of the rest by setting on foot the cosmical rotation. The Homœomeries are coeternal with, if not anterior to, Nous. They have laws and properties of their own, which they follow, when once liberated, without waiting for the dictation of Nous. What they do is known by, but not ordered by, Nous.[2] It is therefore no inconsistency in Anaxagoras that he assigns to mind one distinct and peculiar agency, but nothing more ; and that when trying to

Plato and Aristotle blame Anaxagoras for deserting his own theory.

Anaxagoras *δίνους τινὰς ἀνοήτους ἀναζωγραφῶν, σὺν τῇ τοῦ νοῦ ἀπραξίᾳ καὶ ἀνοίᾳ* (Clemens. Alexandrin. Stromat. ii. p. 365).

To *move* (in the active sense, *i.e.* to cause movement in) and to *know*, are the two attributes of the Anaxagorean Noûs (Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, p. 405, a. 18).

[1] Anaxagoras, Fr. & p. 100, Schaub. *ἐστὶ γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων*, &c.

This means, not that *νοῦς* was unextended or immaterial, but that it was thinner or more subtle than either fire or air. Herakleitus regarded *τὸ περιέχον* as *λογικὸν καὶ φρενῆρες*. Diogenes of Apollonia considered air as endued with cognition, and as imparting cognition by being inhaled. Compare Plutarch, De Placit. Philos. iv. 3.

I cannot think, with Brucker (Hist. Philosop. part ii. b. ii. De Sectâ Ionicâ, p. 504, ed. 2nd), and with Tennemann, Ges. Ph. i. 8, p. 312, that Anaxagoras was "primus qui Dei ideam inter Græcos à materialitate quasi purificavit," &c. I agree rather with Zeller (Philos. der Griech. i. p. 680-683, ed. 2nd), that the Anaxagorean Nous is not conceived as having either immateriality or personality.

[2] Simplikius, in Physic. Aristot. p. 73. *καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ τὸν νοῦν ἐάσας, ὡς φησιν Εὔδημος, καὶ αὐτοματίζων τὰ πολλὰ συνίστησιν.*

explain the variety of phenomena he makes reference to other physical agencies, as the case seems to require.[1]

In describing the formation of the Kosmos, Anaxagoras supposed that, as a consequence of the rotation initiated by mind, the primitive chaos broke up. "The Dense, Wet, Cold, Dark, Heavy, came together into the place where now Earth is: Hot, Dry, Rare, Light, Bright, departed to the exterior region of the revolving Æther."[2] In such separation each followed its spontaneous and inherent tendency. Water was disengaged from air and clouds, earth from water: earth was still farther consolidated into stones by cold.[3] Earth remained stationary in the centre, while fire and air were borne round it by the force and violence of the rotatory movement. The celestial bodies—Sun, Moon, and Stars—were solid bodies analogous to the earth, either caught originally in the whirl of the rotatory movement, or torn from the substance of the earth and carried away into the outer region of rotation.[4] They were rendered hot and luminous by the fiery fluid in the rapid whirl of which they were hurried along. The Sun was a stone thus made red-hot, larger than Peloponnesus: the Moon was of earthy matter, nearer to the Earth, deriving its light from the Sun, and including not merely plains and mountains, but also cities and inhabitants.[5] Of the planetary movements, apart from the diurnal rotation of the celestial sphere, Anaxagoras took no notice.[6] He explained the periodical changes in the apparent course of the sun and moon by resistances which they encountered, the former from accumulated and condensed air, the latter from the cold.[7] Like Anaximenes and Demokritus, Anaxagoras conceived the Earth as flat, round in the surface, and not deep, resting on and supported by the air beneath it. Originally (he thought) the earth was horizontal, with the axis of celestial rotation perpendicular, and the north pole at the zenith, so that

Astronomy and physics of Anaxagoras.

[1] Diogen. Laert. ii. 8. Νοῦν . . . ἀρχὴν κινήσεως.
Brucker, Hist. Philos. ut supra. "Scilicet, semel inducto in materiam à mente motu, sufficere putavit Anaxagoras, juxta leges naturæ motûsque, rerum ortum describere."

[2] Anaxag. Fr. 19, p. 131, Schaub.; compare Fr. 6, p. 97; Diogen. Laert. ii. 8.

[3] Anaxag. Fr. 20, p. 133, Schau.

[4] See the curious passage in Plutarch, Lysander 12, and Plato, Legg. xii. p. 967 B; Diogen. Laert. ii. 12; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 13.

[5] Plato, Kratylus, p. 409 A; Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 14; Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 7.

[6] Schaubach, ad Anax. Fr. p. 165.

[7] Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. ii. 23.

this rotation was then lateral, like that of a dome or roof; it was moreover equable and unchanging with reference to every part of the plane of the earth's upper surface, and distributed light and heat equally to every part. But after a certain time the Earth tilted over of its own accord to the south, thus lowering its southern half, raising the northern half, and causing the celestial rotation to appear oblique.[1]

His geology, meteorology, physiology.

Besides these doctrines respecting the great cosmical bodies, Anaxagoras gave explanations of many among the striking phenomena in geology and meteorology—the sea, rivers, earthquakes, hurricanes, hail, snow, &c.[2] He treated also of animals and plants—their primary origin, and the manner of their propagation.[3] He thought that animals were originally produced by the hot and moist earth; but that being once produced, the breeds were continued by propagation. The seeds of plants he supposed to have been originally contained in the air, from whence they fell down to the warm and moist earth, where they took root and sprung up.[4] He believed that all plants, as well as all animals, had a certain measure of intelligence and sentiment, differing not in kind but only in degree from the intelligence and sentiment of men; whose superiority of intelligence was determined, to a great extent, by their possession of hands.[5] He explained sensation by the action of unlike upon unlike (contrary to Empedokles, who referred it to the action of like upon like),[6] applying this doctrine to the explanation of the five senses separately. But he pronounced the

[1] Diogenes Laert. ii. 9. τὰ δ' ἄστρα κατ' ἀρχὰς θολοειδῶς ἐνεχθῆναι, ὥστε κατὰ κορυφὴν τῆς γῆς τὸν ἀεὶ φαινόμενον εἶναι πόλον, ὕστερον δὲ τὴν (γὴν) ἐγκλισιν λαβεῖν. Plutarch, Placit. Phil. ii. 8.

[2] See Schaubach, ad Anax. Fr. p. 174-181.

Among the points to which Anaxagoras addressed himself was the annual inundation of the Nile, which he ascribed to the melting of the snows in Æthiopia, in the higher regions of the river's course.—Diodor. i. 38. Herodotus notices this opinion (ii. 22), calling it plausible, but false, yet without naming any one as its author. Compare Euripides, Helen. 3.

[3] Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii. 6, iv. 1.

[4] Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iii. 2; Diogen. Laert. ii. 9; Aristot. De Plantis, i. 2.

[5] Aristot. De Plantis, i. 1; Aristot. Part. Animal. iv. 10.

[6] Theophrastus, De Sensu, sect. 1—sect. 27-30.

This difference followed naturally from the opinions of the two philosophers on the nature of the soul or mind. Anaxagoras supposed it peculiar in itself, and dissimilar to the Homœomeries without. Empedokles conceived it as a compound of the four elements, analogous to all that was without: hence man knew each exterior element by its like within himself—earth by earth, water by water, &c.

senses to be sadly obscure and insufficient as means of knowledge. Apparently, however, he did not discard their testimony, nor assume any other means of knowledge independent of it, but supposed a concomitant and controlling effect of intelligence as indispensable to compare and judge between the facts of sense when they appeared contradictory.[1] On this point, however, it is difficult to make out his opinions.

The doctrines of Anaxagoras were regarded as offensive and impious.

Anaxagoras, residing at Athens and intimately connected with Perikles, incurred not only unpopularity, but even legal prosecution, by the tenor of his philosophical opinions, especially those on astronomy. To Greeks who believed in Helios and Selênê as not merely living beings but Deities, his declaration that the Sun was a luminous and fiery stone, and the Moon an earthy mass, appeared alike absurd and impious. Such was the judgment of Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon, as well as of Aristophanes and the general Athenian public.[2] Anaxagoras was threatened with indictment for blasphemy, so that Perikles was compelled to send him away from Athens.

That physical enquiries into the nature of things, and attempts

[1] Anaxag. Fr. 19, Schaub.; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathem. vii. 91-140; Cicero, Academ. i. 12.

Anaxagoras remarked that the contrast between black and white might be made imperceptible to sense by a succession of numerous intermediate colours very finely graduated. He is said to have affirmed that snow was really black, notwithstanding that it appeared white to our senses: since water was black, and snow was only frozen water (Cicero, Academ. iv. 31; Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 33). "Anaxagoras non modo id ita esse (*sc.* albam nivem esse) negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse, unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse *ne videri quidem.*" Whether Anaxagoras ever affirmed that snow did not *appear to him* white, may reasonably be doubted: his real affirmation probably was, that snow, though it appeared white, was not really white. And this affirmation depended upon the line which he drew between the fact of sense, the phenomenal, the relative, on one side—and the substratum, the real, the absolute, on the other. Most philosophers recognise a distinction between the two; but the line between the two has been drawn in very different directions. Anaxagoras assumed as his substratum, real, or absolute, the Homœomeries—numerous primordial varieties of matter, each with its inherent qualities. Among these varieties he reckoned *water*, but he did not reckon *snow*. He also considered that water was really and absolutely black or dark (the Homeric μέλαν ὕδωρ)—that blackness was among its primary qualities. Water, when consolidated into snow, was so disguised as to produce upon the spectator the appearance of whiteness; but it did not really lose, nor could it lose, its inherent colour. A negro covered with white paint, and therefore looking white, is still really black: a wheel painted with the seven prismatic colours, and made to revolve rapidly, will look white, but it is still really septi-coloured: *i.e.* the state of rapid revolution would be considered as an exceptional state, not natural to it. Compare Plato, Lysis, c. 32, p. 217 D.

[2] Plato, Apol. So. c. 14; Xenoph. Memor. iv. 7.

to substitute scientific theories in place of the personal agency of the Gods, were repugnant to the religious feelings of the Greeks, has been already remarked.[1] Yet most of the other contemporary philosophers must have been open to this reproach, not less than Anaxagoras; and we learn that the Apolloniate Diogenes left Athens from the same cause. If others escaped the like prosecution which fell upon Anaxagoras, we may probably ascribe this fact to the state of political party at Athens, and to the intimacy of the latter with Perikles. The numerous political enemies of that great man might fairly hope to discredit him in the public mind—at the very least to vex and embarrass him—by procuring the trial and condemnation of Anaxagoras. Against other philosophers, even when propounding doctrines not less obnoxious respecting the celestial bodies, there was not the same collateral motive to stimulate the aggressive hostility of individuals.

Diogenes of Apollonia recognises one primordial element.

Contemporary with Anaxagoras—yet somewhat younger, as far as we can judge, upon doubtful evidence—lived the philosopher Diogenes, a native of Apollonia in Krete. Of his life we know nothing except that he taught during some time at Athens, which city he was forced to quit on the same ground as Anaxagoras. Accusations of impiety were either brought or threatened against him:[2] physical philosophy being offensive generally to the received religious sentiment, which was specially awakened and appealed to by the political opponents of Perikles.

Diogenes the Apolloniate, the latest in the series of Ionic philosophers or physiologists, adopted, with modifications and enlargements, the fundamental tenet of Anaximenes. There

[1] Plutarch, Nikias, 23.

[2] Diogen. Laert. ix. 52. The danger incurred by Diogenes the Apolloniate at Athens is well authenticated, on the evidence of Demetrius the Phalerean, who had good means of knowing. And the fact may probably be referred to some time after the year B.C. 440, when Athens was at the height of her power and of her attraction for foreign visitors—when the visits of philosophers to the city had been multiplied by the countenance of Perikles—and when the political rivals of that great man had set the fashion of assailing them in order to injure him. This seems to me one probable reason for determining the chronology of the Apolloniate Diogenes: another is, that his description of the veins in the human body is so minute and detailed as to betoken an advanced period of philosophy between B.C. 440-410. See the point discussed in Panzerbieter, Fragment. Diogen. Apoll. c. 12-18 (Leipsic, 1830).

Simplikius (ad Aristot. Phys. fol. 6 A) describes Diogenes as having been σχεδὸν νεώτατος in the series of physical theorists.

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was but one primordial element—and that element was air. He laid it down as indisputable that all the different objects in this Kosmos must be at the bottom one and the same thing: unless this were the fact, they would not act upon each other, nor mix together, nor do good and harm to each other, as we see that they do. Plants would not grow out of the earth, nor would animals live and grow by nutrition, unless there existed as a basis this universal sameness of nature. No one thing therefore has a peculiar nature of its own: there is in all the same nature, but very changeable and diversified.[1]

Air was the primordial, universal element.

Now the fundamental substance, common to all, was air. Air was infinite, eternal, powerful; it was, besides, full of intelligence and knowledge. This latter property Diogenes proved by the succession of climatic and atmospheric phenomena of winter and summer, night and day, rain, wind, and fine weather. All these successions were disposed in the best possible manner by the air: which could not have laid out things in such regular order and measure, unless it had been endowed with intelligence. Moreover, air was the source of life, soul, and intelligence, to men and animals: who inhaled all these by respiration, and lost all of them as soon as they ceased to respire.[2]

Air possessed numerous and diverse pro-

Air, life-giving and intelligent, existed everywhere, formed the essence of everything, comprehended and governed everything. Nothing in nature could be without it: yet at the same time all things in nature partook of it

[1] Diogen. Ap. Fragm. ii. c. 29 Panzerb.; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 39. *εἰ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ἐόντα νῦν γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἄλλα, ὅσα φαίνεται ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ἐόντα, εἰ τουτέων τι ἦν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἕτερον ἐὸν τῇ ἰδίῃ φύσει, καὶ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐὸν μετέπιπτε πολλαχῶς καὶ ἠτεροιοῦτο· οὐδαμῇ οὔτε μίσγεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἠδύνατο οὔτε ὠφέλησις τῷ ἑτέρῳ οὔτε βλάβη*, &c.

Aristotle approves this fundamental tenet of Diogenes, the conclusion that there must be one common Something out of which all things came—*ἐξ ἑνὸς ἅπαντα* (Gen. et Corrupt. i. 6-7, p. 322, a. 14), inferred from the fact that they acted upon each other.

[2] Diog. Apoll. Fr. iv.-vi. c. 36-42, Panz. *—Οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω δέδασθαι οἷόν τε ἦν ἄνευ νοήσιος, ὥστε πάντων μέτρα ἔχειν, χειμῶνός τε καὶ θέρεος καὶ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρης καὶ ὑετῶν καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ εὐδιῶν. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εἴ τις βούλεται ἐννοέεσθαι, εὕρισκοι ἂν οὕτω διακείμενα, ὡς ἀνυστὸν κάλλιστα. Ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τάδε μεγάλα σημεῖα· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ἀναπνέοντα ζώει τῷ ἀέρι. Καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς καὶ ψυχή ἐστι καὶ νόησις——*

—Καὶ μοὶ δοκέει τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὁ ἀὴρ καλεόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, &c.

Schleiermacher has an instructive commentary upon these fragments of the Apolloniate Diogenes (Vermischte Schriften, vol. ii. p. 157-162; Ueber Diogenes von Apollonia).

perties; was eminently modifiable.

in a different manner.[1] For it was distinguished by great diversity of properties and by many gradations of intelligence. It was hotter or colder—moister or drier—denser or rarer—more or less active and movable—exhibiting differences of colour and taste. All these diversities were found in objects, though all at the bottom were air. Reason and intelligence resided in the warm air. So also to all animals as well as to men, the common source of vitality, whereby they lived, saw, heard, and understood, was air; hotter than the atmosphere generally, though much colder than that near the sun.[2] Nevertheless, in spite of this common characteristic, the air was in other respects so indefinitely modifiable, that animals were of all degrees of diversity, in form, habits, and intelligence. Men were doubtless more alike among themselves: yet no two of them could be found exactly alike, furnished with the same dose of aerial heat or vitality. All other things, animate and inanimate, were generated and perished, beginning from air and ending in air: which alone continued immortal and indestructible.[3]

Physiology of Diogenes —his description of the veins in the human body.

The intelligence of men and animals, very unequal in character and degree, was imbibed by respiration, the inspired air passing by means of the veins and along with the blood into all parts of the body. Of the veins Diogenes gave a description remarkable for its minuteness of detail, in an age when philosophers dwelt almost exclusively in loose general analogies.[4] He conceived the principal seat of intelligence in man to be in the thoracic cavity, or in the ventricle of the heart, where a quantity of air was accumulated ready for distribution.[5] The

[1] Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. καί ἐστι μηδὲ ἓν ὅ, τι μὴ μετέχει τούτου (air). Μετέχει δὲ οὐδὲ ἓν ὁμοίως τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ· ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ τρόποι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τῆς νοήσιός εἰσιν.

Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, p. 405, a. 21. Διογένης δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες, ἀέρα [ὑπέλαβε τὴν ψυχήν], &c.

[2] Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. καὶ πάντων ζώων δὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀὴρ θερμότερος μὲν τοῦ ἔξω ἐν ᾧ ἐσμέν, τοῦ μέντοι παρὰ τῷ ἡλίῳ πολλὸν ψυχρότερος.

[3] Diogen. Apoll. Fr. v. ch. 38, Panz.

[4] Diogen. Apoll. Fr. vii. ch. 48, Panz. The description of the veins given by Diogenes is preserved in Aristotel. Hist. Animal. iii. 2: yet seemingly only in a defective abstract, for Theophrastus alludes to various opinions of Diogenes on the veins, which are not contained in Aristotle. See Philippson, Ὑλη ἀνθρωπίνη, p. 203.

[5] Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 5. Ἐν τῇ ἀρτηριακῇ κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας, ἥτις ἐστὶ καὶ πνευματική. See Panzerbieter's commentary upon these words, which are not very clear (c. 50), nor easy to reconcile with the description given by Diogenes himself of the veins.

warm and dry air concentrated round the brain, and reached by veins from the organs of sense, was the centre of sensation. Taste was explained by the soft and porous nature of the tongue, and by the number of veins communicating with it. The juices of sapid bodies were sucked up by it as by a sponge: the odorous stream of air penetrated from without through the nostrils: both were thus brought into conjunction with the sympathising cerebral air. To this air also the image impressed upon the eye was transmitted, thereby causing vision:[1] while pulsations and vibrations of the air without, entering through the ears and impinging upon the same centre, generated the sensation of sound. If the veins connecting the eye with the brain were inflamed, no visual sensation could take place;[2] moreover if our minds or attention were absorbed in other things, we were often altogether insensible to sensations either of sight or of sound: which proved that the central air within us was the real seat of sensation.[3] Thought and intelligence, as well as sensation, was an attribute of the same central air within us, depending especially upon its purity, dryness, and heat, and impeded or deadened by moisture or cold. Both children and animals had less intelligence than men: because they had more moisture in their bodies, so that the veins were choked up, and the air could not get along them freely to all parts. Plants had no intelligence; having no apertures or ducts whereby the air could pervade their internal structure. Our sensations were pleasurable when there was much air mingled with the blood, so as to lighten the flow of it, and to carry it easily to

[1] Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 18. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 39-41-43. *Κριτικώτατον δὲ ἡδονῆς τὴν γλῶτταν· ἁπαλώτατον γὰρ εἶναι καὶ μανὸν καὶ τὰς φλέβας ἁπάσας ἀνήκειν εἰς αὐτήν.*

[2] Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 16; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 40.

[3] Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 42. *Ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ αἰσθάνεται, μικρὸν ὢν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ, σημεῖον εἶναι, ὅτι πολλάκις πρὸς ἄλλα τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντες οὔθ' ὁρῶμεν οὔτ' ἀκούομεν.* The same opinion—that sensation, like thought, is a mental process, depending on physical conditions—is ascribed to Strato (the disciple and successor of Theophrastus) by Porphyry, De Abstinentiâ, iii. 21. *Στράτωνος τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀποδεικνύων, ὡς οὐδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι το παράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει. καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις ἐπιπορευομένους τῇ ὄψει καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσι πρὸς ἑτέρους τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας—ἢ καὶ λέλεκται, νοῦς ὁρᾷ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τἆλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.*

The expression ascribed to Diogenes by Theophrastus—*ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ, μικρὸν ὢν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ*—is so printed by Philippson; but the word *θεοῦ* seems not well avouched as to the text, and Schneider prints *θυμοῦ*. It is not impossible that Diogenes may have called the air God, without departing from his physical theory: but this requires proof.

all parts: they were painful when there was little air, and when the blood was torpid and thick.[1]

Kosmology and Meteorology.

The structure of the Kosmos Diogenes supposed to have been effected by portions of the infinite air, taking upon them new qualities and undergoing various transformations. Some air, becoming cold, dense, and heavy, sunk down to the centre, and there remained stationary as earth and water: while the hotter, rarer, and lighter air ascended and formed the heavens, assuming through the intelligence included in it a rapid rotatory movement round the earth, and shaping itself into sun, moon, and stars, which were light and porous bodies like pumice stone. The heat of this celestial matter acted continually upon the earth and water beneath, so that the earth became comparatively drier, and the water was more and more drawn up as vapour, to serve for nourishment to the heavenly bodies. The stars also acted as breathing-holes to the Kosmos, supplying the heated celestial mass with fresh air from the infinite mass without.[2] Like Anaxagoras, Diogenes conceived the figure of the earth as flat and round, like a drum; and the rotation of the heavens as lateral, with the axis perpendicular to the surface of the earth, and the north pole always at the zenith. This he supposed to have been the original arrangement; but after a certain time, the earth tilted over spontaneously towards the south—the northern half was elevated and the southern half depressed—so that the north pole was no longer at the zenith, and the axis of rotation of the

[1] Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 43-46; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. v. 20. That moisture is the cause of dulness, and that the dry soul is the best and most intelligent—is cited among the doctrines of Herakleitus, with whom Diogenes of Apollonia is often in harmony. Αὖη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη. See Schleiermach. Herakleitos, sect. 59-64.

[2] Plutarch ap. Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8; Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Diogen. Laert. ix. 53. Διογένης κισσηροειδῆ τὰ ἄστρα, διαπνοίας δὲ αὐτὰ νομίζει τοῦ κόσμου, εἶναι δὲ διάπυρα· συμπεριφέρεσθαι δὲ τοῖς φανεροῖς ἄστροις ἀφανεῖς λίθους καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἀνωνύμους· πίπτοντα δὲ πολλάκις ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σβέννυσθαι· καθάπερ τὸν ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς πυρωδῶς κατενεχθέντα ἀστέρα πέτρινον. This remarkable anticipation of modern astronomy—the recognition of aerolithes as a class of non-luminous earthy bodies revolving round the sun, but occasionally coming within the sphere of the earth's attraction, becoming luminous in our atmosphere, falling on the earth, and there being extinguished—is noticed by Alex. von Humboldt in his Kosmos, vol. i. p. 98-104, Eng. trans. He says—"The opinion of Diogenes of Apollonia entirely accords with that of the present day," p. 110. The charm and value of that interesting book is greatly enhanced by his frequent reference to the ancient points of view on astronomical subjects.

heavens became apparently oblique.[1] He thought, moreover, that the existing Kosmos was only of temporary duration; that it would perish and be succeeded by future analogous systems, generated from the same common substance of the infinite and indestructible air.[2] Respecting animal generation—and to some extent respecting meteorological phenomena[3]—Diogenes also propounded several opinions, which are imperfectly known, but which appear to have resembled those of Anaxagoras.

Leukippus and Demokritus—Atomic theory.

Nearly contemporary with Anaxagoras and Empedokles, two other enquirers propounded a new physical theory very different from those already noticed—usually known under the name of the atomic theory. This theory, though originating with the Eleate Leukippus, obtained celebrity chiefly from his pupil Demokritus of Abdêra, its expositor and improver. Demokritus (born seemingly in B.C. 460, and reported to have reached extreme old age) was nine years younger than Sokrates, thirty-three years older than Plato, and forty years younger than Anaxagoras. The age of Leukippus is not known, but he can hardly have been much younger than Anaxagoras.

Long life, varied travels, and numerous compositions of Demokritus.

Of Leukippus we know nothing: of Demokritus, very little—yet enough to exhibit a life, like that of Anaxagoras, consecrated to philosophical investigation, and neglectful not merely of politics, but even of inherited patrimony.[5] His attention was chiefly turned towards the study of Nature, with conceptions less vague, and a more enlarged observation of facts, than any of his contemporaries had ever bestowed. He was enabled to boast that no one had surpassed him in extent of travelling over foreign lands, in intelligent research and converse with enlightened natives, or in following out the geometrical relations

[1] Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 8; Panzerbieter ad Diog. Ap. c. 76-78; Schaubach ad Anaxagor. Fr. p. 175.

[2] Plut. Ap. Euseb., Præp. Evang. i. 8.

[3] Preller, Hist. Philosoph. Græc.-Rom. ex Font. Loc. Contexta, sect. 68. Preller thinks that Diogenes employed his chief attention "in animantium naturâ ex aeris principio repetendâ"; and that he was less full "in cognitione τῶν μετεώρων". But the fragments scarcely justify this.

[4] Diogen. Laert. ix. 41. See the chronology of Demokritus discussed in Mullach, Frag. Dem. p. 12-25; and in Zeller, Phil. der Griech., vol. i. p. 576-581, 2nd edit. The statement of Apollodorus as to the date of his birth, appears more trustworthy than the earlier date assigned by Thrasyllus (B.C. 470). Demokritus declared himself to be forty years younger than Anaxagoras.

[5] Dionys. ix. 36-39.

of lines.[1] He spent several years in visiting Egypt, Asia Minor, and Persia. His writings were numerous, and on many different subjects, including ethics, as well as physics, astronomy, and anthropology. None of them have been preserved. But we read, even from critics like Dionysius of Halikarnassus and Cicero, that they were composed in an impressive and semi-poetical style, not unworthy to be mentioned in analogy with Plato; while in range and diversity of subjects they are hardly inferior to Aristotle.[2]

Relation between the theory of Demokritus and that of Parmenides.

The theory of Leukippus and Demokritus (we have no means of distinguishing the two) appears to have grown out of the Eleatic theory.[3] Parmenides the Eleate (as I have already stated) in distinguishing Ens, the self-existent, real, or absolute, on one side—from the phenomenal and relative on the other—conceived the former in such a way that its connection with the latter was dissolved. The real and absolute, according to him, was One, extended, enduring, continuous, unchangeable, immovable: the conception of Ens included these affirmations, and at the same time excluded peremptorily Non-Ens, or the contrary of Ens. Now the plural, unextended, transient, discontinuous, changeable, and moving, implied a mixture of Ens and Non-Ens, or a partial transition from one to the other. Hence (since Non-Ens was inadmissible) such plurality, &c., could not belong to the real or absolute (ultra-phenomenal), and could only be affirmed as phenomenal or relative. In the latter sense, Parme-

[1] Demokrit. Fragm. 6, p. 238, ed. Mullach. Compare ib. p. 41; Diogen. Laert. ix. 35; Strabo, xv. p. 703.

Pliny, Hist. Natur. "Democritus—vitam inter experimenta consumpsit," &c.

[2] Cicero, Orat. c. 20; Dionys. De Comp. Verbor. c. 24; Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. vii. 265. Δημόκριτος, ὁ τῇ Διὸς φωνῇ παρεικαζόμενος, &c.

Diogenes (ix. 45-48) enumerates the titles of the treatises of Demokritus, as edited in the days of Tiberius by the rhetor Thrasyllus: who distributed them into tetralogies, as he also distributed the dialogues of Plato. It was probably the charm of style, common to Demokritus with Plato, which induced the rhetor thus to edit them both. In regard to scope and spirit of philosophy, the difference between the two was so marked, that Plato is said to have had a positive antipathy to the works of Demokritus, and a desire to burn them (Aristoxenus ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 40). It could hardly be from congeniality of doctrine that the same editor attached himself to both. It has been remarked that Plato never once names Demokritus, while Aristotle cites him very frequently, sometimes with marked praise.

[3] Simplikius, in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 7 A. Λεύκιππος . . . . κοινωνήσας Παρμενίδῃ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐβάδισε Παρμενίδῃ καὶ Ξενοφάνει περὶ τῶν ὄντων δόξαν, ἀλλ', ὡς δοκεῖ, τὴν ἐναντίαν. Aristotel. De Gener. et Corr. i. 8, p. 251, a. 31. Diogen. Laert. ix. 30.

nides *did* affirm it, and even tried to explain it: he explained the phenomenal facts from phenomenal assumptions, apart from and independent of the absolute. While thus breaking down the bridge between the phenomenal on one side and the absolute on the other, he nevertheless recognised each in a sphere of its own.

Demokritean theory—Atoms—Plena and Vacua—Ens and Non-Ens.

This bridge the atomists undertook to re-establish. They admitted that Ens could not really change—that there could be no real generation, or destruction—no transformation of qualities—no transition of many into one, or of one into many. But they denied the unity and continuity and immobility of Ens: they affirmed that it was essentially discontinuous, plural, and moving. They distinguished the extended, which Parmenides had treated as an *Unum continuum*, into extension with body, and extension without body: into *plenum* and *vacuum*, matter and space. They conceived themselves to have thus found positive meanings both for Ens and Non-Ens. That which Parmenides called Non-Ens or nothing, was in their judgment the *vacuum;* not less self-existent than that which he called Something. They established their point by showing that Ens, thus interpreted, would become reconcilable to the phenomena of sense: which latter they assumed as their basis to start from. Assuming motion as a phenomenal fact, obvious and incontestable, they asserted that it could not even appear to be a fact, without supposing *vacuum* as well as body to be real: and the proof that both of them were real was, that only in this manner could sense and reason be reconciled. Farther, they proved the existence of a *vacuum* by appeal to direct physical observation, which showed that bodies were porous, compressible, and capable of receiving into themselves new matter in the way of nutrition. Instead of the Parmenidean Ens, one and continuous, we have a Demokritean Ens, essentially many and discontinuous: *plena* and *vacua*, spaces full and spaces empty, being infinitely intermingled.[1] There existed atoms innumerable, each one in itself

[1] It is chiefly in the eighth chapter of the treatise De Gener. et Corr. (i. 8) that Aristotle traces the doctrine of Leukippus as having grown out of that of the Eleates. Λεύκιππος δ' ἔχειν ὑπόθη λόγους, οἵτινες πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁμολογούμενα λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναιρήσουσιν οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθορὰν οὔτε κίνησιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὄντων, &c. (i. 8, 5). Compare also Aristotel. De Cœlo, iii.

essentially a plenum, admitting no vacant space within it, and therefore indivisible as well as indestructible: but each severed from the rest by surrounding vacant space. The atom could undergo no change: but by means of the empty space around, it could freely move. Each atom was too small to be visible: yet all atoms were not equally small; there were fundamental differences between them in figure and magnitude: and they had no other qualities except figure and magnitude. As no atom could be divided into two, so no two atoms could merge into one. Yet though two or more atoms could not so merge together as to lose their real separate individuality, they might nevertheless come into such close approximation as to appear one, and to act on our senses as a phenomenal combination manifesting itself by new sensible properties.[1]

The bridge, broken down by Parmenides, between the real and the phenomenal world, was thus in theory re-established.

4, p. 303, a. 6; Metaphys. A. 4, p. 985, b. 5. Physic. iv. 6: λέγουσι δὲ (Demokritus, &c., in proving a vacuum) ἐν μὲν ὅτι ἡ κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τόπον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, οὐ γὰρ ἂν δοκεῖν εἶναι κίνησιν εἰ μὴ εἴη κενόν· τὸ γὰρ πλῆρες ἀδύνατον εἶναι δέξασθαί τι· &c.

Plutarch adv. Kolot. p. 1108. Οἷς οὐδ' ὄναρ ἐντυχὼν ὁ Κολώτης, ἐσφάλη περὶ λέξιν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς (Demokritus) ἐν ᾗ διορίζεται, μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν, ἢ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι· δὲν μὲν ὀνομάζων τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν δὲ τὸ κενόν, ὡς καὶ τούτου φύσιν τινὰ καὶ ὑπόστασιν ἰδίαν ἔχοντος.

The affirmation of Demokritus—That Nothing existed, just as much as Something—appears a paradox which we must probably understand as implying that he here adopted, for the sake of argument, the language of the Eleates, his opponents. They called the vacuum *Nothing*, but Demokritus did not so call it. If (said Demokritus) you call vacuum *Nothing*, then I say that Nothing exists as well as Something.

The direct observations by which Demokritus showed the existence of a vacuum were—1. A vessel with ashes in it will hold as much water as if it were empty: hence we know that there are pores in the ashes, into which the water is received. 2. Wind can be compressed in skins. 3. The growth of organised bodies proves that they have pores, through which new matter in the form of nourishment is admitted. (Aristot. Physic. iv. 6, p. 213, b.)

Besides this, Demokritus set forth motion as an indisputable fact, ascertained by the evidence of sense: and affirmed that motion was impossible, except on the assumption that vacuum existed. Melissus, the disciple of Parmenides, inverted the reasoning, in arguing against the reality of motion. If it be real (he said), then there must exist a vacuum: but no vacuum does or can exist: therefore there is no real motion. (Aristot. Physic. iv. 6.)

Since Demokritus started from these facts of sense, as the base of his hypothesis of atoms and vacua, so Aristotle (Gen. et Corr. i. 2; De Animâ, i. 2) might reasonably say that he took sensible appearances as truth. But we find Demokritus also describing reason as an improvement and enlightenment of sense, and complaining how little of truth was discoverable by man. See Mullach, Demokritus (pp. 414, 415). Compare Philippson—Ὕλη ἀνθρωπίνη—Berlin, 1831.

[1] Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325. a. 25, *τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθη τὰ ἀδιαίρετα στερεά*. Diogen. Laert. ix. 44; Plutarch, adv. Koloten. p. 1110 seq.

Zeller, Philos. der Griech., vol. i. p. 583-588, ed. 2nd; Aristotel. Metaphys. Z. 13, p. 1039, a. 10, ἀδύνατον εἶναί φησι Δημόκριτος ἐκ δύο ἓν ἢ ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο γενέσθαι· τὰ γὰρ μεγέθη τὰ ἄτομα τὰς οὐσίας ποιεῖ.

For the real world, as described by Demokritus, differed entirely from the sameness and barrenness of the Parmenidean Ens, and presented sufficient movement and variety to supply a basis of explanatory hypothesis, accommodated to more or less of the varieties in the phenomenal world. In respect of quality, indeed, all the atoms were alike, not less than all the vacua: such likeness was (according to Demokritus) the condition of their being able to act upon each other, or to combine as phenomenal aggregates.[1] But in respect to quantity or magnitude as well as in respect to figure, they differed very greatly: moreover, besides all these diversities, the ordination and position of each atom with regard to the rest were variable in every way. As all objects of sense were atomic compounds, so, from such fundamental differences—partly in the constituent atoms themselves, partly in the manner of their arrangement when thrown into combination—arose all the diverse qualities and manifestations of the compounds. When atoms passed into new combination, then there was generation of a new substance: when they passed out of an old combination there was destruction: when the atoms remained the same, but were merely arranged anew in order and relative position, then the phenomenon was simply change. Hence all qualities and manifestations of such compounds were not original, but derivative: they had no "nature of their own," or law peculiar to them, but followed from the atomic composition of the body to which they belonged. They were not real and absolute, like the magnitude and figure of the constituent atoms, but phenomenal and relative—*i.e.* they were powers of acting upon correlative organs of sentient beings, and nullities in the absence of such organs.[2] Such were the colour, sonorousness,

Primordial atoms differed only in magnitude, figure, position, and arrangement—they had no qualities, but their movements and combinations generated qualities.

[1] Aristotel. Gener. et Corr. i. 7, p. 323, b. 12. It was the opinion of Demokritus, that there could be no action except where agent and patient were alike. Φησὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅμοιον εἶναι τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· οὐ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖν τὰ ἕτερα καὶ διαφέροντα πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· ἀλλὰ κἂν ἕτερα ὄντα ποιῇ τι εἰς ἄλληλα, οὐχ ᾗ ἕτερα, ἀλλ' ᾗ ταὐτόν τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτῃ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν αὐτοῖς. Many contemporary philosophers affirmed distinctly the opposite. Τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πᾶν ἀπαθές, &c. Diogenes the Apolloniate agreed on this point generally with Demokritus; see above, p. 61, note [1]. The facility with which these philosophers laid down general maxims is constantly observable.

[2] Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, p. 316, a. 1; Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 63, 64. Περὶ μὲν οὖν βαρέος καὶ κούφου καὶ

taste, smell, heat, cold, &c., of the bodies around us: they were relative, implying correlative percipients. Moreover they were not merely relative, but perpetually fluctuating; since the compounds were frequently changing either in arrangement or in diversity of atoms, and every such atomic change, even to a small extent, caused it to work differently upon our organs.[1]

Combinations of atoms—generating different qualities in the compounds.

Among the various properties of bodies, however, there were two which Demokritus recognised as not merely relative to the observer, but also as absolute and belonging to the body in itself. These were weight and hardness —primary qualities (to use the phraseology of Locke and Reid), as contrasted with the secondary qualities of colour, taste, and the like. Weight, or tendency downward, belonged (according to Demokritus) to each individual atom separately, in proportion to its magnitude: the specific gravity of all atoms was supposed to be equal. In compound bodies one body was heavier than another, in proportion as its bulk was more filled with atoms and less with vacant space.[2] The hardness and softness of bodies Demokritus explained by the peculiar size and peculiar junction of their component atoms. Thus, comparing lead with iron, the former is heavier and softer, the latter is lighter and harder. Bulk for bulk, the lead contained a larger proportion of solid, and a smaller proportion of interstices, than the iron: hence it was heavier. But its structure was equable throughout; it had a greater multitude of minute atoms diffused through its bulk, equally close to and coherent with each other on every side, but not more close and coherent on one side than on another. The structure of the iron, on the contrary, was unequal and irregular, including larger

σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ ἐν τούτοις ἀφορίζει· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν οὐδενὸς εἶναι φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα πάθη τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀλλοιουμένης, ἐξ ἧς γίνεσθαι τὴν φαντασίαν, &c.

Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. i. c. 16. Φύσιν μὲν μηδὲν εἶναι χρῶμα, τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα ἄποια, τά τε μεστὰ καὶ τὸ κενόν· τὰ δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν συγκρίματα κέχρῶσθαι διαταγῇ τε καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ προτροπῇ, &c.

Demokritus restricted the term Φύσις —Nature—to the primordial atoms and vacua (Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. p. 310 A.).

[1] Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, p. 315, b. 10. Ὥστε ταῖς μεταβολαῖς τοῦ συγκειμένου τὸ αὐτὸ ἐναντίον δοκεῖν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ μετακινεῖσθαι μικροῦ ἐμμιγνυμένου, καὶ ὅλως ἕτερον φαίνεσθαι ἑνὸς μετακινηθέντος.

[2] Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 61. Βαρὺ μὲν οὖν καὶ κοῦφον τῷ μεγέθει διαιρεῖ Δημόκριτος, &c.

Aristotel. De Cœlo, iv. 2, 7, p. 309, a. 10; Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 326, a. 9. Καίτοι βαρύτερόν γε κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν φησιν εἶναι Δημόκριτος ἕκαστον τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων, &c.

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spaces of vacuum in one part, and closer approach of its atoms in other parts: moreover these atoms were in themselves larger, hence there was a greater force of cohesion between them on one particular side, rendering the whole mass harder and more unyielding than the lead.[1]

We thus see that Demokritus, though he supposed single atoms to be all of the same specific gravity, yet recognised a different specific gravity in the various compounds of atoms or material masses. It is to be remembered that, when we speak of contact or combination of atoms, this is not to be understood literally and absolutely, but only in a phenomenal and relative sense; as an approximation, more or less close, but always sufficiently close to form an atomic combination which our senses apprehended as one object. Still every atom was essentially separate from every other, and surrounded by a margin of vacant space: no two atoms could merge into one, any more than one atom could be divided into two.

All atoms essentially separate from each other.

Pursuant to this theory, Demokritus proclaimed that all the properties of objects, except weight, hardness, and softness, were not inherent in the objects themselves, but simply phenomenal and relative to the observer—"modifications of our sensibility". Colour, taste, smell, sweet and bitter, hot and cold, &c., were of this description. In respect to all of them, man differed from other animals, one man from another, and even the same man from himself at different times and ages. There was no sameness of impression, no unanimity or constancy of judgment, because there was no real or objective "nature" corresponding to the impression. From none of these senses could we at all learn what the external thing was in itself. "Sweet and bitter, hot and cold (he said) are by law or convention (*i.e.*, these names designate the impressions of most men on most occasions, taking no account of dissentients): what really exists is, atoms and vacuum. The sensible objects which we suppose and believe to exist do not exist in truth; there exist only atoms and vacuum.

All properties of objects, except weight and hardness, were phenomenal and relative to the observer Sensation could give no knowledge of the real and absolute.

[1] Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 62.

We know nothing really and truly about an object, either what it is or what it is not: our opinions depend upon influences from without, upon the position of our body, upon the contact and resistances of external objects. There are two phases of knowledge, the obscure and the genuine. To the obscure belong all our senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The genuine is distinct from these. When the obscure phase fails, when we can no longer see, nor hear, nor smell, nor taste, nor touch—from minuteness and subtlety of particles—then the genuine phase, or reason and intelligence, comes into operation."[1]

Reason alone gave true and real knowledge, but very little of it was attainable.

True knowledge (in the opinion of Demokritus) was hardly at all attainable; but in so far as it could be attained, we must seek it, not merely through the obscure and insufficient avenues of sense, but by reason or intelligence penetrating to the ultimatum of corpuscular structure, farther than sense could go. His atoms were not pure Abstracta (like Plato's Ideas and geometrical plane figures, and Aristotle's materia prima), but concrete bodies, each with its own[2] magnitude, figure, and movement; too small to be seen or felt by us, yet not too small to be seen or felt by beings endowed with finer sensitive power. They were abstractions mainly in so far as all other qualities were supposed absent. Demokritus professed to show how the movements, approximations, and collisions of these atoms, brought them into such combinations as to form the existing Kosmos; and not that system alone, but also many other cosmical systems, independent of and different from each other, which he supposed to exist.

No separate force required to set the atoms in

How this was done we cannot clearly make out, not having before us the original treatise of Demokritus, called the Great Diakosmos. It is certain, however, that he did not invoke any separate agency to set the atoms

[1] Demokritus, Fr. p. 205, Mullach; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. p. 135; Diogen. Laert. ix. 72.

[2] Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 29. Ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀόρατα διὰ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων, &c.

Marbach observes justly that the Demokritean atoms, though not really objects of sense in consequence of their smallness (of their disproportion to our visual power), are yet spoken of as objects of sense: they are as it were microscopic objects, and the γνησίη γνώμη, or intelligence, is conceived as supplying something of a microscopic power. (Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, sect. 58, vol. i. p. 94.)

in motion—such as the Love and Discord of Empedokles — the Nous or Intelligence of Anaxagoras. Demokritus supposed that the atoms moved by an inherent force of their own: that this motion was as much without beginning as the atoms themselves:[1] that eternal motion was no less natural, no more required any special cause to account for it, than eternal rest. "Such is the course of nature—such is and always has been the fact," was his ultimatum.[2] He farther maintained that all the motions of the atoms were necessary—that is, that they followed each other in a determinate order, each depending upon some one or more antecedents, according to fixed laws, which he could not explain.[3] Fixed

motion—they moved by an inherent force of their own. Like atoms naturally tend towards like. Rotatory motion, the capital fact of the Kosmos.

[1] Aristotel. De Cœlo, iii. 2, 3, p. 300, b. 9. Λευκίππῳ καὶ Δημοκριτῳ, τοῖς λέγουσιν ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι τὰ πρῶτα σώματα, &c. (Physic. viii. 3, 3, p. 253, b. 12, viii. 9, p. 265, b. 23; Cicero, De Finib. i. 6 17.)

[2] Aristot. Generat. Animal. ii. 6, p. 742, b. 20: Physic. viii. 1, p. 252, b. 32. Aristotle blames Demokritus for thus acquiescing in the general course of nature as an ultimatum, and for omitting all reference to final causes. M. Lafaist, in a good dissertation, Sur la Philosophie Atomistique (Paris, 1833, p 78), shows that this is exactly the ultimatum of natural philosophers at the present day. "Un phénomène se passait-il, si on lui en demandait la raison, il (Demokritus) répondait, 'La chose se passe ainsi, parcequ'elle s'est toujours passée ainsi.' C'est, en d'autres termes, la seule réponse que font encore aujourd'hui les naturalistes. Suivant eux, une pierre, quand elle n'est pas soutenue, tombe en vertu de la loi de la pesanteur. Qu'est ce que la loi de la pesanteur? La généralisation de ce fait plusieurs fois observé, qu'une pierre tombe quand elle n'est pas soutenue. Le phénomène dans un cas particulier arrive ainsi, parceque toujours il est arrivé ainsi. Le principe qu'implique l'explication des naturalistes modernes est celle de Démokrite, c'est que la nature demeure constante à elle-même. La proposition de Démokrite—'Tel phénomène a lieu de cette façon, parceque toujours il a eu lieu de cette même façon'—est la première forme qu' ait revêtue le principe de la stabilité des lois naturelles."

[3] Aristotle (Physic. ii. 4, p. 196, a. 25) says that Demokritus (he seems to mean Demokritus) described the motion of the atoms to form the cosmical system, as having taken place ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου. Upon which Mullach (Dem. Frag. p. 382) justly remarks—"Casu (ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου) videntur fieri, quæ naturali quâdam necessitate cujus leges ignoramus evenire dicuntur. Sed quamvis Aristoteles naturalem Abderitani philosophi necessitatem, vitato ἀνάγκης vocabulo, quod alii aliter usurpabant, casum et fortunam vocaret —ipse tamen Democritus, abhorrens ab iis omnibus quæ destinatam causarum seriem tollerent rerumque naturam perturbarent, nihil juris fortunæ et casui in singulis rebus concessit."

Zeller has a like remark upon the phrase of Aristotle, which is calculated to mislead as to the doctrine of Demokritus (Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 600, 2d ed.).

Dugald Stewart, in one of the Dissertations prefixed to the Encyclopædia Britannica, has the like comment respecting the fundamental principle of the Epicurean (identical *quoad hoc* with the Demokritean) philosophy.

"I cannot conclude this note without recurring to an observation ascribed by Laplace to Leibnitz—'that the *blind chance* of the Epicureans involves the supposition of an effect taking place without a cause'. This is a very incorrect statement of the philosophy taught by Lucretius, which nowhere gives countenance to such a supposition. The distinguishing tenet of this sect was, that the order of the universe does not imply the existence of *intelligent* causes, but may be accounted for by the active powers belonging to the

laws, known or unknown, he recognised always. Fortune or chance was only a fiction imagined by men to cover their own want of knowledge and foresight.[1] Demokritus seems to have supposed that like atoms had a spontaneous tendency towards like; that all, when uncombined, tended naturally downwards, yet with unequal force, owing to their different size, and weight proportional to size; that this unequal force brought them into impact and collision one with another, out of which was generated a rotatory motion, gradually extending itself, and comprehending a larger and larger number of them, up to a certain point, when an exterior membrane or shell was formed around them.[2] This rotatory motion was the capital fact which both constituted the Kosmos, and maintained the severance of its central and peripheral masses—Earth and Water in the centre—Air, Fire, and the celestial bodies, near the circumference. Demokritus, Anaxagoras, and Empedokles, imagined different preliminary hypotheses to get at the fact of rotation; but all employed the fact, when arrived at, as a basis from which to deduce the formation of the various cosmical bodies and their known manifestations.[3] In respect to these bodies—Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, &c.—Demokritus seems to have held several opinions like those of Anaxagoras. Both of them conceived the Sun as a redhot mass, and the Earth as a flat surface above and below, round horizontally like a drum, stationary in the centre of the revolving celestial bodies, and supported by the resistance of air beneath.[4]

atoms of matter: which active powers, being exerted through an indefinitely long period of time, might have produced, nay must have produced, exactly such a combination of things as that with which we are surrounded. This does not call in question the necessity of a cause to produce every effect, but, on the contrary, virtually assumes the truth of that axiom. It only excludes from these causes the attribute of intelligence. In the same way, when I apply the words *blind chance* to the throw of a die, I do not mean to deny that I am ultimately the cause of the particular event that is to take place: but only to intimate that I do not here act as a *designing* cause, in consequence of my ignorance of the various accidents to which the die is subjected while shaken in the box. If I am not mistaken, this Epicurean theory approaches very nearly to the scheme which it is the main object of the Essay on Probabilities (by Laplace) to inculcate." (Stewart—First Dissertation, part ii. p. 139, note.)

[1] Demokrit. Frag. p. 167, ed. Mullach; Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xiv. 27. *ἄνθρωποι τύχης εἴδωλον ἐπλάσαντο πρόφασιν ἰδίης ἀβουλίης.*

[2] Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 604 seq.; Demokrit. Fragm. p. 207, Mull.; Sext. Empiricus adv. Mathem. vii. 117.

[3] Demokrit. Fragm. p. 208, Mullach. *Δημόκριτος ἐν οἷς φησι δίνῃ ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀποκρίνεσθαι παντοίων εἰδέων*, &c. Diog. Laert. ix. 31-44.

[4] Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 612, ed. 2nd.

Among the researches of Demokritus there were some relating to animal generation, and zoology; but we cannot find that his opinions on these subjects were in peculiar connection with his atomic theory.[1] Nor do we know how far he carried out that theory into detail by tracing the various phenomenal manifestations to their basis in atomic reality, and by showing what particular magnitude, figure, and arrangement of atoms belonged to each. It was only in some special cases that he thus connected determinate atoms with compounds of determinate quality; for example, in regard to the four Empedoklean elements. The atoms constituting heat or fire he affirmed to be small and globular, the most mobile, rapid, and penetrating of all: those constituting air, water, and earth, were an assemblage of all varieties of figures, but differed from each other in magnitude —the atoms of air being apparently smallest, those of earth largest.[2]

Researches of Demokritus on zoology and animal generation.

In regard to mind or soul generally, he identified it with heat or fire, conceiving it to consist in the same very small, globular, rapidly movable atoms, penetrating everywhere: which he illustrated by comparison with the fine dust seen in sunbeams when shining through a doorway. That these were the constituent atoms of mind, he proved by the fact, that its first and most essential property was to move the body, and to be itself moved.[3] Mind, soul, the vital principle, fire, heat, &c., were, in the opinion of Demokritus, substantially identical—not confined to man or even to animals, but diffused, in unequal proportions, throughout plants, the air, and nature generally. Sensation, thought, knowledge, were all motions of mind or of these restless mental particles, which Demokritus supposed to be distributed over every part of the living body, mingling and alternating with the corporeal particles.[4] It was the essential condition of life, that the mental particles should be maintained

His account of mind—he identified it with heat or fire, diffused throughout animals, plants, and nature generally. Mental particles intermingled throughout all the frame with corporeal particles.

[1] Mullach, Demokr. Fragm. p. 395 seqq.

[2] Aristotle, Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 326, a. 5; De Cœlo, iii. 8, p. 306, b. 35; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 64.

[3] Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, 2-3, p. 403, b. 28; i. 3, p. 406, b. 20; Cicero, Tuscul. Disput. i. 11; Diogen. Laert. ix. 44.

[4] Aristotel. De Respirat. (c. 4, p.

in proper number and distribution throughout the body; but by their subtle nature they were constantly tending to escape, being squeezed or thrust out at all apertures by the pressure of air on all the external parts. Such tendency was counteracted by the process of respiration, whereby mental or vital particles, being abundantly distributed throughout the air, were inhaled along with air, and formed an inward current which either prevented the escape, or compensated the loss, of those which were tending outwards. When breathing ceased, such inward current being no longer kept up, the vital particles in the interior were speedily forced out, and death ensued.[1]

Different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of the body.

Though Demokritus conceived these mental particles as distributed all over the body, yet he recognised different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of the body. Besides the special organs of sense, he considered intelligence as attached to the brain, passion to the heart, and appetite to the liver:[2] the same tripartite division afterwards adopted by Plato. He gave an explanation of perception or sensation in its different varieties, as well as of intelligence or thought. Sensation and thought were, in his opinion, alike material, and alike mental. Both were affections of the same peculiar particles, vital or mental, within us: both were changes operated in these particles by effluvia or images from without; nevertheless the one change was different from the other.[3]

In regard to sensations, Demokritus said little about those of

472, a. 5), λέγει (Demokritus) ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ταὐτὸν, τὰ πρῶτα σχήματα τῶν σφαιροειδῶν.

Lucretius, iii. 370.

Illud in his rebus nequaquam sumere possis,
Democriti quod sancta viri sententia ponit;
Corporis atque animi primordia singula privis
Adposita alternis variare ac nectere membra.

[1] Aristotel. De Respiratione, c. 4, p. 472, a. 10; De Animâ, i. 2, p. 404, a. 12.

[2] Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 618, ed. 2nd.

Plutarch (Placit. Philos. iv. 4), ascribes a bipartite division of the soul to Demokritus: τὸ λογικὸν, in the thorax: τὸ ἄλογον, distributed over all the body. But in the next section (iv. 5), he departs from this statement, affirming that both Demokritus and Plato supposed τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν of the soul to be in the head.

[3] Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 8. Demokritus and Leukippus affirm τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν νόησιν γίνεσθαι, εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προσιόντων· μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος εἰδώλου.

Cicero, De Finibus, i. 6, 21, "imagines, quæ idola nominant, quorum incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam cogitemus," &c.

touch, smell, and hearing; but he entered at some length into those of sight and taste.[1]

Explanation of different sensations and perceptions.

Proceeding upon his hypothesis of atoms and vacua as the only objective existences, he tried to show what particular modifications of atoms, in figure, size, and position, produced upon the sentient the impressions of different colours. He recognised four fundamental or simple colours—white, black, red, and green—of which all other colours were mixtures and combinations.[2] White colour (he said) was caused by smooth surfaces, which presented straight pores and a transparent structure, such as the interior surface of shells: where these smooth substances were brittle or friable, this arose from the constituent atoms being at once spherical and loosely connected together, whereby they presented the clearest passage through their pores, the least amount of shadow, and the purest white colour. From substances thus constituted, the effluvia flowed out easily, and passed through the intermediate air without becoming entangled or confused with it. Black colour was caused by rough, irregular, unequal substances, which had their pores crooked and obstructed, casting much shadow, and sending forth slowly their effluvia, which became hampered and entangled with the intervening medium of air. Red colour arose from the effluvia of spherical atoms, like those of fire, though of larger size: the connection between red colour and fire was proved by the fact that heated substances, man as well as the metals, became red. Green was produced by atoms of large size and wide vacua, not restricted to any determinate shape, but arranged in peculiar order and position. These four were given by Demokritus as the simple colours. But he recognised an infinite diversity of compound colours, arising from mixture of them in different proportions, several of which he explained—gold-colour, purple, blue, violet, leek-green, nut-brown, &c.[3]

Colours.

[1] Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 64.

[2] Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 73 seq.; Aristotel. De Sensu, c. iv. p. 442, b. 10.

The opinions of Demokritus on colour are illustrated at length by Prantl in his Uebersicht der Farbenlehre der Alten (p. 49 seq.), appended to his edition of the Aristotelian or Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, Περὶ Χρωμάτων (Munich, 1849).

Demokritus seems also to have attempted to show, that the sensation of cold and shivering was produced by the irruption of jagged and acute atoms. See Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, p. 947, 948, c. 8.

[3] Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 76-78.

Vision caused by the outflow of effluvia or images from objects. Hearing.

Besides thus setting forth those varieties of atoms and atomic motions which produced corresponding varieties of colour, Demokritus also brought to view the intermediate stages whereby they realised the act of vision. All objects, compounds of the atoms, gave out effluvia or images resembling themselves. These effluvia stamped their impression, first upon the intervening air, next upon the eye beyond: which, being covered by a fine membrane, and consisting partly of water, partly of vacuum, was well calculated to admit the image. Such an image, the like of which any one might plainly see by looking into another person's eye, was the immediate cause of vision.[1] The air, however, was no way necessary as an intervening medium, but rather obstructive: the image proceeding from the object would be more clearly impressed upon the eye through a vacuum: if the air did not exist, vision would be so distinct, even at the farthest distance, that an object not larger than an ant might be seen in the heavens.[2] Demokritus believed that the visual image, after having been impressed upon the eye, was distributed or multiplied over the remaining body.[3] In like manner, he believed that, in hearing, the condensed air carrying the sound entered with some violence through the ears, passed through the veins to the brain, and was from thence dispersed over the body.[4] Both sight and hearing were thus not simply acts of the organ of sense, but concurrent operations of the entire frame: over all which (as has been already stated) the mental or vital particles were assumed to be disseminated.

Difference of tastes—how explained.

Farther, Demokritus conceived that the diversities of taste were generated by corresponding diversities of atoms, or compounds of atoms, of particular figure, magnitude, and position. Acid taste was caused by atoms rough, angular, twisted, small, and subtle, which

ἄπειρα τὰ χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χυλοὺς κατὰ τὰς μίξεις—οὐδὲν γὰρ ὅμοιον ἔσεσθαι θάτερον θατέρου.

[1] Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 50. τὸν ἀέρα τὸν μεταξὺ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρωμένου τυποῦσθαι, &c. Aristotel. De Sensu, c. 2, p. 438, a. 6.

Theophrastus notices this intermediate ἀποτύπωσις ἐν τῷ ἀέρι as a doctrine peculiar (ἰδίως) to Demokritus: he himself proceeds to combat it (51, 52).

[2] Aristotel. De Animâ, ii. 7-9, p. 419, a. 16.

[3] Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 54.

[4] Theophrastus, De Sensu, 55, 56. τὴν γὰρ φωνὴν εἶναι πυκνουμένου τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ μετὰ βίας εἰσιόντος, &c.

Demokritus thought that air entered into the system not only through the

forced their way through all the body, produced large interior vacant spaces, and thereby generated great heat: for heat was always proportional to the amount of vacuum within.[1] Sweet taste was produced by spherical atoms of considerable bulk, which slid gently along and diffused themselves equably over the body, modifying and softening the atoms of an opposite character. Astringent taste was caused by large atoms with many angles, which got into the vessels, obstructing the movement of fluids both in the veins and intestines. Salt taste was produced by large atoms, much entangled with each other, and irregular. In like manner Demokritus assigned to other tastes particular varieties of generating atoms: adding, however, that in every actual substance, atoms of different figures were intermingled, so that the effect of each on the whole was only realised in the ratio of the preponderating figure.[2] Lastly, the working of all atoms, in the way of taste, was greatly modified by the particular system upon which they were brought to act: effects totally opposite being sometimes produced by like atoms upon different individuals.[3]

As sensation, so also thought or intelligence, was produced by the working of atoms from without. But in what manner the different figures and magnitudes of atoms were understood to act, in producing diverse modifications of thought, we do not find explained. It was, however, requisite that there should be a symmetry, or correspondence of condition between the thinking mind within and the inflowing atoms from without, in order that these latter might work upon a man properly: if he were too hot, or too cold, his mind went astray.[4] Though Demokritus identified the mental or vital particles with the

Thought or Intelligence —was produced by influx of atoms from without.

ears, but also through pores in other parts of the body, though so gently as to be imperceptible to our consciousness: the ears afforded a large aperture, and admitted a considerable mass.

[1] Theophrast. De Sensu, 65-68.

[2] Theophrast. De Sensu, 67. *ἀπάντων δὲ τῶν σχημάτων οὐδὲν ἀκέραιον εἶναι καὶ ἀμιγὲς τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκάστῳ πολλὰ εἶναι . . . . . οὗ δ' ἂν ἐνῇ πλεῖστον, τοῦτο μάλιστα ἐνισχύειν πρός τε τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν.*

This essential intermixture, in each distinct substance, of atoms of all different shapes, is very analogous to the essential intermixture of all sorts of Homœomeries in the theory of Anaxagoras.

[3] Theophrast. De Sensu, 67. *εἰς ὁποίαν ἕξιν ἂν εἰσέλθῃ, διαφέρειν οὐκ ὀλίγον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ τἀναντία, καὶ τἀναντία τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε.*

[4] Theophrast. De Sensu, 58. *Περὶ δὲ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἴρηκεν, ὅτι γίνεται συμμέτρως ἐχούσης τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν· ἐὰν δὲ περίθερμός τις ἢ περίψυχρος γένηται, μεταλλάττειν φησί.*

spherical atoms constituting heat or fire, he nevertheless seems to have held that these particles might be in excess as well as in deficiency, and that they required, as a condition of sound mind, to be diluted or attempered with others. The soundest mind, however, did not work by itself or spontaneously, but was put in action by atoms or effluvia from without: this was true of the intellectual mind, not less than of the sensational mind. There was an objective something without, corresponding to and generating every different thought—just as there was an objective something corresponding to every different sensation. But first, the object of sensation was an atomic compound having some appreciable bulk, while that of thought might be separate atoms or vacua so minute as to be invisible and intangible. Next, the object of sensation did not reveal itself as it was in its own nature, but merely produced changes in the percipient, and different changes in different percipients (except as to heavy and light, hard and soft, which were not simply modifications of our sensibility, but were also primary qualities inherent in the objects themselves [1]): while the object of thought, though it worked a change in the thinking subject, yet also revealed itself as it was, and worked alike upon all.

Sensation, obscure knowledge relative to the sentient; Thought, genuine knowledge —absolute, or object per se.

Hence Demokritus termed sensation, *obscure knowledge*—thought, *genuine knowledge*.[2] It was only by thought (reason, intelligence) that the fundamental realities of nature, atoms and vacua, could be apprehended: even by thought, however, only imperfectly, since there was always more or less of subjective movements and conditions, which partially clouded the pure objective apprehension—and since the atoms themselves were in perpetual movement, as well as inseparably mingled one with another. Under such obstructions,

[1] Theophrastus, De Sensu, 71. *νῦν δὲ σκληροῦ μὲν καὶ μαλακοῦ καὶ βαρέος καὶ κούφου ποιεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅπερ (ἄπερ) οὐχ ἧττον ἔδοξε λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, θερμοῦ δὲ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενός.*

This is a remarkable point to be noted in the criticisms of Theophrastus on the doctrine of Demokritus. Demokritus maintains that *hot* and *cold* are relative to us: *hard* and *soft*, *heavy* and *light*, are not only relative to us, but also absolute, objective, things in their own nature,—though causing in us sensations which are like them. Theophrastus denies this distinction altogether: and denies it with the best reason. Not many of his criticisms on Demokritus are so just and pertinent as this one.

[2] Demokritus Fragm. Mullach, p. 205, 206; ap. Sext. Empir. adv. Mathemat. vii. 135-139, *γνώμης δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι· ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη, &c.*

Demokritus proclaimed that no clear or certain knowledge was attainable: that the sensible objects, which men believed to be absolute realities, were only phenomenal and relative to us,—while the atoms and vacua, the true existences or things in themselves, could scarce ever be known as they were:[1] that truth was hidden in an abyss, and out of our reach.

As Demokritus supposed both sensations and thoughts to be determined by effluvia from without, so he assumed a similar cause to account for beliefs, comfortable or uncomfortable dispositions, fancies, dreams, presentiments, &c. He supposed that the air contained many effluences, spectres, images, cast off from persons and substances in nature—sometimes even from outlying very distant objects which lay beyond the bounds of the Kosmos. Of these images, impregnated with the properties, bodily and mental, of the objects from whence they came, some were beneficent, others mischievous: they penetrated into the human body through the pores and spread their influence all through the system.[2] Those thrown off by jealous and vindictive men were especially hurtful,[3] as they inflicted suffering corresponding to the tempers of those with whom they originated. Trains of thought and feeling were thus excited in men's minds; in sleep,[4] dreams, divinations, prophetic warnings, and threats, were communicated: sometimes, pestilence and other misfortunes were thus begun. Demokritus believed that men's happiness depended much upon the nature and character of the images which might approach them, expressing an anxious wish that he might himself meet with such as were propitious.[5] It was from grand and terrific images of this nature, that he supposed the idea and belief of the Gods to have arisen: a sup-

Idola or images were thrown off from objects, which determined the tone of thoughts, feelings, dreams, divinations, &c.

[1] Democr. Frag., Mull., p. 204-5. Ἅπερ νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ κενόν. ἡμέες δὲ τῷ μὲν ἐόντι οὐδὲν ἀτρεκὲς ξυνίεμεν, μετάπιπτον δὲ κατά τε σώματος διαθιγήν, καὶ τῶν ἐπεισιόντων, καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων . . . . . ἐτεῇ μέν νυν, ὅτι οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἐστιν, οὐ ξυνίεμεν, πολλαχῇ δεδήλωται, &c.

Compare Cicero, Acad. Quæst. i. 13, ii. 10; Diog. Laert. ix. 72; Aristotel. Metaphys. iii. 5, p. 1009, b. 10.

[2] Demokriti Frag. p. 207, Mullach; Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathemat. ix. 19; Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 10, p. 735 A.

[3] Plutarch, Symposiac. v. 7, p. 683 A.

[4] Aristotel. De Divinat. per Somnum, p. 464, a. 5; Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 9, p. 733 E. ὅτι καὶ κόσμων ἐκτὸς φθαρέντων καὶ σωμάτων ἀλλοφύλων ἐκ τῆς ἀπορρύσεως ἐπιῤῥεόντων, ἐνταῦθα πολλάκις ἀρχαὶ παρεμπίπτουσι λοιμῶν καὶ παθῶν οὐ συνήθων.

[5] Plutarch, De Oraculor. Defectu, p. 419. αὐτὸς εὔχεται κὐλόγχων εἰδώλων τυγχάνειν.

position countenanced by the numerous tales, respecting appearances of the Gods both to dreaming and to waking men, current among the poets and in the familiar talk of Greece.

Universality of Demokritus—his ethical views.

Among the lost treasures of Hellenic intellect, there are few which are more to be regretted than the works of Demokritus. Little is known of them except the titles: but these are instructive as well as multifarious. The number of different subjects which they embrace is astonishing. Besides his atomic theory, and its application to cosmogony and physics, whereby he is chiefly known, and from whence his title of *physicus* was derived —we find mention of works on geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, optics, geography or geology, zoology, botany, medicine, music, and poetry, grammar, history, ethics, &c.[1] In such universality he is the predecessor, perhaps the model, of Aristotle. It is not likely that this wide range of subjects should have been handled in a spirit of empty generality, without facts or particulars: for we know that his life was long, his curiosity insatiable, and his personal travel and observation greater than that of any contemporary. We know too that he entered more or less upon the field of dialectics, discussing those questions of evidence which became so rife in the Platonic age. He criticised, and is said to have combated, the doctrine laid down by Protagoras, "Man is the measure of all things". It would have been interesting to know from what point of view he approached it: but we learn only the fact that he criticised it adversely.[2] The numerous treatises of Demokritus, together with the proportion of them which relate to ethical and social subjects, rank him with the philosophers of the Platonic and Aristotelian age. His

[1] See the list of the works of Demokritus in Diogen. Laert. ix. 46, and in Mullach's edition of the Fragments, p. 105-107. Mullach mentions here (note 18) that Demokritus is cited seventy-eight times in the extant works of Aristotle, and sometimes with honourable mention. He is never mentioned by Plato. In the fragment of Philodemus de Musica, Demokritus is called *ἀνὴρ οὐ φυσιολογώτατος μόνον τῶν ἀρχαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἱστορούμενα οὐδενὸς ἧττον πολυπράγμων* (Mullach, p. 237). Seneca calls him "Democritus, subtilissimus antiquorum omnium".—Quæstion. Natural. vii. 2. And Dionysius of Hal. (De Comp. Verb. p. 187, R.) characterises Demokritus, Plato, and Aristotle (he arranges them in that order) as first among all the philosophers, in respect of *σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων*.

[2] Plutarch. adv. Kolôten, p. 1108.

Among the Demokritean treatises, was one entitled Pythagoras, which contained probably a comment on the life and doctrines of that eminent man, written in an admiring spirit. (Diog. Laert. ix. 38.)

Summum Bonum, as far as we can make out, appears to have been the maintenance of mental serenity and contentment: in which view he recommended a life of tranquil contemplation, apart from money-making, or ambition, or the exciting pleasures of life.[1]

[1] Seneca, De Tranquill. Animæ, cap. 2. "Hanc stabilem animi sedem Græci Εὐθυμίαν vocant, de quo Democriti volumen egregium est." Compare Cicero De Finib. v. 29; Diogen. Laert. ix. 45. For εὐθυμία Demokritus used as synonyms εὐεστώ. ἀθαμβίη, ἀταραξίη, &c. See Mullach, p. 416.

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CHAPTER II.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE EARLIER PHILOSOPHERS—GROWTH OF DIALECTIC—ZENO AND GORGIAS.

Variety of sects and theories—multiplicity of individual authorities is the characteristic of Greek philosophy.

THE first feeling of any reader accustomed to the astronomy and physics of the present century, on considering the various theories noticed in the preceding chapter, is a sort of astonishment that such theories should have been ever propounded or accepted as true. Yet there can be no doubt that they represent the best thoughts of sincere, contemplative, and ingenious men, furnished with as much knowledge of fact, and as good a method, as was then attainable. The record of what such men have received as scientific truth or probability, in different ages, is instructive in many ways, but in none more than in showing how essentially relative and variable are the conditions of human belief; how unfounded is the assumption of those modern philosophers who proclaim certain first truths or first principles as universal, intuitive, self-evident; how little any theorist can appreciate *à priori* the causes of belief in an age materially different from his own, or can lay down maxims as to what must be universally believed or universally disbelieved by all mankind. We shall have farther illustration of this truth as we proceed: here I only note variety of belief, even on the most fundamental points, as being the essential feature of Grecian philosophy even from its outset, long before the age of those who are usually denounced as the active sowers of discord, the Sophists and the professed disputants. Each philosopher followed his own individual reason, departing from traditional or established creeds, and incurring from the believing public more

or less of obloquy; but no one among the philosophers acquired marked supremacy over the rest. There is no established philosophical orthodoxy, but a collection of Dissenters—*ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα μεμιγμένη*—small sects, each with its own following, each springing from a special individual as authority, each knowing itself to be only one among many.

These early theorists are not known from their own writings, which have been lost. Importance of the information of Aristotle about them.

It is a misfortune that we do not possess a complete work, or even considerable fragments, from any one of these philosophers, so as to know what their views were when stated by themselves, and upon what reasons they insisted. All that we know is derived from a few detached notices, in very many cases preserved by Aristotle; who, not content (like Plato) with simply following out his own vein of ideas, exhibits in his own writings much of that polymathy which he transmitted to the Peripatetics generally, and adverts often to the works of predecessors. Being a critic as well as a witness, he sometimes blends together inconveniently the two functions, and is accused (probably with reason to a certain extent) of making unfair reports; but if it were not for him, we should really know nothing of the Hellenic philosophers before Plato. It is curious to read the manner in which Aristotle speaks of these philosophical predecessors as "the ancients" (*οἱ ἀρχαῖοι*), and takes credit to his own philosophy for having attained a higher and more commanding point of view.[1]

[1] Bacon ascribes the extinction of these early Greek philosophers to Aristotle, who thought that he could not assure his own philosophical empire, except by putting to death all his brothers, like the Turkish Sultan. This remark occurs more than once in Bacon (Nov. Org. Aph. 67; Redargutio Philosoph. vol. xi. p. 450, ed. Montagu). In so far as it is a reproach, I think it is not deserved. Aristotle's works, indeed, have been preserved, and those of his predecessors have not: but Aristotle, far from seeking to destroy their works, has been the chief medium for preserving to us the little which we know about them. His attention to the works of his predecessors is something very unusual among the theorists of the ancient world. His friends Eudêmus and Theophrastus followed his example, in embodying the history of the earlier theories in distinct works of their own, now unfortunately lost.

It is much to be regretted that no scholar has yet employed himself in collecting and editing the fragments of the lost scientific histories of Eudêmus (the Rhodian) and Theophrastus. A new edition of the Commentaries of Simplikius is also greatly wanted: those which exist are both rare and unreadable.

Zeller remarks that several of the statements contained in Proklus's commentary on Euclid, respecting the earliest Grecian mathematicians, are borrowed from the *γεωμετρικαὶ ἱστορίαι* of the Rhodian Eudêmus (Zeller—De Hermodoro Ephesio et Hermodoro Platonico, p. 12).

Abundance of speculative genius and invention—a memorable fact in the Hellenic mind.

During the century and a half between Thales and the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we have passed in review twelve distinct schemes of philosophy—Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Herakleitus, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, the Apolloniate Diogenes, Leukippus, and Demokritus. Of most of these philosophers it may fairly be said that each speculated upon nature in an original vein of his own. Anaximenes and Diogenes, Xenophanes and Parmenides, Leukippus and Demokritus, may indeed be coupled together as kindred pairs—yet by no means in such manner that the second of the two is a mere disciple and copyist of the first. Such abundance and variety of speculative genius and invention is one of the most memorable facts in the history of the Hellenic mind. The prompting of intelligent curiosity, the thirst for some plausible hypothesis to explain the Kosmos and its generation, the belief that a basis or point of departure might be found in the Kosmos itself, apart from those mythical personifications which dwelt both in the popular mind and in the poetical Theogonies, the mental effort required to select some known agency and to connect it by a chain of reasoning with the result—all this is a new phenomenon in the history of the human mind.

Difficulties which a Grecian philosopher had to overcome—prevalent view of Nature, established, impressive and misleading.

An early Greek philosopher found nothing around him to stimulate or assist the effort, and much to obstruct it. He found Nature disguised under a diversified and omnipresent Polytheistic agency, eminently captivating and impressive to the emotions—at once mysterious and familiar—embodied in the ancient Theogonies, and penetrating deeply all the abundant epic and lyric poetry, the only literature of the time. It is perfectly true (as Aristotle remarks[1]) that Hesiod and the other theological poets, who referred everything to the generation and agency of the Gods, thought only of what was plausible to themselves, without enquiring whether it would

[1] Aristot. Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1000, a. 10.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἡσίοδον, καὶ πάντες ὅσοι θεόλογοι, μόνον ἐφρόντισαν τοῦ πιθανοῦ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτούς, ἡμῶν δ' ὠλιγώρησαν· Θεοὺς γὰρ ποιοῦντες τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ἐκ θεῶν γεγονέναι, &c. Aristotle mentions them a few lines afterwards as not worth serious notice. περὶ τῶν μυθικῶς σοφιζομένων οὐκ ἄξιον μετὰ σπουδῆς σκοπεῖν.

appear equally plausible to their successors; a reproach which bears upon many subsequent philosophers also. The contemporary public, to whom they addressed themselves, knew no other way of conceiving Nature than under this religious and poetical view, as an aggregate of manifestations by divine personal agents, upon whose volition—sometimes signified beforehand by obscure warnings intelligible to the privileged interpreters, but often inscrutable—the turn of events depended. Thales and the other Ionic philosophers were the first who became dissatisfied with this point of view, and sought for some "causes and beginnings" more regular, knowable, and predictable. They fixed upon the common, familiar, widely-extended, material substances, water, air, fire, &c.; and they could hardly fix upon any others. Their attempt to find a scientific basis was unsuccessful; but the memorable fact consisted in their looking for one.

Views of the Ionic philosophers—compared with the more recent abstractions of Plato and Aristotle.

In the theories of these Ionic philosophers, the physical ideas of generation, transmutation, local motion, are found in the foreground: generation in the Kosmos to replace generation by the God. Pythagoras and Empedokles blend with their speculations a good deal both of ethics and theology, which we shall find yet more preponderant when we come to the cosmical theories of Plato. He brings us back to the mythical Prometheus, armed with the geometrical and arithmetical combinations of the Pythagoreans: he assumes a chaotic substratum, modified by the intentional and deliberate construction of the Demiurgus and his divine sons, who are described as building up and mixing like a human artisan or chemist. In the theory of Aristotle we find Nature half personified, and assumed to be perpetually at work under the influence of an appetite for good or regularity, which determines her to aim instinctively and without deliberation (like bees or spiders) at constant ends, though these regular tendencies are always accompanied, and often thwarted, by accessories, irregular, undefinable, unpredictable. Both Plato and Aristotle, in their dialectical age, carried abstraction farther than it had been carried by the Ionic philosophers.[1] Aristotle imputes to the

[1] Plato (Sophistes, 242-243) observes respecting these early theorists—what Aristotle says about Hesiod and the Theogonies—that they followed out

Ionic philosophers that they neglected three out of his four causes (the efficient, formal, and final), and that they attended only to the material. This was a height of abstraction first attained by Plato and himself; in a way sometimes useful, sometimes misleading. The earlier philosophers had not learnt to divide substance from its powers or properties; nor to conceive substance without power as one thing, and power without substance as another. Their primordial substance, with its powers and properties, implicated together as one concrete and without any abstraction, was at once an efficient, a formal, and a material cause: a final cause they did not suppose themselves to want, inasmuch as they always conceived a fixed terminus towards which the agency was directed, though they did not conceive such fixed tendency under the symbol of an appetite and its end. Water, Air, Fire, were in their view not simply inert and receptive patients, impotent until they were stimulated by the active force residing in the ever revolving celestial spheres—but positive agents themselves, productive of important effects. So also a geologist of the present day, when he speculates upon the early condition[1] of the Kosmos, reasons upon gaseous, fluid, solid,

their own respective veins of thought without caring whether we, the many listeners, were able to follow them or were left behind in the dark. I dare say that this was true (as indeed it is true respecting most writers on speculative matters), but I am sure that all of them would have made the same complaint if they had heard Plato read his Timæus.

[1] Bacon has some striking remarks on the contrast in this respect between the earlier philosophers and Aristotle.

Bacon, after commending the early Greek philosophers for having adopted as their first principle some known and positive matter, not a mere abstraction, goes on to say:—

"Videntur antiqui illi, in inquisitione principiorum, rationem non admodum acutam instituisse, sed hoc solummodo egisse, ut ex corporibus apparentibus et manifestis, quod maximè excelleret, quærerent, et quod tale videbatur, principium rerum ponerent: tanquam per excellentiam, non veré aut realiter. . . . Quod si principium illud suum teneant non per excellentiam, sed simpliciter, videntur utique in duriorem tropum incidere: cum res planè deducatur ad æquivocum, neque de igne naturali, aut naturali aere, aut aquâ, quod asserunt, prædicari videatur, sed de igne aliquo phantastico et notionali (et sic de cæteris) qui nomen ignis retineat, definitionem abneget. . . . Principium statuerunt secundum sensum, aliquod ens verum: modum autem ejus dispensandi (liberius se gerentes) phantasticum." (Bacon, Parmenidis, Telesii, et Democriti Philosophia, vol. xi., p. 115-116, ed. Montagu.)

"Materia illa spoliata et passiva prorsus humanæ mentis commentum quoddam videtur. Materia prima ponenda est conjuncta cum principio motûs primo, ut invenitur. Hæc tria (materia, forma, motus) nullo modo discerpenda, sed tantummodo distinguenda, atque asserenda materia (qualiscunque ea sit), ita ornata et apparata et formata, ut omnis virtus, essentia, actio, atque motus naturalis, ejus consecutio et emanatio esse possit. Omnes ferè antiqui, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Democritus, de materiâ primâ in cæteris dissidentes, in hoc convenerunt, quod materiam activam formâ

varieties of matter, as manifesting those same laws and properties which experience attests, but manifesting them under different combinations and circumstances. The defect of the Ionic philosophers, unavoidable at the time, was, that possessing nothing beyond a superficial experience, they either ascribed to these physical agents powers and properties not real, or exaggerated prodigiously such as were real; so that the primordial substance chosen, though bearing a familiar name, became little better than a fiction. The Pythagoreans did the same in regard to numbers, ascribing to them properties altogether fanciful and imaginary.

Parmenides and Pythagoras, taking views of the Kosmos metaphysical and geometrical rather than physical, supplied the basis upon which Plato's speculations were built. Aristotle recognises Empedokles and Anaxagoras as having approached to his own doctrine—force abstracted or considered apart from substance, yet not absolutely detached from it. This is true about Empedokles to a certain extent, since his theory admits Love and Enmity as agents, the four elements as patients: but it is hardly true about Anaxagoras, in whose theory Noûs imparts nothing more than a momentary shock, exercising what modern chemists

Parmenides and Pythagoras—more nearly akin to Plato and Aristotle.

nonnullâ, et formam suam dispensantem, atque intra se principium motûs habentem, posuerunt." (Bacon, De Parmenidis, Telesii, et Campanellæ, Philosoph., p. 653-654, t. v.)

Compare Aphorism I. 50 of the Novum Organum.

Bacon, Parmenidis, Telesii, et Democriti Philosophia, vol. xi. ed. Montagu, p. 106-107. "Sed omnes ferè antiqui (anterior to Plato), Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Democritus, de materiâ primâ in cæteris dissidentes, in hoc convenerunt, quod materiam activam, formâ nonnullâ, et formam suam dispensantem, atque intra se principium motûs habentem, posuerunt. Neque aliter cuiquam opinari licebit, qui non experientiæ plané desertor esse velit. Itaque hi omnes mentem rebus submiserunt. At Plato mundum cogitationibus, Aristoteles verò etiam cogitationes verbis, adjudicarunt." . . . . "Omnino materia prima ponenda est conjuncta cum formâ primâ, ac etiam cum principio motûs primo, ut invenitur. Nam et motûs quoque abstractio infinitas phantasias peperit, de animis, vitis, et similibus—ac si iis per materiam et formam non satisfieret, sed ex suis propriis penderent illa principiis. Sed hæc tria nullo modo discerpenda, sed tantummodo distinguenda: atque asserenda materia (qualiscunque ea sit) ita ornata et apparata et formata, ut omnis virtus, essentia, actio, atque motus naturalis, ejus consecutio et emanatio esse possit. Neque propterea metuendum, ne res torpeant, aut varietas ista, quam cernimus, explicari non possit—ut postea docebimus."

Playfair also observes, in his Dissertation on the Progress of Natural Philosophy, prefixed to the Encyclopædia Britannica, p. 31:—

"Science was not merely stationary, but often retrograde; and the reasonings of Democritus and Anaxagoras were in many respects more solid than those of Plato and Aristotle."

See a good summary of Aristotle's cosmical views, in Ideler, Comm. in Aristotel. Meteorologica, i. 2, p. 328-329.

call a catalytic agency in originating movement among a stationary and stagnant mass of Homœomeries, which, as soon as they are liberated from imprisonment, follow inherent tendencies of their own, not receiving any farther impulse or direction from Noûs.

Advantage derived from this variety of constructive imagination among the Greeks.

In the number of cosmical theories proposed, from Thales down to Demokritus, as well as in the diversity and even discordance of the principles on which they were founded—we note not merely the growth and development of scientific curiosity, but also the spontaneity and exuberance of constructive imagination.[1] This last is a prominent attribute of the Hellenic mind, displayed to the greatest advantage in their poetical, oratorical, historical, artistic, productions, and transferred from thence to minister to their scientific curiosity. None of their known contemporaries showed the like aptitudes, not even the Babylonians and Egyptians, who were diligent in the observation of the heavens. Now the constructive imagination is not less indispensable to the formation of scientific theories than to the compositions of art, although in the two departments it is subject to different conditions, and appeals to different canons and tests in the human mind. Each of these early Hellenic theories, though all were hypotheses and "anticipations of nature," yet as connecting together various facts upon intelligible principles, was a step in advance; while the very number and discordance of them (urged by Sokrates[2] as an argument for discrediting the purpose common to all), was on the whole advantageous. It lessened the mischief arising from the imperfections of each, increased the chance of exposing such imperfections, and prevented the consecration of any one among them (with that inveterate and peremptory orthodoxy which Plato so much admires[3] in the Egyptians) as an infallible dogma and an exclusive mode of

[1] Karsten observes, in his account of the philosophy of Parmenides (sect. 23, p. 241):—

"Primum mundi descriptionem consideremus. Argumentum illustre et magnificum, cujus quanto major erat veterum in contemplando admiratio, tanto minor ferè in observando diligentia fuit. Quippe universi *ornatum et pulcritudinem admirati*, ejus *naturam partiumque ordinem non sensu assequi* studuerunt, sed *mente informarunt ad eam pulcri perfectique speciem quæ in ipsorum animis* insideret: sic ut Aristoteles ait, non sua cogitata suasque notiones ad mundi naturam, sed hanc ad illa accommodantes. Hujusmodi quoque fuit Parmenidea ratio."

[2] Xenophon, Memor. i. 1, 13-14.

[3] Plato, Legg. ii. 656-657.

looking at facts. All the theorists laboured under the common defect of a scanty and inaccurate experience: all of them were prompted by a vague but powerful emotion of curiosity to connect together the past and present of Nature by some threads intelligible and satisfactory to their own minds; each of them followed out some analogy of his own, such as seemed to carry with it a self-justifying plausibility; and each could find some phenomena which countenanced his own peculiar view. As far as we can judge, Leukippus and Demokritus greatly surpassed the others, partly in the pains which they took to elaborate their theory, partly in the number of facts which they brought into consistency with it. The loss of the voluminous writings of Demokritus is deeply to be regretted.[1]

All these theories were found in circulation by Sokrates, Zeno, Plato, and the dialecticians. Importance of the scrutiny of negative Dialectic.

In studying the writings of Plato and Aristotle, we must recollect that they found all these theories pre-existent or contemporaneous. We are not to imagine that they were the first who turned an enquiring eye on Nature. So far is this from being the case that Aristotle is, as it were, oppressed both by the multitude and by the discordance of his predecessors, whom he cites, with a sort of indulgent consciousness of superiority, as "the ancients" (*οἱ ἀρχαῖοι*).[2] The dialectic activity, inaugurated by Sokrates and Zeno, lowered the estimation of these cosmical theories in more ways than one: first, by the new topics of man and society, which Sokrates put in the foreground for discussion, and treated as the only topics worthy of discussion: next, by the great acuteness which each of them displayed in the employment of the negative weapons, and in bringing to view the weak part of an opponent's case. When we look at the number of these early theories, and the great need which all of them had to be sifted and scrutinised, we shall recognise the value of negative procedure under such circumstances, whether the negationist had or had not any better affirmative theory of his own. Sokrates,

[1] About the style of Demokritus, see Cicero De Orat. i. 11. Orator. c. 20.

[2] Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 314, a. 6; 325, a. 2; Metaphys. A. 1069, a. 25, See the sense of *ἀρχαϊκῶς*, Met. N. 1089, a. 2, with the note of Bonitz.

Adam Smith, in his very instructive examination of the ancient systems of Physics and Metaphysics, is too much inclined to criticise Plato and Aristotle as if they were the earliest theorizers, and as if they had no predecessors.

moreover, not only turned the subject-matter of discussion from physics to ethics, but also brought into conscious review the *method* of philosophising: which was afterwards still farther considered and illustrated by Plato. General and abstract terms and their meaning, stood out as the capital problems of philosophical research, and as the governing agents of the human mind during the process: in Plato and Aristotle, and the Dialectics of their age, we find the meaning or concept corresponding to these terms invested with an objective character, and represented as a cause or beginning; by which, or out of which, real concrete things were produced. Logical, metaphysical, ethical, entities, whose existence consists in being named and reasoned about, are presented to us (by Plato) as the real antecedents and producers of the sensible Kosmos and its contents, or (by Aristotle) as coeternal with the Kosmos, but as its underlying constituents—the *ἀρχαὶ*, primordia or ultimata—into which it was the purpose and duty of the philosopher to resolve sensible things. The men of words and debate, the dialecticians or metaphysical speculators of the period since Zeno and Sokrates, who took little notice of the facts of Nature, stand contrasted in the language of Aristotle with the antecedent physical philosophers who meddled less with debate and more with facts. The contrast is taken in his mind between Plato and Demokritus.[1]

The early theorists were studied along with Plato and Aristotle, in the third and second centuries B.C.

Both by Stoics and by Epikureans, during the third and second centuries B.C., Demokritus, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Herakleitus were studied along with Plato and Aristotle—by some, even more. Lucretius mentions and criticises all the four, though he never names Plato or Aristotle. Cicero greatly admires the style of Demokritus, whose works were arranged in tetralogies by Thrasyllus, as those of Plato were.[2]

[1] Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 316, a. 6.—*διὸ ὅσοι ἐνῳκήκασι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, μᾶλλον δύνανται ὑποτίθεσθαι τοιαύτας ἀρχάς, αἳ ἐπὶ πολὺ δύνανται συνείρειν· οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἀθεώρητοι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὄντες, πρὸς ὀλίγα βλέψαντες, ἀποφαίνονται ῥᾳον· ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες*, &c. This remark is thoroughly Baconian.

Οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις is the phrase by which Aristotle characterises the Platonici.—Metaphys. Θ. 1050, b. 35.

[2] Epikurus is said to have especially admired Anaxagoras (Diog. L. x. 12).

In considering the early theorists above enumerated, there is great difficulty in finding any positive characteristic applicable to all of them. But a negative characteristic may be found, and has already been indicated by Aristotle. "The earlier philosophers (says he) had no part in dialectics: Dialectical force did not yet exist."[1] And the period upon which we are now entering is distinguished mainly by the introduction and increasing preponderance of this new element—Dialectic—first made conspicuously manifest in the Eleatic Zeno and Sokrates; two memorable persons, very different from each other, but having this property in common.

Negative attribute common to all the early theorists—little or no dialectic.

It is Zeno who stands announced, on the authority of Aristotle, as the inventor of dialectic: that is, as the first person of whose skill in the art of cross-examination and refutation conspicuous illustrative specimens were preserved. He was among the first who composed written dialogues on controversial matters of philosophy.[2] Both he, and his contemporary the Samian Melissus, took up the defence of the Parmenidean doctrine. It is remarkable that both one and the other were eminent as political men in their native cities. Zeno is even said to have perished miserably, in generous but fruitless attempts to preserve Elea from being enslaved by the despot Nearchus.

Zeno of Elea—Melissus.

We know the reasonings of Zeno and Melissus only through scanty fragments, and those fragments transmitted by opponents. But it is plain that both of them, especially Zeno, pressed their adversaries with grave difficulties, which it was more easy to deride than to elucidate. Both took their departure from the ground occupied by Parmenides. They agreed with him in recognising the phenomenal, apparent, or relative world, the world of sense and experience, as a subject of knowledge, though of uncertain and imperfect knowledge.

Zeno's Dialectic—he refuted the opponents of Parmenides, by showing that their assumptions led to contradictions and absurdities.

[1] Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 32. Οἱ γὰρ πρότεροι διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον.—M. 1078, b. 25: διαλεκτικὴ γὰρ ἰσχὺς οὔπω τότ' ἦν, ὥστε δύνασθαι, &c.

[2] Diogen. Laert. ix. 25-28.

The epithets applied to Zeno by Timon are remarkable.

Ἀμφοτερογλώσσου τε μέγα σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδνὸν
Ζήνωνος πάντων ἐπιλήπτορος, &c.

Each of them gave, as Parmenides had done, certain affirmative opinions, or at least probable conjectures, for the purpose of explaining it.[1] But beyond this world of appearances, there lay the real, absolute, ontological, ultra-phenomenal, or Noumenal world, which Parmenides represented as *Ens unum continuum*, and which his opponents contended to be plural and discontinuous. These opponents deduced absurd and ridiculous consequences from the theory of the One. Herein both Zeno and Melissus defended Parmenides. Zeno, the better dialectician of the two, retorted upon the advocates of absolute plurality and discontinuousness, showing that their doctrine led to consequences not less absurd and contradictory than the *Ens unum* of Parmenides. He advanced many distinct arguments; some of them antinomies, deducing from the same premisses both the affirmative and the negative of the same conclusion.[2]

Consequences of their assumption of Entia Plura Discontinua. Reductiones ad Absurdum.

If things in themselves were many (he said) they must be both infinitely small and infinitely great. *Infinitely small*, because the many things must consist in a number of units, each essentially indivisible: but that which is indivisible has no magnitude, or is infinitely small—if indeed it can be said to have any existence whatever:[3] *Infinitely great*, because each of the many things, if assumed to exist, must have

[1] Diog. Laert. ix. 24-29.

Zeller (Phil. d. Griech. i. p. 424, note 2) doubts the assertion that Zeno delivered probable opinions and hypotheses, as Parmenides had done before him, respecting phenomenal nature. But I see no adequate ground for such doubt.

[2] Simplikius, in Aristotel. Physic. f. 30. ἐν μέντοι τῷ συγγράμματι αὐτοῦ, πολλὰ ἔχοντι ἐπιχειρήματα, καθ' ἕκαστον δείκνυσιν, ὅτι τῷ πολλὰ εἶναι λέγοντι συμβαίνει τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν, &c.

[3] Aristotel. Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1001, b. 7. ἔτι εἰ ἀδιαίρετον αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, κατὰ μὲν τὸ Ζήνωνος ἀξίωμα, οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη.

ὃ γὰρ μήτε προστιθέμενον μητὲ ἀφαιρούμενον ποιεῖ τι μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον, οὔ φησιν εἶναι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, ὡς δῆλον ὅτι ὄντος μεγέθους τοῦ ὄντος.

Seneca (Epistol. 88) and Alexander of Aphrodisias (see the passages of Themistius and Simplikius cited by Brandis, Handbuch Philos. i. p. 412-416) conceive Zeno as having dissented from Parmenides, and as having denied the existence, not only of τὰ πολλὰ, but also of τὸ ἕν. But Zeno seems to have adhered to Parmenides; and to have denied the existence of τὸ ἕν, only upon the hypothesis opposed to Parmenides—namely, that τὰ πολλὰ existed. Zeno argued thus:—Assuming that the Real or Absolute is essentially divisible and discontinuous, divisibility must be pushed to infinity, so that you never arrive at any ultimatum, or any real unit (ἀκριβῶς ἕν). If you admit τὰ πολλὰ, you renounce τὸ ἕν. The reasoning of Zeno, as far as we know it, is nearly all directed against the hypothesis of *Entia plura discontinua*. Tennemann (Gesch. Philos. i. 4, p. 205) thinks that the reasoning of Zeno is directed against the world of sense: in which I cannot agree with him.

magnitude. Having magnitude, each thing has parts which also have magnitude: these parts are, by the hypothesis, essentially discontinuous, but this implies that they are kept apart from each other by other intervening parts—and these intervening parts must be again kept apart by others. Each body will thus contain in itself an infinite number of parts, each having magnitude. In other words, it will be infinitely great.[1]

Again—If things in themselves were many, they would be both finite and infinite in number. *Finite*, because they are as many as they are, neither more nor less: and every number is a finite number. *Infinite*, because being essentially separate, discontinuous, units, each must be kept apart from the rest by an intervening unit; and this again by something else intervening. Suppose a multitude A, B, C, D, &c. A and B would be continuous unless they were kept apart by some intervening unit Z. But A and Z would then be continuous unless they were kept apart by something else—Y: and so on ad infinitum: otherwise the essential discontinuousness could not be maintained.[2]

By these two arguments,[3] drawn from the hypothesis which affirmed perpetual divisibility and denied any Continuum, Zeno showed that such *Entia multa discontinua* would have contradictory attributes: they would be both infinitely great and infinitely small—they would be both finite and infinite in number. This he advanced as a *reductio ad absurdum* against the hypothesis.

Each thing must exist in its own place—Grain of millet not sonorous.

Again—If existing things be many and discontinuous, each of these must exist in a place of its own. Nothing can exist except in some place. But the place is itself an existing something: each place must therefore have a place of its own to exist in: the second place must have a third place to exist in—and so forth ad infinitum.[4] We have here a farther *reductio ad impossibile* of the

[1] Scholia ad Aristotel. Physic. p. 334 a. ed. Brandis.

[2] See the argument cited by Simplikius in the words of the Zenonian treatise, in Preller, Hist. Philos. Græc. ex font. context. p. 101, sect. 156.

[3] Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. f. 30. καὶ οὕτω μὲν τὸ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἄπειρον ἐκ τῆς διχοτομίας ἔδειξε, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος πρότερον κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιχείρησιν. Compare Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. i. p. 427.

[4] Aristotel. Physic. iv. 1, p. 209, a. 22; iv. 3, p. 210, b. 23.

Aristotle here observes that the Zenonian argument respecting *place* is easy to be refuted: and he proceeds to give the refutation. But his refutation

original hypothesis: for that hypothesis denies the continuity of space, and represents space as a multitude of discontinuous portions or places.

Another argument of Zeno is to the following effect:—"Does a grain of millet, when dropped upon the floor, make sound? No.—Does a bushel of millet make sound under the same circumstances? Yes.—Is there not a determinate proportion between the bushel and the grain? There is.—There must therefore be the same proportion between the sonorousness of the two. If one grain be not sonorous, neither can ten thousand grains be so."[1]

To appreciate the contradiction brought out by Zeno, we must recollect that he is not here reasoning about facts of sense, phenomenal and relative—but about things in themselves, absolute and ultra phenomenal realities. He did not deny the fact of sense: to appeal to that fact in reply, would have been to concede his point. The adversaries against whom he reasoned (Protagoras is mentioned, but he can hardly have been among them, if we have regard to his memorable dogma, of which more will be said presently) were those who maintained the plurality of absolute substances, each for itself, with absolute attributes, apart from the fact of sense, and independent of any sentient subject. One grain of millet (Zeno argues) has no absolute sonorousness, neither can ten thousand such grains taken together have any. Upon the hypothesis of absolute reality as a discontinuous multitude, you are here driven to a contradiction which Zeno intends as an argument against the hypothesis. There is no absolute sonorousness in the ten thousand grains: the sound which they make is a phenomenal fact, relative to us as sentients of sound, and having no reality except in correlation with a hearer.[2]

is altogether unsatisfactory. Those who despise these Zenonian arguments as *sophisms*, ought to look at the way in which they were answered, at or near the time.

Eudêmus ap. Simplik. ad Aristot. Physic. f. 131. ἄξιον γὰρ πᾶν τῶν ὄντων ποῦ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ὁ τόπος τῶν ὄντων, ποῦ ἂν εἴη;

[1] Aristotel. Physic. vii. 5, p. 250, a. 20, with the Scholia of Simplikius on the passage, p. 423, ed. Brandis.

[2] It will be seen that Aristotle in explaining this ἀπορία, takes into consideration the difference of force in the vibrations of air, and the different impressibility of the ear. The explanation is pertinent and just, if applied to the fact of sense: but it is no reply to Zeno, who did not call in question the fact of sense. Zeno is impugning the doctrine of absolute substances and absolute divisibility. To say that ten thousand grains are sonorous, but that

Zenonian arguments in regard to motion.

Other memorable arguments of Zeno against the same hypothesis were those by which he proved that if it were admitted, motion would be impossible. Upon the theory of absolute plurality and discontinuousness, every line or portion of distance was divisible into an infinite number of parts: before a moving body could get from the beginning to the end of this line, it must pass in succession over every one of these parts: but to do this in a finite time was impossible: therefore motion was impossible.[1]

A second argument of the same tendency was advanced in the form of comparison between Achilles and the tortoise—the swiftest and slowest movers. The two run a race, a certain start being given to the tortoise. Zeno contends that Achilles can never overtake the tortoise. It is plain indeed, according to the preceding argument, that motion both for the one and for the other is an impossibility. Neither one nor the other can advance from the beginning to the end of any line, except by passing successively through all the parts of that line: but those parts are infinite in number, and cannot therefore be passed through in any finite time. But suppose such impossibility to be got over: still Achilles will not overtake the tortoise. For while Achilles advances one hundred yards, the tortoise has advanced ten: while Achilles passes over these additional ten yards, the tortoise will have passed over one more yard: while Achilles is passing over this remaining one yard, the tortoise will have got over one-tenth of another yard: and so on ad infinitum: the tortoise will always be in advance of him by a certain distance, which, though ever diminishing, will never vanish into nothing.

The third Zenonian argument derived its name from the flight of an arrow shot from a bow. The arrow while thus carried forward (says Zeno) is nevertheless at rest.[2] For the time from

no one of them separately taken is so, appears to him a contradiction, similar to what is involved in saying that a real magnitude is made up of mathematical points. Aristotle does not meet this difficulty.

[1] Aristot. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239 b., with the Scholia, p. 412 seq. ed. Brandis; Aristotel. De Lineis Insecabilibus, p. 968, a. 19.

These four arguments against absolute motion caused embarrassment to Aristotle and his contemporaries. τέτταρες δ' εἰσὶ λόγοι Ζήνωνος οἱ παρέχοντες τὰς δυσκολίας τοῖς λύουσιν, &c.

[2] Aristotel. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239, b. 8-30. τρίτος ὁ νῦν ῥηθείς, ὅτι ἡ ὀϊστὸς φερομένη ἕστηκεν.

the beginning to the end of its course consists of a multitude of successive instants. During each of these instants the arrow is in a given place of equal dimension with itself. But that which is during any instant in a given place, is at rest. Accordingly during each successive instant of its flight, the arrow is at rest. Throughout its whole flight it is both in motion and at rest. This argument is a deduction from the doctrine of discontinuous time, as the preceding is a deduction from that of discontinuous space.

A fourth argument[1] was derived from the case of two equal bodies moved with equal velocity in opposite directions, and passing each other. If the body A B were at rest, the other body C D would move along the whole length of C D in two minutes. But if C D be itself moving with equal velocity in the opposite direction, A B will pass along the whole length of C D in half that time, or one minute. Hence Zeno infers that the motion of A B is nothing absolute, or belonging to the thing in itself—for if that were so, it would not be varied according to the movement of C D. It is no more than a phenomenal fact, relative to us and our comparison.

This argument, so far as I can understand its bearing, is not deduced (as those preceding are) from the premisses of opponents: but rests upon premisses of its own, and is intended to prove that motion is only relative.

General purpose and result of the Zenonian Dialectic. Nothing is knowable except the relative.

These Zenonian reasonings are memorable as the earliest known manifestations of Grecian dialectic, and are probably equal in acuteness and ingenuity to anything which it ever produced. Their bearing is not always accurately conceived. Most of them are *argumenta ad hominem:* consequences contradictory and inadmissible, but shown to follow legitimately from a given hypothesis, and therefore serving to disprove the hypothesis itself.[2] The hypothesis was one relating

[1] See the illustration of this argument at some length by Simplikius, especially the citation from Eudêmus at the close of it—ap. Scholia ad Aristotel. p. 414, ed. Brandis.

[2] The scope of the Zenonian dialectic, as I have here described it, is set forth clearly by Plato, in his Parmenides, c. 3-6, p. 127, 128. Πῶς ὦ Ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὁμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον.—Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τά τε ἀνόμοια ὅμοια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι; εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἴη, πάσχοι ἂν

to the real, absolute, or ultra-phenomenal, which Parmenides maintained to be *Ens Unum Continuum*, while his opponents affirmed it to be essentially multiple and discontinuous. Upon the hypothesis of Parmenides, the Real and Absolute, being a continuous One, was obviously inconsistent with the movement and variety of the phenomenal world: Parmenides himself recognised the contradiction of the two, and his opponents made it a ground for deriding his doctrine.[1] The counter-hypothesis, of the discontinuous many, appeared at first sight not to be open to the same objection: it seemed to be more in harmony with the facts of the phenomenal and relative world, and to afford an absolute basis for them to rest upon. Against this delusive appearance the dialectic of Zeno was directed. He retorted upon the opponents, and showed that if the hypothesis of the *Unum Continuum* led to absurd consequences, that of the discontinuous many was pregnant with deductions yet more absurd and contradictory. He exhibits in detail several of these contradictory deductions, with a view to refute the hypothesis from whence they flow; and to prove that, far from performing what it promises, it is worse than useless, as entangling us in contradictory conclusions. The result of his reasoning, implied rather than announced, is—That neither of the two hypotheses are of any avail to supply a real and absolute basis for the phenomenal and relative world: That the latter must rest upon its own evidence, and must be interpreted, in so far as it can be interpreted at all, by its own analogies.

But the purport of Zeno's reasoning is mistaken, when he is

τὰ ἀδύνατα. Ἆρα τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονταί σου οἱ λόγοι; οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς οὐ πολλά ἐστιν; Again, p. 128 D. Ἀντιλέγει οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, ἡ εἰ πολλά ἐστιν—ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι—εἴ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίοι.

Here Plato evidently represents Zeno as merely proving that contradictory conclusions followed, *if you assumed a given hypothesis*; which hypothesis was thereby shown to be inadmissible. But Plato alludes to Zeno in another place (Phædrus, c. 97, p. 261) under the name of the Eleatic Palamedes, as "showing his art in speaking, by making the same things appear to the hearers like and unlike, one and many, at rest and in motion". In this last passage, the impression produced by Zeno's argumentation is brought to view, apart from the scope and purpose with which he employed it: which scope and purpose are indicated in the passage above cited from the Parmenides.

So also Isokrates (Encom. Helen. init.) Ζήνωνα, τὸν ταὐτὰ δυνατὰ καὶ πάλιν ἀδύνατα πειρώμενον ἀποφαίνειν.

[1] Plato, Parmenides, p. 128 D.

Mistake of supposing Zeno's *reductiones ad absurdum* of an opponent's doctrine to be contradictions of data generalised from experience.

conceived as one who wishes to delude his hearers by proving both sides of a contradictory proposition. His contradictory conclusions are elicited with the express purpose of disproving the premisses from which they are derived. For these premisses Zeno himself is not to be held responsible, since he borrows them from his opponents: a circumstance which Aristotle forgets, when he censures the Zenonian arguments as paralogisms, because they assume the Continua, Space, and Time, to be discontinuous or divided into many distinct parts.[1] Now this absolute discontinuousness of matter, space, and time, was not advanced by Zeno as a doctrine of his own, but is the very doctrine of his opponents, taken up by him for the purpose of showing that it led to contradictory consequences, and thus of indirectly refuting it. The sentence of Aristotle is thus really in Zeno's favour, though apparently adverse to him. In respect to motion, a similar result followed from the Zenonian reasonings; namely, to show That motion, as an attribute of the Real and Absolute, was no less inconsistent with the hypothesis of those who opposed Parmenides, than with the hypothesis of Parmenides himself:—That absolute motion could no more be reconciled with the doctrine of the discontinuous Many, than with that of the Continuous One:—That motion therefore was only a phenomenal fact, relative to our sensations, conceptions, and comparisons; and having no application to the absolute. In this phenomenal point of view, neither Zeno nor Parmenides nor Melissus disputed the fact of motion. They recognised it as a portion of the world of sensation and experience; which world they tried to explain, well or ill, by analogies and conjectures derived from itself.

Zenonian Dialectic—Platonic Parmenides.

Though we have not the advantage of seeing the Zenonian dialectics as they were put forth by their author, yet, if we compare the substance of them as handed down to us, with those dialectics which form the latter half of the Platonic dialogue called Parmenides,

[1] Aristotel. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239 b. Ζήνων δὲ παραλογίζεται· οὐ γὰρ σύγκειται ὁ χρόνος ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὄντων τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλο μέγεθος οὐδέν, &c.

Aristotle, in the second and third chapters of his Physica, canvasses and refutes the doctrine of Parmenides and Zeno respecting Ens and Unum. He maintains that Ens and Unum are

we shall find them not inferior in ingenuity, and certainly more intelligible in their purpose. Zeno furnishes no positive support to the Parmenidean doctrine, but he makes out a good negative case against the counter-doctrine.

Views of historians of philosophy respecting Zeno.

Zeller and other able modern critics, while admitting the reasoning of Zeno to be good against this counter-doctrine, complain that he takes it up too exclusively; that One and Many did not exclude each other, and that the doctrines of Parmenides and his opponents were both true together, but neither of them true to the exclusion of the other. But when we reflect that the subject of predication on both sides was the Real (Ens *per se*), it was not likely that either Parmenides or his opponents would affirm it to be both absolutely One and Continuous, and absolutely Many and Discontinuous.[1] If the opponents of Parmenides had taken this ground, Zeno need not have imagined deductions for the purpose of showing that their hypothesis led to contradictory conclusions; for the contradictions would have stood avowedly registered in the hypothesis itself. If a man affirms both at once, he divests the predication of its absolute character, as belonging unconditionally to Ens *per se;* and he restricts it to the phenomenal, the relative, the conditioned—dependent upon our sensations and our fluctuating point of view. This was not intended either by Parmenides or by his opponents.

Absolute and relative—the first unknowable.

If, indeed, we judge the question, not from their standing-point, but from our own, we shall solve the difficulty by adopting the last-mentioned answer. We shall admit that One and Many are predicates which do not necessarily exclude each other; but we shall refrain from affirming or denying either of them respecting the Real, the Absolute, the Unconditioned. Of an object absolutely one and continuous—or of objects absolutely many and discontinuous, apart from the facts of our own sense and con-

equivocal — πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα. He farther maintained that no one before him had succeeded in refuting Zeno. See the Scholia of Alexander ad Sophistic. Elench. p. 320 b. 6, ed. Brandis.

[1] That both of them could not be true respecting Ens *per se*, seems to have been considered indisputable. See the argument of Sokrates in the Parmenides of Plato, p. 129 B-E.

sciousness, and independent of any sentient subject — we neither know nor can affirm anything. Both these predicates (One — Many) are relative and phenomenal, grounded on the facts and comparisons of our own senses and consciousness, and serving only to describe, to record, and to classify, those facts. Discrete quantity or number, or succession of distinct unities—continuous quantity, or motion and extension—are two conceptions derived from comparison, abstracted and generalised from separate particular phenomena of our consciousness; the continuous, from our movements and the consciousness of persistent energy involved therein—the discontinuous, from our movements, intermitted and renewed, as well as from our impressions of sense. We compare one discrete quantity with another, or one continual quantity with another, and we thus ascertain many important truths: but we select our unit, or our standard of motion and extension, as we please, or according to convenience, subject only to the necessity of adapting our ulterior calculations consistently to this unit, when once selected. The same object may thus be considered sometimes as one, sometimes as many; both being relative, and depending upon our point of view. Motion, Space, Time, may be considered either as continuous or as discontinuous: we may reason upon them either as one or the other, but we must not confound the two points of view with each other. When, however, we are called upon to travel out of the Relative, and to decide between Parmenides and his opponents—whether the Absolute be One or Multitudinous—we have only to abstain from affirming either, or (in other words) to confess our ignorance. We know nothing of an absolute, continuous, self-existent One, or of an absolute, discontinuous Many.

Zeno did not deny motion as a fact, phenomenal and relative.

Some critics understand Zeno to have denied motion as a fact—opposing sophistical reasoning to certain and familiar experience. Upon this view is founded the well-known anecdote, that Diogenes the Cynic refuted the argument by getting up and walking. But I do not so construe the scope of his argument. He did not deny motion as a fact. It rested with him on the evidence of sense, acknowledged by every one. It was therefore only a phenomenal fact relative to our consciousness, sensation,

movements, and comparisons. As such, but as such only, did Zeno acknowledge it. What he denied was, motion as a fact belonging to the Absolute, or as deducible from the Absolute. He did not deny the Absolute or Thing in itself, as an existing object, but he struck out variety, divisibility, and motion, from the list of its predicates. He admitted only the Parmenidean Ens, one, continuous, unchanged, and immovable, with none but negative predicates, and severed from the relative world of experience and sensation.

Other reasoners, contemporary with Zeno, did not agree with him, in admitting the Absolute, even as an object with no predicates, except unity and continuity. They denied it altogether, both as substratum and as predicate. To establish this negation is the purpose of a short treatise ascribed to the rhetor or Sophist Gorgias, a contemporary of Zeno; but we are informed that all the reasonings, which Gorgias employed, were advanced, or had already been advanced, by others before him.[1] Those reasonings are so imperfectly preserved, that we can make out little more than the general scope.

Gorgias the Leontine—did not admit the Absolute, even as conceived by Parmenides.

Ens, or Entity *per se* (he contended), did not really exist. Even granting that it existed, it was unknowable by any one. And even granting that it both existed, and was known by any one, still such person could not communicate his knowledge of it to others.[2]

His reasonings against the Absolute, either as Ens or Entia.

As to the first point, Ens was no more real or existent than Non-Ens: the word Non-Ens must have an objective meaning, as well as the word Ens: it was Non-Ens, therefore it *was*, or existed. Both of them existed alike, or rather neither of them existed. Moreover, if Ens existed, it must exist either as One or as Many—either as eternal or as generated—either in itself, or

[1] See the last words of the Aristotelian or Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, De Melisso, Xenophane et Gorgiâ, p. 980.

Ἅπασαι δὲ αὗται καὶ ἑτέρων ἀρχαιοτέρων εἰσὶν ἀπόριαι, ὥστε ἐν τῇ περὶ ἐκείνων σκέψει καὶ ταύτας ἐξεταστέον.

Ἅπασαι is the reading of Mullach in his edition of this treatise (p. 79), in place of ἅπαντες or ἅπαντα.

[2] See the treatise of Aristotle or Pseudo-Aristotle, De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgiâ, in Aristot. p. 979-980, Bekker, also in Mullach's edition, p. 62-78. The argument of Gorgias is also abridged by Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. p. 384, sect. 65-86.

See also a copious commentary on the Aristotelian treatise in Foss, De Gorgiâ Leontino, p. 115 seq.

The text of the Aristotelian treatise is so corrupt as to be often unintelligible.

in some other place. But Melissus, Zeno, and other previous philosophers, had shown sufficient cause against each of these alternatives separately taken. Each of the alternative essential predicates had been separately disproved; therefore the subject, Ens, could not exist under either of them, or could not exist at all.

Ens, incogitable and unknowable.

As to the second point, let us grant that Ens or Entia exist; they would nevertheless (argued Gorgias) be incogitable and unknowable. To be cogitated is no more an attribute of Ens than of Non-Ens. The fact of cogitation does not require Ens as a condition, or attest Ens as an absolute or thing in itself. If our cogitation required or attained Ens as an indispensable object, then there could be no fictitious *cogitata* nor any false propositions. We think of a man flying in the air, or of a chariot race on the surface of the sea. If our *cogitata* were realities, these must be so as well as the rest: if realities alone were the object of cogitation, then these could not be thought of. As Non-Ens was thus undeniably the object of cogitation, so Ens could not be its object: for what was true respecting one of these contraries, could not be true respecting the other.

Ens, even if granted to be knowable, is still incommunicable to others.

As to the third point: Assuming Ens both to exist and to be known by you, you cannot (said Gorgias) declare or explain it to any one else. You profess to have learnt what Ens is in itself, by your sight or other perceptions; but you declare to others by means of words, and these words are neither themselves the absolute Ens, nor do they bring Ens before the hearer. Even though you yourself know Ens, you cannot, by your words, enable *him* to know it. If he is to know Ens, he must know it in the same way as you. Moreover, neither your words, nor Ens itself, will convey to the hearer the same knowledge as to you; for the same cannot be at once in two distinct subjects; and even if it were, yet since you and the hearer are not completely alike, so the effect of the same object on both of you will not appear to be like.[1]

[1] In this third branch of the argument, showing that Ens, even if known, cannot be communicable to others, Gorgias travels beyond the Absolute, and directs his reasoning against the communicability of the Relative or

Such is the reasoning, as far as we can make it out, whereby Gorgias sought to prove that the absolute Ens was neither existent, nor knowable, nor communicable by words from one person to another.

Zeno and Gorgias—contrasted with the earlier Grecian philosophers.

The arguments both of Zeno and of Gorgias (the latter presenting the thoughts of others earlier than himself), dating from a time coinciding with the younger half of the life of Sokrates, evince a new spirit and purpose in Grecian philosophy, as compared with the Ionians, the two first Eleates, and the Pythagoreans. Zeno and Gorgias exhibit conspicuously the new element of dialectic: the force of the negative arm in Grecian philosophy, brought out into the arena, against those who dogmatized or propounded positive theories: the fertility of Grecian imagination in suggesting doubts and difficulties, for which the dogmatists, if they aspired to success and reputation, had to provide answers. Zeno directed his attack against one scheme of philosophy—the doctrine of the Absolute Many: leaving by implication the rival doctrine—the Absolute One of Parmenides—in exclusive possession of the field, yet not reinforcing it with any new defences against objectors. Gorgias impugned the philosophy of the Absolute in either or both of its forms—as One or as Many: not with a view of leaving any third form as the only survivor, or of providing any substitute from his own invention, but of showing that Ens, the object of philosophical research, could neither be found nor known. The negative purpose, disallowing altogether the philosophy of Nature (as then conceived, not as now conceived), was declared without reserve by Gorgias, as we shall presently find that it was by Sokrates also.

New character of Grecian philosophy—antithesis of affirma-

It is the opening of the negative vein which imparts from this time forward a new character to Grecian philosophy. The positive and negative forces, emanating from different aptitudes in the human mind, are now both of them actively developed, and in strenuous anti-

Phenomenal also. Both of his arguments against such communicability have some foundation, and serve to prove that the communicability cannot be exact or entire, even in the case of sensible facts. The sensations, thoughts, emotions, &c., of one person are not *exactly* like those of another.

tive and negative—proof and disproof.

thesis to each other. Philosophy is no longer exclusively confined to dogmatists, each searching in his imagination for the Absolute Ens of Nature, and each propounding what seems to him the only solution of the problem. Such thinkers still continue their vocation, but under new conditions of success, and subject to the scrutiny of numerous dissentient critics. It is no longer sufficient to propound a theory,[1] either in obscure, oracular metaphors and half-intelligible aphorisms, like Herakleitus—or in verse more or less impressive, like Parmenides or Empedokles. The theory must be sustained by proofs, guarded against objections, defended against imputations of inconsistency: moreover, it must be put in comparison with other rival theories, the defects of which must accordingly be shown up along with it. Here are new exigencies, to which dogmatic philosophers had not before been obnoxious. They were now required to be masters of the art of dialectic attack and defence, not fearing the combat of question and answer—a combat in which, assuming tolerable equality between the duellists, the questioner had the advantage of the sun, or the preferable position,[2] and the farther advantage of choosing where to aim his blows. To expose fallacy or inconsistency, was found to be both an easier process, and a more appreciable display of ingenuity, than the discovery and establishment of truth in such manner as to command assent. The weapon of negation, refutation, cross-examination, was wielded for its own results, and was found hard to parry by the affirmative philosophers of the day.

[1] The repugnance of the Herakleitean philosophers to the scrutiny of dialectical interrogation is described by Plato in strong language, it is indeed even caricatured. (Theætêtus, 179-180.)

[2] Theokritus, Idyll. xxii. 83; the description of the pugilistic contest between Pollux and Amykus:—

ἔνθα πολύς σφισι μόχθος ἐπειγομένοισιν ἐτύχθη,
ὁππότερος κατὰ νῶτα λάβῃ φάος ἠελίοιο·
ἀλλ' ἰδρίῃ μέγαν ἄνδρα παρήλυθες ὦ Πολυδεύκεες·
βάλλετο δ' ἀκτίνεσσιν ἅπαν Ἀμύκοιο πρόσωπον.

To toss up for the sun, was a practice not yet introduced between pugilists.

APPENDIX.

To illustrate by comparison the form of Grecian philosophy, before Dialectic was brought to bear upon it, I transcribe from two eminent French scholars (M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire and Professor Robert Mohl) some account of the mode in which the Indian philosophy has always been kept on record and communicated.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (in his Premier Mémoire sur le Sânkhya, pp. 5-11) gives the following observations upon the Sânkhya or philosophy of Kapila, one of the principal systems of Sanskrit philosophy: date (as supposed) about 700 B.C.

There are two sources from whence the Sânkhya philosophy is known:—

"1. Les Soûtras ou aphorismes de Kapila.

"2. Le traité déjà connu et traduit sous le nom de Sânkhya Kârikâ, c'est à dire Vers Mémoriaux du Sânkhya.

"Les Soûtras de Kapila sont en tout au nombre de 499, divisés en six lectures, et répartis inégalement entre chacune d'elles. Les Soûtras sont accompagnés d'un commentaire qui les explique, et qui est d'un brahmane nommé le Mendiant. Le commentateur explique avec des développements plus ou moins longs les Soûtras de Kapila, qu'il cite un à un.

"Les Soûtras sont en général très concis: parfois ils ne se composent que de deux ou trois mots, et jamais ils ne comprennent plus d'une phrase. Cette forme aphoristique, sous laquelle se présente à nous la philosophie Indienne—est celle qu'a prise la science Indienne dans toutes ses branches, depuis la grammaire jusqu' à la philosophie. Les Soûtras de Panini, qui a réduit toutes les régles de la grammaire sanscrite en 3996 aphorismes, ne sont pas moins concis que ceux de Kapila. Ce mode étrange d'exposition tient dans l'Inde à la manière même dont la science s'est transmise d'âge en âge. Un maitre n'a généralement qu'un disciple: il lui suffit, pour la doctrine qu'il communique, d'avoir des points de repère, et le commentaire oral qu'il ajoute

à ces sentences pour les expliquer, met le disciple en état de les bien comprendre. Le disciple lui-même, une fois qu'il en a pénétré le sens véritable, n'a pas besoin d'un symbole plus développé, et la concision même des aphorismes l'aide à les mieux retenir. *C'est une initiation qu'il a reçue : et les sentences, dans lesquelles cette initiation se résume, restent toujours assez claires pour lui.*

" Mais il n'en est pas de même pour les lecteurs étrangers, et il serait difficile de trouver rien de plus obscur que ces Soûtras. Les commentaires mêmes ne suffisent pas toujours à les rendre parfaitement intelligibles.

" Le seul exemple d'une forme analogue dans l'histoire de l'esprit humain et de la science en Occident, nous est fourni par les Aphorismes d'Hippocrate : eux aussi s'adressaient à des adeptes, et ils réclamaient, comme les Soûtras Indiens, l'explication des maîtres pour être bien compris par les disciples. Mais cet exemple unique n'a point tiré à conséquence dans le monde occidental, tandis que dans le monde Indien l'aphorisme est resté pendant de longs siècles la forme spéciale de la science : et les développements de pensée qui nous sont habituels, et qui nous semblent indispensables, ont été reservés aux commentaires.

"La Sânkhya Kârikâ est en vers : En Grèce, la poésie a été pendant quelque temps la langue de la philosophie ; Empédocle, Parménide, ont écrit leurs systèmes en vers. Ce n'est pas Kapila qui l'a écrite. Entre Kapila, et l'auteur de la Kârikâ, Isvara Krishna, on doit compter quelques centaines d'années tout au moins : et le second n'a fait que rediger en vers, pour aider la mémoire des élèves, la doctrine que le maître avait laissée sous la forme axiomatique.

" On conçoit, du reste, sans peine, que l'usage des vers mémoriaux se soit introduit dans l'Inde pour l'enseignement et la transmission de la science : c'était une conséquence nécessaire de l'usage des aphorismes. Les sciences les plus abstraites (mathematics, astronomy, algebra), emploient aussi ce procédé, quoiqu'il semble peu fait pour leur austérité et leur précision. Ainsi, le rhythme est, avec les aphorismes, et par le même motif, la forme à peu près générale de la science dans l'Inde."

(Kapila as a personage is almost legendary ; nothing exact is known about him. His doctrine passes among the Indians " comme une sorte de révélation divine ".—Pp. 252, 253.)

M. Mohl observes as follows :—

" Ceci m'amène aux Pouranas. Nous n'avons plus rien du Pourana primitif, qui paraît avoir été une cosmogonie, suivie d'une histoire des Dieux et des familles héroïques. Les sectes ont fini par s'approprier

ce cadre, après des transformations dont nous ne savons ni le nombre ni les époques : et s'en sont servies, pour exalter chacune son dieu, et y fondre, avec des débris de l'ancienne tradition, leur mythologie plus moderne. Ce que les Pouranas sont pour le peuple, les six systèmes de philosophie le sont pour les savants. Nous trouvons ces systèmes dans la forme abstruse que les Hindous aiment à donner à leur science : chaque école a ses aphorismes, qui, sous forme de vers mnémoniques, contiennent dans le moins grand nombre de mots possible tous les résultats d'une école. Mais nous n'avons aucun renseignement sur les commencements de l'école, sur les discussions que l'élaboration du système a dû provoquer, sur les hommes qui y ont pris part, sur la marche et le développement des idées : nous avons le système dans sa dernière forme, et rien ne nous permet de remplir l'espace qui le sépare des théories plus vagues que l'on trouve dans les derniers écrits de l'époque védique, à laquelle pourtant tout prétend se rattacher. À partir de ces aphorismes, nous avons des commentaires et des traités d'exposition et d'interprétation : mais les idées premières, les termes techniques, et le système entier, sont fixés antérieurement. Tous ces systèmes reposent sur une analyse psychologique très raffinée ; et chacun a sa terminologie précise, et à laquelle la nôtre ne répond que fort imparfaitement : il faut donc, sous peine de se tromper et de tromper ses lecteurs, que les traducteurs créent une foule de termes techniques, ce qui n'est pas la moindre difficulté de ce travail."—R. Mohl, 'Rapport Annuel Fait à la Société Asiatique,' 1863, pp. 103-105 ; collected edition, 'Vingt-sept ans d'histoire des Études Orientales,' vol. ii. pp. 496, 498-9.

When the purpose simply is to imprint affirmations on the memory, and to associate them with strong emotions of reverential belief—mnemonic verses and aphorisms are suitable enough ; Empedokles employed verse, Herakleitus and the Pythagoreans expressed themselves in aphorisms—brief, half-intelligible, impressive symbols. But if philosophy is ever to be brought out of such twilight into the condition of "reasoned truth," this cannot be done without submitting all the affirmations to cross-examining opponents—to the scrutiny of a negative Dialectic. It is the theory and application of this Dialectic which we are about to follow in Sokrates and Plato.

CHAPTER III. *

OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.

HAVING dwelt at some length on the life and compositions of Plato, I now proceed to place in comparison with him some other members of the Sokratic philosophical family: less eminent, indeed, than the illustrious author of the Republic, yet still men of marked character, ability, and influence.[1] Respecting one of the brethren, Xenophon, who stands next to Plato in celebrity, I shall say a few words separately in my next and concluding chapter.

Influence exercised by Sokrates over his companions.

The ascendancy of Sokrates over his contemporaries was powerfully exercised in more than one way. He brought into vogue new subjects both of indefinite amplitude, and familiar as well as interesting to every one. On these subjects, moreover, he introduced, or at least popularised, a new method of communication, whereby the relation of teacher and learner, implying a direct transfer of ready-made knowledge from the one to the other, was put aside. He substituted an interrogatory process, at once destructive and suggestive, in which the teacher began by unteaching and the learner by unlearning what was supposed to be already known, for the purpose of provoking in the learner's mind a self-operative energy of thought, and an internal generation of new notions. Lastly, Sokrates worked forcibly upon the minds of several

* As stated in the prefatory note to this edition, the present and the following chapter have been, for convenience, transferred from the place given to them by the author, to their present position.

1 Dionysius of Halikarnassus contrasts Plato with τὸ Σωκράτους διδασκαλεῖον πᾶν (De Adm. Vi Dic. Demosthen. p. 956.) Compare also Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp. p. 762, where he contrasts the style and phraseology of Plato with that of the Σωκρατικοὶ διάλογοι generally.

friends, who were in the habit of attending him when he talked in the market-place or the palæstra. Some tried to copy his wonderful knack of colloquial cross-examination: how far they did so with success or reputation we do not know: but Xenophon says that several of them would only discourse with those who paid them a fee, and that they thus sold for considerable sums what were only small fragments obtained gratuitously from the rich table of their master.[1] There were moreover several who copied the general style of his colloquies by composing written dialogues. And thus it happened that the great master,—he who passed his life in the oral application of his Elenchus, without writing anything,—though he left no worthy representative in his own special career, became the father of numerous written dialogues and of a rich philosophical literature.[2]

Besides Plato and Xenophon, whose works are known to us, we hear of Alexamenus, Antisthenes, Æschines, Aristippus, Bryson, Eukleides, Phædon, Kriton, Simmias, Kebês, &c., as having composed dialogues of this sort. All of them were companions of Sokrates; several among them either set down what they could partially recollect of his conversations, or employed his name as a dramatic speaker of their own thoughts. Seven of these dialogues were ascribed to Æschines, twenty-five to Aristippus, seventeen to Kriton, twenty-three to Simmias, three to Kebês, six to Eukleides, four to Phædon. The compositions of Antisthenes were far more numerous: ten

Names of those companions.

[1] Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 60. ὧν τινὲς μικρὰ μέρη παρ' ἐκείνου προῖκα λαβόντες πολλοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπώλουν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος δημοτικοί· τοῖς γὰρ μὴ ἔχουσι χρήματα διδόναι οὐκ ἤθελον διαλέγεσθαι.

[2] We find a remarkable proof how long the name and conception of Sokrates lasted in the memory of the Athenian public, as having been the great progenitor of the philosophy and philosophers of the fourth century B.C. in Athens. It was about 306 B.C., almost a century after the death of Sokrates, that Demochârês (the nephew of the orator Demosthenes) delivered an oration before the Athenian judicature for the purpose of upholding the law proposed by Sophokles, forbidding philosophers or Sophists to lecture without a license obtained from the government; which law, passed a year before, had determined the secession of all the philosophers from Athens until the law was repealed. In this oration Demochârês expatiated on the demerits of many philosophers, their servility, profligate ambition, rapacity, want of patriotism, &c., from which Athenæus makes several extracts. Τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας στρατηγοί· περὶ ὧν Δημοχάρης ἔλεγεν, —Ὥσπερ ἐκ θύμβρας οὐδεὶς ἂν δύναιτο κατασκευάσαι λόγχην, οὕτ' ἐκ Σωκράτους στρατιώτην ἄμεμπτον.

Demetrius Phalereus also, in or near that same time, composed a Σωκράτους ἀπολογίαν (Diog. La. ix. 37-57). This shows how long the interest in the personal fate and character of Sokrates endured at Athens.

volumes of them, under a variety of distinct titles (some of them probably not in the form of dialogues) being recorded by Diogenes.[1] Aristippus was the first of the line of philosophers called Kyrenaic or Hedonic, afterwards (with various modifications) Epikurean: Antisthenes, of the Cynics and Stoics: Eukleides, of the Megaric school. It seems that Aristippus, Antisthenes, Eukleides, and Bryson, all enjoyed considerable reputation, as contemporaries and rival authors of Plato: Æschines, Antisthenes (who was very poor), and Aristippus, are said to have received money for their lectures; Aristippus being named as the first who thus departed from the Sokratic canon.[2]

Æschines—Oration of Lysias against him.

Æschines the companion of Sokrates did not become (like Eukleides, Antisthenes, Aristippus) the founder of a succession or sect of philosophers. The few fragments remaining of his dialogues do not enable us to appreciate their merit. He seems to have employed the name of Aspasia largely as a conversing personage, and to have esteemed her highly. He also spoke with great admiration of

[1] Diogenes Laert. i. 47-61-83, vi. 15; Athenæ. xi. p. 505 C.

Bryson is mentioned by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xi. p. 508 D. Theopompus, the contemporary of Aristotle and pupil of Isokrates, had composed an express treatise or discourse against Plato's dialogues, in which discourse he affirmed that most of them were not Plato's own, but borrowed in large proportion from the dialogues of Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Bryson. Ephippus also, the comic writer (of the fourth century B.C., contemporary with Theopompus, perhaps even earlier), spoke of Bryson as contemporary with Plato (Athenæ. xi. 509 C). This is good proof to authenticate Bryson as a composer of "Sokratic dialogues" belonging to the Platonic age, along with Antisthenes and Aristippus: whether Theopompus is correct when he asserts that Plato borrowed *much* from the three, is very doubtful.

Many dialogues were published by various writers, and ascribed falsely to one or other of the *viri Sokratici*: Diogenes (ii. 64) reports the judgment delivered by Panætius, which among them were genuine and which not so. Panætius considered that the dialogues ascribed to Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Æschines, were genuine that those assigned to Phædon and Eukleides were doubtful; and that the rest were all spurious. He thus regarded as spurious those of Alexamenus, Kriton, Simmias, Kebés, Simon, Bryson, &c., or he did not know them all. It is possible that Panætius may not have known the dialogues of Bryson; if he did know them, and believed them to be spurious, I should not accept his assertion, because I think that it is outweighed by the contrary testimony of Theopompus. Moreover, though Panætius was a very able man, our confidence in his critical estimate is much shaken when we learn that he declared the Platonic Phædon to be spurious.

[2] Diogen. Laert. i. 62-65; Athenæus, xi. p. 507 C.

Dion Chrysostom (Orat. lv. De Homero et Socrate, vol. ii. p. 289, Reiske) must have had in his view some of these other Sokratic dialogues, not those composed by Plato or Xenophon, when he alludes to conversations of Sokrates with Lysikles, Glykon, and Anytus; what he says about Anytus can hardly refer to the Platonic Menon.

Themistokles. But in regard to present or recent characters, he stands charged with much bitterness and ill-nature: especially we learn that he denounced the Sophists Prodikus and Anaxagoras, the first on the ground of having taught Theramenes, the second as the teacher of two worthless persons—Ariphrades and Arignôtus. This accusation deserves greater notice, because it illustrates the odium raised by Melêtus against Sokrates as having instructed Kritias and Alkibiades.[1] Moreover, we have Æschines presented to us in another character, very unexpected in a *vir Socraticus*. An action for recovery of money alleged to be owing was brought in the Athenian Dikastery against Æschines, by a plaintiff, who set forth his case in a speech composed by the rhetor Lysias. In this speech it is alleged that Æschines, having engaged in trade as a preparer and seller of unguents, borrowed a sum of money at interest from the plaintiff; who affirms that he counted with assurance upon honest dealing from a disciple of Sokrates, continually engaged in talking about justice and virtue.[2] But so far was this expectation from being realized, that Æschines had behaved most dishonestly. He repaid neither principal nor interest; though a judgment of the Dikastery had been obtained against him, and a branded slave belonging to him had been seized under it. Moreover, Æschines had been guilty of dishonesty equally scandalous in his dealings with many other creditors also. Furthermore, he had made love to a rich woman seventy years old, and had got possession of her property; cheating and impoverishing her family. His character as a profligate and cheat was well known and could be proved by many

[1] Plutarch, Perikles, c. 24-32; Cicero, De Invent. i. 31; Athenæus, v. 220. Some other citations will be found in Fischer's collection of the few fragments of Æschines Sokraticus (Leipsic, 1788, p. 68 seq.), though some of the allusions which he produces seem rather to belong to the orator Æschines. The statements of Athenæus, from the dialogue of Æschines called Telaugês, are the most curious. The dialogue contained, among other things, *τὴν Προδίκου καὶ Ἀναξαγόρους τῶν σοφιστῶν διαμώκησιν*, where we see Anaxagoras denominated a *Sophist* (see also Diodor. xii. 39) as well as Prodikus.

Fischer considers the three Pseudo-Platonic dialogues—*Περὶ Ἀρετῆς*, *Περὶ Πλούτου*, *Περὶ Θανάτου*—as the works of Æschines. But this is noway established.

[2] Athenæus, xiii. pp. 611-612. *Πεισθεὶς δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα λέγοντος, καὶ ἅμα οἰόμενος τοῦτον Αἰσχίνην Σωκράτους γεγονέναι μαθητήν, καὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀρετῆς πολλοὺς καὶ σεμνοὺς λέγοντα λόγους, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐπιχειρῆσαι οὐδὲ τολμῆσαι ἅπερ οἱ πονηρότατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι ἄνθρωποι ἐπιχειροῦσι πράττειν.*

We read also about another oration of Lysias against Æschines—*περὶ συκοφαντίας* (Diogen. Laert. ii. 63), unless indeed it be the same oration differently described.

witnesses. Such are the allegations against Æschines, contained in the fragment of a lost speech of Lysias, and made in open court by a real plaintiff. How much of them could be fairly proved, we cannot say: but it seems plain at least that Æschines must have been a trader as well as a philosopher. All these writers on philosophy must have had their root and dealings in real life, of which we know scarce anything.

Written Sokratic Dialogues—their general character.

The dialogues known by the title of Sokratic dialogues,[1] were composed by all the principal companions of Sokrates, and by many who were not companions. Yet though thus composed by many different authors, they formed a recognised class of literature, noticed by the rhetorical critics as distinguished for plain, colloquial, unstudied, dramatic execution, suiting the parts to the various peakers: from which general character Plato alone departed—and he too not in all of his dialogues. By the Sokratic authors

[1] Aristotel. ap. Athenæum, xi. p. 505 C; Rhetoric, iii. 16.

Dionys. Halikarnass. ad Cn. Pomp. de Platone, p. 762, Reiske. Τραφεὶς (Plato) ἐν τοῖς Σωκρατικοῖς διαλόγοις ἰσχνοτάτοις οὖσι καὶ ἀκριβεστάτοις, οὐ μείνας δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τῆς Γοργίου καὶ Θουκυδίδου κατασκευῆς ἐρασθείς: also, De Admir. Vi Dicend. in Demosthene, p. 968. Again in the same treatise De Adm. V. D. Demosth. p. 956. ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα λέξις, ἡ λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελὴς καὶ δοκοῦσα κατασκευήν τε καὶ ἰσχὺν τὴν πρὸς ἰδιώτην ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὁμοιότητα, πολλοὺς μὲν ἔσχε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας προστάτας—καὶ οἱ τῶν ἠθικῶν διαλόγων ποιηταί, ὧν ἦν τὸ Σωκρατικὸν διδασκαλεῖον πᾶν, ἔξω Πλάτωνος, &c.

Dionysius calls this style ὁ Σωκρατικὸς χαρακτὴρ, p. 1025. I presume it is the same to which the satirist Timon applies the words:—

Ἀσθενική τε λόγων δυας ἢ τριὰς ἢ ἔτι πόρσω,
Οἷος Ξεινοφόων, ἦτ' Αἰσχίνου οὐκ ἐπιπειθὴς
γράψαι— Diogen. La. ii. 55.

Lucian, Hermogenes, Phrynichus, Longinus, and some later rhetorical critics of Greece judged more favourably than Timon about the style of Æschines as well as of Xenophon. See Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. ii. p. 171, sec. ed. And Demetrius Phalereus (or the author of the treatise which bears his name), as well as the rhetor Aristeides, considered Æschines and Plato as the best representatives of the Σωκρατικὸς χαρακτὴρ, Demetr. Phaler. De Interpretat. 310; Aristeides, Orat. Platon. i. p. 35; Photius, Cods. 61 and 158; Longinus, ap. Walz. ix. p. 559, c. 2. Lucian says (De Parasito, 33) that Æschines passed some time with the elder Dionysius at Syracuse, to whom he read aloud his dialogue, entitled Miltiades, with great success.

An inedited discourse of Michael Psellus, printed by Mr. Cox in his very careful and valuable catalogue of the MSS. in the Bodleian Library, recites the same high estimate as having been formed of Æschines by the chief ancient rhetorical critics: they reckoned him among and alongside of the foremost Hellenic classical writers, as having his own peculiar merits of style—παρὰ μὲν Πλάτωνι, τὴν διαλογικὴν φράσιν, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ Σωκρατικοῦ Αἰσχίνου, τὴν ἐμμελῆ συνθήκην τῶν λέξεων, παρὰ δὲ Θουκυδίδου, &c. See Mr. Cox's Catalogue, pp. 743-745. Cicero speaks of the Sokratic philosophers generally, as writing with an elegant playfulness of style (De Officiis, i. 29, 104); which is in harmony with Lucian's phrase—Αἰσχίνης ὁ τοὺς διαλόγους μακροὺς καὶ ἀστείους γράψας, &c.

generally Sokrates appears to have been presented under the same main features: his proclaimed confession of ignorance was seldom wanting: and the humiliation which his cross-questioning inflicted even upon insolent men like Alkibiades, was as keenly set forth by Æschines as by Plato: moreover the Sokratic disciples generally were fond of extolling the Dæmon or divining prophecy of their master.[1] Some dialogues circulating under the name of some one among the companions of Sokrates, were spurious, and the authorship was a point not easy to determine. Simon, a currier at Athens, in whose shop Sokrates often conversed, is said to have kept memoranda of the conversations which he heard, and to have afterwards published them: Æschines also, and some other of the Sokratic companions, were suspected of having preserved or procured reports of the conversations of the master himself, and of having made much money after his death by delivering them before select audiences.[2] Aristotle speaks of the followers of Antisthenes as unschooled, vulgar men: but Cicero appears to have read with satisfaction the dialogues of Antisthenes, whom he designates as acute though not well-instructed.[3] Other accounts describe his dialogues as composed in a rhetorical style, which is ascribed to the fact of his having received lessons from Gorgias:[4] and Theopompus must have held in considerable estimation the dialogues of that

[1] Cicero, Brutus, 85, s. 292; De Divinatione, i. 54-122; Aristeides, Orat. xlv. περὶ Ῥητορικῆς, vol. ii. pp. 24-25; Orat. xlvi. Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων, vol. ii. pp. 295-369, ed. Dindorf. It appears by this that some of the dialogues composed by Æschines were mistaken by various persons for actual conversations held by Sokrates. It was argued, that because Æschines was inferior to Plato in ability, he was more likely to have repeated accurately what he had heard Sokrates say.

[2] Diog. L. ii. 122. He mentions a collection of thirty-three dialogues in one volume, purporting to be reports of real colloquies of Sokrates, published by Simon. But they can hardly be regarded as genuine.

The charge here mentioned is advanced by Xenophon (see a preceding note, Memorab. i. 2, 60), against some persons (τινὲς), but without specifying names. About Æschines, see Athenæus, xiii. p. 611 C; Diogen. Laert. ii. 62.

[3] Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, xii. 38: —"viri acuti magis quam eruditi," is the judgment of Cicero upon Antisthenes. I presume that these words indicate the same defect as that which is intended by Aristotle when he says —οἱ Ἀνθισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι, Metaphysic. H. 3, p. 1043, b. 24. It is plain, too, that Lucian considered the compositions of Antisthenes as not unworthy companions to those of Plato (Lucian, adv. Indoctum, c. 27).

[4] Diogen. Laert. vi. 1. If it be true that Antisthenes received lessons from Gorgias, this proves that Gorgias must sometimes have given lessons *gratis*; for the poverty of Antisthenes is well known. See the Symposion of Xenophon.

same author, as well as those of Aristippus and Bryson, when he accused Plato of having borrowed from them largely.[1]

Relations between the companions of Sokrates—Their proceedings after the death of Sokrates.

Eukleides, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, were all companions and admirers of Sokrates, as was Plato. But none of them were his disciples, in the strict sense of the word: none of them continued or enforced his doctrines, though each used his name as a spokesman. During his lifetime the common attachment to his person formed a bond of union, which ceased at his death. There is indeed some ground for believing that Plato then put himself forward in the character of leader, with a view to keep the body united.[2] We must recollect that Plato though then no more than twenty-eight years of age, was the only one among them who combined the advantages of a noble Athenian descent, opulent circumstances, an excellent education, and great native genius. Eukleides and Aristippus were neither of them Athenians: Antisthenes was very poor: Xenophon was absent on service in the Cyreian army. Plato's proposition, however, found no favour with the others and was even indignantly repudiated by Apollodorus: a man ardently attached to Sokrates, but violent and overboiling in all his feelings.[3] The companions of Sokrates, finding themselves unfavourably looked upon at Athens after his death, left the city for a season and followed Eukleides to Megara. How long they stayed there we do not know. Plato is said, though I think on no sufficient authority, to have remained absent from Athens for several years continuously. It seems certain (from an anecdote recounted by Aristotle)[4] that he talked with something like

[1] Theopomp. ap. Athenæ. xi. p. 508. See K. F. Hermann, Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller. Motive, p. 300.

An extract of some length, of a dialogue composed by Æschines between Sokrates and Alkibiades, is given by Aristeides, Or. xlvi. Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων, vol. ii. pp. 292-294, ed. Dindorf.

[2] Athenæus, xi. p. 507 A-B. from the ὑπομνήματα of the Delphian Hegesander. Who Hegesander was, I do not know: but there is nothing improbable in the anecdote which he recounts.

[3] Plato, Phædon. pp. 59 A, 117 D. Eukleides, however, though his school was probably at Megara, seems to have possessed property in Attica: for there existed, among the orations of Isæus, a pleading composed by that rhetor for some client—Πρὸς Εὐκλείδην τὸν Σωκρατικὸν ἀμφισβήτησις ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ χωρίου λύσεως (Dion. Hal., Isæ., c. 14, p. 612 Reiske). Harpokr.—Ὅτι τὰ ἐπικηρυττόμενα: also under some other words by Harpokration and by Pollux, viii. 48.

[4] Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23, p. 1398, b. 30. ἢ ὡς Ἀρίστιππος, πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰπόντα, ὡς ᾤετο—ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γ' ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν, ἔφη, οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον—λέγων τὸν Σωκράτην.

arrogance among the companions of Sokrates: and that Aristippus gently rebuked him by reminding him how very different had been the language of Sokrates himself. Complaints too were made by contemporaries, about Plato's jealous, censorious, spiteful, temper. The critical and disparaging tone of his dialogues, notwithstanding the admiration which they inspire, accounts for the existence of these complaints: and anecdotes are recounted, though not verified by any sufficient evidence, of ill-natured dealing on his part towards other philosophers who were poorer than himself.[1] Dissension or controversy on philosophical topics is rarely carried on without some invidious or hostile feeling. Athens, and the *viri Sokratici*, Plato included, form no exception to this ordinary malady of human nature.

No Sokratic school—each of the companions took a line of his own.

It is common for historians of philosophy to speak of a Sokratic school: but this phrase, if admissible at all, is only admissible in the largest and vaguest sense. The effect produced by Sokrates upon his companions was, not to teach doctrine, but to stimulate self-working enquiry, upon ethical and social subjects. Eukleides, Antisthenes, Aristippus, each took a line of his own, not less decidedly than Plato. But unfortunately we have no compositions remaining from either of the three. We possess only brief reports respecting some leading points of their doctrine, emanating altogether from those who disagreed with it: we have besides aphorisms, dicta, repartees, bons-mots, &c., which they are said to have uttered. Of these many are evident inventions; some proceeding from opponents and probably coloured or exaggerated, others hardly authenticated at all. But if they were ever so well authenticated, they would form very insufficient evidence on which to judge a philosopher—much less

This anecdote, mentioned by Aristotle, who had good means of knowing, appears quite worthy of belief.

The jealousy and love of supremacy inherent in Plato's temper (τὸ φιλότιμον), were noticed by Dionysius Hal. (Epist. ad Cn. Pompeium, p. 756).

[1] Athenæus, xi. pp. 505-508. Diog. Laert. ii. 60-65, iii. 36.

The statement made by Plato in the Phædon—That Aristippus and Kleombrotus were not present at the death of Sokrates, but were said to be in Ægina—is cited as an example of Plato's ill-will and censorious temper (Demetr. Phaler. s. 306). But this is unfair. The statement ought not to be so considered, if it were true: and if not true, it deserves a more severe epithet. We read in Athenæus various other criticisms, citing or alluding to passages of Plato, which are alleged to indicate ill-nature; but many of the passages cited do not deserve the remark.

to condemn him with asperity.[1] Philosophy (as I have already observed) aspires to deliver not merely truth, but reasoned truth. We ought to know not only what doctrines a philosopher maintained, but how he maintained them:—what objections others made against him, and how he replied:—what objections he made against dissentient doctrines, and what replies were made to him. Respecting Plato and Aristotle, we possess such information to a considerable extent:—respecting Eukleides, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, we are without it. All their compositions (very numerous, in the case of Antisthenes) have perished.

EUKLEIDES.

Eukleides of Megara—he blended Parmenides with Sokrates.

Eukleides was a Parmenidean, who blended the ethical point of view of Sokrates with the ontology of Parmenides, and followed out that negative Dialectic which was common to Sokrates with Zeno. Parmenides (I have already said)[2] and Zeno after him, recognised no absolute reality except Ens Unum, continuous, indivisible: they denied all real plurality: they said that the plural was Non-Ens or Nothing, *i.e.* nothing real or absolute, but only apparent, perpetually transient and changing, relative, different as appreciated by one man and by another. Now Sokrates laid it down that wisdom or knowledge of Good, was the sum total of ethical perfection, including within it all the different virtues: he spoke also about the divine wisdom inherent in, or pervad-

[1] Respecting these ancient philosophers, whose works are lost, I transcribe a striking passage from Descartes, who complains, in his own case, of the injustice of being judged from the statements of others, and not from his own writings:—

"Quod adeo in hâc materiâ verum est, ut quamvis sæpe *aliquas ex meis opinionibus explicaverim viris acutissimis*, et qui *me loquente videbantur eas valdé distinctè intelligere: attamen cum eas retulerunt, observavi* ipsos fere *semper illas ita mutavisse, ut pro meis agnoscere amplius non possem.* Quâ occasione posteros hic oratos volo, ut nunquam credant, quidquam à me esse profectum, quod ipse in lucem non edidero. *Et nullo modo miror absurda illa dogmata, quæ veteribus illis philosophis tribuuntur, quorum scripta non habemus:* nec propterea judico ipsorum cogitationes valdé à ratione fuisse alienas, cum habuerint præstantissima suorum sæculorum ingenia; sed tantum nobis perperam esse relatas." (Descartes, Diss. De Methodo, p. 43.)

[2] See ch. i. pp. 19-22.

ing the entire Kosmos or universe.[1] Eukleides blended together the Ens of Parmenides with the Good of Sokrates, saying that the two names designated one and the same thing: sometimes called Good, Wisdom, Intelligence, God, &c., and by other names also, but always one and the same object named and meant. He farther maintained that the opposite of Ens, and the opposite of Bonum (Non-Ens, Non-Bonum, or Malum) were things non-existent, unmeaning names, Nothing,[2] &c.: *i.e.* that they were nothing really, absolutely, permanently, but ever varying and dependent upon our ever varying conceptions. The One—the All—the Good—was absolute, immoveable, invariable, indivisible. But the opposite thereof was a non-entity or nothing: there was no one constant meaning corresponding to Non-Ens—but a variable meaning, different with every man who used it.

Doctrine of Eukleides about *Bonum.*

It was in this manner that Eukleides solved the problem which Sokrates had brought into vogue—What is the Bonum—or (as afterwards phrased) the Summum Bonum? Eukleides pronounced the Bonum to be coincident with the Ens Unum of Parmenides. The Parmenidean thesis, originally belonging to Transcendental Physics or Ontology, became thus implicated with Transcendental Ethics.[3]

The doctrine compared to that of Plato —changes in Plato.

Plato departs from Sokrates on the same point. He agrees with Eukleides in recognising a Transcendental Bonum. But it appears that his doctrines on this head underwent some change. He held for some time what is called the doctrine of Ideas: transcendental Forms, Entia, Essences: he considered the Transcendental to be essentially multiple, or to be an aggregate —whereas Eukleides had regarded it as essentially One. This is

[1] Xenophon. Memor. i. 4, 17. *τὴν ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησιν.* Compare Plato, Philêbus, pp. 29-30; Cicero, Nat. Deor. ii. 6, 6, iii. 11.

[2] Diog. L. ii. 106. *Οὗτος ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφήνατο πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπά. Τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀνῄρει, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων.* Compare also vii. 2, 161, where the Megarici are represented as recognising only *μίαν ἀρετὴν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην.* Cicero, Academ. ii. 42.

[3] However, in the verse of Xenophanes, the predecessor of Parmenides —*Οὖλος ὁρᾷ, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δέ τ' ἀκούει*—the Universe is described as a thinking, seeing, hearing God—*Ἕν καὶ Πᾶν.* Sextus Empir. adv. Mathemat. ix. 144; Xenophan. Fragm. p. 36, ed. Karsten.

the doctrine which we find in some of the Platonic dialogues. In the Republic, the Idea of Good appears as one of these, though it is declared to be the foremost in rank and the most ascendant in efficacy.[1] But in the later part of his life, and in his lectures (as we learn from Aristotle), Plato came to adopt a different view. He resolved the Ideas into numbers. He regarded them as made up by the combination of two distinct factors:—1. The One—the Essentially One. 2. The Essentially Plural: The Indeterminate Dyad: the Great and Little.—Of these two elements he considered the Ideas to be compounded. And he identified the Idea of Good with the essentially One—*τὸ ἀγαθὸν* with *τὸ ἕν*: the principle of Good with the principle of Unity: also the principle of Evil with the Indeterminate. But though Unity and Good were thus identical, he considered Unity as logically antecedent, or the subject—Good as logically consequent, or the predicate.[2]

Last doctrine of Plato nearly the same as that of Eukleides.

This last doctrine of Plato in his later years (which does not appear in the dialogues, but seems, as far as we can make out, to have been delivered substantially in his oral lectures, and is ascribed to him by Aristotle) was nearly coincident with that of Eukleides. Both of them held the identity of *τὸ ἓν* with *τὸ ἀγαθόν*. This one doctrine is all that we know about Eukleides: what

[1] Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 E, vii. p. 517 A.

[2] The account given by Aristotle of Plato's doctrine of Ideas, as held by Plato in his later years, appears in various passages of the Metaphysica, and in the curious account repeated by Aristoxenus (who had often heard it from Aristotle—*Ἀριστοτέλης ἀεὶ διηγεῖτο*) of the *ἀκρόασις* or lecture delivered by Plato, De Bono. See Aristoxen. Harmon. ii. p. 30, Meibom. Compare the eighth chapter in this work,—Platonic Compositions Generally. Metaphys. N. 1091, b. 13. *τῶν δὲ τὰς ἀκινήτους οὐσίας εἶναι λεγόντων* (sc. Platonici) *οἱ μέν φασιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι· οὐσίαν μέντοι τὸ ἓν αὐτοῦ ᾤοντο εἶναι μάλιστα*, which words are very clearly explained by Bonitz in the note to his Commentary, p. 586: also Metaphys. 987, b. 20, and Scholia, p. 551, b. 20, p. 567, b. 34, where the work of Aristotle, *Περὶ Τἀγαθοῦ*, is referred to: probably the memoranda taken down by Aristotle from Plato's lecture on that subject, accompanied by notes of his own.

In Schol. p. 573, a. 18, it is stated that the astronomer Eudoxus was a hearer both of Plato and of Eukleides.

The account given by Zeller (Phil. der Griech. ii. p. 453, 2nd ed.) of this latter phase of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, applies exactly to that which we hear about the main doctrine of Eukleides. Zeller describes the Platonic doctrine as being "Eine Vermischung des ethischen Begriffes vom höchsten Gut, mit dem Metaphysischen des Absoluten: Der Begriff des Guten ist zunächst aus dem menschlichen Leben abstrahirt; er bezeichnet das, was dem Menschen zuträglich ist. So noch bei Sokrates. Plato verallgemeinert ihn nun zum Begriff des Absoluten; dabei spielt aber seine ursprüngliche Bedeutung noch fortwährend herein, und so ent-

consequences he derived from it, or whether any, we do not know. But Plato combined, with this transcendental Unum = Bonum, a transcendental indeterminate plurality: from which combination he considered his Ideas or Ideal Numbers to be derivatives.

Megaric succession of philosophers. Eleian or Eretrian succession.

Eukleides is said to have composed six dialogues, the titles of which alone remain. The scanty information which we possess respecting him relates altogether to his negative logical procedure. Whether he deduced any consequences from his positive doctrine of the Transcendental Ens, Unum, Bonum, we do not know: but he, as Zeno had been before him,[1] was acute in exposing contradictions and difficulties in the positive doctrines of opponents. He was a citizen of Megara, where he is said to have harboured Plato and the other companions of Sokrates, when they retired for a time from Athens after the death of Sokrates. Living there as a teacher or debater on philosophy, he founded a school or succession of philosophers who were denominated *Megarici*. The title is as old as Aristotle, who both names them and criticises their doctrines.[2] None of their compositions are preserved. The earliest who becomes known to us is Eubulides, the contemporary and opponent of Aristotle; next Ichthyas, Apollonius, Diodôrus Kronus, Stilpon, Alexinus, between 340-260 B.C.

With the Megaric philosophers there soon become confounded another succession, called Eleian or Eretrian, who trace their origin to another Sokratic man—Phædon. The chief Eretrians

steht die Unklarheit, dass weder der ethische noch der metaphysische Begriff des Guten rein gefasst wird."

This remark is not less applicable to Eukleides than to Plato, both of them agreeing in the doctrine here criticised. Zeller says truly, that the attempt to identify Unum and Bonum produces perpetual confusion. The two notions are thoroughly distinct and independent. It ought not to be called (as he phrases it) "a generalization of Bonum". There is no common property on which to found a generalization. It is a forced conjunction between two disparates.

[1] Plato, Parmenides, p. 128 C, where Zeno represents himself as taking for his premisses the conclusions of opponents, to show that they led to absurd consequences. This seems what is meant, when Diogenes says about Eukleides—ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν ἐνίστατο οὐ κατὰ λήμματα, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπιφοράν (ii. 107); Deycks, De Megaricorum Doctrinâ, p. 34.

[2] Aristot. Metaph. iv. p. 1046, b. 29.

The sarcasm ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic implies that Eukleides was really known as the founder of a *school*—καὶ τὴν μὲν Εὐκλείδου σχολὴν ἔλεγε χολήν (Diog. L. vi. 24)—the earliest mention (I apprehend) of the word σχολὴ in that sense.

made known to us are Pleistanus, Menedêmus, Asklepiades. The second of the three acquired some reputation.

The Megarics and Eretrians, as far as we know them, turned their speculative activity altogether in the logical or intellectual direction, paying little attention to the ethical and emotional field. Both Antisthenes and Aristippus, on the contrary, pursued the ethical path. To the Sokratic question, What is the Bonum? Eukleides had answered by a transcendental definition: Antisthenes and Aristippus each gave to it an ethical answer, having reference to human wants and emotions, and to the different views which they respectively took thereof. Antisthenes declared it to consist in virtue, by which he meant an independent and self-sufficing character, confining all wants within the narrowest limits: Aristippus placed it in the moderate and easy pleasures, in avoiding ambitious struggles, and in making the best of every different situation, yet always under the guidance of a wise calculation and self-command. Both of them kept clear of the transcendental: they neither accepted it as Unum et Omne (the view of Eukleides), nor as Plura (the Eternal Ideas or Forms, the Platonic view). Their speculations had reference altogether to human life and feelings, though the one took a measure of this wide subject very different from the other: and in thus confining the range of their speculations, they followed Sokrates more closely than either Eukleides or Plato followed him. They not only abstained from transcendental speculation, but put themselves in declared opposition to it. And since the intellectual or logical philosophy, as treated by Plato, became intimately blended with transcendental hypothesis—Antisthenes and Aristippus are both found on the negative side against its pretensions. Aristippus declared the mathematical sciences to be useless, as conducing in no way to happiness, and taking no account of what was better or what was worse.[1] He declared

Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus—Ethical, not transcendental.

[1] Aristotel. Metaph. B. 996, a. 32. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα τῶν σοφιστῶν τινες οἷον Ἀρίστιππος προεπηλάκιζον αὐτὰς (τὰς μαθηματικὰς τέχνας)·—ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ ταῖς βαναύσοις, οἷον ἐν τεκτονικῇ καὶ σκυτικῇ, διότι βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον λέγεσθαι πάντα, τὰς δὲ μαθηματικὰς οὐθένα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

Aristotle here ranks Aristippu among the σοφισταί.

Aristippus, in discountenancing φυσιολογίαν, cited the favourite saying of Sokrates that the proper study of mankind was ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται.

Plutarch, ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8.

that we could know nothing except in so far as we were affected by it, and as it was or might be in correlation with ourselves: that as to causes not relative to ourselves, or to our own capacities and affections, we could know nothing about them.[1]

Preponderance of the negative vein in the Platonic age.

Such were the leading writers and talkers contemporary with Plato, in the dialectical age immediately following on the death of Sokrates. The negative vein greatly preponderates in them, as it does on the whole even in Plato—and as it was pretty sure to do, so long as the form of dialogue was employed. Affirmative exposition and proof is indeed found in some of the later Platonic works, carried on by colloquy between two speakers. But the colloquial form manifests itself evidently as unsuitable for the purpose: and we must remember that Plato was a lecturer as well as a writer, so that his doctrines made their way, at least in part, through continuous exposition. But it is Aristotle with whom the form of affirmative continuous exposition first becomes predominant, in matters of philosophy. Though he composed dialogues (which are now lost), and though he appreciates dialectic as a valuable exercise, yet he considers it only as a discursive preparation; antecedent, though essential, to the more close and concentrated demonstrations of philosophy.

Harsh manner in which historians of philosophy censure the negative vein.

Most historians deal hardly with this negative vein. They depreciate the Sophists, the Megarics and Eretrians, the Academics and Sceptics of the subsequent ages —under the title of Eristics, or lovers of contention for itself—as captious and perverse enemies of truth.

Negative method in philosophy essential to the control of the affirmative.

I have already said that my view of the importance and value of the negative vein of philosophy is altogether different. It appears to me quite as essential as the affirmative. It is required as an antecedent, a test, and a corrective. Aristotle deserves all honour for his attempts to construct and defend various affirmative theories: but the value of these theories depends upon their being defensible against all objectors. Affirmative philosophy,

[1] Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 191; Diog. L. ii. 92.

as a body not only of truth but of reasoned truth, holds the champion's belt, subject to the challenge not only of competing affirmants, but of all deniers and doubters. And this is the more indispensable, because of the vast problems which these affirmative philosophers undertake to solve: problems especially vast during the age of Plato and Aristotle. The question has to be determined, not only which of two proposed solutions is the best, but whether either of them is tenable, and even whether any solution at all is attainable by the human faculties: whether there exist positive evidence adequate to sustain any conclusion, accompanied with adequate replies to the objections against it. The burthen of proof lies upon the affirmant: and the proof produced must be open to the scrutiny of every dissentient.

Sokrates—the most persevering and acute Eristic of his age.

Among these dissentients or negative dialecticians, Sokrates himself, during his life, stood prominent. In his footsteps followed Eukleides and the Megarics: who, though they acquired the unenviable surname of Eristics or Controversialists, cannot possibly have surpassed Sokrates, and probably did not equal him, in the refutative Elenchus. Of no one among the Megarics, probably, did critics ever affirm, what the admiring Xenophon says about Sokrates—"that he dealt with every one in colloquial debate just as he chose,"—*i.e.*, that he baffled and puzzled his opponents whenever he chose. No one of these Megarics probably ever enunciated so sweeping a negative programme, or declared so emphatically his own inability to communicate positive instruction, as Sokrates in the Platonic Apology. A person more thoroughly Eristic than Sokrates never lived. And we see perfectly, from the Memorabilia of Xenophon (who nevertheless strives to bring out the opposite side of his character), that he was so esteemed among his contemporaries. Plato, as well as Eukleides, took up this vein in the Sokratic character, and worked it with unrivalled power in many of his dialogues. The Platonic Sokrates is compared, and compares himself, to Antæus, who compelled every new-comer, willing or unwilling, to wrestle with him.[1]

[1] Plato, Theætet. p. 169 A. *Theodorus.* Οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν καθάπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· σὺ

Platonic Parmenides —its extreme negative character.

Of the six dialogues composed by Eukleides, we cannot speak positively, because they are not preserved. But they cannot have been more refutative, and less affirmative, than most of the Platonic dialogues; and we can hardly be wrong in asserting that they were very inferior both in energy and attraction. The Theætêtus and the Parmenides, two of the most negative among the Platonic dialogues, seem to connect themselves, by the *personnel* of the drama, with the Megaric philosophers: the former dialogue is ushered in by Eukleides, and is, as it were, dedicated to him: the latter dialogue exhibits, as its *protagonistes*, the veteran Parmenides himself, who forms the one factor of the Megaric philosophy, while Sokrates forms the other. Parmenides (in the Platonic dialogue so called) is made to enforce the negative method in general terms, as a philosophical duty co-ordinate with the affirmative; and to illustrate it by a most elaborate argumentation, directed partly against the Platonic Ideas (here advocated by the youthful Sokrates), partly against his own (the Parmenidean) dogma of Ens Unum. Parmenides adduces unanswerable objections against the dogma of Transcendental Forms or Ideas; yet says at the same time that there can be no philosophy unless you admit it. He reproves the youthful Sokrates for precipitancy in affirming the dogma, and contends that you are not justified in affirming any dogma until you have gone through a bilateral scrutiny of it—that is, first assuming the doctrine to be true, next assuming it to be false, and following out the deductions arising from the one assumption as well as from the other.[1] Parmenides then gives a string of successive

δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίῤῥωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταῖόν τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾷν· τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἀναγκάσῃς ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαίσαι.

Sokrates. Ἄριστα γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπείκασας· ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων· μυρίοι γὰρ ἤδη μοι Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυχόντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ' εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι. οὕτω τις ἐρῶς δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας· μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὀνῆσαι.

How could the eristic appetite be manifested in stronger language either by Eukleides, or Eubulides, or Diodorus Kronus, or any of those Sophists upon whom the Platonic commentators heap so many harsh epithets?

Among the compositions ascribed to Protagoras by Diogenes Laertius (ix. 55), one is entitled Τέχνη Ἐριστικῶν. But if we look at the last chapter of the Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis, we shall find Aristotle asserting explicitly that there existed no Τέχνη Ἐριστικῶν anterior to his own work the Topica.

[1] Plato, Parmen. p. 136.

deductions (at great length, occupying the last half of the dialogue)—four pairs of counter-demonstrations or Antinomies—in which contradictory conclusions appear each to be alike proved. He enunciates the final result as follows:—"Whether Unum exists, or does not exist, Unum itself and Cætera, both exist and do not exist, both appear and do not appear, all things and in all ways—both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other".[1]

If this memorable dialogue, with its concluding string of elaborate antinomies, had come down to us under the name of Eukleides, historians would probably have denounced it as a perverse exhibition of ingenuity, worthy of "that litigious person, who first infused into the Megarians the fury of disputation".[2] But since it is of Platonic origin, we must recognise Plato not only as having divided with the Megaric philosophers the impulse of negative speculation which they had inherited from Sokrates, but as having carried that impulse to an extreme point of invention, combination, and dramatic handling, much beyond their powers. Undoubtedly, if we pass from the Parmenidês to other dialogues, we find Plato very different. He has various other intellectual impulses, an abundant flow of ideality and of constructive fancy, in many distinct channels. But negative philosophy is at least one of the indisputable and prominent items of the Platonic aggregate.

The Megarics shared the negative impulse with Sokrates and Plato.

While then we admit that the Megaric succession of philosophers exhibited negative subtlety and vehement love of contentious debate, we must recollect that these qualities were inherited from Sokrates and shared with Plato. The philosophy of Sokrates, who taught nothing and cross-examined every one, was essentially more negative and controversial, both in him and his successors, than any which had preceded it. In an age when

[1] Plato, Parmen. p. 166. ἓν εἴτ' ἔστιν, εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.—Ἀληθέστατα.

See below, vol. iii. chap. xxvii. Parmenides.

[2] This is the phrase of the satirical sillographer Timon, who spoke with scorn of all the philosophers except Pyrrhon:—

Ἀλλ' οὔ μοι τούτων φλεδόνων μέλει, οὐδὲ μὲν ἄλλου
Οὐδενός, οὐ Φαίδωνος, ὅτις γε μὲν— οὔδ' ἐριδάντεω
Εὐκλείδου, Μεγαρεῦσιν ὃς ἔμβαλε λύσσαν ἐρισμοῦ.

dialectic colloquy was considered as appropriate for philosophical subjects, and when long continuous exposition was left to the rhetor—Eukleides established a succession or school [1] which was more distinguished for impugning dogmas of others than for defending dogmas of its own. Schleiermacher and others suppose that Plato in his dialogue Euthydêmus intends to expose the sophistical fallacies of the Megaric school:[2] and that in the dialogue Sophistês, he refutes the same philosophers (under the vague designation of "the friends of Forms") in their speculations about Ens and Non-Ens. The first of these two opinions is probably true to some extent, though we cannot tell how far: the second of the two is supported by some able critics—yet it appears to me untenable.[3]

Of Eukleides himself, though he is characterised as strongly controversial, no distinct points of controversy have been preserved: but his successor Eubulides is celebrated for various sophisms. He was the contemporary and rival of Aristotle: who, without however expressly naming him, probably intends to speak of him when alluding to the Megaric philosophers generally.[4] Another of the same school, Alexinus (rather later than Eubulides) is also said to have written against Aristotle.

[1] If we may trust a sarcastic bon-mot ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic, the contemporary of the *viri Sokratici* and the follower of Antisthenes, the term σχολὴ was applied to the visitors of Eukleides rather than to those of Plato—καὶ τὴν μὲν Εὐκλείδου σχολὴν ἔλεγε χολήν, τὴν δὲ Πλάτωνος διατριβήν, κατατριβήν. Diog. L. vi. 24.

[2] Schleierm. Einleitung to Plat. Euthyd. p. 403 seq.

[3] Schleierm. Introduction to the Sophistês, pp. 134-135.

See Deycks, Megaricorum Doctrina, p. 41 seq. Zeller, Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 180 seq., with his instructive note. Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, vol. i. p. 37, and others cited by Zeller.—Ritter dissents from this view, and I concur in his dissent. To affirm that Eukleides admitted a plurality of Ideas or Forms, is to contradict the only one deposition, certain and unequivocal, which we have about his philosophy. His doctrine is that of the Transcendental Unum, Ens, Bonum; while the doctrine of the Transcendental Plura (Ideas or Forms) belongs to Plato and others. Both Deycks and Zeller (p. 185) recognise this as a difficulty. But to me it seems fatal to their hypothesis; which, after all, is only an hypothesis—first originated by Schleiermacher. If it be true that the Megarici are intended by Plato under the appellation οἱ τῶν εἰδῶν φίλοι, we must suppose that the school had been completely transformed before the time of Stilpon, who is presented as the great opponent of τὰ εἴδη.

[4] Aristokles, ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 2. Eubulides is said not merely to have controverted the philosophical theories of Aristotle, but also to have attacked his personal character with bitterness and slander: a practice not less common in ancient controversy than in modern. About Alexinus, Diog. L. ii. 109.

Among those who took lessons in rhetoric and pronunciation from Eubu-

Eubulides—his logical problems or puzzles—difficulty of solving them—many solutions attempted.

Six sophisms are ascribed to Eubulides. 1. Ὁ ψευδόμενος — Mentiens. 2. Ὁ διαλανθάνων, or ἐγκεκαλυμμένος—the person hidden under a veil. 3. Ἠλέκτρα. 4. Σωρείτης — Sorites. 5. Κερατίνης —Cornutus. 6. Φάλακρος — Calvus. Of these the second is substantially the same with the third; and the fourth the same with the sixth, only inverted.[1]

These sophisms are ascribed to Eubulides, and belonged probably to the Megaric school both before and after him. But it is plain both from the Euthydêmus of Plato, and from the Topica of Aristotle, that there were many others of similar character; frequently employed in the abundant dialectic colloquies which prevailed at Athens during the fourth and third centuries B.C. Plato and Aristotle handle such questions and their authors contemptuously, under the name of Eristic: but it was more easy to put a bad name upon them, as well as upon the Eleate Zeno, than to elucidate the logical difficulties which they brought to view. Neither Aristotle nor Plato provided a sufficient answer to them: as is proved by the fact, that several subsequent philosophers wrote treatises expressly in reference to them—even philosophers of reputation, like Theophrastus and Chrysippus.[2] How these two latter philosophers performed their task, we cannot say. But the fact that they attempted the task, exhibits a commendable anxiety to make their logical theory complete, and to fortify it against objections.

lides, we read the name of the orator Demosthenes, who is said to have improved his pronunciation thereby. Diog. Laert. ii. p. 108. Plutarch, x. Orat. 21, p. 845 C.

[1] Diog. L. ii. pp. 108-109; vii. 82. Lucian Vit. Auct. 22.

1. Cicero, Academ. ii. pp. 30-96. "Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris. Dicis autem te mentiri, verumque dicis: mentiris igitur." 2, 3. Ὁ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος. You know your father: you are placed before a person covered and concealed by a thick veil: you do not know him. But this person is your father. Therefore you both know your father and do not know him. 5. Κερατίνης. That which you have not lost, you have: but you have not lost horns; therefore you *have* horns. 4, 6. Σωρείτης—Φάλακρος. What number of grains make a heap—or are many? What number are few? Are three grains few, and four *many?*—or, where will you draw the line between Few and Many? The like question about the hairs on a man's head—How many must he lose before he can be said to have only a few, or to be bald?

[2] Diog. L. v. p. 49; vii. pp. 192-198. Seneca, Epistol. p. 45. Plutarch (De Stoicor. Repugnantiis, p. 1037) has some curious extracts and remarks from Chrysippus; who (he says) spoke in the harshest terms against the Μεγαρικὰ ἐρωτήματα, as having puzzled and unsettled men's convictions without ground—while he (Chrysippus) had himself proposed puzzles and difficulties still more formidable, in his treatise κατὰ Συνηθείας.

It is in this point of view—in reference to logical theory—that the Megaric philosophers have not been fairly appreciated. They, or persons reasoning in their manner, formed one essential encouragement and condition to the formation of any tolerable logical theory. They administered, to minds capable and constructive, that painful sense of contradiction, and shock of perplexity, which Sokrates relied upon as the stimulus to mental parturition—and which Plato extols as a lever for raising the student to general conceptions.[1] Their sophisms were not intended to impose upon any one, but on the contrary, to guard against imposition.[2] Whoever states a fallacy clearly and nakedly, applying it to a particular case in which it conducts to a conclusion known upon other evidence not to be true—contributes to divest it of its misleading effect. The persons most liable to be deceived by the fallacy are those who are not forewarned:—in cases where the premisses are stated not nakedly, but in an artful form of words—and where the conclusion, though false, is not known beforehand to be false by the hearer. To use Mr. John Stuart Mill's phrase,[3] the fallacy is a case of apparent evidence mistaken for real evidence: you expose it to be evidence only apparent and not real, by giving a type of the fallacy, in which the conclusion obtained is

Real character of the Megaric sophisms, not calculated to deceive, but to guard against deception.

[1] Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 523 A, 524. *τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρινόμενα —τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελευόμενα ἐκείνην ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιούσης . . . Τὰ μὲν οὖ παρακαλοῦντα, ὅσα μὴ ἐκβαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα· τὰ δ' ἐκβαίνοντα, ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθημι, ἐπειδὰν ἡ αἴσθησις μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ.* Compare p. 524 E: the whole passage is very interesting.

[2] The remarks of Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. ii. p. 139, 2nd ed.) upon these Megaric philosophers are more just and discerning than those made by most of the historians of philosophy—"Doch darf man wohl annehmen, dass sie solche Trugschlüsse nicht zur Taüschung, sondern zur Belehrung für unvorsichtige, oder zur Warnung vor der Seichtigkeit gewöhnlicher Vorstellungsweisen, gebrauchen wollten. So viel ist gewiss, dass die Megariker sich viel mit den Formen des Denken beschäftigten, vielleicht mehr zu Aufsuchung einzelner Regeln, als zur Begründung eines wissenschaftlichen Zusammenhangs unter ihnen; obwohl auch besondere Theile der Logik unter ihren Schriften erwähnt werden."

This is much more reasonable than the language of Prantl, who denounces "the shamelessness of doctrinarism" (die Unverschämtheit des Doctrinarismus) belonging to these Megarici—"the petulance and vanity which prompted them to seek celebrity by intentional offences against sound common sense," &c. (Gesch. der Logik, pp. 39-40.—Sir Wm. Hamilton has some good remarks on these sophisms, in his Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxiii. p. 452 seq.)

[3] See the first chapter of his book v. on Fallacies, System of Logic, vol. ii.

obviously false: and the more obviously false it is, the better suited for its tutelary purpose. Aristotle recognises, as indispensable in philosophical enquiry, the preliminary wrestling into which he conducts his reader, by means of a long string of unsolved difficulties or puzzles—(*ἀπόριαι*). He declares distinctly and forcibly, that whoever attempts to lay out a positive theory, without having before his mind a full list of the difficulties with which he is to grapple, is like one who searches without knowing what he is looking for; without being competent to decide whether what he hits upon as a solution be really a solution or not.[1] Now that enumeration of puzzles which Aristotle here postulates (and in part undertakes, in reference to Philosophia Prima) is exactly what the Megarics, and various other dialecticians (called by Plato and Aristotle Sophists) contributed to furnish for the use of those who theorised on Logic.

If the process of theorising be admissible, it must include negative as well as affirmative.

You may dislike philosophy: you may undervalue, or altogether proscribe, the process of theorising. This is the standing-point usual with the bulk of mankind, ancient as well as modern: who generally dislike all accurate reasoning, or analysis and discrimination of familiar abstract words, as mean and tiresome hair-splitting.[2] But if you admit the business of theorising to be legitimate, useful, and even honourable, you must reckon on free working of independent, individual, minds as the operative force—and on the necessity of dissentient, conflicting, manifestations of this common force, as essential conditions to any successful result. Upon no other conditions can you obtain any tolerable body of reasoned truth—or even reasoned *quasi-truth*.

[1] Aristotel. Metaphys. B. 1, p. 995, a. 33.

διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων δὲ χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ' εἰ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὕρηκεν ἢ μὴ γιγνώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον, τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον.

Aristotle devotes the whole of this Book to an enumeration of ἀπόριαι.

[2] See my account of the Platonic dialogue Hippias Major, vol. ii. chap. xiii. Aristot. Metaphys. A. minor, p. 995, a. 9. τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς, ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνείρειν, ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν· ἔχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθερον εἶναί τισι δοκεῖ. Cicero (Paradoxa, c. 2) talks of the "minutæ interrogatiunculæ" of the Stoics as tedious and tiresome.

Now the historians of philosophy seldom take this view of philosophy as a whole—as a field to which the free antithesis of affirmative and negative is indispensable. They consider true philosophy as represented by Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle, one or other of them: while the contemporaries of these eminent men are discredited under the name of Sophists, Eristics, or sham-philosophers, sowing tares among the legitimate crop of wheat—or as devils whom the miraculous virtue of Sokrates and Plato is employed in expelling from the Athenian mind. Even the companions of Sokrates, and the Megarics among them, whom we know only upon the imperfect testimony of opponents, have fallen under this unmerited sentence:[1] as if they were destructive agents breaking down an edifice of well-constituted philosophy—no such edifice in fact having ever existed in Greece, though there were several dissenting lecture rooms and conflicting veins of speculation promoted by eminent individuals.

Logical position of the Megaric philosophers erroneously described by historians of philosophy.

Necessity of a complete collection of difficulties.

Whoever undertakes, *bonâ fide*, to frame a complete and defensible logical theory, will desire to have before him a copious collection of such difficulties, and will consider those who pro-

[1] The same charge is put by Cicero into the mouth of Lucullus against the Academics:—"Similiter vos (Academici) quum perturbare, ut illi" (the Gracchi and others) "rempublicam, sic vos philosophiam, benè jam constitutam velitis. . . . Tum exortus est, ut in optimâ republicâ Tib. Gracchus, qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas, qui constitutam philosophiam everteret" (Acad. Prior. ii. 5, 14-15).

Even in the liberal and comprehensive history of the Greek philosophy by Zeller (vol. ii. p. 187, ed. 2nd), respecting Eukleides and the Megarians;—"Dagegen bot der *Streit gegen die geltenden Meinungen* dem Scharfsinn, der Rechthaberei, und dem wissenschaftlichen Ehrgeiz, ein unerschöpfliches Feld dar, welches denn auch die Megarischen Philosophen rüstig ausbeuteten."

If by "die geltenden Meinungen" Zeller means the *common sense* of the day—that is, the opinions and beliefs current among the ἰδιῶται, the working, enjoying, non-theorising public—it is very true that the Megaric philosophers contended against them: but Sokrates and Plato contended against them quite as much: we see this in the Platonic Apology, Gorgias, Republic, Timæus, Parmenidês, &c.

If, on the other hand, by "die geltenden Meinungen" Zeller means any philosophical or logical theories generally or universally admitted by thinking men as valid, the answer is that there were none such in the fourth and third centuries B.C. Various eminent speculative individuals were labouring to construct such theories, each in his own way, and each with a certain congregation of partisans; but established theory there was none. Nor can any theory (whether accepted or not) be firm or trustworthy, unless it be exposed to the continued thrusts of the negative weapon, searching out its vulnerable points. We know of the Megarics only what they furnished towards that negative testing; without which, however,—as we may learn from Plato and Aristotle themselves,—the true value of the affirmative defences can never be measured.

pound them as useful auxiliaries.[1] If he finds no one to propound them, he will have to imagine them for himself. "The philosophy of reasoning" (observes Mr. John Stuart Mill) "must comprise the philosophy of bad as well as of good reasoning."[2] The one cannot be complete without the other. To enumerate the different varieties of apparent evidence which is not real evidence (called Fallacies), and of apparent contradictions which are not real contradictions—referred as far as may be to classes, each illustrated by a suitable type—is among the duties of a logician. He will find this duty much facilitated, if there happen to exist around him an active habit of dialectic debate: ingenious men who really study the modes of puzzling and confuting a well-armed adversary, as well as of defending themselves against the like. Such a habit did exist at Athens: and unless it had existed, the Aristotelian theories on logic would probably never have been framed. Contemporary and antecedent dialecticians, the Megarici among them, supplied the stock of particular examples enumerated and criticised by Aristotle in the Topica:[3] which treatise (especially the last book, De Sophisticis Elenchis) is intended both to explain the theory, and to give suggestions on the practice, of logical controversy. A man who takes lessons in fencing must learn not only how to thrust and parry, but also how to impose on his opponent by feints, and to meet the feints employed against himself: a general who learns the art of war must know how to take advantage of the enemy by effective cheating and treachery (to use the language of Xenophon), and how to avoid being cheated himself. The Aristotelian Topica, in

[1] Marbach (Gesch. der Philos. s. 91), though he treats the Megarics as jesters (which I do not think they were), yet adds very justly: "Nevertheless these puzzles (propounded by the Megarics) have their serious and scientific side. We are forced to inquire, how it happens that the contradictions shown up in them are not merely possible but even necessary."

Both Tiedemann and Winckelmann also remark that the debaters called Eristics contributed greatly to the formation of the theory and precepts of Logic, afterwards laid out by Aristotle. Winckelmann, Prolegg. ad Platon. Euthydem. pp. xxiv.-xxxi. Even Stallbaum, though full of harshness towards those Sophists whom he describes as belonging to the school of Protagoras, treats the Megaric philosophers with much greater respect. Prolegom. ad Platon. Euthydem. p. 9.

[2] System of Logic, Book v. 1, 1.

[3] Prantl (Gesch. der Logik, vol. i. pp. 43-50) ascribes to the Megarics all or nearly all the sophisms which Aristotle notices in the Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis. This is more than can be proved, and more than I think probable. Several of them are taken from the Platonic Euthydêmus.

like manner, teach the arts both of dialectic attack and of dialectic defence.[1]

The Sophisms ascribed to Eubulidês, looked at from the point of view of logical theory, deserve that attention which they seem to have received. The logician lays down as a rule that no affirmative proposition can be at the same time true and false. Now the first sophism (called *Mentiens*) exhibits the case of a proposition which is, or appears to be, at the same time

Sophisms propounded by Eubulides.
1. Mentiens.
2. The Veiled Man.
3. Sorites.
4. Cornutus.

[1] See the remarkable passages in the discourses of Sokrates (Memorab. iii. 1, 6; iv. 2, 15), and in that of Kambyses to Cyrus, which repeats the same opinion—Cyropæd. i. 6, 27—respecting the amount of deceit, treachery, the thievish and rapacious qualities required for conducting war against an enemy—(*τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους νόμιμα*, i. 6, 34).

Aristotle treats of Dialectic, as he does of Rhetoric, as an art having its theory, and precepts founded upon that theory. I shall have occasion to observe in a future chapter (xxi.), that logical Fallacies are not generated or invented by persons called Sophists, but are inherent liabilities to error in the human intellect; and that the habit of debate affords the only means of bringing them into clear daylight, and guarding against being deceived by them. Aristotle gives precepts both how to thrust, and how to parry with the best effect: if he had taught only how to parry, he would have left out one-half of the art.

One of the most learned and candid of the Aristotelian commentators—M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire—observes as follows (Logique d'Aristote, p. 435, Paris, 1838) respecting De Sophist. Elenchis:—

"Aristote va donc s'occuper de la marche qu'il faut donner aux discussions sophistiques: et ici il serait difficile quelquefois de décider, à la manière dont les choses sont présentées par lui, si ce sont des conseils qu'il donne aux Sophistes, ou à ceux qui veulent éviter leurs ruses. Tout ce qui précède, prouve, au reste, que c'est en ce dernier sens qu'il faut entendre la pensée du philosophe. Ceci est d'ailleurs la seconde portion du traité."

It appears to me that Aristotle intended to teach or to suggest both the two things which are here placed in Antithesis—though I do not agree with M. St. Hilaire's way of putting the alternative—as if there were one class of persons, professional Sophists, who fenced with poisoned weapons, while every one except them refrained from such weapons. Aristotle intends to teach the art of Dialectic as a whole; he neither intends nor wishes that any learners shall make a bad use of his teaching; but if they do use it badly, the fault does not lie with him. See the observations in the beginning of the Rhetorica, i. p. 1355, a. 26, and the observations put by Plato into the mouth of Gorgias (Gorg. p. 456 E).

Even in the Analytica Priora (ii. 19, a. 34) (independent of the Topica) Aristotle says:—*χρὴ δ' ὅπερ φυλάττεσθαι παραγγέλλομεν ἀποκρινομένους, αὐτοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας πειρᾶσθαι λανθάνειν.* Investigations of the double or triple senses of words (he says) are useful—*καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παραλογισθῆναι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ παραλογίσασθαι*, Topica, i. 18, p. 108, a. 26. See also other passages of the Topica where artifices are indicated for the purpose of concealing your own plan of proceeding and inducing your opponent to make answer in the sense which you wish, Topica, i. 2, p. 101, a. 25; vi. 10, p. 148, a. 37; viii. 1, p. 151, b. 23; viii. 1, p. 153, a. 6; viii. 2, p. 154, a. 5; viii. 11, p. 161, a. 24 seq. You must be provided with the means of meeting every sort and variety of objection—*πρὸς γὰρ τὸν πάντως ἐνιστάμενον πάντως ἀντιτακτέον ἐστίν.* Topic. v. 4, p. 134, a. 4.

I shall again have to touch on the Topica, in this point of view, as founded upon and illustrating the Megaric logical puzzles (ch. viii. of the present volume).

true and false.[1] It is for the logician to explain how this proposition can be brought under his rule—or else to admit it as an exception. Again, the second sophism in the list (the Veiled or Hidden Man) is so contrived as to involve the respondent in a contradiction: he is made to say both that he knows his father, and that he does not know his father. Both the one answer and the other follow naturally from the questions and circumstances supposed. The contradiction points to the loose and equivocal way in which the word *to know* is used in common speech. Such equivocal meaning of words is not only one of the frequent sources of error and fallacy in reasoning, but also one of the least heeded by persons untrained in dialectics; who are apt to presume that the same word bears always the same meaning. To guard against this cause of error, and to determine (or impel others to determine) the accurate meaning or various distinct meanings of each word, is among the duties of the logician: and I will add that the verb *to know* stands high in the list of words requiring such determination—as the Platonic Theætêtus[2] alone would be sufficient to teach us. Farthermore, when we examine what is called the Soritês of Eubulidês, we perceive that it brings to view an inherent indeterminateness of various terms: indeterminateness which cannot be avoided, but which must be pointed out in order that it may not mislead. You cannot say how many grains are *much*—or how many grains

[1] Theophrastus wrote a treatise in three books on the solution of the puzzle called Ὁ ψευδόμενος (see the list of his lost works in Diogenes L. v. 49). We find also other treatises entitled Μεγαρικὸς ἁ (which Diogenes cites, vi. 22),—Ἀγωνιστικὸν τῆς περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους θεωρίας—Σοφισμάτων ἁ, β—besides several more titles relating to dialectics, and bearing upon the solution of syllogistic problems. Chrysippus also, in the ensuing century, wrote a treatise in three books, Περὶ τῆς τοῦ ψευδομένου λύσεως (Diog. vii. 197). Such facts show the importance of these problems in their bearing upon logical theory, as conceived by the ancient world. Epikurus also wrote against the Μεγαρικοί (Diog. x. 27).

The discussion of sophisms, or logical difficulties (λύσεις ἀπορίων), was a favourite occupation at the banquets of philosophers at Athens, on or about 100 B.C. Ἀντίπατρος δ' ὁ φιλόσοφος, συμπόσιόν ποτε συνάγων, συνέταξε τοῖς ἐρχομένοις ὡς περὶ σοφισμάτων ἐροῦσιν (Athenæus, v. 186 C). Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, p. 1096 C; De Sanitate Præcepta, c. 20, p. 133 B.

[2] Various portions of the Theætêtus illustrate this Megaric sophism (pp. 165-198). The situation assumed in the question of Eubulidês—having before your eyes a person veiled—might form a suitable addition to the various contingencies specified in Theætêt. pp. 192-193.

The manner in which the Platonic Sokrates proves (Theæt. 165) that you at the same time see, and do not see, an object before you, is quite as sophistical as the way in which Eubulidês proves that you both know, and do not know, your father.

make *a heap*. When this want of precision, pervading many words in the language, was first brought to notice in a suitable special case, it would naturally appear a striking novelty. Lastly, the sophism called Κερατίνης or Cornutus, is one of great plausibility, which would probably impose upon most persons, if the question were asked for the first time without any forewarning. It serves to administer a lesson, nowise unprofitable or superfluous, that before you answer a question, you should fully weigh its import and its collateral bearings.

Causes of error constant—the Megarics were sentinels against them.

The causes of error and fallacy are inherent in the complication of nature, the imperfection of language, the small range of facts which we know, the indefinite varieties of comparison possible among those facts, and the diverse or opposite predispositions, intellectual as well as emotional, of individual minds. They are not fabricated by those who first draw attention to them.[1] The Megarics, far from being themselves deceivers, served as sentinels against deceit. They planted conspicuous beacons upon some of the sunken rocks whereon unwary reasoners were likely to be wrecked. When the general type of a fallacy is illustrated by a particular case in which the conclusion is manifestly untrue, the like fallacy is rendered less operative for the future.

Controversy of the Megarics with Aristotle about Power. Arguments of Aristotle.

Of the positive doctrines of the Megarics we know little: but there is one upon which Aristotle enters into controversy with them, and upon which (as far as can be made out) I think they were in the right. In the question about Power, they held that the power to do a thing did not exist, except when the thing was

[1] Cicero, in his Academ. Prior. ii. 92-94, has very just remarks on the obscurities and difficulties in the reasoning process, which the Megarics and others brought to view—and were blamed for so doing, as unfair and captious reasoners—as if they had themselves created the difficulties—"(Dialectica) primo progressu festivé tradit elementa loquendi et ambiguorum intelligentiam concludendique rationem; tum paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sané et periculosum locum, quod tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus. Quid ergo? *istius vitii num nostra culpa est?* Rerum natura nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ullâ in re statuere possimus quatenus. Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nullâ omnino in re minutatim interroganti—dives, pauper—clarus, obscurus, sit—multa, pauca, magna, parva, longa, brevia, lata, angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto certum respondeamus, non habemus. At vitiosi sunt soritæ. Frangite igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. . . . Sic me (inquit) sustineo, neque diutius captiosé interroganti respondes. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbis: si non habes, ne tu quidem percipis."

The principle of the Sorites (ἡ σωρι-

actually done: that an architect, for example, had no power to build a house, except when he actually did build one. Aristotle controverts this opinion at some length: contending that there exists a sort of power or cause which is in itself irregular and indeterminate, sometimes turning to the affirmative, sometimes to the negative, to do or not to do;[1] that the architect *has* the *power to build* constantly, though he exerts it only on occasions: and that many absurdities would follow if we did not admit, That a given power or energy—and the exercise of that power—are things distinct and separable.[2]

These arguments not valid against the Megarici.

Now these arguments of Aristotle are by no means valid against the Megarics, whose doctrine, though apparently paradoxical, will appear when explained to be no paradox at all, but perfectly true. When we say that the architect has power to build, we do not mean that he has power to do so under all supposable circumstances, but only under certain conditions: we wish to distinguish him from non-professional men, who under those same conditions have no power to build. The architect must be awake and sober: he must have the will or disposition to build:[3] he must be provided with tools and materials, and be secure against destroying enemies. These and other conditions being generally understood, it is unnecessary to enunciate them in common speech. But when we engage in dialectic analysis, the accurate discussion (*ἀκριβολογία*) indispensable to philosophy requires us to bring under distinct notice, that which the elliptical character of common speech implies without enunciating. Unless these favourable conditions be supposed, the architect is no more able to build than an ordinary non-professional man. Now the

τικὴ ἀπορία—Sextus adv. Gramm. s. 68), though differently applied, is involved in the argument of Zeno the Eleate, addressed to Protagoras—see Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. 250, p. 423, b. 42, Sch. Brand. Compare chap. ii. of this volume.

[1] Aristot. De Interpret. p. 19, a. 6-20. ὅλως ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦσι τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως· ἐν οἷς ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι.

[2] Aristot. Metaph. Θ. 3, p. 1046. b. 29. Εἰσὶ δέ τινες, οἳ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ, μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ, μὴ δύνασθαι—οἷον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Deycks (De Megaricorum Doctrinâ, pp. 70-71) considers this opinion of the Megarics to be derived from their general Eleatic theory of the Ens Unum et Immotum. But I see no logical connection between the two.

[3] About this condition implied in the predicate δυνατός, see Plato, Hippias Minor, p. 366 D.

Megarics did not deny the distinctive character of the architect, as compared with the non-architect: but they defined more accurately in what it consisted, by restoring the omitted conditions. They went a step farther: they pointed out that whenever the architect finds himself in concert with these accompanying conditions (his own volition being one of the conditions) he goes to work—and the building is produced. As the house is not built, unless he wills to build, and has tools and materials, &c.—so conversely, whenever he has the will to build and has tools and materials, &c., the house is actually built. The effect is not produced, except when the full assemblage of antecedent conditions come together: but as soon as they do come together, the effect is assuredly produced. The accomplishments of the architect, though an essential item, are yet only one item among several, of the conditions necessary to building the house. He has no power to build, except when those other conditions are assumed along with him: in other words, he has no such power except when he actually does build.

His arguments cited and criticised.

Aristotle urges against the Megarics various arguments, as follows:—1. Their doctrine implies that the architect is not an architect, and does not possess his professional skill,[1] except at the moment when he is actually building.—But the Megarics would have denied that their doctrine did imply this. The architect possesses his art at all times: but his art does not constitute a power of building except under certain accompanying conditions.

2. The Megaric doctrine is the same as that of Protagoras, implying that there exists no perceivable Object, and no Subject capable of perceiving, except at the moment when perception actually takes place.[2]—On this we may observe, that the Megarics coincide with Protagoras thus far, that they bring into open daylight the relative and conditional, which the received phraseology tends to hide. But neither they nor he affirm what is here put upon them. When we speak of a perceivable Object, we mean that which may and will be perceived, *if* there be a proper Subject to perceive it: when we affirm a Subject capable of perception, we mean, one which will perceive, under those

[1] Aristot. Metaph. Θ. 3, 1047, a. 3. ὅταν παύσηται (οἰκοδομῶν) οὐχ ἕξει τὴν τέχνην.
[2] Aristot. Metaph. Θ. 3, 1047, a. 8-13.

circumstances which we call the presence of an Object suitably placed. The Subject and Object are correlates: but it is convenient to have a language in which one of them alone is introduced unconditionally, while the conditional sign is applied to the correlate: though the matter affirmed involves a condition common to both.

3. According to the Megaric doctrine (Aristotle argues) every man when not actually seeing, is blind; every man when not actually speaking, is dumb.—Here the Megarics would have said that this is a misinterpretation of the terms dumb and blind; which denote a person who cannot speak or see, even though he wishes it. One who is now silent, though not dumb, may speak if he wills it: but his own volition is an essential condition.[1]

4. According to the Megaric doctrine (says Aristotle) when you are now lying down, you have no power to rise: when you are standing up, you have no power to lie down: so that the present condition of affairs must continue for ever unchanged: nothing can come into existence which is not now in being.—Here again, the Megarics would have denied his inference. The man who is now standing up, has power to lie down, *if he wills* to do so—or he may be thrown down by a superior force: that is, he will lie down, *if* some new fact of a certain character shall supervene. The Megarics do not deny that he has power, *if*—so and so: they deny that he has power, without the *if*—that is, without the farther accompaniments essential to energy.

[1] The question between Aristotle and the Megarics has not passed out of debate with modern philosophers.

Dr. Thomas Brown observes, in his inquiry into Cause and Effect—"From the mere silence of any one, we cannot infer that he is dumb in consequence of organic imperfection. He may be silent only because he has no desire of speaking, not because speech would not have followed his desire: and it is not with the mere *existence* of any one, but *with his desire of speaking*, that we suppose utterance to be connected. A man who has *no desire of speaking, has in truth*, and in strictness of language, *no power of speaking, when in that state of mind:* since he has not a circumstance which, as immediately prior, is essential to speech. But since he has that power, as soon as the new circumstance of desire arises—and as the presence or absence of the desire cannot be perceived but in its effects—*there is no inconvenience in the common language*, which ascribes the power, *as if it were possessed at all times, and in all circumstances of mind*, though unquestionably, nothing more is meant than that the desire existing will be followed by utterance." (Brown, Essay on the Relation of Cause and Effect, p. 200.)

This is the real sense of what Aristotle calls τὸ δὲ (λέγεται) δυνατόν, οἷον δυνατὸν εἶναι βαδίζειν ὅτι βαδιστεῖν ἂν, *i.e.* he will walk *if* he desires to do so (De Interpret. p. 23, a. 9-15).

On the whole, it seems to me that Aristotle's refutation of the Megarics is unsuccessful. A given assemblage of conditions is requisite for the production of any act:— while there are other circumstances, which, if present at the same time, would defeat its production. We often find it convenient to describe a state of things in which some of the antecedent conditions are present without the rest: in which therefore the act is not produced, yet would be produced, if the remaining circumstances were present, and if the opposing circumstances were absent.[1] The state of things thus described is the *potential* as distinguished from the *actual:* power, distinguished from act or energy: it represents an incomplete assemblage of the antecedent positive conditions—or perhaps a complete assemblage, but counteracted by some opposing circumstances. As soon as the assemblage becomes complete, and the opposing circumstances removed, the potential passes into the actual. The architect, when he is not building, possesses, not indeed the full or plenary power to build, but an important fraction of that power, which will become plenary when the other fractions supervene, but will then at the same time become operative, so as to produce the actual building.[2]

Potential as distinguished from the Actual—What it is.

[1] Hobbes, in his Computation or Logic (chaps. ix. and x. Of Cause and Effect. Of Power and Act) expounds this subject with his usual perspicuity.

"A Cause simply, or an Entire Cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents, both of the agents, how many soever they be, and of the patient, put together; which, when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the same instant: and if any one of them be wanting, it cannot be understood but that the effect is not produced" (ix. 3).

"Correspondent to Cause and Effect are Power and Act: nay, those and these are the same things, though for divers considerations they have divers names. For whensoever any agent has all those accidents which are necessarily requisite for the production of some effect in the patient, then we say that agent has power to produce that effect if it be applied to a patient. In like manner, whensoever any patient has all those accidents which it is requisite it should have for the production of some effect in it, we say it is in the power of that patient to produce that effect if it be applied to a fitting agent. Power, active and passive, are parts only of plenary and entire power: nor, except they be joined, can any effect proceed from them. And therefore these powers are but conditional: namely, the agent has power if it be applied to a patient, and the patient has power if it be applied to an agent. *Otherwise neither of them have power, nor can the accidents which are in them severally be properly called powers:* nor any action be said to be possible for the power of the agent alone or the patient alone."

[2] Aristotle does in fact grant all that is here said, in the same book and in the page next subsequent to that which contains his arguments against the Megaric doctrine, Metaphys. Θ. 5, 1048, a. 1-24.

In this chapter Aristotle distinguishes powers belonging to things, from powers belonging to persons—powers irrational from powers rational—powers in which the agent acts with-

Diodôrus Kronus—his doctrine about τὸ δυνατόν.

The doctrine which I have just been canvassing is expressly cited by Aristotle as a Megaric doctrine, and was therefore probably held by his contemporary Eubulidês. From the pains which Aristotle takes (in the treatise 'De Interpretatione' and elsewhere) to explain and vindicate his own doctrine about the Potential and the Actual, we may see that it was a theme much debated among the dialecticians of the day. And we read of another Megaric, Diodorus[1] Kronus, perhaps contemporary (yet probably a little later than Aristotle), as advancing a position substantially the same as that of Eubulidês. That alone is possible (Diodorus affirmed) which either is happening now, or will happen at some future time. As in speaking about facts of an unrecorded past, we know well that a given fact either occurred or did not occur, yet without knowing which of the two is true—and therefore we affirm only that the fact *may* have occurred: so also about the future, either the assertion that a given fact will at some time

out any will or choice, from those in which the will or choice of the agent is one item of the aggregate of conditions. He here expressly recognises that the power of the agent, separately considered, is only *conditional;* that is, conditional on the presence and suitable state of the patient, as well as upon the absence of counteracting circumstances. But he contends that such absence of counteracting circumstances is plainly implied, and need not be expressly mentioned in the definition.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατὸν τὶ δυνατὸν καὶ ποτὲ καὶ πῶς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ—

τὸ δυνατὸν κατὰ λόγον ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὀρέγηται, οὗ τ' ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, τοῦτο ποιεῖν· ἔχει δὲ παρόντος τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὠδὶ ἔχοντος ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, ποιεῖν οὐ δυνήσεται. τὸ γὰρ μηθενὸς τῶν ἔξω κωλύοντος προσδιορίζεσθαι, οὐθὲν ἔτι δεῖ· τὴν γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχει ὡς ἔστι δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν, ἔστι δ' οὐ πάντως, ἀλλ' ἐχόντων πῶς, ἐν οἷς ἀφορισθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἔξω κωλύοντα· ἀφαιρεῖται γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσόντων ἕνια.

The commentary of Alexander Aphr. upon this chapter is well worth consulting (pp. 546-548 of the edition of his commentary by Bonitz, 1847). Moreover Aristotle affirms in this chapter, that when τὸ ποιητικὸν and τὸ παθητικὸν come together under suitable circumstances, the power will certainly pass into act.

Here then, it seems to me, Aristotle concedes the doctrine which the Megarics affirmed; or, if there be any difference between them, it is rather verbal than real. In fact, Aristotle's reasoning in the third chapter (wherein he impugns the doctrine of the Megarics), and the definition of δυνατὸν which he gives in that chapter (1047, a. 25), are hardly to be reconciled with his reasoning in the fifth chapter. Bonitz (Notes on the Metaphys. pp. 393-395) complains of the *mira levitas* of Aristotle in his reasoning against the Megarics, and of his omitting to distinguish between *Vermögen* and *Möglichkeit.* I will not use so uncourteous a phrase; but I think his refutation of the Megarics is both unsatisfactory and contradicted by himself. I agree with the following remark of Bonitz:—"Nec mirum, quod Megarici, aliis illi quidem in rebus arguti, in hâc autem satis acuti, existentiam τῷ δυνάμει ὄντι tribuere recusarint," &c.

[1] The dialectic ingenuity of Diodorus is powerfully attested by the verse of Ariston, applied to describe Arkesilaus (Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. p. 234):

Πρόσθε Πλάτων, ὄπιθεν Πύῤῥων, μέσσος Διόδωρος.

occur, is positively true, or the assertion that it will never occur, is positively true: the assertion that it may or may not occur some time or other, represents only our ignorance, which of the two is true. That which will never at any time occur, is impossible.

Sophism of Diodorus—Ὁ Κυριεύων

The argument here recited must have been older than Diodorus, since Aristotle states and controverts it: but it seems to have been handled by him in a peculiar dialectic arrangement, which obtained the title of Ὁ Κυριεύων.[1] The Stoics (especially Chrysippus), in times somewhat later, impugned the opinion of Diodorus, though seemingly upon grounds not quite the same as Aristotle. This problem was one upon which speculative minds occupied themselves for several centuries. Aristotle and Chrysippus maintained that affirmations respecting the past were *necessary* (one necessarily true and the other necessarily false)—affirmations respecting the future, *contingent* (one must be true and the other false, but either might be true). Diodorus held that both varieties of affirmations were equally necessary—Kleanthes the Stoic thought that both were equally contingent.[2]

It was thus that the Megaric dialecticians, with that fertility of mind which belonged to the Platonic and Aristotelian century, stirred up many real problems and difficulties connected with logical evidence, and supplied matters for discussion which not only occupied the speculative minds of the next four or five centuries, but have continued in debate down to the present day.

Question between Aristotle and Diodorus, depends upon whether

The question about the Possible and Impossible, raised between Aristotle and Diodorus, depends upon the larger question, Whether there are universal laws of Nature or not? whether the sequences are, universally and throughout, composed of assemblages of conditions regularly antecedent, and assemblages of events

[1] Aristot. De Interpret. p. 18, a. pp. 27-38. Alexander ad Aristot. Analyt. Prior. 34, p. 163, b. 34, Schol. Brandis. See also Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxiii. p. 464.

[2] Arrian ad Epiktet. ii. p. 19. Upton, in his notes on this passage of Arrian (p. 151) has embodied a very valuable and elaborate commentary by Mr. James Harris (the great English Aristotelian scholar of the 18th century), explaining the nature of this controversy, and the argument called ὁ Κυριεύων.

Compare Cicero, De Fato, c. 7-9. Epistol. Fam. ix. 4.

universal regularity of sequence be admitted or denied.

regularly consequent; though from the number and complication of causes, partly co-operating and partly conflicting with each other, we with our limited intelligence are often unable to predict the course of events in each particular situation. Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle, all maintained that regular sequence of antecedent and consequent was not universal, but partial only:[1] that there were some agencies essentially regular, in which observation of the past afforded ground for predicting the future—other agencies (or the same agencies on different occasions) essentially irregular, in which the observation of the past afforded no such ground. Aristotle admitted a graduation of causes from perfect regularity to perfect irregularity:—1. The Celestial Spheres, with their included bodies or divine persons, which revolved and exercised a great and preponderant influence throughout the Kosmos, with perfect uniformity; having no power of contraries, *i.e.*, having no power of doing anything else but what they actually did (having *ἐνεργεία* without *δύναμις*). 2. The four Elements, in which the natural agencies were to a great degree necessary and uniform, but also in a certain degree otherwise—either always or for the most part uniform (*τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*)—tending by inherent appetency towards uniformity, but not always attaining it. 3. Besides these there were two other varieties of Causes accidental, or perfectly irregular—Chance and Spontaneity: powers of contraries, or with equal chance of contrary manifestations—essentially capricious, undeterminable, unpredictable.[2] This *Chance* of Aristotle—with one of two contraries sure to turn up, though you could never tell beforehand which of the two—was a conception analogous to what logicians sometimes call an Indefinite Proposition, or to what some grammarians have reckoned as a special variety of genders called the *doubtful gender*. There were thus positive causes of regularity, and positive

[1] Xenophon, Memor. i. 1; Plato, Timæus, p. 48 A. *ἡ πλανωμένη αἰτία*, &c.

[2] *Ἡ τύχη—τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε—τὸ αὐτόματον* are in the conception of Aristotle independent *Ἀρχαί*, attached to and blending with *ἀνάγκη* and *τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*. See Physic. ii. 196, b. 11; Metaphys. E. 1026-1027.

Sometimes *τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε* is spoken of as an *Ἀρχή*, but not as an *αἴτιον*, or belonging to *ὕλη* as the *Ἀρχή*. 1027, b. 11. *δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι μέχρι τινὸς βαδίζει ἀρχῆς, αὕτη δ' οὐκετι εἰς ἄλλο· ἔσται οὖν ἡ τοῦ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν αὕτη, καὶ αἴτιοι τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῆς οὐθέν.*

See, respecting the different notions of Cause held by ancient philosophers, my remarks on the Platonic Phædon infrà, vol. iii. ch. xxv.

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causes of irregularity, the co-operation or conflict of which gave the total manifestations of the actual universe. The principle of irregularity, or the Indeterminate, is sometimes described under the name of Matter,[1] as distinguishable from, yet co-operating with, the three determinate Causes—Formal, Efficient, Final. The Potential—the Indeterminate—the *May or May not be*—is characterised by Aristotle as one of the inherent principles operative in the Kosmos.

In what manner Diodorus stated and defended his opinion upon this point, we have no information. We know only that he placed affirmations respecting the future on the same footing as affirmations respecting the past: maintaining that our potential affirmation—*May or May not be*—respecting some future event, meant no more than it means respecting some past event, viz.: no inherent indeterminateness in the future sequence, but our

Conclusion of Diodôrus—defended by Hobbes—Explanation given by Hobbes.

[1] Aristot. Metaph. E. 1027, a. 13; A. 1071, a. 10.
ὥστε ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰτία, ἡ ἐνδεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ το πολὺ ἄλλως τοῦ συμβεβηκότος.

Matter is represented as the principle of irregularity, of *τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε*—as the *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων*.

In the explanation given by Alexander of Aphrodisias of the Peripatetic doctrine respecting chance—free-will, the principle of irregularity—*τύχη* is no longer assigned to the material cause, but is treated as an *αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, distinguished from *αἰτία προηγούμενα* or *καθ' αὐτά*. The exposition given of the doctrine by Alexander is valuable and interesting. See his treatise De Fato, addressed to the Emperor Severus, in the edition of Orelli, Zurich, 1824 (a very useful volume, containing treatises of Ammonius, Plotinus, Bardesanes, &c., on the same subject); also several sections of his Quæstiones Naturales et Morales, ed. Spengel, Munich, 1842, pp. 22-61-65-123, &c. He gives, however, a different explanation of *τὸ δυνατὸν* and *τὸ ἀδύνατον* in pp. 62-63, which would not be at variance with the doctrine of Diodorus. We may remark that Alexander puts the antithesis of the two doctrines differently from Aristotle,—in this way. 1. Either all events happen *καθ' εἱμαρμένην*. 2. Or all events do not happen *καθ' εἱμαρμένην*, but some events are *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*. See De Fato, p. 14 seq. This way of putting the question is directed more against the Stoics, who were the great advocates of *εἱμαρμένη*, than against the Megaric Diodorus. The treatises of Chrysippus and the other Stoics alter both the wording and the putting of the thesis. We know that Chrysippus impugned the doctrine of Diodorus, but I do not see how.

The Stoic antithesis of *τα καθ' εἱμαρμένην—τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν* is different from the antithesis conceived by Aristotle and does not touch the question about the universality of regular sequence. *Τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν* describes those sequences in which human volition forms one among the appreciable conditions determining or modifying the result; *τὰ καθ' εἱμαρμένην* includes all the other sequences wherein human volition has no appreciable influence. But the sequence *τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν* is just as regular as the sequence *τῶν καθ' εἱμαρμένην*: both the one and the other are often imperfectly predictable, because our knowledge of facts and power of comparison is so imperfect.

Theophrastus discussed *τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην*, and explained it to mean the same as *τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. φανερώτατα δὲ Θεόφραστος δείκνυσι ταὐτὸν ὂν τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην τῷ κατὰ φύσιν* (Alexander Aphrodisias ad Aristot De Animâ, ii).

ignorance of the determining conditions, and our inability to calculate their combined working.[1] In regard to scientific method generally, this problem is of the highest importance: for it is only so far as uniformity of sequence prevails, that facts become fit matter for scientific study.[2] Consistently with the doctrine of all-pervading uniformity of sequence, the definition of Hobbes gives the only complete account of the Impossible and Possible: *i.e.* an account such as would appear to an omniscient calculator, where *May or May not* merge in *Will or Will not*. According as each person falls short of or approaches this ideal

[1] The same doctrine as that of the Megaric Diodorus is declared by Hobbes in clear and explicit language (First Grounds of Philosophy, ii. 10, 4-5):—

"That is an impossible act, for the production of which there is no power plenary. For seeing plenary power is that in which all things concur which are requisite for the production of an art, if the power shall never be plenary, there will always be wanting some of those things, without which the act cannot be produced. Wherefore that act shall never be produced: that is, that act is *impossible*. And every act, which is not impossible, is *possible*. Every act therefore which is possible, shall at some time or other be produced. For if it shall never be produced, then those things shall never concur which are requisite for the production of it; wherefore the act is *impossible*, by the definition; which is contrary to what was supposed.

"A *necessary act* is that, the production of which it is impossible to hinder: and therefore every act that shall be produced, shall necessarily be produced; for that it shall not be produced is impossible, because, as has already been demonstrated, every possible act shall at some time be produced. Nay, this proposition—*What shall be shall be*—is as necessary a proposition as this—*A man is a man*.

"But here, perhaps, some man will ask whether those future things which are commonly called *contingents*, are necessary. I say, then, that generally all contingents have their necessary causes, but are called *contingents*, in respect of other events on which they do not depend—as the rain which shall be to-morrow shall be necessary, that is, from necessary causes; but we think and say, it happens by chance, because we do not yet perceive the causes thereof, though they exist now. For men commonly call that *casual* or *contingent*, whereof they do not perceive the necessary cause: *and in the same manner they use to speak of things past, when not knowing whether a thing be done or not, they say, It is possible it never was done.*

"Wherefore all propositions concerning future things, contingent or not contingent, as this—It will rain to-morrow, or To-morrow the sun will rise—are either necessarily true or necessarily false: but we call them contingent, because we do not yet know whether they be true or false; whereas their verity depends not upon our knowledge, but upon the foregoing of their causes. But there are some, who, though they will confess this whole proposition—*To-morrow it will either rain or not rain*—to be true, yet they will not acknowledge the parts of it, as, *To-morrow it will rain*, or *To-morrow it will not rain*, to be either of them true by itself; because (they say) neither this nor that is true *determinately*. But what is this *true determinately*, but true *upon our knowledge* or *evidently true?* And therefore they say no more but that it is not yet known whether it be true or not; but they say it more obscurely, and darken the evidence of the truth with the same words by which they endeavour to hide their own ignorance."

[2] The reader will find this problem admirably handled in Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Book iii. ch. 21, and Book vi. chs. 2 and 3; also in the volume of Professor Bain on the Emotions and the Will, Chapter on Belief.

standard — according to his knowledge and mental resource, inductive and deductive—will be his appreciation of what may be or may not be—as of what may have been or may not have been during the past. But such appreciation, being relative to each individual mind, is liable to vary indefinitely, and does not admit of being embodied in one general definition.

Besides the above doctrine respecting Possible and Impossible, there is also ascribed to Diodorus a doctrine respecting Hypothetical Propositions, which, as far as I comprehend it, appears to have been a correct one.[1] He is also said to have reasoned against the reality of motion, renewing the arguments of Zeno the Eleate.

Reasonings of Diodôrus—respecting Hypothetical Propositions—respecting Motion. His difficulties about the *Now* of time.

But if he reproduced the arguments of Zeno, he also employed another, peculiar to himself. He admitted the reality of *past* motion: but he denied the reality of *present* motion. You may affirm truly (he said) that a thing *has been moved:* but you cannot truly affirm that any thing *is being moved.* Since it was *here* before, and is *there* now, you may be sure that it has been moved: but actual present motion you cannot perceive or prove. Affirmation in the perfect tense may be true, when affirmation in the present tense neither is nor ever was true: thus it is true to say—Helen *had* three husbands (Menelaus, Paris, Deiphobus): but it was never true to say—Helen *has* three husbands, since they became her husbands in succession.[2] Diodorus supported this paradox by some ingenious arguments, and the opinion which he denied seems to have presented itself to him as involving the position of indivisible minima—atoms of body, points of space, instants of time. He admitted such minima of atoms, but not of space or time: and without such admission he could not make intelligible to himself the fact of present or actual motion. He could find no present *Now* or Minimum of Time; without which

[1] Sextus Emp. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. ii. pp. 110-115. ἀληθὲς συνημμένον. Adv. Mathemat. viii. 112. Philo maintained that an hypothetical proposition was true, if both the antecedent and consequent were true—"If it be day, I am conversing". Diodorus denied that this proposition, as an Hypothetical proposition, was true; since the consequent might be false, though the antecedent were true. An Hypothetical proposition was true only when, assuming the antecedent to be true, the consequent must be true also.

[2] Sextus Empir. adv. Mathemat. x. pp. 85-101.

neither could any present motion be found. Plato in the Parmenidês[1] professes to have found this inexplicable moment of transition, but he describes it in terms not likely to satisfy a dialectical mind: and Aristotle denying that the Now is any portion or constituent part of time, considers it only as a boundary of the past and future.[2]

Motion is always present, past, and future.

This opinion of Aristotle is in the main consonant with that of Diodorus; who, when he denied the reality of present motion, meant probably only to deny the reality of *present motion apart from past and future motion.* Herein also we find him agreeing with Hobbes, who denies the same in clearer language.[3] Sextus Empiricus declares

[1] Plato, Parmenidês, p. 156 D-E. Πόσ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὸς ἂν οὔτε κινούμενον μετάβαλλοι, οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν. (Here Plato adverts to the difficulties attending the supposition of actual μεταβολή, as Diodorus to those of actual κίνησις. Next we have Plato's hypothesis for getting over the difficulties.) Ἆρ' οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότ' ἂν εἴη ὅτε μεταβάλλει; Τὸ ποῖον δή; Τὸ ἐξαίφνης· ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεως τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἑστάναι καὶ τὸ ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι.

Diodorus could not make out this φύσις ἄτοπος which Plato calls τὸ ἐξαίφνης.

[2] To illustrate this apparent paradox of Diodorus, affirming past motion, but denying present motion, we may compare what is said by Aristotle about the Now or Point of Present Time—that it is not a part, but a boundary between Past and Future.

Aristot. Physic. iv. p. 218, a. 4-10. τοῦ δὲ χρόνου τὰ μὲν γέγονε, τὰ δὲ μέλλει, ἔστι δ' οὐδὲν, ὄντος μεριστοῦ· τὸ δὲ νῦν οὐ μέρος—τὸ δὲ νῦν πέρας ἔστι (a. 24)—p. 222, a. 10-20-223, a. 20. ὁ δὲ χρόνος καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἅμα κατά τε δύναμιν καὶ κατ' ἐνεργείαν.

Which doctrine is thus rendered by Harris in his Hermes, ch. vii. pp. 101-103-105:—

"Both Points and Nows being taken as Bounds, and not as Parts, it will follow that in the same manner as the same point may be the end of one line and the beginning of another—so the same Now may be the End of one time, and the beginning of another. . . I say of these two times, that with respect to the *Now*, or Instant which they include, the first of them is necessarily Past time, as being previous to it: the other is necessarily Future, as being subsequent. . . From the above speculations, there follow some conclusions, which may be called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place, there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such thing as Time Present. For if all Time be transient, as well as continuous, it cannot like a line be present altogether, but part will necessarily be gone and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its continuity were to be present at once, it would so far quit its transient nature, and be Time no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can Time possibly be present, to which such continuity is essential?"—Compare Sir William Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy, p. 581.

[3] Hobbes, First Grounds of Philosophy, ii. 8, 11.

"That is said to be at rest which, during any time, is in one place; and that to be moved, or to have been moved, which whether it be now at rest or moved, was formerly in another place from that which it is now in. From which definition it may be inferred, first, that whatsoever is moved *has been* moved: for if it still be in the same place in which it was formerly, it is at rest: but if it be in another place, it *has been* moved, by the definition of moved. Secondly, that what *is* moved, *will yet be* moved: for that which is moved, leaveth the place where it is,

Diodorus to have been inconsistent in admitting past motion while he denied present motion.[1] But this seems not more inconsistent than the doctrine of Aristotle respecting the *Now* of time. I know, when I compare a child or a young tree with what they respectively were a year ago, that they have grown: but whether they actually are growing, at every moment of the intervening time, is not ascertainable by sense, and is a matter of probable inference only.[2] Diodorus could not understand present motion, except in conjunction with past and future motion, as being the common limit of the two: but he could understand past motion, without reference to present or future. He could not state to himself a satisfactory theory respecting the beginning of motion: as we may see by his reasonings distinguishing the motion of a body all at once in its integrity, from the motion of a body considered as proceeding from the separate motion of its constituent atoms—the moving atoms preponderating over the atoms at rest, and determining them to motion,[3] until gradually the whole body came to move. The same argument re-appears in another example, when he argues—The wall does not fall while its component stones hold together, for then it is still standing: nor yet when they have come apart, for then it *has* fallen.[4]

Stilpon of Megara—His great celebrity.

That Diodorus was a person seriously anxious to solve logical difficulties, as well as to propose them, would be incontestably proved if we could believe the story recounted of him—that he hanged himself because he could not solve a problem proposed by Stilpon in the presence of Ptolemy Soter.[5] But this story probably grew out of the fact, that Stilpon succeeded Diodorus at Megara, and eclipsed him in reputation. The celebrity of Stilpon, both at Megara and

and consequently will be moved still. Thirdly, that whatsoever is moved, is not in one place during any time, how little soever that may be: for by the definition of rest, that which is in one place during any time, is at rest. . . . From what is above demonstrated—namely, that whatsoever *is* moved, *has also been* moved, and *will be* moved: this also may be collected, That there can be no conception of motion without conceiving past and future time."

[1] Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. pp. 91-97-112-116.

[2] See this point touched by Plato in Philêbus, p. 43 B.

[3] Sext. Emp. adv. Math. x. 113. *κίνησις κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν . . . κίνησις κατ' ἐπικράτειαν.* Compare Zeller, die Philosophie, der Griechen. ii. p. 191, ed. 2nd.

[4] Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. pp. 346-348.

[5] Diog. L. ii. 112.

at Athens (between 320-300 B.C., but his exact date can hardly be settled), was equal, if not superior, to that of any contemporary philosopher. He was visited by listeners from all parts of Greece, and he drew away pupils from the most renowned teachers of the day; from Theophrastus as well as the others.[1] He was no less remarkable for fertility of invention than for neatness of expression. Two persons, who came for the purpose of refuting him, are said to have remained with him as admirers and scholars. All Greece seemed as it were looking towards him, and inclining towards the Megaric doctrines.[2] He was much esteemed both by Ptolemy Soter and by Demetrius Poliorkêtes, though he refused the presents and invitations of both: and there is reason to believe that his reputation in his own day must have equalled that of either Plato or Aristotle in theirs. He was formidable in disputation; but the nine dialogues which he composed and published are characterised by Diogenes as cold.[3]

Menedêmus and the Eretriacs.

Contemporary with Stilpon (or perhaps somewhat later) was Menedêmus of Eretria, whose philosophic parentage is traced to Phædon. The name of Phædon has been immortalised, not by his own works, but by the splendid dialogue of which Plato has made him the reciter. He is said (though I doubt the fact) to have been a native of Elis. He was of good parentage, a youthful companion of Sokrates in the last years of his life.[4] After the death of Sokrates, Phædon went to Elis, composed some dialogues, and established a suc-

[1] This is asserted by Diogenes upon the authority of Φίλιππος ὁ Μεγαρικός, whom he cites κατὰ λέξιν. We do not know anything about Philippus.

Menedêmus, who spoke with contempt of the other philosophers, even of Plato and Xenokrates, admired Stilpon (Diog. L. ii. 134).

[2] The phrase of Diogenes is here singular, and must probably have been borrowed from a partisan—ὥστε μικροῦ δεῆσαι πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀφορῶσαν εἰς αὐτὸν μεγαρίσαι. Stilpon εὑρεσιλογίᾳ καὶ σοφιστείᾳ προῆγε τοὺς ἄλλους—κομψότατος (Diog. L. ii. 113-116).

[3] Diog. L. ii. 119-120. ψυχροί.

[4] The story given by Diogenes L. (ii. 31 and 105; compare Aulus Gellius, ii. 18) about Phædon's adventures antecedent to his friendship with Sokrates, is unintelligible to me. "Phædon was made captive along with his country (Elis), sold at Athens, and employed in a degrading capacity; until Sokrates induced Alkibiades or Kriton to pay his ransom." Now, no such event as the capture of Elis, and the sale of its Eupatrids as slaves, happened at that time: the war between Sparta and Elis (described by Xenophon, Hell. iii. 2, 21 seq.) led to no such result, and was finished, moreover, after the death of Sokrates. Alkibiades had been long in exile. If, in the text of Diogenes, where we now read Φαίδων, Ἤλειος, τῶν εὐπατριδῶν—we were allowed to substitute Φαίδων Μήλιος, τῶν εὐπατριδῶν—the narrative would be rendered consistent with known historical facts. The Athenians captured the island of Melos in 415 B.C., put to death the Melians of

cession or sect of philosophers—Pleistanus, Anchipylus, Moschus. Of this sect Menedêmus,[1] contemporary and hearer of Stilpon, became the most eminent representative, and from him it was denominated Eretriac instead of Eleian. The Eretriacs, as well as the Megarics, took up the negative arm of philosophy, and were eminent as puzzlers and controversialists.

Open speech and licence of censure assumed by Menedêmus.

But though this was the common character of the two, in a logical point of view, yet in Stilpon, as well as Menedêmus, other elements became blended with the logical. These persons combined, in part at least, the free censorial speech of Antisthenes with the subtlety of Eukleides. What we hear of Menedêmus is chiefly his bitter, stinging sarcasms, and clever repartees. He did not, like the Cynic Diogenes, live in contented poverty, but occupied a prominent place (seemingly under the patronage of Antigonus and Demetrius) in the government of his native city Eretria. Nevertheless he is hardly less celebrated than Diogenes for open speaking of his mind, and carelessness of giving offence to others.[2]

ANTISTHENES.

Antisthenes took up Ethics principally, but with negative Logic intermingled.

Antisthenes, the originator of the Cynic succession of philosophers, was one of those who took up principally the ethical element of the Sokratic discoursing, which the Megarics left out or passed lightly over. He did not indeed altogether leave out the logical element: all his doctrines respecting it, as far as we hear of them, appear to have been on the negative side. But

military age, and sold into slavery the younger males as well as the females (Thucyd. v. 116). If Phædon had been a Melian youth of good family, he would have been sold at Athens, and might have undergone the adventures narrated by Diogenes. We know that Alkibiades purchased a female Melian as slave (Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad.).

[1] Diog. L. ii. 105, 126 seq. There was a statue of Menedêmus in the ancient stadium of Eretria: Diogenes speaks as if it existed in his time, and as if he himself had seen it (ii. 132).

[2] Diog. L. ii. 129-142.

respecting ethics, he laid down affirmative propositions,[1] and delivered peremptory precepts. His aversion to pleasure, by which he chiefly meant sexual pleasure, was declared in the most emphatic language. He had therefore, in the negative logic, a point of community with Eukleides and the Megarics: so that the coalescence of the two successions, in Stilpon and Menedêmus, is a fact not difficult to explain.

The life of Sokrates being passed in conversing with a great variety of persons and characters, his discourses were of course multifarious, and his ethical influence operated in different ways. His mode of life, too, exercised a certain influence of its own.

He copied the manner of life of Sokrates, in plainness and rigour.

Antisthenes, and his disciple Diogenes, were in many respects closer approximations to Sokrates than either Plato or any other of the Sokratic companions. The extraordinary colloquial and cross-examining force was indeed a peculiar gift, which Sokrates bequeathed to none of them: but Antisthenes took up the Sokratic purpose of inculcating practical ethics not merely by word of mouth, but also by manner of life. He was not inferior to his master in contentment under poverty, in strength of will and endurance,[2] in acquired insensibility both to pain and pleasure, in disregard of opinion around him, and in fearless exercise of a self-imposed censorial mission. He learnt from Sokrates indifference to conventional restraints and social superiority, together with the duty of reducing wants to a minimum, and stifling all such as were above the lowest term of necessity. To this last point, Sokrates gave a religious colour, proclaiming that the Gods had no wants, and that those who had least came nearest to the Gods.[3] By Antisthenes, these qualities were exhibited in eminent measure; and by his disciple Diogenes

[1] Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. 20, p. 485, Potter. ἐγὼ δ' ἀποδέχομαι τὸν Ἀφροδίτην λέγοντα κᾆν κατοξεύσαιμι, εἰ λάβοιμι, &c.

Μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην, Diog. L. vi. 3.

[2] Cicero, de Orator. iii. 17, 62; Diog. L. vi. 2. παρ' οὗ (Sokrates) καὶ τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας κατῆρξε πρῶτος τοῦ κυνισμοῦ: also vi. 15. The appellation of Cynics is said to have arisen from the practice of Antisthenes to frequent the gymnasium called Κυνόσαργες (D. L. vi. 13), though other causes are also assigned for the denomination (Winckelmann, Antisth. Frag. pp. 8-10).

[3] Sokrates had said, τὸ μηδενὸς δέεσθαι, θεῖον εἶναι· τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων, ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου (Xenophon, Memor. i. 6, 10. Compare Apuleius, Apol. p. 25). Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 E. The same dictum is ascribed to Diogenes (Diog. L. vi. 105).

they were still farther exaggerated. Epiktetus, a warm admirer of both, considers them as following up the mission from Zeus which Sokrates (in the Platonic Apology) sets forth as his authority, to make men independent of the evils of life by purifying and disciplining the appreciation of good and evil in the mind of each individual.[1]

Antisthenes declared virtue to be the End for men to aim at—and to be sufficient *per se* for conferring happiness; but he also declared that virtue must be manifested in acts and character, not by words. Neither much discourse nor much learning was required for virtue; nothing else need be postulated except bodily strength like that of Sokrates.[2] He undervalued theory even in regard to Ethics: much more in regard to Nature (Physics) and to Logic: he also despised literary, geometrical, musical teaching, as distracting men's attention from the regulation of their own appreciative sentiment, and the adaptation of their own conduct to it. He maintained strenuously (what several Platonic dialogues call in question) that virtue both could be taught and must be taught: when once learnt, it was permanent, and could not be eradicated. He prescribed the simplest mode of life, the reduction of wants to a minimum, with perfect indifference to enjoyment, wealth, or power. The reward was, exemption from fear, anxiety, disappointments, and wants: together with the pride of approximation to the Gods.[3] Though Antisthenes thus despised both literature and theory, yet he had obtained a rhetorical education, and had even heard the rhetor Gorgias. He composed a large number of dialogues and other treatises, of which only the titles (very multifarious) are preserved to us.[4] One dialogue, entitled Sathon, was a coarse attack on Plato: several treated of Homer and of other poets, whose verses he seems to have allegorised. Some of his dialogues are also declared by Athenæus to contain slanderous abuse of Alkibiades and other leading Athenians.

Doctrines of Antisthenes exclusively ethical and ascetic. He despised music, literature, and physics.

[1] Epiktetus, Dissert. iii. 1, 19-22, iii. 21-19, iii. 24-40-60-69. The whole of the twenty-second Dissertation, Περὶ Κυνισμοῦ, is remarkable. He couples Sokrates with Diogenes more closely than with any one else.

[2] Diog. L. vi. 11.

[3] Diog. L. vi. 102-104.

[4] Diog. L. vi. 1, 15-18. The two remaining fragments—Αἴας, Ὀδυσσεὺς (Winckelmann, Antisth. Fragm. pp. 38-42)—cannot well be genuine, though Winckelmann seems to think them so.

On the other hand, the dialogues are much commended by competent judges; and Theopompus even affirmed that much in the Platonic dialogues had been borrowed from those of Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Bryson.[1]

Constant friendship of Antisthenes with Sokrates—Xenophontic Symposion.

Antisthenes was among the most constant friends and followers of Sokrates, both in his serious and in his playful colloquies.[2] The Symposion of Xenophon describes both of them, in their hours of joviality. The picture, drawn by an author, himself a friend and companion, exhibits Antisthenes (so far as we can interpret caricature and jocular inversion) as poor, self-denying, austere, repulsive, and disputatious—yet bold and free-spoken, careless of giving offence, and forcible in colloquial repartee.[3]

Diogenes, successor of Antisthenes—His Cynical perfection—striking effect which he produced.

In all these qualities, however, Antisthenes was surpassed by his pupil and successor Diogenes of Sinôpê; whose ostentatious austerity of life, eccentric and fearless character, indifference to what was considered as decency, great acuteness and still greater power of expression, freedom of speech towards all and against all—constituted him the perfect type of the Cynical sect. Being the son of a money-agent at Sinôpê,

[1] Athenæus, v. 220, xi. 508; Diog. L. iii. 24-35; Phrynichus ap. Photium, cod. 158; Epiktêtus, ii. 16-35. Antisthenes is placed in the same line with Kritias and Xenophon, as a Sokratic writer, by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, De Thucyd. Jud. p. 941. That there was standing reciprocal hostility between Antisthenes and Plato we can easily believe. Plato never names Antisthenes: and if the latter attacked Plato, it was under the name of Sathon. How far Plato in his dialogues intends to attack Antisthenes without naming him—is difficult to determine. Probably he does intend to designate Antisthenes as γέρων ὀψιμαθής, in Sophist. 251. Schleiermacher and other commentators think that he intends to attack Antisthenes in Philêbus, Theætêtus, Euthydêmus, &c. But this seems to me not certain. In Philêbus, p. 44, he can hardly include Antisthenes among the μάλα δεινοὶ περὶ φύσιν. Antisthenes neglected the study of φύσις.

[2] Xenophon, Memor. iii. 11, 17.

[3] Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 11, 17; Symposion, ii. 10, iv. 2-3-44. Plutarch (Quæst. Symp. ii. 1, 6, p. 632) and Diogenes Laertius (vi. 1, 15) appear to understand the description of Xenophon as ascribing to Antisthenes a winning and conciliatory manner. To me it conveys the opposite impression. We must recollect that the pleasantry of the Xenophontic Symposion (not very successful as pleasantry) is founded on the assumption, by each person, of qualities and pretensions the direct reverse of that which he has in reality—and on his professing to be proud of that which is a notorious disadvantage. Thus Sokrates pretends to possess great personal beauty, and even puts himself in competition with the handsome youth Kritobulus; he also prides himself on the accomplishments of a good μαστροπός. Antisthenes, quite indigent, boasts of his wealth; the neglected Hermogenes boasts of being powerfully friended. The passage, iv. 57, 61, which talks of the winning manners of Antisthenes, and his power of imparting popular accomplishments, is to be understood in this ironical and inverted sense.

he was banished with his father for fraudulently counterfeiting the coin of the city. On coming to Athens as an exile, he was captivated with the character of Antisthenes, who was at first unwilling to admit him, and was only induced to do so by his invincible importunity. Diogenes welcomed his banishment, with all its poverty and destitution, as having been the means of bringing him to Antisthenes,[1] and to a life of philosophy. It was Antisthenes (he said) who emancipated him from slavery, and made him a freeman. He was clothed in one coarse garment with double fold: he adopted the wallet (afterwards the symbol of cynicism) for his provisions, and is said to have been without any roof or lodging—dwelling sometimes in a tub near the Metroon, sometimes in one of the public porticoes or temples: he is also said to have satisfied all his wants in the open day. He here indulged unreservedly in that unbounded freedom of speech, which he looked upon as the greatest blessing of life. No man ever turned that blessing to greater account: the string of repartees, sarcasms, and stinging reproofs, which are attributed to him by Diogenes Laertius, is very long, but forms only a small proportion of those which that author had found recounted.[2] Plato described Diogenes as Sokrates running mad:[3] and when

[1] Diog. L. vi. 2, 21-49; Plutarch Quæst. Sympos. ii. 1, 7; Epiktetus, iii. 22, 67, iv. 1, 114; Dion Chrysostom. Orat. viii.-ix.-x.

Plutarch quotes two lines from Diogenes respecting Antisthenes:—

Ὃς με ῥάκη τ' ἤμπισχε κἀξηνάγκασε
Πτωχὸν γενέσθαι καὶ δόμων ἀνάστατον—
οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὁμοίως πιθανὸς ἦν λέγων—
Ὃς με σοφὸν καὶ αὐτάρκη καὶ μακάριον
ἐποίησε.

The interpretation given of the passage by Plutarch is curious, but quite in the probable meaning of the author. However, it is not easy to reconcile with the fact of this extreme poverty another fact mentioned about Diogenes, that he asked fees from listeners, in one case as much as a mina (Diog. L. vi. 2, 67).

[2] Diog. L. v. 18, vi. 2, 69. ἐρωτηθεὶς τί κάλλιστον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἔφη—παῤῥησία. Among the numerous lost works of Theophrastus (enumerated by Diogen. Laert. v. 43) one is Τῶν Διογένους Συναγωγὴ, ά, a remarkable evidence of the impression made by the sayings and proceedings of Diogenes upon his contemporaries. Compare Dion Chrysostom, Or. ix. (vol. i. 288 seq. Reiske) for the description of the conduct of Diogenes at the Isthmian festival, and the effect produced by it on spectators.

These smart sayings, of which so many are ascribed to Diogenes, and which he is said to have practised beforehand, and to have made occasions for—ὅτι χρείαν εἴη μεμελετηκώς (Diog. L. v. 18, vi. 91, vii. 26)—were called by the later rhetors Χρεῖαι. See Hermogenes and Theon, apud Walz, Rhetor. Græc. i. pp. 19-201; Quintilian, i. 9, 4.

Such collections of *Ana* were ascribed to all the philosophers in greater or less number. Photius, in giving the list of books from which the Sophist Sopater collected extracts, indicates one as Τὰ Διογένους τοῦ Κυνικοῦ Ἀποφθέγματα (Codex 161).

[3] Diog. L. vi. 54: Σωκράτης μαινόμενος. vi. 26: Οἱ δέ φασι τὸν Διογένην εἰπεῖν, Πατῶ τὸν Πλάτωνος τῦφον· τὸν δὲ φάναι, Ἑτέρῳ γε τύφῳ, Διόγενες. The term τῦφος ("vanity, self-conceit, assumption of knowing better than

Diogenes, meeting some Sicilian guests at his house and treading upon his best carpet, exclaimed—"I am treading on Plato's empty vanity and conceit," Plato rejoined—"Yes, with a different vanity of your own". The impression produced by Diogenes in conversation with others, was very powerfully felt both by young and old. Phokion, as well as Stilpon, were among his hearers.[1] In crossing the sea to Ægina, Diogenes was captured by pirates, taken to Krete, and there put up to auction as a slave: the herald asked him what sort of work he was fit for: whereupon Diogenes replied—To command men. At his own instance, a rich Corinthian named Xeniades bought him and transported him to Corinth. Diogenes is said to have assumed towards Xeniades the air of a master: Xeniades placed him at the head of his household, and made him preceptor of his sons. In both capacities Diogenes discharged his duty well.[2] As a slave well treated by his master, and allowed to enjoy great freedom of speech, he lived in greater comfort than he had ever enjoyed as a freeman: and we are not surprised that he declined the offers of friends to purchase his liberation. He died at Corinth in very old age: it is said, at ninety years old, and on the very same day on which Alexander the Great died at Babylon (B.C. 323). He was buried at the gate of Corinth leading to the Isthmus: a monument being erected to his honour, with a column of Parian marble crowned by the statue of a dog.[3]

Doctrines and smart sayings of Diogenes—Contempt of

In politics, ethics, and rules for human conduct, Diogenes adopted views of his own, and spoke them out freely. He was a freethinker (like Antisthenes) as to the popular religion: and he disapproved of marriage laws, considering that the intercourse of the sexes

others, being puffed up by the praise of vulgar minds") seems to have been much interchanged among the ancient philosophers, each of them charging it upon his opponents; while the opponents of philosophy generally imputed it to all philosophers alike. Pyrrho the Sceptic took credit for being the only ἄτυφος: and he is complimented as such by his panegyrist Timon in the Silli. Aristokles affirmed that Pyrrho had just as much τῦφον as the rest. Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xiv. 18.

[1] Diog. L. vi. 2, 75-76.

[2] Diog. L. vi. 2, 74.

Xeniades was mentioned by Demokritus: he is said to have been a sceptic (Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 48-53), at least he did not recognise any κριτήριον.

[3] Diog. L. vi. 2, 77-78.

Diogenes seems to have been known by his contemporaries under the title of ὁ Κύων. Aristotle cites from him a witty comparison under that designation, Rhetoric, iii. 10, 1410, a. 24. καὶ ὁ Κύων (ἐκάλει) τὰ καπηλεῖα, τὰ Ἀττικὰ φιδίτια.

ought to be left to individual taste and preference.[1] Though he respected the city and conformed to its laws, yet he had no reverence for existing superstitions, or for the received usages as to person, sex, or family. He declared himself to be a citizen of the Kosmos and of Nature.[2] His sole exigency was, independence of life, and freedom of speech: having these, he was satisfied, fully sufficient to himself for happiness, and proud of his own superiority to human weakness. The main benefit which he derived from philosophy (he said) was, that he was prepared for any fortune that might befall him. To be ready to accept death easily, was the sure guarantee of a free and independent life.[3] He insisted emphatically upon the necessity of exercise or training (*ἄσκησις*) both as to the body and as to the mind. Without this, nothing could be done: by means of it everything might be achieved. But he required that the labours imposed should be directed to the acquisition of habits really useful; instead of being wasted, as they commonly were, upon objects frivolous and showy. The truly wise man ought to set before him as a model the laborious life of Hêraklês: and he would find, after proper practice and training, that the contempt of pleasures would afford him more enjoyment than the pleasures themselves.[4]

pleasure—training and labour required—indifference to literature and geometry.

Diogenes declared that education was sobriety to the young, consolation to the old, wealth to the poor, ornament to the rich. But he despised much of what was commonly imparted as education—music, geometry, astronomy, &c.: and he treated with equal scorn Plato and Eukleides.[5] He is said however to have conducted the education of the sons of his master Xeniades[6] with-

[1] Diog. L. vi. 2, 72. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 13.

[2] Diog. L. vi. 2, 63-71. The like declaration is ascribed to Sokrates. Epiktêtus, i. 9, 1.

[3] Diog. L. vi. 2, 63, 72. *μηδὲν ἐλευθερίας προκρίνων.* Epiktêtus, iv. 1, 30. *Οὕτω καὶ Διογένης λέγει, μίαν εἶναι μηχανὴν πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν—τὸ εὐκόλως ἀποθνήσκειν.* Compare iv. 7-28, i. 24, 6.

[4] Diog. L. vi. 2, 70-71. *καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡ καταφρόνησις ἡδυτάτη προμελετηθεῖσα, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ συνεθισθέντες ἡδέως ζῇν, ἀηδῶς ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον μετίασιν, οὕτω οἱ τοὐναντίον ἀσκηθέντες ἥδιον αὐτῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν καταφρονοῦσι.* See Lucian, Vitar. Auct. c. 9, about the hard life and the happiness of Diogenes. Compare s. 26 about the *τῦφος* of Diogenes treading down the different *τῦφος* of Plato, and Epiktêtus iii. 22, 57. Antisthenes, in his dialogue or discourse called *Ἡρακλῆς*, appears to have enforced the like appeal to that hero as an example to others. See Winckelmann, Fragm. Antisthen. pp. 15-18.

[5] Diog. L. vi. 2, 68-73-24-27.

[6] Diog. L. vi. 2, 30-31.

out material departure from the received usage. He caused them to undergo moderate exercise (not with a view to athletic success) in the palæstra, and afterwards to practise riding, shooting with the bow, hurling the javelin, slinging and hunting: he cultivated their memories assiduously, by recitations from poets and prose authors, and even from his own compositions: he kept them on bread and water, without tunic or shoes, with clothing only such as was strictly necessary, with hair closely cut, habitually silent, and fixing their eyes on the ground when they walked abroad. These latter features approximate to the training at Sparta (as described by Xenophon) which Diogenes declared to contrast with Athens as the apartments of the men with those of the women. Diogenes is said to have composed several dialogues and even some tragedies.[1] But his most impressive display (like that of Sokrates) was by way of colloquy—prompt and incisive interchange of remarks. He was one of the few philosophers who copied Sokrates in living constantly before the public—in talking with every one indiscriminately and fearlessly, in putting home questions like a physician to his patient.[2] Epiktêtus,—speaking of Diogenes as equal, if not superior, to Sokrates—draws a distinction pertinent and accurate. "To Sokrates" (says he) "Zeus assigned the elenchtic or cross-examining function: to Diogenes, the magisterial and chastising function: to Zeno (the Stoic) the didactic and dogmatical." While thus describing Diogenes justly enough, Epiktêtus nevertheless insists upon his agreeable person and his extreme gentleness and good-nature:[3] qualities for which

[1] Diog. L. vi. 2, 80. Diogenes Laertius himself cites a fact from one of the dialogues—Pordalus (vi. 2, 20): and Epiktêtus alludes to the treatise on Ethics by Diogenes—ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ—ii. 20, 14. It appears however that the works ascribed to Diogenes were not admitted by all authors as genuine (Diog. L. c).

[2] Dion Chrysost. Or. x.; De Servis, p. 295 R. Or. ix.; Isthmicus, p. 289 R. ὥσπερ ἰατροὶ ἀνακρίνουσι τοὺς ἀσθενοῦντας, οὕτως Διογένης ἀνέκρινε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, &c.

[3] Epiktêtus, iii. 21, 19. ὡς Σωκράτει συνεβούλευε τὴν ἐλεγκτικὴν χώραν ἔχειν, ὡς Διογένει τὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ ἐπιπληκτικήν, ὡς Ζήνωνι τὴν διδασκαλικὴν καὶ δογματικήν.

About τὸ ἥμερον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον of Diogenes, see Epiktêtus, iii. 24, 64; who also tells us (iv. 11, 19), professing to follow the statements of contemporaries, that the bodies both of Sokrates and Diogenes were by nature so sweet and agreeable (ἐπίχαρι καὶ ἡδύ) as to dispense with the necessity of washing.

"Ego certé" (says Seneca, Epist. 108, 13-14, about the lectures of the eloquent Stoic Attalus) "cum Attalum audirem, in vitia, in errores, in mala vitæ perorantem, sæpé misertus sum generis humani, et illum sublimem altioremque humano fastigio credidi. Ipse regem se esse dicebat: sed plus quam regnare mihi videbatur, cui liceret censuram agere regnantium." See also his treatises De Beneficiis, v. 4-6, and De Tranquillitate Animi (c. 8), where,

probably Diogenes neither took credit himself, nor received credit from his contemporaries. Diogenes seems to have really possessed—that which his teacher Antisthenes postulated as indispensable—the Sokratic physical strength and vigour. His ethical creed, obtained from Antisthenes, was adopted by many successors, and (in the main) by Zeno and the Stoics in the ensuing century. But the remarkable feature in Diogenes which attracts to him the admiration of Epiktêtus, is—that he set the example of acting out his creed, consistently and resolutely, in his manner of life:[1] an example followed by some of his immediate successors, but not by the Stoics, who confined themselves to writing and preaching. Contemporary both with Plato and Aristotle, Diogenes stands to both of them in much the same relation as Phokion to Demosthenes in politics and oratory: he exhibits strength of will, insensibility to applause as well as to reproach, and self-acting independence—in antithesis to their higher gifts and cultivation of intellect. He was undoubtedly, next to Sokrates, the most original and unparalleled manifestation of Hellenic philosophy.

Admiration of Epiktêtus for Diogenes, especially for his consistency in acting out his own ethical creed.

Respecting Diogenes and the Cynic philosophers generally, we have to regard not merely their doctrines, but the effect produced by their severity of life. In this point Diogenes surpassed his master Antisthenes, whose life he criticised as not fully realising the lofty spirit of his doctrine. The spectacle of man not merely abstaining from enjoyment, but enduring with indifference hunger, thirst, heat, cold, poverty, privation, bodily torture, death, &c., exercises a powerful influence on the imagination of mankind.

Admiration excited by the asceticism of the Cynics—Asceticism extreme in the East—Comparison of the Indian Gymnosophists with Diogenes.

after lofty encomium on Diogenes, he exclaims—"Si quis de felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest idem dubitare et de Deorum immortalium statu, an parum beaté degant," &c.

[1] Cicero, in his Oration in defence of Murena (30-61-62) compliments Cato (the accuser) as one of the few persons who adopted the Stoic tenets with a view of acting them out, and who did really act them out—"Hæc homo ingeniosissimus M. Cato, autoribus eruditissimis inductus, arripuit: neque disputandi causâ, ut magna pars, sed ita vivendi". Tacitus (Histor. iv. 5) pays the like compliment to Helvidius Priscus.

M. Gaston Boissier (Étude sur la Vie et les Ouvrages de Varron, pp. 113-114, Paris, 1861) expresses an amount of surprise which I should not have expected, on the fact that persons adopted a philosophical creed for the purpose only of debating it and defending it, and not of acting it out. But he recognises the fact, in regard to Varro and his contemporaries, in terms not less applicable to the Athe-

It calls forth strong feelings of reverence and admiration in the beholders: while in the sufferer himself also, self-reverence and self-admiration, the sense of power and exaltation above the measure of humanity, is largely developed. The extent to which self-inflicted hardships and pains have prevailed in various regions of the earth, the long-protracted and invincible resolution with which they have been endured, and the veneration which such practices have procured for the ascetics who submitted to them—are among the most remarkable chapters in history.[1] The East, especially India, has always been, and still is, the country in which these voluntary endurances have reached their extreme pitch of severity; even surpassing those of the Christian monks in Egypt and Syria, during the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era.[2] When Alexander the Great first opened India to the observation of Greeks, one of the novelties which most surprised him and his followers was, the sight of the Gymnosophists or naked philosophers. These men were found lying on the ground, either totally uncovered or with nothing but a cloth round the loins; abstaining from all enjoyment, nourishing themselves upon a minimum of coarse vegetables or fruits, careless of the extreme heat of the plain, and the extreme cold of the mountain; and often superadding pain, fatigue, or prolonged and distressing uniformity of posture. They passed their time either in silent meditation or in discourse on religion and philosophy: they were venerated as well as consulted by every one, censuring even the most powerful persons in the land. Their fixed idea was to stand as examples to all, of endurance, insensibility, submission only to the indispensable necessities of nature, and freedom from all other fear or authority. They acted out the doctrine, which Plato so eloquently preaches

nian world: amidst such general practice, Antisthenes, Diogenes, Krates, &c., stood out as memorable exceptions. "Il ne faut pas non plus oublier de quelle manière, et dans quel esprit, les Romains lettrés étudiaient la philosophie Grecque. Ils venaient écouter les plus habiles maîtres, connaître les sectes les plus célèbres: mais ils les étudiaient plutôt en curieux, qu'ils ne s'y attachaient en adeptes. On ne les voit guères approfondir un système et s'y tenir, adopter un ensemble de croyances, et y conformer leur conduite. On étudiait le plus souvent la philosophie pour discuter. C'était seulement une matière à des conversations savantes, un exercice et un aliment pour les esprits curieux. Voilà pourquoi la secte Académique étoit alors mieux accueillie que les autres," &c.

[1] Dion Chrysostom, viii. p. 275, Reiske.

[2] See the striking description in Gibbon, Decl. and Fall, ch. xxxvii. pp. 253-265.

under the name of Sokrates in the Phædon—That the whole life of the philosopher is a preparation for death : that life is worthless, and death an escape from it into a better state.[1] It is an interesting fact to learn that when Onesikritus (one of Alexander's officers, who had known and frequented the society of Diogenes in Greece), being despatched during the Macedonian march through India for the purpose of communicating with these Gymnosophists, saw their manner of life and conversed with them—he immediately compared them with Diogenes, whom he had himself visited—as well as with Sokrates and Pythagoras, whom he knew by reputation. Onesikritus described to the Gymnosophists the manner of life of Diogenes : but Diogenes wore a threadbare mantle, and this appeared to them a mark of infirmity and imperfection. They remarked that Diogenes was right to a considerable extent ; but wrong for obeying convention in preference to nature, and for being ashamed of going naked, as they did.[2]

[1] Strabo, xv. 713 A (probably from Onesikritus, see Geier, Fragment. Alexandr. Magn. Histor. p. 379). Πλείστους δ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι λόγους περὶ τοῦ θανάτου· νομίζειν γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι, τὸν δὲ θάνατον γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα τοῖς φιλοσοφήσασι· διὸ τῇ ἀσκήσει πλείστῃ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἑτοιμοθάνατον· ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἢ κακὸν μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν συμβαινόντων ἀνθρώποις, &c.

This is an application of the doctrines laid down by the Platonic Sokrates in the Phædon, p. 64 A : Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. Compare p. 67 D.; Cicero, Tusc. D. i. 30. Compare Epiktêtus, iv. i. 30 (cited in a former note) about Diogenes the Cynic. Also Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 27 ; Valerius Maximus, iii. 3, 6 ; Diogen. L. Prooem. s. 6 ; Pliny, H. N. vii. 2.

Bohlen observes (Das Alte Indien, ch. ii. pp. 279-289), "It is a remarkable fact that Indian writings of the highest antiquity depict as already existing the same ascetic exercises as we see existing at present : they were even then known to the ancients, who were especially astonished at such fanaticism".

[2] Strabo gives a condensed summary of this report, made by Onesikritus respecting his conversation with the Indian Gymnosophist Mandanis, or Dandamis (Strabo, xv. p. 716 B) : —Ταῦτ' εἰπόντα ἐξερέσθαι (Dandamis asked Onesikritus), εἰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι λόγοι τοιοῦτοι λέγοιντο. Εἰπόντος δ' (Ὀνησικρίτου), ὅτι καὶ Πυθαγόρας τοιαῦτα λέγοι, κελεύοι τε ἐμψύχων ἀπέχεσθαι, καὶ Σωκράτης, καὶ Διογένης, οὗ καὶ αὐτὸς (Onesikritus) ἀκροάσαιτο, ἀποκρίνασθαι (Dandamis), ὅτι τἆλλα μὲν νομίζοι φρονίμως αὐτοὺς δοκεῖν, ἓν δ' ἁμαρτάνειν—νόμον πρὸ τῆς φύσεως τιθεμένους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν αἰσχύνεσθαι γυμνούς, ὥσπερ αὐτόν, διάγειν, ἀπὸ λιτῶν ζῶντας· καὶ γὰρ οἰκίαν ἀρίστην εἶναι, ἥτις ἂν ἐπισκευῆς ἐλαχίστης δέηται.

About Onesikritus, Diog. Laert. vi. 75-84 ; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 65 ; Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alexandri, p. 331.

The work of August Gladitsch (Einleitung in das Verständniss der Weltgeschichte, Posen, 1841) contains an instructive comparison between the Gymnosophists and the Cynics, as well as between the Pythagoreans and the Chinese philosophers—between the Eleatic sect and the Hindoo philosophers. The points of analogy, both in doctrine and practice, are very numerous and strikingly brought out, pp. 356-377. I cannot, however, agree in his conclusion, that the doctrines and practice of Antisthenes were borrowed,

The precepts and principles laid down by Sokrates were carried into fullest execution by the Cynics.

These observations of the Indian Gymnosophist are a reproduction and an application in practice[1] of the memorable declaration of principle enunciated by Sokrates—"That the Gods had no wants: and that the man who had fewest wants, approximated most nearly to the Gods". This principle is first introduced into Grecian ethics by Sokrates: ascribed to him both by Xenophon and Plato, and seemingly approved by both. In his life, too, Sokrates carried the principle into effect, up to a certain point. Both admirers and opponents attest his poverty, hard fare, coarse clothing, endurance of cold and privation:[2] but he was a family man, with a wife and children to maintain, and he partook occasionally of indulgences which made him fall short of his own ascetic principle. Plato and Xenophon—both of them well-born Athenians, in circumstances affluent, or at least easy, the latter being a knight, and even highly skilled in horses and horsemanship — contented themselves with preaching on the text, whenever they had to deal with an opponent more self-indulgent than themselves; but made no attempt to carry it into practice.[3] Zeno the Stoic laid down broad principles of self-denial and apathy: but in practice he was unable to conquer the sense of shame, as the Cynics did, and still more the Gymnosophists. Antisthenes, on the other hand, took to heart, both in word and act, the principle

not from Sokrates with exaggeration, but from the Parmenidean theory, and the Vedanta theory of the Ens Unum, leading to negation and contempt of the phenomenal world.

[1] Onesikritus observes, respecting the Indian Gymnosophists, that "they were more striking in act than in discourse" (*ἐν ἔργοις γὰρ αὐτοὺς κρείττονος ἢ λόγοις εἶναι*, Strabo, xv. 713 B); and this is true about the Cynic succession of philosophers, in Greece as well as in Rome. Diogenes Laertius (compare his prooem, s. 19, 20, and vi. 103) ranks the Cynic philosophy as a distinct *αἵρεσις*: but he tells us that other writers (especially Hippobotus) would not reckon it as an *αἵρεσις*, but only as an *ἔνστασις βίου*—practice without theory.

[2] Xenophon, Memor. i. 6, 2-5; Plato, Sympos. 219, 220.

The language of contemporary comic writers, Ameipsias, Eupolis, Aristophanes, &c., about Sokrates—is very much the same as that of Menander a century afterwards about Kratês. Sokrates is depicted as a Cynic in mode of life (Diogen. L. ii. 28; Aristophan. Nubes, 104-362-415).

[3] Zeno, though he received instructions from Kratês, was *ἄλλως μὲν εὔτονος πρὸς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, αἰδήμων δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν κυνικὴν ἀναισχυντίαν* (Diog. L. vii. 3).

"Disputare cum Socrate licet, dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicuro quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis excedere," &c. This is the distinction which Seneca draws between Stoic and Cynic (De Brevitat. Vitæ, 14, 5). His admiration for the "seminudus" Cynic Demetrius, his contemporary and companion, was extreme (Epist. 62, 2, and Epist. 20, 18).

of Sokrates: yet even he, as we know from the Xenophontic Symposion, was not altogether constant in rigorous austerity. His successors Diogenes and Krates attained the maximum of perfection ever displayed by the Cynics of free Greece. They stood forth as examples of endurance, abnegation—insensibility to shame and fear—free-spoken censure of others. Even they however were not so recognised by the Indian Gymnosophists; who, having reduced their wants, their fears, and their sensibilities, yet lower, had thus come nearer to that which they called the perfection of Nature, and which Sokrates called the close approach to divinity.[1] When Alexander the Great (in the first year of his reign and prior to any of his Asiatic conquests) visited Diogenes at Corinth, found him lying in the sun, and asked if there was anything which he wanted—Diogenes made the memorable reply—"Only that you and your guards should stand out of my sunshine". This reply doubtless manifests the self-satisfied independence of the philosopher. Yet it is far less impressive than the fearless reproof which the Indian Gymnosophists administered to Alexander, when they saw him in the Punjab at the head of his victorious army, after exploits, dangers, and fatigues almost superhuman, as conqueror of Persia and acknowledged son of Zeus.[2]

[1] Xenoph. Memor. i. 6, 10 (the passage is cited in a previous note).

The Emperor Julian (Orat. vi. p. 192 Spanh.) says about the Cynics—*ἀπάθειαν γὰρ ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος, τοῦτο δὲ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ θεὸν γενέσθαι.* Dion Chrysostom (Or. vi. p. 208) says also about Diogenes the Cynic—*καὶ μάλιστα ἐμιμεῖτο τῶν θεῶν τὸν βίον.*

[2] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 32, 92, and the Anabasis of Arrian, vii. 1-2-3, where both the reply of Diogenes and that of the Indian Gymnosophists are reported. Dion Chrysostom (Orat. iv. p. 145 seq. Reiske) gives a prolix dialogue between Alexander and Diogenes. His picture of the effect produced by Diogenes upon the different spectators at the Isthmian festival, is striking and probable.

Kalanus, one of the Indian Gymnosophists, was persuaded, by the instances of Alexander, to abandon his Indian mode of life and to come away with the Macedonian army—very much to the disgust of his brethren, who scornfully denounced him as infirm and even as the slave of appetite (*ἀκόλαστον*, Strabo, xv. 718). He was treated with the greatest consideration and respect by Alexander and his officers; yet when the army came into Persis, he became sick of body and tired of life. He obtained the reluctant consent of Alexander to allow him to die. A funeral pile was erected, upon which he voluntarily burnt himself in presence of the whole army; who witnessed the scene with every demonstration of military honour. See the remarkable description in Arrian, Anab. vii. 3. Cicero calls him "Indus indoctus ac barbarus" (Tusc. Disp. ii. 22, 52); but the impression which he made on Alexander himself, Onesikritus, Lysimachus, and generally upon all who saw him, was that of respectful admiration (Strabo, xv. 715; Arrian, l. c.). One of these Indian sages, who had come into Syria along with the Indian envoys sent by an Indian king to the Roman Emperor Augustus, burnt

Antithesis between Nature—and Law or Convention—insisted on by the Indian Gymnosophists.

Another point, in the reply made by the Indian Gymnosophist to Onesikritus, deserves notice: I mean the antithesis between law (or convention) and nature (*νόμος*—*φύσις*)—the supremacy which he asserts for Nature over law—and the way in which he understands Nature and her supposed ordinances. This antithesis was often put forward and argued in the ancient Ethics: and it is commonly said, without any sufficient proof, that the Sophists (speaking of them collectively) recognised only the authority of law—while Sokrates and Plato had the merit of vindicating against them the superior authority of Nature. The Indian Gymnosophist agrees with the Athenian speaker in the Platonic treatise De Legibus, and with the Platonic Kallikles in the Gorgias, thus far—that he upholds the paramount authority of Nature. But of these three interpreters, each hears and reports the oracles of Nature differently from the other two: and there are many other dissenting interpreters besides.[1] Which of them are we to follow? And if, adopting any one of them, we reject the others, upon what grounds are we to justify our preference? When the Gymnosophist points out, that nakedness is the natural condition of man; when he farther infers, that because natural it is therefore right—and that the wearing of clothes, being a departure from nature, is also a departure from right—how are we to prove to him that his interpretation of nature is the wrong one? These questions have received no answer in any of the Platonic dialogues: though we have seen that Plato is very bitter against those who dwell upon the antithesis between Law and Nature, and who undertake to decide between the two.

himself publicly at Athens, with an exulting laugh when he leaped upon the funeral pile (Strabo, xv. 720 A) —*κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν Ἰνδῶν ἔθη*.

The like act of self-immolation was performed by the Grecian Cynic Peregrinus Proteus, at the Olympic festival in the reign of Marcus Antoninus, 165 A.D. (See Clinton, Fasti Romani.) Lucian, who was present and saw the proceeding, has left an animated description of it, but ridicules it as a piece of silly vanity. Theagenes, the admiring disciple of Peregrinus, and other Cynics, who were present in considerable numbers—and also Lucian himself—compare this act to that of the Indian Gymnosophists—*οὗτος δὲ τίνος αἰτίας ἕνεκεν ἐμβάλλει φέρων ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ πῦρ; νὴ Δί', ὅπως τὴν καρτερίαν ἐπιδείξηται, καθάπερ οἱ Βραχμᾶνες* (Lucian, De Morte Peregrini, 25-39, &c.).

[1] Though Seneca (De Brevitate Vit. 14) talks of the Stoics as "conquering Nature, and the Cynics as exceeding Nature," yet the Stoic Epiktêtus considers his morality as the only scheme conformable to Nature

Reverting to the Cynics, we must declare them to be in one respect the most peculiar outgrowth of Grecian philosophy: because they are not merely a doctrinal sect, with phrases, theories, reasonings, and teachings, of their own—but still more prominently a body of practical ascetics, a mendicant order[1] in philosophy, working up the bystanders by exhibiting themselves as models of endurance and apathy. These peculiarities seem to have originated partly with Pythagoras, partly with Sokrates—for there is no known prior example of it in Grecian history, except that of the anomalous priests of Zeus at Dodona, called Selli, who lay on the ground with unwashed feet. The discipline of Lykurgus at Sparta included severe endurance; but then it was intended to form, and actually did form, good soldiers. The Cynics had no view to military action. They exaggerated the peculiarities of Sokrates, and we should call their mode of life the Sokratic life, if we followed the example of those who gave names to the Pythagorean or Orphic life, as a set of observances derived from the type of Pythagoras or Orpheus.[2]

The Greek Cynics—an order of ascetic or mendicant friars.

Though Antisthenes and Diogenes laid chief stress upon ethical topics, yet they also delivered opinions on logic and evidence.[3] Antisthenes especially was engaged in controversy, and seemingly in acrimonious contro-

Logical views of Antisthenes and Dio-

(Epiktêt. Diss. iv. 1, 121-128); while the Epikurean Lucretius claims the same conformity for the precepts of Epikurus.

[1] Respecting the historical connexion between the Grecian Cynics and the ascetic Christian monks, see Zeller, Philos. der Griech. ii. p. 241, ed. 2nd.

Homer, Iliad xvi. 233-5:—

Ζεῦ ἄνα, Δωδωναῖε, Πελασγικέ, τηλόθι ναίων,
Δωδώνης μεδέων δυσχειμέρου, ἀμφὶ δὲ Σέλλοι
Σοὶ ναίουσ' ὑποφῆται ἀνιπτόποδες, χαμαιεῦναι.

There is no analogy in Grecian history to illustrate this very curious passage: the Excursus of Heyne furnishes no information (see his edition of the Iliad, vol. vii. p. 289) except the general remark:—"Selli—vitæ genus et institutum affectarunt abhorrens à communi usu, vitæ monachorum mendicantium haud absimile, cum sine vitæ cultu viverent, nec corpus abluerent, et humi cubarent. Ita inter barbaros non modo, sed inter ipsas feras gentes intellectum est, eos qui auctoritatem apud multitudinem consequi vellent, externâ specie, vitæ cultu austeriore, abstinentiâ et continentiâ, oculos hominum in se convertere et mirationem facere debere."

[2] Plato, Republic, x. 600 B; Legib. vi. 782 C; Eurip. Hippol. 955; Fragm. Κρῆτες.

See also the citations in Athenæus (iv. pp. 161-163) from the writers of the Attic middle comedy, respecting the asceticism of the Pythagoreans, analogous to that of the Cynics.

[3] Among the titles of the works of Antisthenes, preserved by Diogenes Laertius (vi. 15), several relate to dialectic or logic. Ἀλήθεια. Περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι, ἀντιλογικός. Σάθων, περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν, α, β, γ. Περὶ Διαλέκτου. Περὶ Παιδείας ἢ ὀνομάτων,

genes—they opposed the Platonic Ideas.

versy, with Plato; whose opinions he impugned in an express dialogue entitled Sathon. Plato on his side also attacked the opinions of Antisthenes, and spoke contemptuously of his intelligence, yet without formally naming him. At least there are some criticisms in the Platonic dialogues (especially in the Sophistês, p. 251) which the commentators pronounce, on strong grounds, to be aimed at Antisthenes: who is also unfavourably criticised by Aristotle. We know but little of the points which Antisthenes took up against Plato—and still less of the reasons which he urged in support of them. Both he and Diogenes, however, are said to have declared express war against the Platonic theory of self-existent Ideas. The functions of general Concepts and general propositions, together with the importance of defining general terms, had been forcibly insisted on in the colloquies of Sokrates; and his disciple Plato built upon this foundation the memorable hypothesis of an aggregate of eternal, substantive realities, called Ideas or Forms, existing separate from the objects of sense, yet affording a certain participation in themselves to those objects: not discernible by sense, but only by the Reason or understanding. These bold creations of the Platonic fancy were repudiated by Antisthenes and Diogenes: who are both said to have declared—"We see Man, and we see Horse; but Manness and Horseness we do not see". Whereunto Plato replied—"You possess that eye by which Horse is seen: but you have not yet acquired that eye by which Horseness is seen".[1]

First protest of Nominalism against Realism.

This debate between Antisthenes and Plato marks an interesting point in the history of philosophy. It is the first protest of Nominalism against the doctrine of an extreme Realism. The Ideas or Forms of Plato (according to many of his phrases, for he is not

α, β, γ, δ, ε. Περὶ ὀνομάτων χρησεως, ἢ ἐριστικός. Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως, &c., &c.

Diogenes Laertius refers to *ten* τόμοι of these treatises.

[1] Simplikius, ad Aristot. Categ. p. 66, b. 47, 67, b. 18, 68, b. 25, Schol. Brand.; Tzetzes, Chiliad. vii. 606.

τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἀνῄρουν τὰς ποιότητας τελέως, τὸ ποιὸν συγχωροῦντες εἶναι· ὥσπερ Ἀντισθένης, ὃς ποτε Πλάτωνι διαμφισβητῶν—ὦ Πλάτων, ἔφη, ἵππον μὲν ὁρῶ, ἱππότητα δ' οὐχ ὁρῶ· καὶ ὃς εἶπεν, ἔχεις μὲν ᾧ ἵππος ὁρᾶται τόδε τὸ ὄμμα, ᾧ δὲ ἱππότης θεωρεῖται, οὐδέπω κέκτησαι. καὶ ἄλλοι δέ τινες ἦσαν ταύτης τῆς δόξης. οἱ δὲ τινὰς μὲν ἀνῄρουν ποιότητας, τινὰς δὲ κατελίμπανον.

Ἀνθρωπότης occurs p. 68, a. 31. Compare p. 20, a. 2.

The same conversation is reported

always consistent with himself) are not only real existences distinct from particulars, but absorb to themselves all the reality of particulars. The real universe in the Platonic theory was composed of Ideas or Forms—such as Manness or Horseness[1] (called by Plato the Αὐτὸ-Ἄνθρωπος and Αὐτὸ-Ἵππος), of which particular men and horses were only disfigured, transitory, and ever-varying photographs. Antisthenes denied what Plato affirmed, and as Plato affirmed it. Aristotle denied it also; maintaining that genera, species, and attributes, though distinguishable as separate predicates of, or inherencies in, individuals —yet had no existence apart from individuals. Aristotle was no less wanting than Antisthenes, in the intellectual eye required for discerning the Platonic Ideas. Antisthenes is said to have declared these Ideas to be mere thoughts or conceptions (ψιλὰς ἐννοίας): *i.e.*, merely subjective or within the mind, without any object corresponding to them. This is one of the various modes of presenting the theory of Ideas, resorted to even in the Platonic Parmenidês, not by one who opposes that theory, but by one seeking to defend it—*viz.*, by Sokrates, when he is hard pressed by the objections of the Eleate against the more extreme and literal version of the theory.[2] It is remarkable, that the objections ascribed to Parmenides against that version which exhibits the Ideas as mere Concepts of and in the mind, are decidedly less forcible than those which he urges against the other versions.

There is another singular doctrine, which Aristotle ascribes to Antisthenes, and which Plato notices and confutes; alluding to its author contemptuously, but not mentioning his name. Every name (Antisthenes argued) has its own special reason or meaning (οἰκεῖος[3] λόγος),

Doctrine of Antisthenes about predication—He admits no

as having taken place between Diogenes and Plato, except that instead of ἱππότης and ἀνθρωπότης, we have τραπεζότης and κυαθότης (Diog. L. vi. 53).

We have ζωότης—Ἀθηναιότης—in Galen's argument against the Stoics (vol. xix. p. 481, Kühn).

[1] We know from Plato himself (Theætêtus, p. 182 A) that even the word ποιότης, if not actually first introduced by himself, was at any rate so recent as to be still repulsive, and to require an Apology. If ποιότης was strange, ἀνθρωπότης and ἱππότης would be still more strange. Antisthenes probably invented them, to present the doctrine which he impugned in a dress of greater seeming absurdity.

[2] Plato, Parmenidês, p. 132 B.

See, afterwards, chapter xxvii., Parmenides.

[3] Diogen. L. vi. 3. Πρῶτός τε ὡρίσατο (Antisthenes) λόγον, εἰπών, λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἐστι δηλῶν.

other predication but identical.

declaring the essence of the thing named, and differing from every other word: you cannot therefore truly predicate any one word of any other, because the reason or meaning of the two is different: there can be no true propositions except identical propositions, in which the predicate is the same with the subject—"man is man, good is good". "Man is good" was an inadmissible proposition: affirming different things to be the same, or one thing to be many.[1] Accordingly, it was impossible for two speakers really to contradict each other. There can be no contradiction between them if both declare the essence of the same thing—nor if neither of them declare the essence of it—nor if one speaker declares the essence of one thing, and another speaker that of another. But one of these three cases must happen: therefore there can be no contradiction.[2]

The same doctrine asserted by Stilpon, after the time of Aristotle.

The works of Antisthenes being lost, we do not know how he himself stated his own doctrine, nor what he said on behalf of it, declaring contradiction to be impossible. Plato sets aside the doctrine as absurd and silly; Aristotle—since he cites it as a paradox, apt for dialectical debate, where the opinion of a philosopher stood opposed to what was generally received—seems to imply that there were plausible arguments to be urged in its favour.[3] And that the doctrine actually continued to be held

[1] Aristotle, Metaphy. Δ. 1024, b. 32, attributes this doctrine to Antisthenes by name; which tends to prove that Plato meant Antisthenes, though not naming him, in Sophist. p. 251 B, where he notices the same doctrine. Compare Philêbus, p. 14 D.

It is to be observed that a doctrine exactly the same as that which Plato here censures in Antisthenes, will be found maintained by the Platonic Sokrates himself, in Plato, Hippias Major, p. 304 A. See chap. xiii. vol. ii. of the present work.

[2] Aristot. Topic. i. p. 104, b. 20. *θέσις δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν· οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης.*

Plato puts this *θέσις* into the mouth of Dionysodorus, in the Euthydêmus—p. 286 B; but he says (or makes Sokrates say) that it was maintained by many persons, and that it had been maintained by Protagoras, and even by others yet more ancient.

Antisthenes had discussed it specially in a treatise of three sections polemical against Plato—*Σάθων, ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν, α, β, γ* (Diog. L. vi. 16).

[3] Aristotle (Met. Δ. 1024) represents the doctrine of Antisthenes, That contradictory and false propositions are impossible—as a consequence deduced from the position laid down—That no propositions except identical propositions were admissible. If you grant this last proposition, the consequences will be undeniable. Possibly Antisthenes may have reasoned in this way: "There are many contradictory and false propositions now afloat; but this arises from the way in which predication is conducted. So long as the predicate is different from the subject, there is nothing *in the form of a proposition*

and advocated, in the generation not only after Antisthenes but after Aristotle—we may see by the case of Stilpon: who maintained (as Antisthenes had done) that none but identical propositions, wherein the predicate was a repetition of the subject, were admissible: from whence it followed (as Aristotle observed) that there could be no propositions either false or contradictory. Plutarch,[1] in reciting this doctrine of Stilpon (which had been vehemently impugned by the Epikurean Kolôtês), declares it to have been intended only in jest. There is no ground for believing that it was so intended: the analogy of Antisthenes goes to prove the contrary.

Nominalism of Stilpon. His reasons against accidental predication.

Stilpon, however, while rejecting (as Antisthenes had done) the universal Ideas[2] or Forms, took a larger ground of objection. He pronounced them to be inadmissible both as subject and as predicate. If you speak of Man in general (he said), what, or whom, do you mean? You do not mean A or B, or C or D, &c.: that is, you do not mean any one of these more than any other. You have no determinate meaning at all: and beyond this indefinite multitude of individuals, there is nothing that the term can mean. Again, as to predicates—when you say, *The man runs*, or *The man is good*, what do you mean by the predicate *runs*, or is *good?* You do not mean any thing specially belonging to *man:* for you apply the same predicates to many other subjects: you

to distinguish falsehood from truth (to distinguish *Theætêtus sedet*, from *Theætêtus volat*—to take the instance in the Platonic Sophistês—p. 263). There ought to be no propositions except identical propositions: the form itself will then guarantee you against both falsehood and contradiction: you will be sure always to give τὸν οἰκεῖον λόγον τοῦ πράγματος." There would be nothing inconsistent in such a precept: but Aristotle might call it silly (εὐηθῶς), because, while shutting out falsehood and contradiction, it would also shut out the great body of useful truth, and would divest language of its usefulness as a means of communication.

Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Römisch. Phil. vol. ii. xciii. 1) gives something like this as the probable purpose of Antisthenes—"Nur Eins bezeichne die Wesenheit eines Dinges—die Wesenheit als einfachen Träger des mannichfaltigen der Eigenschaften" (this is rather too Aristotelian)—"zur Abwehr von Streitigkeiten auf dem Gebiete der Erscheinungen". Compare also Ritter, Gesch. Phil. vol. ii. p. 130. We read in the Kratylus, that there were persons who maintained the rectitude of all names: to say that a name was not right, was (in their view) tantamount to saying that it was no name at all, but only an unmeaning sound (Plato, Krat. pp. 429-430).

[1] Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, p. 1119 C-D.

[2] Hegel (Geschichte der Griech. Philos. i. p. 123) and Marbach (Geschichte der Philos. s. 91) disallow the assertion of Diogenes, that Stilpon ἀνῄρει τὰ εἴδη. They maintain that Stilpon rejected the particular affirmations, and allowed only general or universal affirmations. This construction appears to me erroneous.

say *runs*, about a horse, a dog, or a cat—you say *good* in reference to food, medicine, and other things besides. Your predicate, therefore, being applied to many and diverse subjects, belongs not to one of them more than to another: in other words, it belongs to neither: the predication is not admissible.[1]

[1] Diog. L. ii. 113; Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, 1119-1120. εἰ περὶ ἵππου τὸ τρέχειν κατηγοροῦμεν, οὗ φησι (Stilpon) ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ περὶ οὗ κατηγορεῖται τὸ κατηγορούμενον—ἑκατέρου γὰρ ἀπαιτούμενοι τὸν λόγον, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποδίδομεν ὑπὲρ ἀμφοῖν. Ὅθεν ἁμαρτάνειν τοὺς ἕτερον ἑτέρου κατηγοροῦντας. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῷ ἵππῳ τὸ τρέχειν, πῶς καὶ σιτίου καὶ φαρμάκου τὸ ἀγαθόν; καὶ νὴ Δία πάλιν λέοντος καὶ κυνὸς τὸ τρέχειν, κατηγοροῖμεν; εἰ δ' ἕτερον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἄνθρωπον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἵππον τρέχειν λέγομεν.

Sextus Empiricus (adv. Mathem. vii. p. 269-282) gives a different vein of reasoning respecting predication,—yet a view which illustrates this doctrine of Antisthenes. Sextus does not require that all predication shall be restricted to identical predication: but he maintains that you cannot define any general word. To define, he says, is to enunciate the essence of that which is defined. But when you define Man—"a mortal, rational animal, capable of reason and knowledge"—you give only certain attributes of Man, which go along with the essence—you do not give the essence itself. If you enumerate even all the accompaniments (*συμβεβηκότα*), you will still fail to tell me what the essence of Man is; which is what I desire to know, and what you profess to do by your definition. It is useless to enumerate accompaniments, until you explain to me what the essence is which they accompany.

These are ingenious objections, which seem to me quite valid, if you assume the logical subject to be a real, absolute essence, apart from all or any of its predicates. And this is a frequent illusion, favoured even by many logicians. We enunciate the subject first, then the predicate; and because the subject can be conceived after abstraction of this, that, *or* the other predicates—we are apt to imagine that it may be conceived without *all or any* of the predicates. But this is an illusion. If you suppress all predicates, the subject or supposed substratum vanishes along with them: just as the Genus vanishes, if you suppress all the different species of it.

"Scais-tu au moins ce que c'est que la matière? Très-bien. . . Par exemple, cette pierre est grise, est d'une telle forme, a ses trois dimensions; elle est pésante et divisible. Eh bien (dit le Sirien), cette chose qui te paroît être divisible, pésante, et grise, me dirois tu bien ce que c'est? Tu vois quelques attributs: mais le fond de la chose, le connois tu? Non, dit l'autre. Tu ne scais donc point ce que c'est que la matière." (Voltaire, Micromégas, c. 7.)

"Le fond de la chose"—the Ding an sich—is nothing but the name itself, divested of every fraction of meaning: it is *titulus sine re*. But the name being familiar, and having been always used with a meaning, still appears invested with much of the old emotional associations, even though it has been stripped of all its meaning by successive acts of abstraction. If you subtract from four, 1 + 1 + 1 + 1, there will remain zero. But by abstracting, from the subject *man*, all its predicates, real and possible, you cannot reduce it to zero. The *name* man always remains, and appears by old association to carry with it some meaning—though the meaning can no longer be defined.

This illusion is well pointed out in a valuable passage of Cabanis (Du Degré de Certitude de la Médecine, p. 61):—

"Je pourrois d'ailleurs demander ce qu'on entend par la nature et les causes premières des maladies. Nous connoissons de leur nature, ce que les faits en manifestent. Nous savons, par exemple, que la fièvre produit tels et tels changements: ou plutôt, c'est par ces changements qu'elle se montre à nos yeux: c'est *par eux seuls qu'elle existe pour nous*. Quand un homme tousse, crache du sang, respire avec peine, ressent une douleur de côté, a le pouls plus vite et plus dur, la peau plus chaude que dans l'état naturel—l'on dit qu'il est attaqué d'une pleurésie. Mais qu'est ce donc *qu'une pleurésie?* On vous répliquera que c'est une ma-

Stilpon (like Antisthenes, as I have remarked above) seems to have had in his mind a type of predication, similar to the type of reasoning which Aristotle laid down in the syllogism: such that the form of the proposition should be itself a guarantee for the truth of what was affirmed. Throughout the ancient philosophy, especially in the more methodised debates between the Academics and Sceptics on one side, and the Stoics on the other —what the one party affirmed and the other party denied, was, the existence of a Criterion of Truth: some distinguishable mark, such as falsehood could not possibly carry. To find this infallible mark in propositions, Stilpon admitted none except identical. While agreeing with Antisthenes, that no predicate could belong to a subject different from itself, he added a new argument, by pointing out that predicates applied to one subject were also applied to many other subjects. Now if the predicates belonged to one, they could not (in his view) belong to the others: and therefore they did not really belong to any. He considered that predication involved either identity or special and exclusive implication of the predicate with the subject.

Difficulty of understanding how the same predicate could belong to more than one subject.

Stilpon was not the first who had difficulty in explaining to himself how one and the same predicate could be applied to many different subjects. The difficulty had already been set forth in the Platonic Parmenidês.[1] How can the Form (Man, White, Good, &c.) be present at one and the same time in many distinct indi-

Analogous difficulties in the Platonic Parmenidês.

ladie, dans laquelle tous, ou presque tous, ces accidents se trouvent combinés. S'il en manque un ou plusieurs, ce n'est point la pleurésie, du moins la vraie pleurésie essentielle des écoles. *C'est donc le concours de ces accidents qui la constitue.* Le mot *pleurésie ne fait que les retracer d'une manière plus courte. Ce mot n'est pas un être par lui-même:* il exprime une abstraction de l'esprit, et réveille par un seul trait toutes les images d'un assez grand tableau.

"Ainsi lorsque, non content de connoître une maladie par ce qu'elle offre à nos sens, par ce qui seul là constitue, et sans quoi elle n'existeroit pas, *vous demandez encore quelle est sa nature en elle-même, quelle est son essence—c'est comme si vous demandiez quelle est la nature ou l'essence d'un mot, d'une pure abstraction.* Il n'y a donc pas beaucoup de justesse à dire, d'un air de triomphe, que les médecins ignorent même la nature de la fièvre, et que sans cesse ils agissent dans des circonstances, ou manient des instruments, dont l'essence leur est inconnue."

[1] Plato, Parmenidês, p. 131. Compare also Philêbus, p. 15, and Stallbaum's Proleg. to the Parmenidês, pp. 46-47. The long commentary of Proklus (v. 100-110. pp. 670-682 of the edition of Stallbaum) amply attests the *δυσκολίαν* of the problem.

The argument of Parmenidês (in the dialogue called Parmenidês) is applied to the Platonic *εἴδη* and to *τὰ μετέχοντα*. But the argument is just as much applicable to attributes, genera, species: to all general predicates.

viduals? It cannot be present as a whole in each: nor can it be divided, and thus present partly in one, partly in another. How therefore can it be present at all in any of them? In other words, how can the One be Many, and how can the Many be One? Of this difficulty (as of many others) Plato presents no solution, either in the Parmenidês or anywhere else.[1] Aristotle alludes to several contemporaries or predecessors who felt it. Stilpon reproduces it in his own way. It is a very real difficulty, requiring to be dealt with by those who lay down a theory of predication; and calling upon them to explain the functions of general propositions, and the meaning of general terms.

Menedêmus disallowed all negative predications.

Menedêmus the Eretrian, one among the hearers and admirers of Stilpon, combined even more than Stilpon the attributes of the Cynic with those of the Megaric. He was fearless in character, and uncontrouled in speech, delivering harsh criticisms without regard to offence given: he was also a great master of ingenious dialectic and puzzling controversy.[2] His robust frame, grave deportment, and simplicity of life, inspired great respect; especially as he occupied a conspicuous position, and enjoyed political influence at Eretria. He is said to have thought meanly both of Plato and Xenokrates. We are told that Menedêmus, like Antisthenes and Stilpon, had doctrines of his own on the subject of predication. He disallowed all negative propositions, admitting none but affirmative: moreover even of the affirmative propositions, he disallowed all the hypothetical, approving only the simple and categorical.[3]

It is impossible to pronounce confidently respecting these doctrines, without knowing the reasons upon which they were grounded. Unfortunately these last have not been transmitted to us. But we may be very sure that there *were* reasons, sufficient or insufficient: and the knowledge of those reasons would have enabled us to appreciate more fully the state of the Greek

[1] Aristot. Physic. i. 2, 185, b. 26-36. Lykophron and some others anterior to Aristotle proposed to elude the difficulty, by ceasing to use the substantive verb as copula in predication: instead of saying Σωκράτης ἐστὶ λευκός, they said either Σωκράτης λευκός, simply, or Σωκράτης λελεύκωται. This is a remarkable evidence of the difficulty arising, even in these early days of logic, about the logical function of the copula.

[2] Diog. L. ii. 127-134. ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἐπικόπτης καὶ παῤῥησιαστής.

[3] Diog. L. ii. 134.

mind, in respect to logical theory, in and before the year 300 B.C.

Distinction ascribed to Antisthenes between simple and complex objects. Simple objects undefinable.

Another doctrine, respecting knowledge and definition, is ascribed by Aristotle to "the disciples of Antisthenes and other such uninstructed persons": it is also canvassed by Plato in the Theætêtus,[1] without specifying its author, yet probably having Antisthenes in view. As far as we can make out a doctrine which both these authors recite as opponents, briefly and in their own way, it is as follows:—"Objects must be distinguished into—1. Simple or primary; and 2. Compound or secondary combinations of these simple elements. This last class, the compounds, may be explained or defined, because you can enumerate the component elements. By such analysis, and by the definition founded thereupon, you really come to *know* them—describe them—predicate about them. But the first class, the simple or primary objects, can only be perceived by sense and named: they cannot be analysed, defined, or known. You can only predicate about them that they are like such and such other things: *e.g.*, *silver*, you cannot say what it is in itself, but only that it is like tin, or like something else. There may thus be a *ratio* and a definition of any compound object, whether it be an object of perception or of conception: because one of the component elements will serve as Matter or Subject of the proposition, and the other as Form or Predicate. But there can be no definition of any one of the component elements separately taken: because there is neither Matter nor Form to become the Subject and Predicate of a defining proposition."

This opinion, ascribed to the followers of Antisthenes, is not in harmony with the opinion ascribed by Aristotle to Antisthenes himself (*viz.*, That no propositions, except identical propositions, were admissible): and we are led to suspect that the first opinion must have been understood or qualified by its author in some manner not now determinable. But the second opinion, drawing a marked logical distinction between simple and complex Objects, has some interest from the criticisms of Plato and Aristotle: both of whom select, for the example illustrating the opinion, the

[1] Plato, Theætêt, pp. 201-202. Aristotel. Metaph. H. 1043, b. 22.

syllable—as the compound made up of two or more letters which are its simple constituent elements.

Remarks of Plato on this doctrine.

Plato refutes the doctrine,[1] but in a manner not so much to prove its untruth, as to present it for a verbal incongruity. How can you properly say (he argues) that you *know* the compound AB, when you know neither A nor B separately? Now it may be incongruous to restrict in this manner the use of the words *know—knowledge:* but the distinction between the two cases is not denied by Plato. Antisthenes said—"I feel a simple sensation (A or B) and can name it, but I do not *know* it: I can affirm nothing about it in itself, or about its real essence. But the compound AB I do know, for I know its essence: I can affirm about it that *it is* compounded of A and B, and this is its essence." Here is a real distinction: and Plato's argument amounts only to affirming that it is an incorrect use of words to call the compound *known*, when the component elements are not known. Unfortunately the refutation of Plato is not connected with any declaration of his own counter-doctrine, for Theætêtus ends in a result purely negative.

Remarks of Aristotle upon the same.

Aristotle, in his comment on the opinion of Antisthenes, makes us understand better what it really is:—"Respecting simple essences (A or B), I cannot tell what they really are: but I can tell what they are like or unlike, *i.e.*, I can compare them with other essences, simple or compound. But respecting the compound AB, I can tell what it really is: its essence is, to be compounded of A and B. And this I call *knowing* or *knowledge*."[2] The distinction

[1] Plato, Theætêt, ut suprà.

[2] Aristot. Metaphys. H. 1043, b. 24-32, with the Scholia, p. 774, b. Br.

Mr. J. S. Mill observes, Syst. of Logic, i. 5, 6, p. 116, ed. 9:—"There is still another exceptional case, in which, though the predicate is the name of a class, yet in predicating it we affirm nothing but resemblance: the class being founded not on resemblance in any given particular, but on general unanalysable resemblance. The classes in question are those into which our simple sensations, or other simple feelings, are divided. Sensations of white, for instance, are classed together, not because we can take them to pieces, and say, they are alike in this, not alike in that, but because we feel them to be alike altogether, though in different degrees. When therefore I say—The colour I saw yesterday was a white colour, or, The sensation I feel is one of tightness—in both cases the attribute I affirm of the colour or of the other sensation is mere resemblance: simple likeness to sensations which I have had before, and which have had that name bestowed upon them. The names of feelings, like other concrete general names, are connotative: but they connote a mere resemblance. When pre-

here taken by Antisthenes (or by his followers) is both real and useful: Plato does not contest it: while Aristotle distinctly acknowledges it, only that among the simple items he ranks both Percepta and Concepta.

Later Grecian Cynics —Monimus —Krates— Hipparchia

Monimus a Syracusan, and Krates a Theban, with his wife Hipparchia,[1] were successors of Diogenes in the Cynic vein of philosophy: together with several others of less note. Both Monimus and Krates are said to have been persons of wealthy condition,[2] yet their minds were so powerfully affected by what they saw of Diogenes, that they followed his example, renounced their wealth, and threw themselves upon a life of poverty; with nothing beyond the wallet and the threadbare cloak, but with fearless independence of character, free censure of every one, and indifference to opinion. "I choose as my country" (said Krates) "poverty and low esteem, which fortune cannot assail: I am the fellow-citizen of Diogenes, whom the snares of envy cannot reach."[3] Krates is said to have admonished every one, whether they invited it or not: and to have gone unbidden from house to

dicated of any individual feelings, the information they convey is that of its likeness to the other feelings which we have been accustomed to call by the same name."

[1] Hipparchia was a native of Maroneia in Thrace; born in a considerable station, and belonging to an opulent family. She came to Athens with her brother Mêtroklês, and heard both Theophrastus and Kratês. Both she and her brother became impressed with the strongest admiration for Kratês: for his mode of life, as well as for his discourses and doctrine. Rejecting various wealthy suitors, she insisted upon becoming his wife, both against his will and against the will of her parents. Her resolute enthusiasm overcame the reluctance of both. She adopted fully his hard life, poor fare, and threadbare cloak. She passed her days in the same discourses and controversies, indifferent to the taunts which were addressed to her for having relinquished the feminine occupations of spinning and weaving. Diogenes Laertius found many striking dicta or replies ascribed to her (ἄλλα μυρία τῆς φιλοσόφου, vi. 96-98). He gives an allusion made to her by the contemporary comic poet Menander, who (as I before observed) handled the Cynics of his time as Aristophanes, Eupolis, &c., had handled Sokrates—

Συμπεριπατήσεις γὰρ τρίβων' ἔχουσ' ἐμοὶ,
ὥσπερ Κράτητι τῷ Κυνικῷ ποθ' ἡ γυνὴ.
Καὶ θυγατέρ' ἐξέδωκ' ἐκεῖνος, ὡς ἔφη
αὐτὸς, ἐπὶ πειρᾷ δοὺς τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας.
(vi. 93.)

[2] Diog. L. vi. 82-88. Μόνιμος ὁ Κύων, Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 48-88.

About Krates, Plutarch, De Vit. Aere Alieno, 7, p. 831 F.

[3] Diog. L. vi. 93. ἔχειν δὲ πατρίδα ἀδοξίαν τε καὶ πενίαν, ἀνάλωτα τῇ τύχῃ: καὶ—Διογένους εἶναι πολίτης ἀνεπιβούλευτον φθόνῳ. The parody or verses of Krates, about his city of Pera (the Wallet), vi. 85, are very spirited—

Πήρη τις πόλις ἐστὶ μέσῳ ἐνὶ οἰνοπι τύφῳ, &c.

Krates composed a collection of philosophical Epistles, which Diogenes pronounces to be excellent, and even to resemble greatly the style of Plato (vi. 98).

house for the purpose of exhortation. His persistence in this practice became so obtrusive that he obtained the title of "the Door-Opener".[1] This feature, common to several other Cynics, exhibits an approximation to the missionary character of Sokrates, as described by himself in the Platonic Apology: a feature not found in any of the other eminent heads of philosophy—neither in Plato nor in Aristotle, Zeno, or Epikurus.

Zeno of Kitium in Cyprus.

Among other hearers of Krates, who carried on, and at the same time modified, the Cynic discipline, we have to mention Zeno, of Kitium in Cyprus, who became celebrated as the founder of the Stoic sect. In him the Cynic, Megaric, and Herakleitean tendencies may be said to have partially converged, though with considerable modifications:[2] the ascetic doctrines (without the ascetic practices or obtrusive forwardness) of the Cynics—and the logical subtleties of the others. He blended them, however, with much of new positive theory, both physical and cosmological. His compositions were voluminous; and those of the Stoic Chrysippus, after him, were still more numerous. The negative and oppugning function, which in the fourth century B.C. had been directed by the Megarics against Aristotle, was in the third century B.C. transferred to the Platonists, or Academy represented by Arkesilaus: whose formidable dialectic was brought to bear upon the Stoic and Epikurean schools—both of them positive, though greatly opposed to each other.

ARISTIPPUS.

Along with Antisthenes, among the hearers and companions of Sokrates, stood another Greek of very opposite dispositions, yet equally marked and original — Aristippus of Kyrênê. The stimulus of the Sokratic method, and the novelty of the topics on which it was brought to bear, operated forcibly upon both,

[1] Diog. L. vi. 86. ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ θυρεπανοίκτης, διὰ τὸ εἰς πᾶσαν εἰσιέναι οἰκίαν καὶ νουθετεῖν. Compare Seneca, Epist. 29.

[2] Numenius ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. xiv. 5.

prompting each of them to theorise in his own way on the best plan of life.

Aristippus, a Kyrenean of easy circumstances, having heard of the powerful ascendancy exercised by Sokrates over youth, came to Athens for the express purpose of seeing him, and took warm interest in his conversation.[1] He set great value upon mental cultivation and accomplishments; but his habits of life were inactive, easy, and luxurious. Upon this last count, one of the most interesting chapters in the Xenophontic Memorabilia reports an interrogative lecture addressed to him by Sokrates, in the form of dialogue.[2]

Aristippus—life, character, and doctrine.

Sokrates points out to Aristippus that mankind may be distributed into two classes: 1. Those who have trained themselves to habits of courage, energy, bodily strength, and command over their desires and appetites, together with practice in the actual work of life:—these are the men who become qualified to rule, and who do actually rule. 2. The rest of mankind, inferior in these points, who have no choice but to obey, and who do obey.[3]—Men of the first or ruling class possess all the advantages of life: they perform great exploits, and enjoy a full measure of delight and happiness, so far as human circumstances admit. Men of the second class are no better than slaves, always liable to suffer, and often actually suffering, ill-treatment and spoliation of the worst kind. To which of these classes (Sokrates asks Aristippus) do you calculate on belonging—and for which do you seek to qualify yourself?—To neither of them (replies Aristippus). I do not wish to share the lot of the subordinate multitude: but I have no relish for a life of command, with all the fatigues, hardships, perils, &c., which are inseparable from it. I prefer a middle course: I wish neither to rule, nor to be ruled, but to be a freeman: and I consider freedom as the best guarantee for happiness.[4] I desire only

Discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus.

[1] Plutarch (De Curiositate, p. 516 A) says that Aristippus informed himself, at the Olympic games, from Ischomachus respecting the influence of Sokrates.

[2] See the first chapter of the Second Book of the Memorabilia.

I give an abstract of the principal points in the dialogue, not a literal translation.

[3] Xen. Memor. ii. 1, 1 seq. τὸν μὲν ὅπως ἱκανὸς ἔσται ἄρχειν, τὸν δὲ ὅπως μήδ' ἀντιποιήσεται ἀρχῆς—τοὺς ἀρχικούς.

[4] Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 11. ἀλλ' εἶναί τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδός, ἣν πειρῶμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς, οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐλευθερίας, ἥπερ μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει.

to pass through life as easily and pleasantly as possible.[1]—Which of the two do you consider to live most pleasantly, the rulers or the ruled? asks Sokrates.—I do not rank myself with either (says Aristippus): nor do I enter into active duties of citizenship anywhere: I pass from one city to another, but everywhere as a stranger or non-citizen.—Your scheme is impracticable (says Sokrates). You cannot obtain security in the way that you propose. You will find yourself suffering wrong and distress along with the subordinates[2]—and even worse than the subordinates: for a stranger, wherever he goes, is less befriended and more exposed to injury than the native citizens. You will be sold into slavery, though you are fit for no sort of work: and your master will chastise you until you become fit for work.—But (replies Aristippus) this very art of ruling, which you consider to be happiness,[3] is itself a hard life, a toilsome slavery, not only stripped of enjoyment, but full of privation and suffering. A man must be a fool to embrace such discomforts of his own accord.—It is that very circumstance (says Sokrates), that he does embrace them of his own accord—which renders them endurable, and associates them with feelings of pride and dignity. They are the price paid beforehand, for a rich reward to come. He who goes through labour and self-denial, for the purpose of gaining good friends or subduing enemies, and for the purpose of acquiring both mental and bodily power, so that he may manage his own concerns well and may benefit both his friends and his country—such a man will be sure to find his course of labour pleasurable. He will pass his life in cheerful[4] satisfaction, not only enjoying his own esteem and admiration, but also extolled and envied by others. On the contrary, whoever passes his earlier years in immediate pleasures and indolent ease, will

[1] Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 9. *ἐμαυτον τοίνυν τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ἧ ῥᾷστα καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν.*

[2] Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 12. *εἰ μέντοι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὢν μήτε ἄρχειν ἀξιώσεις μήτε ἄρχεσθαι, μήτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑκὼν θεραπεύσεις, οἶμαί σε ὁρᾶν ὡς ἐπίστανται οἱ κρείττονες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ κλαίοντας καθίσαντες, ὡς δούλοις χρῆσθαι.*

What follows is yet more emphatic, about the unjust oppression of rulers, and the suffering on the part of subjects.

[3] Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 17. *Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι, ἣν δοκεῖς μοι σὺ νομίζειν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι.*

Compare Memor. ii. 8, 4.

[4] Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 19. *πῶς οὐκ οἴεσθαι χρὴ τούτους καὶ πονεῖν ἡδέως εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ζῆν εὐφραινομένους, ἀγαμένους μὲν ἑαυτοὺς, ἐπαινουμένους δὲ καὶ ζηλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων;*

acquire no lasting benefit either in mind or body. He will have a soft lot at first, but his future will be hard and dreary[1].

Sokrates enforces his lecture by reciting to Aristippus the memorable lecture or apologue, which the Sophist Prodikus was then delivering in lofty diction to numerous auditors[2]—the fable still known as the Choice of Hêraklês. Virtue and Pleasure (the latter of the two being here identified with Evil or Vice) are introduced as competing for the direction of the youthful Hêraklês. Each sets forth her case, in dramatic antithesis. Pleasure is introduced as representing altogether the gratification of the corporeal appetites and the love of repose: while Virtue replies by saying, that if youth be employed altogether in pursuing such delights, at the time when the appetites are most vigorous—the result will be nothing but fatal disappointment, accompanied with entire loss of the different and superior pleasures available in mature years and in old age. Youth is the season of labour: the physical appetites must be indulged sparingly, and only at the call of actual want: accomplishments of body and mind must be acquired in that season, which will enable the mature man to perform in after life great and glorious exploits. He will thus realise the highest of all human delights—the love of his friends and the admiration of his countrymen—the sound of his own praises and the reflexion upon his own deserts. At the price of a youth passed in labour and self-denial, he will secure the fullest measure of mature and attainable happiness.

Choice of Hêraklês.

"It is worth your while, Aristippus" (says Sokrates, in concluding this lecture), "to bestow some reflexion on what is to happen in the latter portions of your life."

This dialogue (one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and probably reported by Xenophon from actual hearing) is valuable in reference not only to Aristippus, but also to Sokrates himself. Many recent historians of philosophy describe Sokrates and Plato as setting up an idea of Virtue or Good Absolute (*i.e.*

Illustration afforded of the views of Sokrates respecting Good and Evil.

[1] Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 20, cited from Epicharmus:—
μὴ τὰ μαλακὰ μώεο, μὴ τὰ σκλήρ' ἔχῃς.

[2] Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21-34. *ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ περὶ Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται—μεγαλειοτέροις ῥήμασιν.*

having no essential reference to the happiness or security of the agent or of any one else) which they enforce—and an idea of Vice or Evil Absolute (*i.e.* having no essential reference to suffering or peril, or disappointment, either of the agent or of any one else) which they denounce and discommend—and as thereby refuting the Sophists, who are said to have enforced Virtue and denounced Vice only relatively—*i.e.* in consequence of the bearing of one and the other upon the security and happiness of the agent or of others. Whether there be any one doctrine or style of preaching which can be fairly ascribed to the Sophists as a class, I will not again discuss here: but I believe that the most eminent among them, Protagoras and Prodikus, held the language here ascribed to them. But it is a mistake to suppose that upon this point Sokrates was their opponent. The Xenophontic Sokrates (a portrait more resembling reality than the Platonic) always holds this same language: the Platonic Sokrates not always, yet often. In the dialogue between Sokrates and Aristippus, as well as in the apologue of Prodikus, we see that the devotion of the season of youth to indulgence and inactive gratification of appetite, is blamed as productive of ruinous consequences—as entailing loss of future pleasures, together with a state of weakness which leaves no protection against future suffering; while great care is taken to show, that though laborious exercise is demanded during youth, such labour will be fully requited by the increased pleasures and happiness of after life. The pleasure of being praised, and the pleasure of seeing good deeds performed by one's self, are especially insisted on. On this point both Sokrates and Prodikus concur.[1]

Comparison of the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic Sokrates.

If again we compare the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic Sokrates, we shall find that the lecture of the former to Aristippus coincides sufficiently with the theory laid down by the latter in the dialogue Protagoras; to which theory the Sophist Protagoras is represented as yielding a reluctant adhesion. But we shall find also that it differs materially from the doctrine main-

[1] Xenoph. Mem. ii. 1, 31. τοῦ πώποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθέασαι.... δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου τὰ μὲν ἡδέα ἐν τῇ νεότητι διαδρασεαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ, καὶ τοῦ πάντων μόντες, τὰ δὲ χαλεπὰ ἐς τὸ γῆρας ἀποθέἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ μενοι.

tained by Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias. Nay, if we follow the argument addressed by the Xenophontic Sokrates to Aristippus, we perceive that it is in substance similar to that which the Platonic dialogue Gorgias puts in the mouth of the rhetor Pôlus and the politician Kalliklês. The Xenophontic Sokrates distributes men into two classes—the rulers and the ruled: the former strong, well-armed, and well-trained, who enjoy life at the expense of the submission and suffering of the latter: the former committing injustice, the latter enduring injustice. He impresses upon Aristippus the misery of being confounded with the suffering many, and exhorts him to qualify himself by a laborious apprenticeship for enrolment among the ruling few. If we read the Platonic Gorgias, we shall see that this is the same strain in which Pôlus and Kalliklês address Sokrates, when they invite him to exchange philosophy for rhetoric, and to qualify himself for active political life. "Unless you acquire these accomplishments, you will be helpless and defenceless against injury and insult from others: while, if you acquire them, you will raise yourself to political influence, and will exercise power over others, thus obtaining the fullest measure of enjoyment which life affords: see the splendid position to which the Macedonian usurper Archelaus has recently exalted himself.[1] Philosophy is useful, when studied in youth for a short time as preface to professional and political apprenticeship: but if a man perseveres in it and makes it the occupation of life, he will not only be useless to others, but unable to protect himself; he will be exposed to suffer any injustice which the well-trained and powerful men may put upon him." To these exhortations of Pôlus and Kalliklês Sokrates replies by admitting their case as true matter of fact. "I know that I am exposed to such insults and injuries: but my life is just and innocent. If I suffer, I shall suffer wrong: and those who do the wrong will thereby inflict upon themselves a greater mischief than they inflict upon me. Doing wrong is worse for the agent than suffering wrong."[2]

There is indeed this difference between the Xenophontic

[1] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 466-470-486.

[2] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 508-509-521-527 C καὶ ἔασόν τινα σοῦ καταφρονῆσαι ὡς **ἀνοήτου**, καὶ προπηλακίσαι ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε θαῤῥῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ᾖς καλὸς κἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετήν.

Xenophontic Sokrates talking to Aristippus—Kalliklês in Platonic Gorgias.

Sokrates in his address to Aristippus, and the Platonic Kalliklês in his exhortation to Sokrates: That whereas Kalliklês proclaims and even vindicates it as natural justice and right, that the strong should gratify their desires by oppressing and despoiling the weak—the Xenophontic Sokrates merely asserts such oppression as an actual fact, notorious and undeniable,[1] without either approving or blaming it. Plato, constructing an imaginary conversation with the purpose that Sokrates shall be victorious, contrives intentionally and with dramatic consistency that the argument of Kalliklês shall be advanced in terms so invidious and revolting that no one else would be bold enough to speak it out:[2] which contrivance was the more necessary, as Sokrates is made not only to disparage the poets, rhetors, and most illustrious statesmen of historical Athens, but to sustain a thesis in which he admits himself to stand alone, opposed to aristocrats as well as democrats.[3] Yet though there is this material difference in the manner of handling, the plan of life which the Xenophontic Sokrates urges upon Aristippus, and the grounds upon which he enforces it, are really the same as those which Kalliklês in the Platonic Gorgias urges upon Sokrates. "Labour to qualify yourself for active political power"—is the lesson addressed in the one case to a wealthy man who passed his life in ease and indulgence, in the other case to a poor man who devoted himself to speculative debate on general questions, and to cross-examination of every one who would listen and answer. The man of indulgence, and the man of speculation,[4] were both of them equally destitute of those active energies,

[1] If we read the conversation alleged by Thucydides (v. 94-105-112) to have taken place between the Athenian generals and the executive council of Melos, just before the siege of that island by the Athenians, we shall see that this same language is held by the Athenians. "You, the Melians, being much weaker, must submit to us who are much stronger; this is the universal law and necessity of nature, which we are not the first to introduce, but only follow out, as others have done before us, and will do after us. Submit—or it will be worse for you. No middle course, or neutrality, is open to you."

[2] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-487-492.

[3] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 472-521.

[4] If we read the treatise of Plutarch, Περὶ Στωικων ἐναντιωμάτων (c. 2-3, p. 1033 C-D), we shall see that the Stoic writers, Zeno, Kleanthes, Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater, all of them earnestly recommended a life of active citizenship and laborious political duty, as incumbent upon philosophers not less than upon others; and that they treated with contempt a life of literary leisure and speculation. Chrysippus explicitly declared οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον τοῦ ἡδονικοῦ, *i. e.* that the speculative philosopher who kept aloof from political activity, was in substance a follower of Epikurus. Tacitus holds much the same language (Hist. iv. 5) when he says about

which were necessary to confer power over others, or even security against oppression by others.

Language held by Aristippus —his scheme of life.

In the Xenophontic dialogue, Aristippus replies to Sokrates that the apprenticeship enjoined upon him is too laborious, and that the exercise of power, itself laborious, has no charm for him. He desires a middle course, neither to oppress nor to be oppressed: neither to command, nor to be commanded—like Otanes among the seven Persian conspirators.[1] He keeps clear of political obligation, and seeks to follow, as much as he can, his own individual judgment. Though Sokrates, in the Xenophontic dialogue, is made to declare this middle course impossible, yet it is substantially the same as what the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias aspires to:—moreover the same as what the real Sokrates at Athens both pursued as far as he could, and declared to be the only course consistent with his security.[2] The Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias declares emphatically that no man can hope to take active part in the government of a country, unless he be heartily identified in spirit with the ethical and political system of the country: unless he not merely professes, but actually and sincerely shares, the creed, doctrines, tastes, and modes of appreciation prevalent among the citizens.[3] Whoever is deficient in this indispensable condition, must be content "to mind his own business and to abstain from active meddling with public affairs". This is the course which the Platonic Sokrates claims both for

Helvidius Priscus:—"ingenium illustre altioribus studiis juvenis admodum dedit: non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo constantior adversus fortuita rempublicam capesseret," &c.

The contradiction which Plutarch notes is, that these very Stoic philosophers (Chrysippus and the others) who affected to despise all modes of life except active civic duty—were themselves, all, men of literary leisure, spending their lives away from their native cities, in writing and talking philosophy. The same might have been said about Sokrates and Plato (except as to leaving their native cities), both of whom incurred the same reproach for inactivity as Sokrates here addresses to Aristippus.

[1] Herodot. iii. 80-83.

[2] Plato, Apol. So. p. 32 A. ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

[3] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 510-513. Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἥπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἑταῖρον εἶναι. (This is exactly the language which Sokrates holds to Aristippus, Xenoph. Memor. ii. 1, 12.)

ὃς ἂν, ὁμοήθης ὢν, ταὐτὰ ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι—εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ (510 D). οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις (513 B).

himself and for the philosopher generally[1]: it is also the course which Aristippus chooses for himself, under the different title of a middle way between the extortion of the ruler and the suffering of the subordinate. And the argument of Sokrates that no middle way is possible—far from refuting Aristippus (as Xenophon says that it did)[2] is founded upon an incorrect assumption: had it been correct, neither literature nor philosophy could have been developed.

The real Sokrates, since he talked incessantly and with every one, must of course have known how to diversify his conversation and adapt it to each listener. Xenophon not only attests this generally,[3] but has preserved the proofs of it in his Memorabilia — real conversations, reported though doubtless dressed up by himself. The conversations which he has preserved relate chiefly to piety and to the duties and proceedings of active life: and to the necessity of controuling the appetites: these he selected partly because they suited his proclaimed purpose of replying to the topics of indictment, partly because they were in harmony with his own *idéal*. Xenophon was a man of action, resolute in mind and vigorous in body, performing with credit the duties of the general as well as of the soldier. His heroes were men like Cyrus, Agesilaus, Ischomachus—warriors, horsemen, hunters, husbandmen, always engaged in active competition for power, glory, or profit, and never shrinking from danger, fatigue,

Diversified conversations of Sokrates, according to the character of the hearer.

[1] Plato, Gorgias, p. 526 C-D. (Compare Republic, vi. p. 496 D.) *ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μέν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ—καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ* (Sokrates to Kalliklês) *ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον.* Upon these words Routh remarks: "Respicitur inter hæc verba ad Calliclis orationem, quâ rerum civilium tractatio et *πολυπραγμοσύνη* Socrati persuadentur,"—which is the same invitation as the Xenophontic Sokrates addresses to Aristippus. Again, in Plat. Republ. viii. pp. 549 C, 550 A, we read, that corruption of the virtuous character begins by invitations to the shy youth to depart from the quiet plan of life followed by a virtuous father (who *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττει*) and to enter on a career of active political ambition. The youth is induced, by instigation of his mother and relatives without, to pass from *ἀπραγμοσύνη* to *φιλοπραγμοσύνη*, which is described as a change for the worse. Even in Xenophon (Memor. iii. 11, 16) Sokrates recognises and jests upon his own *ἀπραγμοσύνη*.

[2] Xen. Mem. iii. 8, 1. Diogenes L. says (and it is probable enough, from radical difference of character) that Xenophon was adversely disposed to Aristippus. In respect to other persons also, Xenophon puts invidious constructions (for which at any rate no ground is shown) upon their purposes in questioning Sokrates: thus, in the dialogue (i. 6) with the Sophist Antiphon, he says that Antiphon questioned Sokrates in order to seduce away his companions (Mem. i. 6, 1).

[3] Xen. Mem. iv. 1, 2-3.

or privation. For a life of easy and unambitious indulgence, even though accompanied by mental and speculative activity—"homines ignavâ operâ et philosophâ sententiâ"—he had no respect. It was on this side that the character of Aristippus certainly seemed to be, and probably really was, the most defective. Sokrates employed the arguments the most likely to call forth within him habits of action—to render him *πρακτικώτερον*.[1] In talking with the presumptuous youth Glaukon, and with the diffident Charmides,[2] Sokrates used language adapted to correct the respective infirmities of each. In addressing Kritias and Alkibiades, he would consider it necessary not only to inculcate self-denial as to appetite, but to repress an exorbitance of ambition.[3] But in dealing with Aristippus, while insisting upon command of appetite and acquirement of active energy, he at the same time endeavours to kindle ambition, and the love of command: he even goes so far as to deny the possibility of a middle course, and to maintain (what Kritias and Alkibiades[4] would have cordially approved) that there was no alternative open, except between the position of the oppressive governors and that of the suffering subjects. Addressed to Aristippus, these topics were likely to thrust forcibly upon his attention the danger of continued indulgences during the earlier years of life, and the necessity, in view to his own future security, for training in habits of vigour, courage, self-command, endurance.

[1] Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 1. *ὡς δὲ καὶ πρακτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῷ, νῦν αὖ τοῦτο λέξω.*

[2] Xenoph. Mem. iii. capp. 6 and 7.

[3] Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 15-18-24. Respecting the different tone and arguments employed by Sokrates, in his conversations with different persons, see a good passage in the Rhetor Aristeides, Orat. xlvi. *Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων*, p. 161, Dindorf.

[4] We see from the first two chapters of the Memorabilia of Xenophon (as well as from the subsequent intimation of Æschines, in the oration against Timarchus, p. 173) how much stress was laid by the accusers of Sokrates on the fact that he had educated Kritias and Alkibiades; and how the accusers alleged that his teaching tended to encourage the like exorbitant aspirations in others, dangerous to established authority, traditional, legal, parental, divine. I do not doubt (what Xenophon affirms) that Sokrates, when he conversed with Kritias and Alkibiades, held a very opposite language. But it was otherwise when he talked with men of ease and indulgence without ambition, such as Aristippus. If Melêtus and Anytus could have put in evidence the conversation of Sokrates with Aristippus, many points of it would have strengthened their case against Sokrates before the Dikasts. We read in Xenophon (Mem. i. 2, 58) how the point was made to tell, that Sokrates often cited and commented on the passage of the Iliad (ii. 188) in which the Grecian chiefs, retiring from the agora to their ships, are described as being respectfully addressed by Odysseus—while the common soldiers are scolded and beaten by him, for the very same conduct: the relation which Sokrates here dwells on as subsisting between *οἱ ἀρχικοὶ* and *οἱ ἀρχόμενοι*, would favour the like colouring.

Conversation between Sokrates and Aristippus about the Good and Beautiful.

Xenophon notices briefly two other colloquies between Sokrates and Aristippus. The latter asked Sokrates, "Do you know anything good?" in order (says Xenophon) that if Sokrates answered in the affirmative and gave as examples, health, wealth, strength, courage, bread, &c., he (Aristippus) might show circumstances in which this same particular was evil; and might thus catch Sokrates in a contradiction, as Sokrates had caught him before.[1] But Sokrates (says Xenophon) far from seeking to fence with the question, retorted it in such a way as to baffle the questioner, and at the same time to improve and instruct the by-standers.[2] "Do you ask me if I know anything good for a fever?—No. Or for ophthalmic distemper?—No. Or for hunger?—No. Oh! then, if you mean to ask me, whether I know anything good, which is good for nothing—I reply that I neither know any such thing, nor care to know it."

Again, on another occasion Aristippus asked him—"Do you know anything beautiful?—Yes; many things.—Are they all like to each other?—No; they are as unlike as possible to each other.—How then (continues Aristippus) can that which is unlike to the beautiful, be itself beautiful?—Easily enough (replies Sokrates); one man is beautiful for running; another man, altogether unlike him, is beautiful for wrestling. A shield which is beautiful for protecting your body, is altogether unlike to a javelin, which is beautiful for being swiftly and forcibly hurled.—Your answer (rejoined Aristippus) is exactly the same as it was when I asked you whether you knew anything good.—Certainly (replies Sokrates). Do you imagine, that the Good is one thing, and the Beautiful another? Do you not know that all things are good and beautiful in relation to the same purpose? Virtue is not good in relation to one purpose, and beautiful in relation to another. Men are called both good and beautiful in reference to the same ends: the

[1] Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. Both Xenophon and some of his commentators censure this as a captious string of questions put by Aristippus—"captiosas Aristippi quæstiunculas". Such a criticism is preposterous, when we recollect that Sokrates was continually examining and questioning others in the same manner. See in particular his cross-examination of Euthydêmus, reported by Xenophon, Memor. iv. 2; and many others like it, both in Xenophon and in Plato.

[2] Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. βουλόμενος τοὺς συνόντας ὠφελεῖν.

bodies of men, in like manner: and all things which men use, are considered both good and beautiful, in consideration of their serving their ends well.—Then (says Aristippus) a basket for carrying dung is beautiful?—To be sure (replied Sokrates), and a golden shield is ugly; if the former be well made for doing its work, and the latter badly.—Do you then assert (asked Aristippus) that the same things are beautiful and ugly?—Assuredly (replied Sokrates); and the same things are both good and evil. That which is good for hunger, is often bad for a fever: that which is good for a fever, is often bad for hunger. What is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling—and *vice versâ*. All things are good and beautiful, in relation to the ends which they serve well: all things are evil and ugly, in relation to the ends which they serve badly."[1]

Remarks on the conversation—Theory of Good.

These last cited colloquies also, between Sokrates and Aristippus, are among the most memorable remains of Grecian philosophy: belonging to one of the years preceding 399 B.C., in which last year Sokrates perished. Here (as in the former dialogue) the doctrine is distinctly enunciated by Sokrates—That Good and Evil—Beautiful (or Honourable) and Ugly (or Dishonourable—Base)—have no intelligible meaning except in relation to human happiness and security. Good or Evil Absolute (*i.e.*, apart from such relation) is denied to exist. The theory of Absolute Good (a theory traceable to the Parmenidean doctrines, and adopted from them by Eukleides) becomes first known to us as elaborated by Plato. Even in his dialogues it is neither always nor exclusively advocated, but is often modified by, and sometimes even exchanged for, the eudæmonistic or relative theory.

Good is relative to human beings and wants, in the view of Sokrates.

Sokrates declares very explicitly, in his conversation with Aristippus, what *he* means by the Good and the Beautiful: and when therefore in the name of the Good and the Beautiful, he protests against an uncontrolled devotion to the pleasures of sense (as in one of the Xenophontic dialogues with Euthydemus[2]), what he

[1] Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1-9.

[2] Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5.

Sokrates exhorts those with whom he converses to be sparing in indulgences, and to cultivate self-command and fortitude as well as bodily energy and activity. The reason upon which these exhortations are founded is eudæmonistic: that a person will thereby escape or be able to confront

means is, that a man by such intemperance ruins his prospects of future happiness, and his best means of being useful both to himself and others. Whether Aristippus first learnt from Sokrates the relative theory of the Good and the Beautiful, or had already embraced it before, we cannot say. Some of his questions, as reported in Xenophon, would lead us to suspect that it took him by surprise: just as we find, in the Protagoras of Plato that a theory substantially the same, though in different words, is proposed by the Platonic Sokrates to the Sophist Protagoras: who at first repudiates it, but is compelled ultimately to admit it by the elaborate dialectic of Sokrates.[1] If Aristippus did not learn the theory from Sokrates, he was at any rate fortified in it by the authority of Sokrates; to whose doctrine, in this respect, he adhered more closely than Plato.

Aristippus adhered to the doctrine of Sokrates.

Aristippus is recognised by Aristotle[2] in two characters: both as a Sophist, and as a companion of Sokrates and Plato. Moreover it is remarkable that the doctrine, in reference to which Aristotle cites him as one among the Sophists, is a doctrine unquestionably Sokratic—contempt of geometrical science as useless, and as having no bearing on the good or evil of life.[3] Herein also Aristippus followed Sokrates, while Plato departed from him.

Life and dicta of Aristippus —His type of character.

In estimating the character of Aristippus, I have brought into particular notice the dialogues reported by Xenophon, because the Xenophontic statements, with those of Aristotle, are the only contemporary evidence (for Plato only names him once to say that he was not present at the death of Sokrates, and was reported to be in Ægina). The other statements respecting Aristippus, preserved

serious dangers—and will obtain for himself ultimately greater pleasures than those which he foregoes (Memor. i. 6, 8; ii. 1, 31-33; iii. 12, 2-5). Τοῦ δὲ μὴ δουλεύειν γαστρὶ μηδὲ ὕπνῳ καὶ λαγνείᾳ οἶει τι ἄλλο αἰτιώτερον εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἕτερα ἔχειν τούτων ἡδίω, ἃ οὐ μόνον ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντα εὐφραίνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔλπιδας παρέχοντα ὠφελήσειν ἀεί; See also Memor. ii. 4, ii. 10, 4, about the importance of acquiring and cultivating friends, because a good friend is the most useful and valuable of all possessions. Sokrates, like Aristippus, adopts the prudential view of life, and not the transcendental; recommending sobriety and virtue on the ground of pleasures secured and pains averted. We find Plutarch, in his very bitter attacks on Epikurus, reasoning on the Hedonistic basis, and professing to prove that Epikurus discarded pleasures more and greater for the sake of obtaining pleasures fewer and less. See Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, pp. 1096-1099.

[1] Plato, Protagoras, pp. 351-361.

[2] Aristot. Rhetoric. ii. 24; Metaphysic. B. 996, a. 32.

[3] Xenophon. Memor. iv. 7, 2.

by Diogenes and others, not only come from later authorities, but give us hardly any facts; though they ascribe to him a great many sayings and repartees, adapted to a peculiar type of character. That type of character, together with an imperfect notion of his doctrines, is all that we can make out. Though Aristippus did not follow the recommendation of Sokrates, to labour and qualify himself for a ruler, yet both the advice of Sokrates, to reflect and prepare himself for the anxieties and perils of the future—and the spectacle of self-sufficing independence which the character of Sokrates afforded—were probably highly useful to him. Such advice being adverse to the natural tendencies of his mind, impressed upon him forcibly those points of the case which he was most likely to forget: and contributed to form in him that habit of self-command which is a marked feature in his character. He wished (such are the words ascribed to him by Xenophon) to pass through life as easily and agreeably as possible. Ease comes before pleasure: but his plan of life was to obtain as much pleasure as he could, consistent with ease, or without difficulty and danger. He actually realised, as far as our means of knowledge extend, that middle path of life which Sokrates declared to be impracticable.

Much of the advice given by Sokrates, Aristippus appears to have followed, though not from the reasons which Sokrates puts forward for giving it. When Sokrates reminds him that men liable to be tempted and ensnared by the love of good eating, were unfit to command—when he animadverts on the insanity of the passionate lover, who exposed himself to the extremity of danger for the purpose of possessing a married woman, while there were such abundant means of gratifying the sexual appetite without any difficulty or danger whatever[1]—to all this Aristippus assents: and what we read about his life is in perfect conformity therewith. Reason and prudence supply ample motives for following such advice, whether a man be animated with the love of command or not. So again, when Sokrates impresses upon Aristippus that

Aristippus acted conformably to the advice of Sokrates.

[1] Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 5. καὶ τηλικούτων μὲν ἐπικειμένων τῷ μοιχεύοντι κακῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, ὄντων δὲ πολλῶν τῶν ἀπολυσόντων τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισιῶν ἐπιθυμίας ἐν ἀδείᾳ, ὅμως εἰς τὰ ἐπικίνδυνα φέρεσθαι, ἆρ' οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο παντάπασι κακοδαιμονῶντός ἐστιν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη (Ἀρίστιππος).

the Good and the Beautiful were the same, being relative only to human wants or satisfaction—and that nothing was either good or beautiful, except in so far as it tended to confer relief, security, or enjoyment—this lesson too Aristippus laid to heart, and applied in a way suitable to his own peculiar dispositions and capacities.

Self-mastery and independence—the great aspiration of Aristippus.

The type of character represented by Aristippus is the man who enjoys what the present affords, so far as can be done without incurring future mischief, or provoking the enmity of others—but who will on no account enslave himself to any enjoyment; who always maintains his own self-mastery and independence—and who has prudence and intelligence enabling him to regulate each separate enjoyment so as not to incur preponderant evil in future.[1] This self-mastery and independence is in point of fact the capital aspiration of Aristippus, hardly less than of Antisthenes and Diogenes. He is competent to deal suitably with all varieties of persons, places, and situations, and to make the best of each—*Οὗ γὰρ τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτος εἶμ' ἐγώ*:[2] but he accepts what the situation presents, without yearning or struggling for that which it cannot present.[3] He enjoys the society both of the Syracusan despot Dionysius, and of the Hetæra Lais; but he will not make himself subservient either to one or to the other: he conceives himself able to afford, to both, as much satisfaction as he receives.[4] His enjoyments are not enhanced by the idea that others are excluded from the like enjoyment, and that he is a superior, privileged man: he has no jealousy or antipathy, no passion for triumphing over rivals, no demand for envy or admiration from spectators. Among the Hetæræ in Greece were included all the most engaging and accomplished women—for in

[1] Diog. L. ii. 67. *οὕτως ἦν καὶ ἐλέσθαι καὶ καταφρονῆσαι πολύς.*

[2] Diog. L. ii. 66. *ἦν δὲ ἱκανὸς ἁρμόσασθαι καὶ τόπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ προσώπῳ, καὶ πᾶσαν περίστασιν ἁρμονίως ὑποκρίνασθαι· διὸ καὶ παρὰ Διονυσίῳ τῶν ἄλλων ηὐδοκίμει μᾶλλον, ἀεὶ τὸ προσπεσὸν εὖ διατιθέμενος· ἀπέλαυε μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς τῶν παρόντων, οὐκ ἐθήρα δὲ πόνῳ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τῶν οὐ παρόντων.*

Horat. Epistol. i. 17, 23-24:—

"Omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res,
Tentantem majora, ferè præsentibus æquum."

[3] Sophokles, Philoktêtes, 1049 (the words of Odysseus).

[4] Diog. L. ii. 75. *ἔχρητο καὶ Λαΐδι τῇ ἑταίρᾳ· πρὸς οὖν τοὺς μεμφομένους ἔφη, Ἔχω Λαΐδα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχομαι· ἐπεὶ τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι ἡδονῶν, ἄριστον—οὐ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι.* ii. 77, *Διονυσίου ποτὲ ἐρομένου, ἐπὶ τί ἥκοι, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τῷ μεταδώσειν ὧν ἔχοι, καὶ μεταλήψεσθαι ὧν μὴ ἔχοι.*

Lucian introduces Ἀρετὴ and Τρυφὴ as litigating before Δίκη for the possession of Aristippus: the litigation is left undecided (Bis Accusatus, c. 13-23).

Grecian matrimony, it was considered becoming and advantageous that the bride should be young and ignorant, and that as a wife she should neither see nor know any thing beyond the administration of her own feminine apartments and household.[1] Aristippus attached himself to those Hetæræ who pleased him; declaring that the charm of their society was in no way lessened by the knowledge that others enjoyed it also, and that he could claim no exclusive privilege.[2] His patience and mildness in argument is much commended. The main lesson which he had learnt from philosophy (he said), was self-appreciation—to behave himself with confidence in every man's society: even if all laws were abrogated, the philosopher would still, without any law, live in the same way as he now did.[3] His confidence remained unshaken, when seized as a captive in Asia by order of the Persian satrap Artaphernes: all that he desired was, to be taken before the satrap himself.[4] Not to renounce pleasure, but to enjoy pleasure moderately and to keep desires under controul,—was in his judgment the true policy of life. But he was not solicitous to grasp enjoyment beyond what was easily attainable, nor to accumulate wealth or power which did not yield positive result.[5] While Sokrates recommended, and Antisthenes practised, the precaution of deadening the sexual appetite by approaching no women except such as were ugly and repulsive,[6] —while Xenophon in the Cyropædia,[7] working out the Sokratic idea of the dangerous fascination of beauty, represents Cyrus as refusing to see the captive Pantheia, and depicts the too con-

[1] Xenophon, Œconomic. iii. 13, vii. 5, Ischomachus says to Sokrates about his wife, Καὶ τί ἂν ἐπισταμένην αὐτὴν παρέλαβον, ἢ ἔτη μὲν οὔπω πεντεκαίδεκα γεγονυῖα ἦλθε πρὸς ἐμέ, τὸν δ' ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον ἔζη ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας, ὅπως ὡς ἔλαχιστα μὲν ὄψοιτο, ἐλάχιστα δ' ἀκούσοιτο, ἐλάχιστα δὲ ἔροιτο;

[2] Dion. L. ii. 74. On this point his opinion coincided with that of Diogenes, and of the Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus (D. L. vii. 131), who maintained, that among the wise wives ought to be in common, and that all marital jealousy ought to be discarded. Ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν παρὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς ὥστε τὸν ἐντυχόντα τῇ ἐντυχούσῃ χρῆσθαι, καθά φησι Ζήνων ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ Πολιτείας, ἀλλά τε Διογένης ὁ Κυνικὸς καὶ Πλάτων· πάντας τε παῖδας ἐπίσης στέρξομεν πατέρων τρόπον, καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ μοιχείᾳ ζηλοτυπία περιαιρεθήσεται. Compare Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. H. iii. 205.

[3] Diog. L. ii. 68. The like reply is ascribed to Aristotle. Diog. L. v. 20; Plutarch, De Profect. in Virtut. p. 80 D.

[4] Diog. L. ii. 79.

[5] Diog. L. ii. 72-74.

[6] Xenoph. Memor. i. 3, 11-14; Symposion, iv. 38; Diog. L. vi. 3. (Ἀντισθένης) ἔλεγε συνεχὲς—Μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην—καὶ—χρὴ τοιαύταις πλησιάζειν γυναιξίν, αἳ χάριν εἴσονται.

[7] Xenoph. Cyropæd. v. 1, 2-18.

fident Araspes (who treats such precaution as exaggerated timidity, and fully trusts his own self-possession), when appointed to the duty of guarding her, as absorbed against his will in a passion which makes him forget all reason and duty—Aristippus has sufficient self-mastery to visit the most seductive Hetæræ without being drawn into ruinous extravagance or humiliating subjugation. We may doubt whether he ever felt, even for Lais, a more passionate sentiment than Plato in his Epigram expresses towards the Kolophonian Hetæra Archeanassa.

Aristippus compared with Antisthenes and Diogenes—Points of agreement and disagreement between them.

Aristippus is thus remarkable, like the Cynics Antisthenes and Diogenes, not merely for certain theoretical doctrines, but also for acting out a certain plan of life.[1] We know little or nothing of the real life of Aristippus, except what appears in Xenophon. The biography of him (as of the Cynic Diogenes) given by Diogenes Laertius, consists of little more than a string of anecdotes, mostly sayings, calculated to illustrate a certain type of character.[2] Some of these are set down by those who approved the type, and who therefore place it in a favourable point of view—others by those who disapprove it and give the opposite colour.

We can understand and compare the different types of character represented by Antisthenes or Diogenes, and by Aristippus: but we have little knowledge of the real facts of their lives. The two types, each manifesting that marked individuality which belongs to the Sokratic band, though in many respects strongly contrasted, have also some points of agreement. Both Aristippus and Diogenes are bent on individual freedom and independence of character: both of them stand upon their own appreciation of life and its phenomena: both of them are impatient of that servitude to the opinions and antipathies of

[1] Sextus Empiricus and others describe this by the Greek word ἀγωγή (Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 150). Plato's beautiful epigram upon Archeanassa is given by Diogenes L. iii. 31. Compare this with the remark of Aristippus—Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 750 E.

That the society of these fascinating Hetæræ was dangerous, and exhaustive to the purses of those who sought it, may be seen from the expensive manner of life of Theodotê, described in Xenophon, Mem. iii. 11, 4.

The amorous impulses or fancies of Plato were censured by Dikæarchus. See Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 34, 71, with Davies's note.

[2] This is justly remarked by Wendt in his instructive Dissertation, De Philosophiâ Cyrenaicâ, p. 8 (Göttingen, 1841).

others, which induces a man to struggle for objects, not because they afford him satisfaction, but because others envy him for possessing them—and to keep off evils, not because he himself feels them as such, but because others pity or despise him for being subject to them: both of them are exempt from the competitive and ambitious feelings, from the thirst after privilege and power, from the sense of superiority arising out of monopolised possession and exclusion of others from partnership. Diogenes kept aloof from political life and civil obligations as much as Aristippus; and would have pronounced (as Aristippus replies to Sokrates in the Xenophontic dialogue) that the task of ruling others, instead of being a prize to be coveted, was nothing better than an onerous and mortifying servitude,[1] not at all less onerous because a man took up the burthen of his own accord. These points of agreement are real: but the points of disagreement are not less real. Diogenes maintains his free individuality, and puts himself out of the reach of human enmity, by clothing himself in impenetrable armour: by attaining positive insensibility, as near as human life permits. This is with him not merely the acting out of a scheme of life, but also a matter of pride. He is proud of his ragged garment and coarse[2] fare, as exalting him above others, and as constituting him a pattern of endurance: and he indulges this sentiment by stinging and contemptuous censure of every one. Aristippus has no similar vanity: he achieves his independence without so heavy a renunciation: he follows out his own plan of life, without setting himself up as a pattern for others. But his plan is at the same time more delicate; requiring greater skill and intelligence, more of

[1] It is this servitude of political life, making the politician the slave of persons and circumstances around him, which Horace contrasts with the philosophical independence of Aristippus:—

Ac ne forté roges, quo me duce, quo lare tuter;
Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri
Quo me cunque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes.
Nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis,
Virtutis veræ custos rigidusque satelles:
Nunc in Aristippi furtim præcepta relabor,
Et mihi res, non me rebus, subjungere conor.

(Epist. i. 1, 15.)

So also the Platonic Sokrates (Theætêt. pp. 172-175) depicts forcibly the cramped and fettered lives of rhetors and politicians; contrasting them with the self-judgment and independence of speculative and philosophical enquirers—*ὡς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι—ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένος, ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς.*

[2] Diog. L. ii. 36. *στρέψαντος Ἀντισθένους τὸ διερρωγὸς τοῦ τρίβωνος εἰς τοὐμφανές, Ὁρῶ σοῦ, ἔφη (Σωκράτης), διὰ τοῦ τρίβωνος τὴν κενοδοξίαν.*

manifold sagacity, in the performer. Horace, who compares the two and gives the preference to Aristippus, remarks that Diogenes, though professing to want nothing, was nevertheless as much dependent upon the bounty of those who supplied his wallet with provisions, as Aristippus upon the favour of princes: and that Diogenes had only one fixed mode of proceeding, while Aristippus could master and turn to account a great diversity of persons and situations—could endure hardship with patience and dignity, when it was inevitable, and enjoy the opportunities of pleasure when they occurred. "To Aristippus alone it is given to wear both fine garments and rags"—is a remark ascribed to Plato.[1] In truth, Aristippus possesses in eminent measure that accomplishment, the want of which Plato proclaims to be so misleading and mischievous—artistic skill in handling human affairs, throughout his dealings with mankind.[2]

Attachment of Aristippus to ethics and philosophy—contempt for other studies.

That the scheme of life projected by Aristippus was very difficult, requiring great dexterity, prudence, and resolution, to execute it—we may see plainly by the Xenophontic dialogue; wherein Sokrates pronounces it to be all but impracticable. As far as we can judge, he surmounted the difficulties of it: yet we do not know enough of his real life to determine with accuracy what varieties of difficulties he experienced. He

[1] Horat. Epistol. i. 17, 13-24; Diog. L. vi. 46-56-66.

"Si pranderet olus patienter, regibus uti
Nollet Aristippus." "Si sciret regibus uti,
Fastidiret olus, qui me notat." Utrius horum
Verba probes et facta, doce: vel junior audi
Cur sit Aristippi potior sententia. Namque
Mordacem Cynicum sic eludebat, ut aiunt:
"Scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu: rectius hoc et
Splendidius multò est. Equus ut me portet, alat rex,
Officium facio: tu poscis vilia rerum,
Dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem."
Omnis Aristippum decuit color, et status, et res,
Tentantem majora, ferè præsentibus æquum.

(Compare Diog. L. ii. 102, vi. 58, where this anecdote is reported as of Plato instead of Aristippus.)

Horace's view and scheme of life are exceedingly analogous to those of Aristippus. Plutarch, Fragm. De Homero, p. 1190; De Fortunâ Alex. p. 330 D. Diog. Laert. ii. 67. διό ποτε Στράτωνα, οἱ δὲ Πλάτωνα, πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, Σοὶ μόνῳ δέδοται καὶ χλανίδα φορεῖν καὶ ῥάκος. The remark cannot have been made by Straton, who was not contemporary with Aristippus. Even Sokrates lived by the bounty of his rich friends, and indeed could have had no other means of supporting his wife and children; though he accepted only a small portion of what they tendered to him, declining the remainder. See the remark of Aristippus, Diog. L. ii. 74.

[2] Plato, Phædon, p. 89 E. ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

followed the profession of a Sophist, receiving fees for his teaching: and his attachment to philosophy (both as contrasted with ignorance and as contrasted with other studies not philosophy) was proclaimed in the most emphatic language. It was better (he said) to be a beggar, than an uneducated man:[1] the former was destitute of money, but the latter was destitute of humanity. He disapproved varied and indiscriminate instruction, maintaining that persons ought to learn in youth what they were to practise in manhood: and he compared those who, neglecting philosophy, employed themselves in literature or physical science, to the suitors in the Odyssey who obtained the favours of Melantho and the other female servants, but were rejected by the Queen Penelopê herself.[2] He treated with contempt the study of geometry, because it took no account, and made no mention, of what was good and evil, beautiful and ugly. In other arts (he said), even in the vulgar proceeding of the carpenter and the currier, perpetual reference was made to good, as the purpose intended to be served—and to evil as that which was to be avoided: but in geometry no such purpose was ever noticed.[3]

This last opinion of Aristippus deserves particular attention, because it is attested by Aristotle. And it confirms what we hear upon less certain testimony, that Aristippus discountenanced the department of physical study generally (astronomy and physics) as well as geometry; confining his attention to facts and reasonings which bore upon the regulation of life.[4] In this restrictive view he followed the example and precepts of Sokrates—of Isokrates—seemingly also of Protagoras and Prodikus—though not of the Eleian Hippias, whose course of study was larger and more varied.[5] Aristippus taught as a Sophist, and appears to have acquired great reputa-

Aristippus taught as a Sophist. His reputation thus acquired procured for him the attentions of Dionysius and others.

[1] Diog. L. ii. 70; Plutarch, Fragm. Ὑπομνήματ· εἰς Ἡσίοδον, s. 9. Ἀριστιππος δὲ ἀπ' ἐναντίας ὁ Σωκρατικὸς ἔλεγε, συμβούλου δεῖσθαι χείρον εἶναι ἢ προσαιτεῖν.

[2] Diog. L. ii. 79-80. τοὺς τῶν ἐγκυκλίων παιδευμάτων μετασχόντας, φιλοσοφίας δὲ ἀπολειφθέντας, &c. Plutarch. Fragm. Στρωματέων, sect. 9.

[3] Aristot. Metaph. B. 996, a 32, M. 1078, a. 35. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν τινὲς οἷον Ἀρίστιππος προεπηλάκιζον αὐτὰς, &c.

[4] Diog. L. ii. 92. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 11. Plutarch, apud Eusebium Præp. Ev. i. 8, 9.

[5] Plato, Protagor. p. 318 E, where the different methods followed by Protagoras and Hippias are indicated.

tion in that capacity both at Athens and elsewhere.[1] Indeed, if he had not acquired such intellectual and literary reputation at Athens, he would have had little chance of being invited elsewhere, and still less chance of receiving favours and presents from Dionysius and other princes:[2] whose attentions did not confer celebrity, but waited upon it when obtained, and doubtless augmented it. If Aristippus lived a life of indulgence at Athens, we may fairly presume that his main resources for sustaining it, like those of Isokrates, were derived from his own teaching: and that the presents which he received from Dionysius of Syracuse, like those which Isokrates received from Nikokles of Cyprus, were welcome additions, but not his main income. Those who (like most of the historians of philosophy) adopt the opinion of Sokrates and Plato, that it is disgraceful for an instructor to receive payment from the persons taught—will doubtless despise Aristippus for such a proceeding: for my part I dissent from this opinion, and I therefore do not concur in the disparaging epithets bestowed upon him. And as for the costly indulgences, and subservience to foreign princes, of which Aristippus stands accused, we must recollect that the very same

[1] Diog. Laert. ii. 62. Alexis Comicus ap. Athenæ. xii. 544.

Aristokles (ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xiv. 18) treats the first Aristippus as a mere voluptuary, who said nothing generally *περὶ τοῦ τέλους*. All the doctrine (he says) came from the younger Aristippus. I think this very improbable. To what did the dialogues composed by the first Aristippus refer? How did he get his reputation?

[2] Several anecdotes are recounted about sayings and doings of Aristippus in his intercourse with *Dionysius*. *Which* Dionysius is meant?—the elder or the younger? Probably the elder.

It is to be remembered that Dionysius the Elder lived and reigned until the year 367 B.C., in which year his son Dionysius the Younger succeeded him. The death of Sokrates took place in 399 B.C.: between which, and the accession of Dionysius the Younger, an interval of 32 years occurred. Plato was old, being sixty years of age, when he first visited the younger Dionysius, shortly after the accession of the latter. Aristippus cannot well have been younger than Plato, and he is said to have been older than Æschines Sokraticus (D. L. ii. 83). Compare D. L. ii. 41.

When, with these dates present to our minds, we read the anecdotes recounted by Diogenes L. respecting the sayings and doings of Aristippus with *Dionysius*, we find that several of them relate to the contrast between the behaviour of Aristippus and that of Plato at Syracuse. Now it is certain that Plato went *once* to Syracuse when he was forty years of age (Epist. vii. init.), in 387 B.C.—and according to one report (Lucian, De Parasito, 34), he went there *twice*—while the elder Dionysius was in the plenitude of power: but he made an unfavourable impression, and was speedily sent away in displeasure. I think it very probable that Aristippus may have visited the elder Dionysius, and may have found greater favour with him than Plato found (see Lucian, l. c.), since Dionysius was an accomplished man and a composer of tragedies. Moreover Aristippus was a Kyrenæan, and wrote about Libya (D. L. ii. 83).

reproaches were advanced against Plato and Aristotle by their contemporaries: and as far as we know, with quite as much foundation.[1]

Aristippus composed several dialogues, of which the titles alone are preserved.[2] They must however have been compositions of considerable merit, since Theopompus accused Plato of borrowing largely from them.

Ethical theory of Aristippus and the Kyrenaic philosophers.

As all the works of Aristippus are lost, we cannot pretend to understand fully his theory from the meagre abstract given in Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes. Yet the theory is of importance in the history of ancient speculation, since it passed with some modifications to Epikurus, and was adopted by a large proportion of instructed men. The Kyrenaic doctrine was transmitted by Aristippus to his disciples Æthiops and Antipater: but his chief disciple appears to have been his daughter Arêtê: whom he instructed so well, that she was able to instruct her own son, the second Aristippus, called for that reason Metrodidactus. The basis of his ethical theory was, pleasure and pain: pleasure being *smooth motion*, pain, *rough motion*:[3] pleasure being the object which all animals, by nature and without deliberation, loved, pursued, and felt satisfaction in obtaining—pain being the object which they all by nature hated and tried to avoid. Aristippus considered that no one pleasure was different from another, nor more pleasurable than another:[4] that the attainment of these special pleasurable moments, or as many of them as practicable, was The End to be pursued in life. By *Happiness*, they understood the sum total of these special pleasures, past, present, and future: yet Happiness was desirable

[1] See the epigram of the contemporary poet, Theokritus of Chios, in Diog. L. v. 11; compare Athenæus, viii. 354, xiii. 566. Aristokles, ap. Eusebium Præp. Ev. xv. 2.

[2] Diog. L. ii. 84-85.

[3] Diog. L. ii. 86-87. δύο πάθη ὑφίσταντο, πόνον καὶ ἡδονήν· τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν, τὴν ἡδονήν, τὸν δὲ πόνον, τραχεῖαν κίνησιν· μὴ διαφέρειν τε ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς, μηδὲ ἥδιόν τι εἶναι· καὶ τὴν μὲν, σκηπηνεὺδ πᾶσι ζώοις, τὸν δὲ ἀποκρουστικόν.

[4] Diog. L. ii. p. 87. μὴ διαφέρειν τε ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς, μηδὲ ἥδιόν τι εἶναι. They did not mean by these words to deny that one pleasure was more vehement and attractive than another pleasure, or that one pain is more vehement and deterrent than another pain: for it is expressly said afterwards (s. 90) that they admitted this. They meant to affirm that one pleasure did not differ from another *so far forth as pleasure:* that all pleasures must be ranked as a class, and compared with each other in respect of intensity, durability, and other properties possessed in greater or less degree.

not on its own account, but on account of its constituent items, especially such of those items as were present and certainly future.[1] Pleasures and pains of memory and expectation were considered to be of little importance. Absence of pain or relief from pain, on the one hand—they did not consider as equivalent to positive pleasure—nor absence of pleasure or withdrawal of pleasure, on the other hand—as equivalent to positive pain. Neither the one situation nor the other was a *motion* (κίνησις), *i.e.* a positive situation, appreciable by the consciousness: each was a middle state—a mere negation of consciousness, like the phenomena of sleep.[2] They recognised some mental pleasures and pains as derivative from bodily sensation and as exclusively individual—others as not so: for example, there were pleasures and pains of sympathy; and a man often felt joy at the prosperity of his friends and countrymen, quite as genuine as that which he felt for his own good fortune. But they maintained that the bodily pleasures and pains were much more vehement than the mental which were not bodily: for which reason, the pains employed by the laws in punishing offenders were chiefly bodily. The fear of pain was in their judgments more operative than the love of pleasure: and though pleasure was desirable for its own sake, yet the accompanying conditions of many pleasures were so painful as to deter the prudent man from aiming at them. These obstructions rendered it impossible for any one to realise the sum total of pleasures constituting Happiness. Even the wise man sometimes failed, and the foolish man sometimes did well, though in general the reverse was the truth: but under the difficult conditions of life, a man must be satisfied if he realised some particular pleasurable conjunctions, without aspiring to a continuance or totality of the like.[3]

[1] Diog. L. ii. pp. 88-89. Athenæus, xii. p. 544.

[2] Diog. L. ii. 89-90. μὴ οὔσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἡ τῆς ἀηδονίας κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἱονεὶ καθεύδοντός ἐστι κατάστασις — μέσας καταστάσεις ὠνόμαζον ἀηδονίαν καὶ ἀπονίαν.

A doctrine very different from this is ascribed to Aristippus in Galen—Placit. Philos. (xix. p. 230, Kühn). It is there affirmed that by *pleasure* Aristippus understood, not the pleasure of sense, but that disposition of mind whereby a person becomes insensible to pain, and hard to be imposed upon (ἀνάλγητος καὶ δυσγοήτευτος).

[3] Diog. L. ii. 91.

It does not appear that the Kyrenaic sect followed out into detail the derivative pleasures and pains; nor the way in which, by force of association, these come to take precedence of the primary, exercising influence on the mind both more forcible and more constant. We find this important fact remarkably stated in the doctrine of Kalliphon.

Aristippus regarded prudence or wisdom as good, yet not as good *per se*, but by reason of the pleasures which it enabled us to procure and the pains which it enabled us to avoid—and wealth as a good, for the same reason. A friend also was valuable, for the use and necessities of life: just as each part of one's own body was precious, so long as it was present and could serve a useful purpose.[1] Some branches of virtue might be possessed by persons who were not wise: and bodily training was a valuable auxiliary to virtue. Even the wise man could never escape pain and fear, for both of these were natural: but he would keep clear of envy, passionate love, and superstition, which were not natural, but consequences of vain opinion. A thorough acquaintance with the real nature of Good and Evil would relieve him from superstition as well as from the fear of death.[2]

Prudence—good, by reason of the pleasure which it ensured, and of the pains which it was necessary to avoid. Just and honourable, by law or custom—not by nature.

The Kyrenaics did not admit that there was anything just, or honourable, or base, by nature: but only by law and custom: nevertheless the wise man would be sufficiently restrained, by the fear of punishment and of discredit, from doing what was repugnant to the society in which he lived. They maintained that wisdom was attainable; that the senses did not at first judge truly, but might be improved by study; that progress was realised in philosophy as in other arts, and that there were different gradations of it, as well as different gradations of pain and suffering, discernible in different men. The wise man, as they conceived him, was a reality; not (like the wise man of the Stoics) a sublime but unattainable ideal.[3]

Such were (as far as our imperfect evidence goes) the ethical and emotional views of the Kyrenaic school: their theory and precepts respecting the plan and prospects of life. In regard to truth and knowledge, they

Their logical theory—nothing knowable except

Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. p. 415, ed. 1629. Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς περὶ Καλλιφῶντα, ἕνεκα μὲν τῆς ἡδονῆς παρεισῆλθεν ἡ ἀρετή· χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον, τὸ περὶ αὐτὴν κάλλος κατιδοῦσα, ἰσότιμον ἑαυτὴν τῇ ἀρχῇ, τοντέστι τῇ ἡδονῇ, παρέσχεν.

[1] Diog. L. ii. 91. τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐ δι' ἑαυτὴν δὲ αἱρετήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς περιγινόμενα· τὸν φίλον τῆς χρείας ἕνεκα· καὶ γὰρ μέρος σώματος, μέχρις ἂν παρῇ, ἀσπάζεσθαι.

The like comparison is employed by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia (i. 2, 52-55), that men cast away portions of their own body, so soon as these portions cease to be useful.

[2] Diog. L. ii. p. 92.

[3] Diog. L. ii. p. 93.

the phenomenal, our own sensations and feelings—no knowledge of the absolute.

maintained that we could have no knowledge of anything but human sensations, affections, feelings, &c. (*πάθη*): that respecting the extrinsic, extra-sensational, absolute, objects or causes from whence these feelings proceeded, we could know nothing at all. Partly for this reason, they abstained from all attention to the study of nature—to astronomy and physics: partly also because they did not see any bearing of these subjects upon good and evil, or upon the conduct of life. They turned their attention mainly to ethics, partly also to logic as subsidiary to ethical reasoning.[1]

Such low estimation of mathematics and physics—and attention given almost exclusively to the feelings and conduct of human life—is a point common to the opposite schools of Aristippus and Antisthenes, derived by both of them from Sokrates. Herein Plato stands apart from all the three.

The theory of Aristippus, as given above, is only derived from a meagre abstract and from a few detached hints. We do not know how he himself stated it: still less how he enforced and vindicated it.—He, as well as Antisthenes, composed dialogues: which naturally implies diversity of handling. Their main thesis, therefore—the text, as it were, upon which they debated or expatiated (which is all that the abstract gives)—affords very inadequate means, even if we could rely upon the accuracy of the statement, for appreciating their philosophical competence. We should form but a poor idea of the acute, abundant, elastic and diversified dialectic of Plato, if all his dialogues had been lost—and if we had nothing to rely upon except the summary of Platonism prepared by Diogenes Laertius: which summary, nevertheless, is more copious and elaborate than the same author has furnished either of Aristippus or Antisthenes.

In the history of the Greek mind these two last-mentioned philosophers (though included by Cicero among the *plebeii philosophi*) are not less important than Plato and Aristotle. The speculations and precepts of Antisthenes passed, with various enlargements and modifications, into the Stoic philosophy: those of

Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus passed to the Stoics and Epikureans.

[1] Diog. L. ii. p. 92. Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vi. 53.

Aristippus into the Epikurean: the two most widely extended ethical sects in the subsequent Pagan world.—The Cynic sect, as it stood before it embraced the enlarged physical, kosmical, and social theories of Zeno and his contemporaries, reducing to a minimum all the desires and appetites—cultivating insensibility to the pains of life, and even disdainful insensibility to its pleasures—required extraordinary force of will and obstinate resolution, but little beyond. Where there was no selection or discrimination, the most ordinary prudence sufficed. It was otherwise with the scheme of Aristippus and the Kyrenaics: which, if it tasked less severely the powers of endurance, demanded a far higher measure of intelligent prudence. Selection of that which might safely be enjoyed, and determination of the limit within which enjoyment must be confined, were constantly indispensable. Prudence, knowledge, the art of mensuration or calculation, were essential to Aristippus, and ought to be put in the foreground when his theory is stated.

That theory is, in point of fact, identical with the theory expounded by the Platonic Sokrates in Plato's Protagoras. The general features of both are the same. Sokrates there lays it down explicitly, that pleasure *per se* is always good, and pain *per se* always evil: that there is no other good (*per se*) except pleasure and diminution of pain—no other evil (*per se*) except pain and diminution of pleasure: that there is no other object in life except to live through it as much as possible with pleasures and without pains;[1] but that many pleasures become evil, because they cannot be had without depriving us of greater pleasures or imposing upon us greater pains—while many pains become good, because they prevent greater pains or ensure greater pleasures: that the safety of life thus lies in a correct comparison of the more or less in pleasures and pains, and in a selection founded thereupon. In other words, the safety of life

Ethical theory of Aristippus is identical with that of the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras.

[1] Plato, Protag. p. 355 A. ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ, καὶ μὴ ἔχετε μηδὲν ἄλλο φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ὃ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾷ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε.

The exposition of this theory, by the Platonic Sokrates, occupies the latter portion of the Protagoras, from p. 351 to near the conclusion. See below, ch. xxiii. of the present work.

The language held by Aristippus to Sokrates, in the Xenophontic dialogue (Memor. ii. i. 9), is exactly similar to that of the Platonic Sokrates, as above cited—ἐμαυτὸν τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν.

depends upon calculating knowledge or prudence, the art or science of measuring.

Difference in the manner of stating the theory by the two.

The theory here laid down by the Platonic Sokrates is the same as that of Aristippus. The purpose of life is stated almost in the same words by both: by the Platonic Sokrates, and by Aristippus in the Xenophontic dialogue—"to live through with enjoyment and without suffering". The Platonic Sokrates denies, quite as emphatically as Aristippus, any good or evil, honourable or base, except as representing the result of an intelligent comparison of pleasures and pains. Judicious calculation is postulated by both: pleasures and pains being assumed by both as the only ends of pursuit and avoidance, to which calculation is to be applied. The main difference is, that the prudence, art, or science, required for making this calculation rightly, are put forward by the Platonic Sokrates as the prominent item in his provision for passing through life: whereas, in the scheme of Aristippus, as far as we know it, such accomplished intelligence, though equally recognised and implied, is not equally thrust into the foreground. So it appears at least in the abstract which we possess of his theory; if we had his own exposition of it, perhaps we might find the case otherwise. In that abstract, indeed, we find the writer replying to those who affirmed prudence or knowledge to be good *per se*—and maintaining that it is only good by reason of its consequences:[1] that is, that it is not good as End, in the same sense in which pleasure or mitigation of pain are good. This point of the theory, however, coincides again with the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras: where the art of calculation is extolled simply as an indispensable condition to the most precious results of human happiness.

What I say here applies especially to the Protagoras: for I am well aware that in other dialogues the Platonic Sokrates is made to hold different language.[2] But in the Protagoras he

[1] Diog. L. ii. p. 91.

[2] See chapters xxiii., xxix., xxxii. of the present work, in which I enter more fully into the differences between the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Philêbus, in respect to this point.

Aristippus agrees with the Platonic Sokrates *in the Protagoras*, as to the general theory of life respecting pleasure and pain.

He agrees with the Platonic Sokrates *in the Gorgias* (see pp. 500-515), in keeping aloof from active political life. ἀ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμο-

defends a theory the same as that of Aristippus, and defends it by an elaborate argument which silences the objections of the Sophist Protagoras; who at first will not admit the unqualified identity of the pleasurable, judiciously estimated and selected, with the good. The general and comprehensive manner in which Plato conceives and expounds the theory, is probably one evidence of his superior philosophical aptitude as compared with Aristippus and his other contemporaries. He enunciates, side by side, and with equal distinctness, the two conditions requisite for his theory of life. 1. The calculating or measuring art. 2. A description of the items to which alone such measurement must be applied—pleasures and pains.—These two together make the full theory. In other dialogues Plato insists equally upon the necessity of knowledge or calculating prudence: but then he is not equally distinct in specifying the items to which such prudence or calculation is to be applied. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Aristippus, in laying out the same theory, may have dwelt with peculiar emphasis upon the other element in the theory: *i.e.* that while expressly insisting upon pleasures and pains, as the only data to be compared, he may have tacitly assumed the comparing or calculating intelligence, as if it were understood by itself, and did not require to be formally proclaimed.

Distinction to be made between a general theory—and the particular application of it made by the theorist to his own tastes and circumstances.

A distinction must here be made between the general theory of life laid down by Aristippus—and the particular application which he made of that theory to his own course of proceeding. What we may observe is, that the Platonic Sokrates (in the Protagoras) agrees in the first, or general theory: whether he would have agreed in the second (or application to the particular case) we are not informed, but we may probably assume the negative. And we find Sokrates (in the Xenophontic dialogue) taking the same negative ground against Aristippus — upon the second point, not upon the first. He seeks to prove that the course of conduct adopted by Aristippus, instead of carrying with it a pre-

νεῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ—which Sokrates, in the Gorgias (p. 526 C), proclaims as the conduct of the true philosopher, is proclaimed with equal emphasis by Aristippus. Compare the Platonic Apology, p. 31 D-E.

ponderance of pleasure, will entail a preponderance of pain. He does not dispute the general theory.

Kyrenaic theorists after Aristippus.

Though Aristippus and the Kyrenaic sect are recognised as the first persons who laid down this general theory, yet various others apart from them adopted it likewise. We may see this not merely from the Protagoras of Plato, but also from the fact that Aristotle, when commenting upon the theory in his Ethics,[1] cites Eudoxus (eminent both as mathematician and astronomer, besides being among the hearers of Plato) as its principal champion. Still the school of Kyrênê are recorded as a continuous body, partly defending, partly modifying the theory of Aristippus.[2] Hegesias, Annikeris, and Theodôrus are the principal Kyrenaics named: the last of them contemporary with Ptolemy Soter, Lysimachus, Epikurus, Theophrastus, and Stilpon.

Theodôrus —Annikeris —Hegesias.

Diogenes Laertius had read a powerfully written book of Theodôrus, controverting openly the received opinions respecting the Gods:—which few of the philosophers ventured to do. Cicero also mentions a composition of Hegesias.[3] Of Annikeris we know none; but he, too, probably, must have been an author. The doctrines which we find ascribed to these Kyrenaics evince how much affinity there was, at bottom, between them and the Cynics, in spite of the great apparent opposition. Hegesias received the surname of the Death-Persuader: he considered happiness to be quite unattainable, and death to be an object not of fear, but of welcome acceptance, in the eyes of a wise man. He started from the same basis as Aristippus: pleasure as the *expetendum*, pain as the *fugiendum*, to which all our personal friendships and aversions were ultimately referable. But he considered that the pains of life preponderated over the pleasures, even under the

[1] Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. x. 2.

[2] Sydenham, in his notes on Philêbus (note 39, p. 76), accuses Aristippus and the Kyrenaics of prevarication and sophistry in the statement of their doctrine respecting Pleasure. He says that they called it indiscriminately ἀγαθὸν and τἀγαθόν—(a good—The Good)—"they used the fallacy of changing a particular term for a term which is universal, or vice versâ, by the sly omission or insertion of the definite article *The* before the word Good" (p. 73). He contrasts with this prevarication the ingenuousness of Eudoxus, as the advocate of Pleasure (Aristot. Eth. N. x. 2). I know no evidence for either of these allegations: either for the prevarication of Aristippus or the ingenuousness of Eudoxus.

[3] Diog. L. ii. 97. Θεόδωρος—παντάπασιν ἀναιρῶν τὰς περὶ θεῶν δόξας. Diog. L. ii. 86, 97. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 34, 83-84. Ἡγησίας ὁ πεισιθάνατος.

most favourable circumstances. For conferring pleasure, or for securing continuance of pleasure—wealth, high birth, freedom, glory, were of no greater avail than their contraries poverty, low birth, slavery, ignominy. There was nothing which was, by nature or universally, either pleasurable or painful. Novelty, rarity, satiety, rendered one thing pleasurable, another painful, to different persons and at different times. The wise man would show his wisdom, not in the fruitless struggle for pleasures, but in the avoidance or mitigation of pains: which he would accomplish more successfully by rendering himself indifferent to the causes of pleasure. He would act always for his own account, and would value himself higher than other persons: but he would at the same time reflect that the mistakes of these others were involuntary, and he would give them indulgent counsel, instead of hating them. He would not trust his senses as affording any real knowledge: but he would be satisfied to act upon the probable appearances of sense, or upon phenomenal knowledge.[1]

Hegesias—Low estimation of life—renunciation of pleasure—coincidence with the Cynics.

Such is the summary which we read of the doctrines of Hegesias: who is said to have enforced his views,[2]—of the real character of life, as containing a great preponderance of misfortune and suffering—in a manner so persuasive, that several persons were induced to commit suicide. Hence he was prohibited by the first Ptolemy from lecturing in such a strain. His opinions respecting life coincide in the main with those set forth by Sokrates in the Phædon of Plato: which dialogue also is alleged to have operated so powerfully on the Platonic disciple Kleombrotus, that he was induced to terminate his own existence. Hegesias, agreeing with Aristippus that pleasure would be the Good, if you could get it—maintains that the circumstances of life are such as to render pleasure unattainable: and therefore advises to renounce pleasure at once and systematically, in order that we may turn our attention to the only practicable end—that of lessening pain. Such deliberate renunciation of pleasure brings him into harmony with the doctrine of the Cynics.

1 Diog. L. ii. 93, 94.

2 Compare the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue entitled Axiochus, pp. 366, 367, and the doctrine of Kleanthes in Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathemat. ix. 88-92. Lucretius, v. 196-234.

Doctrine of Relativity affirmed by the Kyrenaics, as well as by Protagoras.

On another point, however, Hegesias repeats just the same doctrine as Aristippus. Both deny any thing like absolute knowledge: they maintain that all our knowledge is phenomenal, or relative to our own impressions or affections: that we neither do know, nor can know, anything about any real or supposed ultra-phenomenal object, *i.e.*, things in themselves, as distinguished from our own impressions and apart from our senses and other capacities. Having no writings of Aristippus left, we know this doctrine only as it is presented by others, and those too opponents. We cannot tell whether Aristippus or his supporters stated their own doctrine in such a way as to be open to the objections which we read as urged by opponents. But the doctrine itself is not, in my judgment, refuted by any of those objections. "Our affections (*πάθη*) alone are known to us, but not the supposed objects or causes from which they proceed." The word rendered by *affections* must here be taken in its most general and comprehensive sense — as including not merely sensations, but also remembrances, emotions, judgments, beliefs, doubts, volitions, conscious energies, &c. Whatever we know, we can know only as it appears to, or implicates itself somehow with, our own minds. All the knowledge which I possess, is an aggregate of propositions affirming facts, and the order or conjunction of facts, as they are, or have been, or may be, relative to myself. This doctrine of Aristippus is in substance the same as that which Protagoras announced in other words as—"Man is the measure of all things". I have already explained and illustrated it, at considerable length, in my chapter on the Platonic Theætêtus, where it is announced by Theætetus and controverted by Sokrates.[1]

[1] See below, vol. iii. ch. xxviii. Compare Aristokles ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. xiv. 18, 19, and Sextus Emp. adv. Mathemat. vii. 190-197, vi. 53.

Sextus gives a summary of this doctrine of the Kyrenaics, more fair and complete than that given by Aristokles—at least so far as the extract from the latter in Eusebius enables us to judge. Aristokles impugns it vehemently, and tries to fasten upon it many absurd consequences—in my judgment without foundation. It is probable that by the term *πάθος* the Kyrenaics meant simply sensations internal and external: and that the question, as they handled it, was about the reality of the supposed Substratum or Object of sense, independent of any sentient Subject. It is also probable that, in explaining their views, they did not take account of the memory of past sensations—and the expectation of future sensations, in successions or conjunctions more or less similar—associating in the mind with the sensation present and actual, to

form what is called a permanent object of sense. I think it likely that they set forth their own doctrine in a narrow and inadequate manner.

But this defect is noway corrected by Aristokles their opponent. On the contrary, he attacks them on their strong side: he vindicates against them the hypothesis of the ultra phenomenal, absolute, transcendental Object, independent of and apart from any sensation, present, past, or future—and from any sentient Subject. Besides that, he assumes them to deny, or ignore, many points which their theory noway requires them to deny. He urges one argument which, when properly understood, goes not against them, but strongly in their favour. "If these philosophers," says Aristokles (Eus. xiv. 19, 1), "know that they experience sensation and perceive, they must know something beyond the sensation itself. If I say ἐγὼ καίομαι, 'I am being burned,' this is a proposition, not a sensation. These three things are of necessity co-essential—the sensation itself, the Object which causes it, the Subject which feels it (*ἀνάγκη γε τρία ταῦτα συννφίστασθαι—τό τε πάθος αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον*)." In trying to make good his conclusion—That you cannot know the sensation without the Object of sense—Aristokles at the same time asserts that the Object cannot be known apart from the sensation, nor apart from the knowing Subject. He asserts that the three are by necessity *co-essential—i.e.* implicated and indivisible in substance and existence: if distinguishable therefore, distinguishable only logically (λόγῳ χωριστὰ), admitting of being looked at in different points of view. But this is exactly the case of his opponents, when properly stated. They do not deny Object: they do not deny Subject: but they deny the independent and separate existence of the one as well as of the other: they admit the two only as relative to each other, or as reciprocally implicated in the indivisible fact of cognition. The reasoning of Aristokles thus goes to prove the opinion which he is trying to refute. Most of the arguments, which Sextus adduces in favour of the Kyrenaic doctrine, show forcibly that the Objective Something, apart from its Subjective correlate, is unknowable and a non-entity; but he does not include in the Subjective as much as ought to be included; he takes note only of the present sensation, and does not include sensations remembered or anticipated. Another very forcible part of Sextus's reasoning may be found, vii. sect. 269-272, where he shows that a logical Subject *per se* is undefinable and inconceivable—that those who attempt to define Man (*e.g.*) do so by specifying more or fewer of the predicates of Man—and that if you suppose all the predicates to vanish, the Subject vanishes along with them.

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CHAPTER IV.

XENOPHON.

THERE remains one other companion of Sokrates, for whom a dignified place must be reserved in this volume—Xenophon the son of Gryllus. It is to him that we owe, in great part, such knowledge as we possess of the real Sokrates. For the Sokratic conversations related by Xenophon, though doubtless dressed up and expanded by him, appear to me reports in the main of what Sokrates actually said. Xenophon was sparing in the introduction of his master as titular spokesman for opinions, theories, or controversial difficulties, generated in his own mind: a practice in which Plato indulged without any reserve, as we have seen by the numerous dialogues already passed in review.

Xenophon—his character—essentially a man of action and not a theorist—the Sokratic element is in him an accessory.

I shall not however give any complete analysis of Xenophon's works: because both the greater part of them, and the leading features of his personal character, belong rather to active than to speculative Hellenic life. As such, I have dealt with them largely in my History of Greece. What I have here to illustrate is the Sokratic element in his character, which is important indeed as accessory and modifying—yet not fundamental. Though he exemplifies and attests, as a witness, the theorising negative vein, the cross-examining Elenchus of Sokrates—it is the preceptorial vein which he appropriates to himself and expands in its bearing on practical conduct. He is the semi-philosophising general; undervalued indeed as a hybrid by Plato—but by high-minded Romans like Cato, Agricola, Helvidius Priscus, &c.

likely to be esteemed higher than Plato himself.[1] He is the military brother of the Sokratic family, distinguished for ability and energy in the responsible functions of command: a man of robust frame, courage, and presence of mind, who affronts cheerfully the danger and fatigues of soldiership, and who extracts philosophy from experience of the variable temper of armies, together with the multiplied difficulties and precarious authority of a Grecian general.[2] For our knowledge, imperfect as it is, of real Grecian life, we are greatly indebted to his works. All historians of Greece must draw largely from his Hellenica and Anabasis: and we learn much even from his other productions, not properly historical; for he never soars high in the region of ideality, nor grasps at etherial visions—"nubes et inania"—like Plato.

Date of Xenophon—probable year of his birth.

Respecting the personal history of Xenophon himself, we possess but little information: nor do we know the year either of his birth or death. His Hellenica concludes with the battle of Mantineia in 362 B.C. But he makes incidental mention in that work of an event five years later—the assassination of Alexander, despot of Pheræ, which took place in 357 B.C.[3]—and his language seems to imply that the event was described shortly after it took place. His pamphlet De Vectigalibus appears to have been composed still later—not before 355 B.C. In the year 400 B.C., when Xenophon joined the Grecian military force assembled at Sardis to accompany Cyrus the younger in his march to Babylon, he must have been still a young man: yet he had even then established an intimacy with Sokrates at Athens: and he was old enough to call himself the "ancient guest" of the Bœotian Proxenus, who engaged him to come and take service with Cyrus.[4]

[1] See below, my remarks on the Platonic Euthydêmus, vol. ii. chap. xxii.

[2] We may apply to Plato and Xenophon the following comparison by Euripides, Supplices, 905. (Tydeus and Meleager.)

γνώμῃ δ' ἀδελφοῦ Μελεάγρου λελειμμένος,
ἴσον παρέσχεν ὄνομα διὰ τέχνην δορός,
εὑρὼν ἀκριβῆ μουσικὴν ἐν ἀσπίδι·
φιλότιμον ἦθος, πλούσιον φρόνημα δὲ
ἐν τοῖσιν ἔργοις, οὐχὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἔχων.

[3] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 37. τῶν δὲ ταῦτα πραξάντων (*i.e.* of the brothers of Thêbê, which brothers had assassinated Alexander) ἄχρι οὗ ὧδε ὁ λόγος ἐγράφετο, Τισίφονος, πρεσβύτατος ὢν τῶν ἀδελφῶν, τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶχε.

[4] That he was still a young man appears from his language, Anabas. iii. 1, 25. His intimacy with Sokrates, whose advice he asked about the propriety of accepting the invitation of Proxenus to go to Asia, is shown iii. 1, 5. Proxenus was his ξένος ἀρχαῖος, iii. 1, 4.

We may suppose him to have been then about thirty years of age; and thus to have been born about 430 B.C.—two or three years earlier than Plato. Respecting his early life, we have no facts before us: but we may confidently affirm (as I have already observed about[1] Plato), that as he became liable to military service in 412 B.C., the severe pressure of the war upon Athens must have occasioned him to be largely employed, among other citizens, for the defence of his native city, until its capture in 405 B.C. He seems to have belonged to an equestrian family in the census, and therefore to have served on horseback. More than one of his compositions evinces both intelligent interest in horsemanship, and great familiarity with horses.

His personal history—He consults Sokrates—takes the opinion of the Delphian oracle.

Our knowledge of his personal history begins with what he himself recounts in the Anabasis. His friend Proxenus, then at Sardis commanding a regiment of Hellenic mercenaries under Cyrus the younger, wrote recommending him earnestly to come over and take service, in the army prepared ostensibly against the Pisidians. Upon this Xenophon asked the advice of Sokrates: who exhorted him to go and consult the Delphian oracle—being apprehensive that as Cyrus had proved himself the strenuous ally of Sparta, and had furnished to her the principal means for crushing Athens, an Athenian taking service under him would incur unpopularity at home. Xenophon accordingly went to Delphi: but instead of asking the question broadly—"Shall I go, or shall I decline to go?"—he put to Apollo the narrower question—"Having in contemplation a journey, to which of the Gods must I sacrifice and pray, in order to accomplish it best, and to come back with safety and success?" Apollo indicated to him the Gods to whom he ought to address himself: but Sokrates was displeased with him for not having first asked, whether he ought to go at all. Nevertheless (continued Sokrates), since you have chosen to put the question in your own way you must act as the God has prescribed.[2]

The story mentioned by Strabo (ix. 403) that Xenophon served in the Athenian cavalry at the battle of Delium (424 B.C.), and that his life was saved by Sokrates, I consider to be not less inconsistent with any reasonable chronology, than the analogous anecdote—that Plato distinguished himself at the battle of Delium. See below, ch. v.

[1] See ch. v.

[2] Xenoph. Anab. iii. 1, 4-6.

His service and command with the Ten Thousand Greeks; afterwards under Agesilaus and the Spartans.—He is banished from Athens.

The anecdote here recounted by Xenophon is interesting, as it illustrates his sincere faith, as well as that of Sokrates, in the Delphian oracle: though we might have expected that on this occasion, Sokrates would have been favoured with some manifestation of that divine sign, which he represents to have warned him so frequently and on such trifling matters. Apollo however was perhaps displeased (as Sokrates was) with Xenophon, for not having submitted the question to him with full frankness: since the answer given was proved by subsequent experience to be incomplete.[1] After fifteen months passed, first, in the hard upward march—next, in the still harder retreat—of the Ten Thousand, to the preservation of whom he largely contributed by his energy, presence of mind, resolute initiative, and ready Athenian eloquence, as one of their leaders—Xenophon returned to Athens. It appears that he must have come back not long after the death of Sokrates. But Athens was not at that time a pleasant residence for him. The Sokratic companions shared in the unpopularity of their deceased master, and many of them were absent: moreover Xenophon himself was unpopular as the active partisan of Cyrus. After a certain stay, we know not how long, at Athens, Xenophon appears to have gone back to Asia; and to have resumed his command of the remaining Cyreian soldiers, then serving under the Lacedæmonian generals against the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. He served first under Derkyllidas, next under Agesilaus. For the latter he conceived the warmest admiration, and contracted with him an intimate friendship. At the time when Xenophon rejoined the Cyreians in Asia, Athens was not at war with the Lacedæmonians: but after some time, the hostile confederacy of Athens, Thebes, and Corinth, against them was organised: and Agesilaus was summoned home by them from Asia, to fight their battles in

[1] Compare Anabas. vi. 1, 22, and vii. 8, 1-6.

See also Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 33 C, and Plato, Theagês, p. 129; also below, vol. ii. ch. xv.

Sokrates and Xenophon are among the most imposing witnesses cited by Quintus Cicero, in his long pleading to show the reality of divination (Cicero, De Divinatione, i. 25, 52, i. 54, 122). Antipater the Stoic collected a large number of examples, illustrating the miraculous divining power of Sokrates. Several of these examples appear much more trifling than this incident of Xenophon.

Greece. Xenophon and his Cyreians were still a portion of the army of Agesilaus, and accompanied him in his march into Bœotia; where they took part in his desperate battle and bloody victory at Koroneia.[1] But he was now lending active aid to the enemies of Athens, and holding conspicuous command in their armies. A sentence of banishment, on the ground of Laconism, was passed against him by the Athenians, on the proposition of Eubulus.[2]

His residence at Skillus near Olympia.

How long he served with Agesilaus, we are not told. At the end of his service, the Lacedæmonians provided him with a house and land at the Triphylian town of Skillûs near Olympia, which they had seemingly taken from the Eleians and re-colonised. Near this residence he also purchased, under the authority of the God (perhaps Olympian Zeus) a landed estate to be consecrated to the Goddess Artemis: employing therein a portion of the tithe of plunder devoted to Artemis by the Cyreian army, and deposited by him for the time in the care of Megabyzus, priest of Artemis at Ephesus. The estate of the Goddess contained some cultivated ground, but consisted chiefly of pasture; with wild ground, wood and mountain, abounding in game and favourable for hunting. Xenophon became Conservator of this property for Artemis: to whom he dedicated a shrine and a statue, in miniature copy of the great temple at Ephesus. Every year he held a formal hunting-match, to which he invited all the neighbours, with abundant hospitality, at the expense of the Goddess. The Conservator and his successors were bound by formal vow, on pain of her displeasure, to employ one tenth of the whole annual produce in sacrifices to her: and to keep the shrine and statue in good order, out of the remainder.[3]

Xenophon seems to have passed many years of his life either at Skillus or in other parts of Peloponnesus, and is said to have died very old at Corinth. The sentence of banishment passed

[1] Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 6; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 18.

[2] Diog. L. ii. 51-59. ἐπὶ Λακωνισμῷ φυγὴν ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων κατεγνώσθη.

[3] Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 8-12; Diog. L. ii. 52; Pausanias, v. 6, 3. φησὶ δ' ὁ Δείναρχος ὅτι καὶ οἰκίαν καὶ ἄγρον αὐτῷ ἔδοσαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι.

Deinarchus appears to have composed for a client at Athens a judicial speech against Xenophon, the grandson of Xenophon Sokraticus. He introduced into the speech some facts relating to the grandfather.

against him by the Athenians was revoked after the battle of Leuktra, when Athens came into alliance with the Lacedæmonians against Thebes. Some of Xenophon's later works indicate that he must have availed himself of this revocation to visit Athens: but whether he permanently resided there is uncertain. He had brought over with him from Asia a wife named Philesia, by whom he had two sons, Gryllus and Diodorus.[1] He sent these two youths to be trained at Sparta, under the countenance of Agesilaus:[2] afterwards the eldest of them, Gryllus, served with honour in the Athenian cavalry which assisted the Lacedæmonians and Mantineians against Epameinondas, B.C. 362. In the important combat[3] of the Athenian and Theban cavalry, close to the gates of Mantineia—shortly preceding the general battle of Mantineia, in which Epameinondas was slain—Gryllus fell, fighting with great bravery. The death of this gallant youth—himself seemingly of great promise, and the son of so eminent a father—was celebrated by Isokrates and several other rhetors, as well as by the painter Euphranor at Athens, and by sculptors at Mantineia itself.[4]

Family of Xenophon—his son Gryllus killed at Mantineia.

Skillus, the place in which the Lacedæmonians had established Xenophon, was retaken by the Eleians during the humiliation of Lacedæmonian power, not long before the battle of Mantineia. Xenophon himself was absent at the time; but his family were constrained to retire to Lepreum. It was after this, we are told, that he removed to Corinth, where he died in 355 B.C. or in some year later. The Eleian Exegetæ told the traveller Pausanias,

Death of Xenophon at Corinth—Story of the Eleian Exegetæ.

[1] Æschines Sokraticus, in one of his dialogues, introduced Aspasia conversing with Xenophon and his (Xenophon's) wife. Cicero, De Invent. i. 31, 51-54; Quintil. Inst. Orat. v. p. 312.

[2] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 20.

[3] Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 5, 15-16-17. This combat of cavalry near the gates of Mantineia was very close and sharply contested; but at the great battle fought a few days afterwards the Athenian cavalry were hardly at all engaged, vii. 5, 25.

[4] Pausanias, i. 3, 3, viii. 11, 4, ix. 15, 3; Diogenes L. ii. 54. Harpokration v. Κηφισόδωρος.

It appears that Euphranor, in his picture represented Gryllus as engaged in personal conflict with Epameinondas and wounding him—a compliment not justified by the facts. The Mantineians believed Antikrates, one of their own citizens, to have mortally wounded the great Theban general with his spear, and they awarded to him as recompense immunity from public burthens (ἀτέλειαν), both for himself and his descendants. One of his descendants, Kallikrates, continued even in Plutarch's time to enjoy this immunity. Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35

when he visited the spot five centuries afterwards, that Xenophon had been condemned in the judicial Council of Olympia as wrongful occupant of the property at Skillus, through Lacedæmonian violence; but that the Eleians had granted him indulgence, and had allowed him to remain.[1] As it seems clearly asserted that he died at Corinth, he can hardly have availed himself of the indulgence; and I incline to suspect that the statement is an invention of subsequent Eleian Exegetæ, after they had learnt to appreciate his literary eminence.

Xenophon different from Plato and the other Sokratic brethren.

From the brief outline thus presented of Xenophon's life, it will plainly appear that he was quite different in character and habits from Plato and the other Sokratic brethren. He was not only a man of the world (as indeed Aristippus was also), but he was actively engaged in the most responsible and difficult functions of military command: he was moreover a landed proprietor and cultivator, fond of strong exercise with dogs and horses, and an intelligent equestrian. His circumstances were sufficiently easy to dispense with the necessity of either composing discourses or taking pupils for money. Being thus enabled to prosecute letters and philosophy in an independent way, he did not, like Plato and Aristotle, open a school.[2] His relations, as active coadjutor and subordinate, with Agesilaus, form a striking contrast to those of Plato with Dionysius, as tutor and pedagogue. In his mind, the Sokratic conversations, suggestive and stimulating to every one, fell upon the dispositions and aptitudes of a citizen-soldier, and fructified in a peculiar manner. My present work deals with Xenophon, not as an historian of Grecian affairs or of the Cyreian expedition, but only on the intellectual and theorising side:—as author of the Memorabilia,

[1] Pausan. v. 6, 3; Diog. L. ii. 53-56.

[2] See, in the account of Theopompus by Photius (Cod. 176, p. 120; compare also Photius, Cod. 159, p. 102, a. 41), the distinction taken by Theopompus: who said that the four most celebrated literary persons of his day were, his master Isokrates, Theodektês of Phasêlis, Naukrates of Erythræ, and himself (Theopompus). He himself and Naukrates were in good circumstances, so that he passed his life in independent prosecution of philosophy and philomathy. But Isokrates and Theodektês were compelled δι' ἀπορίαν βίου, μισθοῦ λόγους γράφειν καὶ σοφιστεύειν, ἐκπαιδεύοντες τοὺς νέους, κἀκεῖθεν καρπουμένους τὰς ὑφελείας.

Theopompus does not here present the profession of a Sophist (as most Platonic commentators teach us to regard it) as a mean, unprincipled, and corrupting employment.

the Cycropædia, Œkonomikus, Symposion, Hieron, De Vectigalibus, &c.

His various works—Memorabilia, Œkonomikus, &c.

The Memorabilia were composed as records of the conversations of Sokrates, expressly intended to vindicate Sokrates against charges of impiety and of corrupting youthful minds, and to show that he inculcated, before every thing, self-denial, moderation of desires, reverence for parents, and worship of the Gods. The Œkonomikus and the Symposion are expansions of the Memorabilia: the first[1] exhibiting Sokrates not only as an attentive observer of the facts of active life (in which character the Memorabilia present him also), but even as a learner of husbandry[2] and family management from Ischomachus—the last describing Sokrates and his behaviour amidst the fun and joviality of a convivial company. Sokrates declares[3] that as to himself, though poor, he is quite as rich as he desires to be; that he desires no increase, and regards poverty as no disadvantage. Yet since Kritobulus, though rich, is beset with temptations to expense quite sufficient to embarrass him, good proprietary management is to him a necessity. Accordingly, Sokrates, announcing that he has always been careful to inform himself who were the best economists in the city,[4] now cites as authority Ischomachus, a citizen of wealth and high position, recognised by all as one of the "super-excellent".[5] Ischomachus loves wealth, and is anxious to maintain and even enlarge his property: desiring to spend magnificently for the honour of the Gods, the assistance of friends, and the support of the city.[6] His whole life is arranged, with intelligence and

[1] Galen calls the Œkonomicus the last book of the Memorabilia (ad Hippokrat. De Articulis, t. xviii. p. 301, Kühn). It professes to be repeated by Xenophon from what he himself *heard* Sokrates say—*ἤκουσα δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ οἰκονομίας τοιάδε διαλεγομένου*, &c. Sokrates first instructs Kritobulus that economy, or management of property, is an art, governed by rules, and dependent upon principles; next, he recounts to him the lessons which he professes to have himself received from Ischomachus.

I have already adverted to the Xenophontic Symposion as containing jocular remarks which some erroneously cite as serious.

[2] To *learn* in this way the actualities of life, and the way of extracting the greatest amount of wheat and barley from a given piece of land, is the sense which Xenophon puts on the word *φιλόσοφος* (Xen. Œk. xvi. 9; compare Cyropædia, vi. 1, 41).

[3] Xenoph. Œkonom. ii. 3; xi. 3, 4.

I have made some observations on the Xenophontic Symposion, comparing it with the Platonic Symposion, in a subsequent chapter of this work, ch. xxvi.

[4] Xen. Œkon. ii. 16.

[5] Xen. Œkon. vi. 17, xi. 3. *πρὸς πάντων καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ ξένων καὶ ἀστῶν, καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐπονομαζόμενον.*

[6] Xen. Œkon. xi. 9.

forethought, so as to attain this object, and at the same time to keep up the maximum of bodily health and vigour, especially among the horsemen of the city as an accomplished rider[1] and cavalry soldier. He speaks with respect, and almost with enthusiasm, of husbandry, as an occupation not merely profitable, but improving to the character: though he treats with disrespect other branches of industry and craft.[2] In regard to husbandry, too, as in regard to war or steersmanship, he affirms that the difference between one practitioner and another consists, not so much in unequal knowledge, as in unequal care to practise what both of them know.[3]

Ischomachus, hero of the Œkonomikus—ideal of an active citizen, cultivator, husband, house-master, &c.

Ischomachus describes to Sokrates, in reply to a string of successive questions, both his scheme of life and his scheme of husbandry. He had married his wife before she was fifteen years of age: having first ascertained that she had been brought up carefully, so as to have seen and heard as little as possible, and to know nothing but spinning and weaving.[4] He describes how he took this very young wife into training, so as to form her to the habits which he himself approved. He declares that the duties and functions of women are confined to in-door work and superintendence, while the out-door proceedings, acquisition as well as defence, belong to men:[5] he insists upon such separation of functions emphatically, as an ordinance of nature—holding an opinion the direct reverse of that which we have seen expressed by Plato.[6] He makes many remarks on the arrangements of the house, and of the stores within it: and he dwells particularly on the management of servants, male and female.

[1] Xen. Œkon. xi. 17-21. ἐν τοῖς ἱππικωτάτοις τε καὶ πλουσιωτάτοις.

[2] Xen. Œkon. iv. 2-3, vi. 5-7. Ischomachus asserts that his father had been more devoted to agriculture (φιλογεωργότατος) than any man at Athens; that he had bought several pieces of land (χώρους) when out of order, improved them, and then resold them with very large profit, xx. 26.

[3] Xen. Œkon. xx. 2-10.

[4] Xen. Œkon. vii. 3-7. τὸν δ' ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον ἔζη ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας, ὅπως ὡς ἐλάχιστα μὲν ὄψοιτο, ἐλάχιστα δὲ ἀκούσοιτο, ἐλάχιστα δὲ ἔροιτο.

The διδασκαλία addressed to Sokrates by Ischomachus is in the form of ἐρώτησις, xix. 15. The Sokratic interrogation is here brought to bear *upon* Sokrates, instead of by Sokrates; like the Elenchus in the Parmenidês of Plato.

[5] Xen. Œkon. vii. 22-32.

[6] See below, ch. xxxvii.

Compare also Aristotel. Politic. iii. 4, 1277, b. 25, where Aristotle lays down the same principle as Xenophon.

It is upon this last point that he lays more stress than upon any other. To know how to command men—is the first of all accomplishments in the mind of Xenophon. Ischomachus proclaims it as essential that the superior shall not merely give orders to his subordinates, but also see them executed, and set the example of personal active watchfulness in every way. Xenophon aims at securing not simply obedience, but cheerful and willing obedience — even attachment from those who obey. "To exercise command over willing subjects"[1] (he says) "is a good more than human, granted only to men truly consummated in virtue of character essentially divine. To exercise command over unwilling subjects, is a torment like that of Tantalus."

Text upon which Xenophon insists—capital difference between command over subordinates willing, and subordinates unwilling.

The sentence just transcribed (the last sentence in the Œkonomikus) brings to our notice a central focus in Xenophon's mind, from whence many of his most valuable speculations emanate. "What are the conditions under which subordinates will cheerfully obey their commanders?"—was a problem forced upon his thoughts by his own personal experience, as well as by contemporary phenomena in Hellas. He had been elected one of the generals of the Ten Thousand: a large body of brave warriors from different cities, most of them unknown to him personally, and inviting his authority only because they were in extreme peril, and because no one else took the initiative.[2] He discharged his duties admirably: and his ready eloquence was an invaluable accomplishment, distinguishing him from all his colleagues. Nevertheless when the army arrived at the Euxine, out of the reach of urgent peril, he was made to feel sensibly the vexations of authority resting upon such precarious basis, and perpetually traversed by jealous rivals. Moreover, Xenophon, be-

Probable circumstances generating these reflections in Xenophon's mind.

[1] Xen. Œkon. xxi. 10-12. ἤθους βασιλικοῦ — θεῖον γενέσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ πάνυ μοὶ δοκεῖ ὅλον τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεῖον, τὸ ἐθελόντων ἄρχειν· σαφῶς δὲ δίδοται τοῖς ἀληθινῶς σωφροσύνῃ τετελεσμένοις. Τὸ δὲ ἀκόντων τυραννεῖν διδόασιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται ἀξίους εἶναι βιοτεύειν, ὥσπερ ὁ Τάνταλος ἐν ᾅδου λέγεται. Compare also iv. 19, xiii. 3-7.

[2] The reader will find in my 'History of Greece,' ch. 70, p. 103 seq., a narrative of the circumstances under which Xenophon was first chosen to command, as well as his conduct afterwards.

sides his own personal experience, had witnessed violent political changes running extensively through the cities of the Grecian world: first, at the close of the Peloponnesian war—next, after the battle of Knidus—again, under Lacedæmonian supremacy, after the peace of Antalkidas, and the subsequent seizure of the citadel of Thebes—lastly, after the Thebans had regained their freedom and humbled the Lacedæmonians by the battle of Leuktra. To Xenophon—partly actor, partly spectator—these political revolutions were matters of anxious interest; especially as he ardently sympathised with Agesilaus, a political partisan interested in most of them, either as conservative or revolutionary.

This text affords subjects for the Hieron and Cyropædia—Name of Sokrates not suitable.

We thus see, from the personal history of Xenophon, how his attention came to be peculiarly turned to the difficulty of ensuring steady obedience from subordinates, and to the conditions by which such difficulty might be overcome. The sentence, above transcribed from the Œkonomikus, embodies two texts upon which he has discoursed in two of his most interesting compositions—Cyropædia and Hieron. In Cyropædia he explains and exemplifies the divine gift of ruling over cheerful subordinates: in Hieron, the torment of governing the disaffected and refractory. For neither of these purposes would the name and person of Sokrates have been suitable, exclusively connected as they were with Athens. Accordingly Xenophon, having carried that respected name through the Œkonomikus and Symposion, now dismisses it, yet retaining still the familiar and colloquial manner which belonged to Sokrates. The Epilogue, or concluding chapter, of the Cyropædia, must unquestionably have been composed after 364 B.C.—in the last ten years of Xenophon's life: the main body of it may perhaps have been composed earlier.

Hieron—Persons of the dialogue—Simonides and Hieron.

The Hieron gives no indication of date: but as a picture purely Hellenic, it deserves precedence over the Cyropædia, and conveys to my mind the impression of having been written earlier. It describes a supposed conversation (probably suggested by current traditional conversations, like that between Solon and Krœsus) between the poet Simonides and Hieron the despot of Syracuse; who, shortly after the Persian invasion of Greece by Xerxes, had succeeded his

brother Gelon the former despot.[1] Both of them had been once private citizens, of no remarkable consequence: but Gelon, an energetic and ambitious military man, having raised himself to power in the service of Hippokrates despot of Gela, had seized the sceptre on the death of his master: after which he conquered Syracuse, and acquired a formidable dominion, enjoyed after his death by his brother Hieron. This last was a great patron of eminent poets—Pindar, Simonides, Æschylus, Bacchylides: but he laboured under a painful internal complaint, and appears to have been of an irritable and oppressive temper.[2]

Questions put to Hieron; view taken by Simonides. Answer of Hieron.

Simonides asks of Hieron, who had personally tried both the life of a private citizen and that of a despot, which of the two he considered preferable, in regard to pleasures and pains. Upon this subject, a conversation of some length ensues, in which Hieron declares that the life of a despot has much more pain, and much less pleasure, than that of a private citizen under middling circumstances:[3] while Simonides takes the contrary side, and insists in detail upon the superior means of enjoyment, apparent at least, possessed by the despot. As each of these means is successively brought forward, Hieron shews that however the matter may appear to the spectator, the despot feels no greater real happiness in his own bosom: while he suffers many pains and privations, of which the spectator takes no account. As to the pleasures of sight, the despot forfeits altogether the first and greatest, because it is unsafe for him to visit the public festivals and matches. In regard to hearing — many praises, and no reproach, reach his ears: but then he knows that the praises are insincere—and that reproach is unheard, only because speakers dare not express what they really feel. The despot has finer cookery and richer unguents; but others enjoy a modest banquet

[1] Plato, Epistol. ii. p. 311 A. Aristot. Rhetor. ii. 16, 1391, a. 9; Cicero, Nat. Deo. i. 22, 60. How high was the opinion entertained about Simonides as a poet, may be seen illustrated in a passage of Aristophanes, Vespæ, 1362.

[2] See the first and second Pythian Odes of Pindar, addressed to Hieron, especially Pyth. i. 55-61-90, with the Scholia and Boeckh's Commentary. Pindar compliments Hieron upon having founded his new city of Ætna—θεοδμάτῳ σὺν ἐλευθερίᾳ. This does not coincide with the view of Hieron's character taken by Xenophon; but Pindar agrees with Xenophon in exhorting Hieron to make himself popular by a liberal expenditure.

[3] Xenoph. Hier. i. 8. εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σιμωνίδη, ὅτι πολὺ μείω εὐφραίνονται οἱ τύραννοι τῶν μετρίως διαγόντων ἰδιωτῶν, πολὺ δὲ πλείω καὶ μείζω λυποῦνται.

as much or more—while the scent of the unguents pleases those who are near him more than himself.[1] Then as to the pleasures of love, these do not exist, except where the beloved person manifests spontaneous sympathy and return of attachment. Now the despot can never extort such return by his power; while even if it be granted freely, he cannot trust its sincerity and is compelled even to be more on his guard, since successful conspiracies against his life generally proceed from those who profess attachment to him.[2] The private citizen on the contrary knows that those who profess to love him, may be trusted, as having no motive for falsehood.

Misery of governing unwilling subjects declared by Hieron.

Still (contends Simonides) there are other pleasures greater than those of sense. You despots possess the greatest abundance and variety of possessions — the finest chariots and horses, the most splendid arms, the finest palaces, ornaments, and furniture—the most brilliant ornaments for your wives—the most intelligent and valuable servants. You execute the greatest enterprises: you can do most to benefit your friends, and hurt your enemies: you have all the proud consciousness of superior might.[3] —Such is the opinion of the multitude (replies Hieron), who are misled by appearances: but a wise man like you, Simonides, ought to see the reality in the background, and to recollect that happiness or unhappiness reside only in a man's internal feelings. You cannot but know that a despot lives in perpetual insecurity, both at home and abroad: that he must always go armed himself, and have armed guards around him: that whether at war or at peace, he is always alike in danger: that, while suspecting every one as an enemy, he nevertheless knows that when he has put to death the persons suspected, he has only weakened the power of the city:[4] that he has no sincere friendship with any one: that he cannot count even upon good faith, and must cause all his food to be tasted by others, before he eats it: that whoever has slain a private citizen, is shunned in Grecian cities as an abomi-

[1] Xen. Hieron, i. 12-15-24.

[2] Xen. Hier. i. 26-38. Τῷ τυράννῳ οὔ ποτ' ἐστὶ πιστεῦσαι, ὡς φιλεῖται. Αἱ ἐπιβουλαὶ ἐξ οὐδένων πλέονες τοῖς τυράννοις εἰσὶν ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μάλιστα φιλεῖν αὐτοὺς προσποιησαμένων.

This chapter affords remarkable illustration of Grecian manners, especially in the distinction drawn between τὰ παιδικὰ ἀφροδίσια and τὰ τεκνοποιὰ ἀφροδίσια.

[3] Xen. Hier. ii. 2.

[4] Xen. Hieron, ii. 5-17.

nation — while the tyrannicide is everywhere honoured and recompensed: that there is no safety for the despot even in his own family, many having been killed by their nearest relatives:[1] that he is compelled to rely upon mercenary foreign soldiers and liberated slaves, against the free citizens who hate him: and that the hire of such inauspicious protectors compels him to raise money, by despoiling individuals and plundering temples:[2] that the best and most estimable citizens are incurably hostile to him, while none but the worst will serve him for pay: that he looks back with bitter sorrow to the pleasures and confidential friendships which he enjoyed as a private man, but from which he is altogether debarred as a despot.[3]

Nothing brings a man so near to the Gods (rejoins Simonides) as the feeling of being honoured. Power and a brilliant position must be of inestimable value, if they are worth purchasing at the price which you describe.[4] Otherwise, why do you not throw up your sceptre? How happens it that no despot has ever yet done this?—To be honoured (answers Hieron) is the greatest of earthly blessings, when a man obtains honour from the spontaneous voice of freemen. But a despot enjoys no such satisfaction. He lives like a criminal under sentence of death by every one: and it is impossible for him to lay down his power, because of the number of persons whom he has been obliged to make his enemies. He can neither endure his present condition, nor yet escape from it. The best thing he can do is to hang himself.[5]

Simonides in reply, after sympathising with Hieron's despondency, undertakes to console him by showing that such consequences do not necessarily attend despotic rule. The despot's power is an instrument

Advice to Hieron by Simonides —that he

[1] Xenoph. Hieron, ii. 8, iii. 1, 5. Compare Xenophon, Hellenic. iii. 1, 14.

[2] Xen. Hieron, iv. 7-11.

[3] Xen. Hieron, vi. 1-12.

[4] Xen. Hieron, vii. 1-5.

[5] Xen. Hieron, vii. 5-13. Ὁ δὲ τύραννος, ὡς ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων κατακεκριμένος δι' ἀδικίαν ἀποθνήσκειν—καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν διάγει. . . . Ἀλλ' εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λυσιτελεῖ ἀπάγξασθαι, ἴσθι ὅτι τυράννῳ ἔγωγε εὑρίσκω μάλιστα τοῦτο λυσιτελοῦν ποιῆσαι. Μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ οὔτε ἔχειν, οὔτε καταθέσθαι τὰ κακὰ λυσιτελεῖ.

Solon in his poems makes the remark, that for the man who once usurps the sceptre no retreat is possible. See my 'History of Greece,' chap. xi. p. 132 seq.

The impressive contrast here drawn by Hieron (c. vi.) between his condition as a despot and the past enjoyments of private life and citizenship which he has lost, reminds one of the still more sorrowful contrast in the Atys of Catullus, v. 58-70.

should govern well, and thus make himself beloved by his subjects.

available for good as well as for evil. By a proper employment of it, he may not only avoid being hated, but may even make himself beloved, beyond the measure attainable by any private citizen. Even kind words, and petty courtesies, are welcomed far more eagerly when they come from a powerful man than from an equal: moreover a showy and brilliant exterior seldom fails to fascinate the spectator.[1] But besides this, the despot may render to his city the most substantial and important services. He may punish criminals and reward meritorious men: the punishments he ought to inflict by the hands of others, while he will administer the rewards in person—giving prizes for superior excellence in every department, and thus endearing himself to all.[2] Such prizes would provoke a salutary competition in the performance of military duties, in choric exhibitions, in husbandry, commerce, and public usefulness of every kind. Even the foreign mercenaries, though usually odious, might be so handled and disciplined as to afford defence against foreign danger,—to ensure for the citizens undisturbed leisure in their own private affairs—to protect and befriend the honest man, and to use force only against criminals.[3] If thus employed, such mercenaries, instead of being hated, would be welcome companions: and the despot himself may count, not only upon security against attack, but upon the warmest gratitude and attachment. The citizens will readily furnish contributions to him when asked, and will regard him as their greatest benefactor. "You will obtain in this way" (Simonides thus concludes his address to Hieron), "the finest and most enviable of all acquisitions. You will have your subjects obeying you willingly, and caring for you of their own accord. You may travel safely wherever you please, and will be a welcome visitor at all the crowded festivals. You will be happy, without jealousy from any one."[4]

Probable experience

The dialogue of which I have given this short abstract, illustrates what Xenophon calls the torment of Tantalus —the misery of a despot who has to extort obedience

[1] Xen. Hieron, viii. 2-7.
[2] Xen. Hieron, ix. 1-4.
[3] Xen. Hieron, x. 6-8.
[4] Xen. Hieron, xi. 10-12-15. ταῦτα πάντα ποιῆς, εὖ ἴσθι πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις κάλλιστον καὶ μακαριώτατον κτῆμα κεκτημένος· εὐδαιμονῶν γὰρ κἂν οὐ φθονηθήσῃ.

from unwilling subjects :—especially if the despot be one who has once known the comfort and security of private life, under tolerably favourable circumstances. If we compare this dialogue with the Platonic Gorgias, where we have seen a thesis very analogous handled in respect to Archelaus,—we shall find Plato soaring into a sublime ethical region of his own, measuring the despot's happiness and misery by a standard peculiar to himself, and making good what he admits to be a paradox by abundant eloquence covering faulty dialectic : while Xenophon, herein following his master, applies to human life the measure of a rational common sense, talks about pleasures and pains which every one can feel to be such, and points out how many of these pleasures the despot forfeits, how many of these pains and privations he undergoes,—in spite of that great power of doing hurt, and less power, though still considerable, of doing good, which raises the envy of spectators. The Hieron gives utterance to an interesting vein of sentiment, more common at Athens than elsewhere in Greece ; enforced by the conversation of Sokrates, and serving as corrective protest against that unqualified worship of power which prevailed in the ancient world no less than in the modern. That the Syrakusan Hieron should be selected as an exemplifying name, may be explained by the circumstance, that during thirty-eight years of Xenophon's mature life (405-367 B.C.), Dionysius the elder was despot of Syrakuse ; a man of energy and ability, who had extinguished the liberties of his native city, and acquired power and dominion greater than that of any living Greek. Xenophon, resident at Skillus, within a short distance from Olympia, had probably [1] seen the splendid Thêory (or sacred legation of representative envoys) installed in rich and ornamented tents, and the fine running horses sent by Dionysius, at the ninety-ninth Olympic festival (384 B.C.) : but he probably also heard the execration with which the name of Dionysius himself had been received by the spectators, and he would feel that the despot could hardly shew himself there in person. There were narratives in circulation about the interior life of Dionysius,[2] analogous to those statements which Xenophon

had by Xenophon of the feelings at Olympia against Dionysius

[1] Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 11.

[2] See chap. 83, vol. xi. pp. 40-50, of my 'History of Greece,' where this memorable scene at Olympia is described.

puts into the mouth of Hieron. A predecessor of Dionysius as despot of Syracuse [1] and also as patron of poets, was therefore a suitable person to choose for illustrating the first part of Xenophon's thesis—the countervailing pains and penalties which spoilt all the value of power, if exercised over unwilling and repugnant subjects.[2]

Xenophon could not have chosen a Grecian despot to illustrate his theory of the happiness of governing willing subjects.

But when Xenophon came to illustrate the second part of his thesis—the possibility of exercising power in such manner as to render the holder of it popular and beloved—it would have been scarcely possible for him to lay the scene in any Grecian city. The repugnance of the citizens of a Grecian city towards a despot who usurped power over them, was incurable—however much the more ambitious individuals among them might have wished to obtain such power for themselves: a repugnance as great among oligarchs as among democrats—perhaps even greater. When we read the recommendations addressed by Simonides, teaching Hieron how he might render himself popular, we perceive at once that they are alike well intentioned and ineffectual. Xenophon could neither find any real Grecian despot corresponding to this portion of his illustrative purpose—nor could he invent one with any shew of plausibility. He was forced to resort to other countries and other habits different from those of Greece.

Cyropædia—blending of Spartan and Persian customs—Xenophon's experience of Cyrus the Younger.

To this necessity probably we owe the Cyropædia: a romance in which Persian and Grecian experience are singularly blended, and both of them so transformed as to suit the philosophical purpose of the narrator. Xenophon had personally served and communicated with Cyrus the younger: respecting whom also he had large means of information, from his intimate friend Proxenus, as well as from the other Grecian generals of the expedition. In the first book of the Anabasis, we find this young prince depicted as an energetic and magnanimous

[1] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 20, 57-63; De Officiis, ii. 7, 24-25.

"Multos timebit ille, quem multi timent."

[2] An anecdote is told about a visit of Xenophon to Dionysius at Syracuse—whether the elder or the younger is not specified—but the tenor of the anecdote points to the younger; if so, the visit must have been later than 367 B.C. (Athenæus x. 427).

character, faithful to his word and generous in his friendships—inspiring strong attachment in those around him, yet vigorous in administration and in punishing criminals—not only courting the Greeks as useful for his ambitious projects, but appreciating sincerely the superiority of Hellenic character and freedom over Oriental servitude.[1] And in the Œkonomikus, Cyrus is quoted as illustrating in his character the true virtue of a commander; the test of which Xenophon declares to be—That his subordinates follow him willingly, and stand by him to the death.[2]

Portrait of Cyrus the Great—his education—Preface to the Cyropædia.

It is this character—Hellenised, Sokratised, idealised—that Xenophon paints into his glowing picture of Cyrus the founder of the Persian monarchy, or the Cyropædia. He thus escapes the insuperable difficulty arising from the position of a Grecian despot; who never could acquire willing or loving obedience, because his possession of power was felt by a majority of his subjects to be wrongful, violent, tainted. The Cyrus of the Cyropædia begins as son of Kambyses, king or chief of Persia, and grandson of Astyages, king of Media; recognised according to established custom by all, as the person to whom they look for orders. Xenophon furnishes him with a splendid outfit of heroic qualities, suitable to this ascendant position: and represents the foundation of the vast Persian empire, with the unshaken fidelity of all the heterogeneous people composing it, as the reward of a laborious life spent in the active display of such qualities. In his interesting Preface to the Cyropædia, he presents this as the solution of a problem which had greatly perplexed him. He had witnessed many revolutions in the Grecian cities—subversions of democracies, oligarchies, and despotisms: he had seen also private establishments, some with numerous servants, some with few, yet scarcely any house-master able to obtain hearty or continued obedience. But as to herds of cattle or flocks of sheep, on the contrary, he had seen them uniformly obedient; suffering the

[1] Xenoph. Anab. i. 9, also i. 7, 3, the address of Cyrus to the Greek soldiers—*Ὅπως οὖν ἔσεσθε ἄνδρες ἄξιοι τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἧς κέκτησθε, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἧς ὑμᾶς εὐδαιμονίζω. Εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὅτι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐλοίμην ἄν, ἀντὶ ὧν ἔχω πάντων καὶ ἄλλων πολλαπλασίων*, compared with i. 5, 16, where Cyrus gives his appreciation of the Oriental portion of his army, and the remarkable description of the trial of Orontes, i. 6.

[2] Xenoph. Œconom. iv. 18-19. *Κῦρος, εἰ ἐβίωσεν, ἄριστος ἂν δοκεῖ ἄρχων γενέσθαι—ἡγοῦμαι μέγα τεκμήριον ἄρχοντος ἀρετῆς εἶναι, ᾧ ἂν ἑκόντες ἕπωνται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς παραμένειν ἐθέλωσιν.* Compare Anab. i. 9, 29-30.

herdsman or shepherd to do what he pleased with them, and never once conspiring against him. The first inference of Xenophon from these facts was, that man was by nature the most difficult of all animals to govern.[1] But he became satisfied that he was mistaken, when he reflected on the history of Cyrus; who had acquired and maintained dominion over more men than had ever been united under one empire, always obeying him cheerfully and affectionately. This history proved to Xenophon that it was not impossible, nor even difficult,[2] to rule mankind, provided a man undertook it with scientific or artistic competence. Accordingly, he proceeded to examine what Cyrus was in birth, disposition, and education—and how he came to be so admirably accomplished in the government of men.[3] The result is the Cyropædia. We must observe, however, that his solution of the problem is one which does not meet the full difficulties. These difficulties, as he states them, had been suggested to him by his Hellenic experience: by the instability of government in Grecian cities. But the solution which he provides departs from Hellenic experience, and implies what Aristotle and Hippokrates called the more yielding and servile disposition of Asiatics:[4] for it postulates an hereditary chief of heroic or divine lineage, such as was nowhere acknowledged in Greece, except at Sparta—and there, only under restrictions which would have rendered the case unfit for Xenophon's purpose. The heroic and regal lineage of Cyrus was a condition not less essential to success than his disposition and education:[5] and not merely his lineage, but also the farther fact, that besides being constant in the duties of prayer and sacrifice to the Gods, he was peculiarly favoured by them with premonitory signs and warnings in all difficult emergencies.[6]

[1] Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 2.

[2] Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 3. ἐκ τούτου δὴ ἠναγκαζόμεθα μετανοεῖν, μὴ οὕτε τῶν ἀδυνάτων οὔτε τῶν χαλεπῶν ἔργων ἦ τὸ ἀνθρώπων ἄρχειν, ἢν τις ἐπιστα-μένως τοῦτο πράττῃ.

[3] Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 3-8.

[4] Aristot. Politic. vii. 7, 1327, b. 25. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν, διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἄθυμα δέ· διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ.

Hippokrates, De Aere, Locis, et Aquis, c. 19-23.

[5] So it is stated by Xenophon himself, in the speech addressed by Krœsus after his defeat and captivity to Cyrus, vii. 2, 24—ἀγνοῶν ἐμαυτὸν ὅτι σοι ἀντιπολεμεῖν ἱκανὸς ὤμην εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ θεῶν γεγονότι, ἔπειτα δὲ διὰ βασιλέων πεφυκότι, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντι· τῶν δ' ἐμῶν προγόνων ἀκούω τὸν πρῶτον βασιλεύσαντα ἅμα τε βασιλέα καὶ ἐλεύθερον γενέσθαι. Cyrop. i. 2, 1: τοῦ Περσειδῶν γένους, &c.

[6] See the remarkable words addressed by Cyrus, shortly before his death, in sacrificing on the hill-top to

The fundamental principle of Xenophon is, that to obtain hearty and unshaken obedience is not difficult for a ruler, provided he possesses the science or art of ruling. This is a principle expressly laid down by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia.[1] We have seen Plato affirming in the Politikus[2] that this is the only true government, though very few individuals are competent to it: Plato gives to it a peculiar application in the Republic, and points out a philosophical or dialectic tuition whereby he supposes that his Elders will acquire the science or art of command. The Cyropædia presents to us an illustrative example. Cyrus is a young prince who, from twenty-six years of age to his dying day, is always ready with his initiative, provident in calculation of consequences, and personally active in enforcement: giving the right order at the right moment, with good assignable reasons. As a military man, he is not only personally forward, but peculiarly dexterous in the marshalling and management of soldiers; like the Homeric Agamemnon[3]—

Xenophon does not solve his own problem—The governing aptitude and popularity of Cyrus come from nature, not from education.

Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθός, κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής.

But we must consider this aptitude for command as a spontaneous growth in Cyrus—a portion of his divine constitution or of the golden element in his nature (to speak in the phrase of the Platonic Republic): for no means are pointed out whereby he acquired it, and the Platonic Sokrates would have asked in vain, where teachers of it were to be found. It is true that he is made to go through a rigorous and long-continued training: but this training is common to him with all the other Persian youths of

Ζεὺς Πατρῷος and Ἥλιος, Cyrop. viii. 7, 3.

The special communications of the Gods to Cyrus are insisted on by Xenophon, like those made to Sokrates, and like the constant aid of Athênê to Odysseus in Homer, Odyss. iii. 221:—

Οὐ γάρ πω ἴδον ὧδε θεοὺς ἀναφανδὰ φιλεῦντας
Ὡς κείνῳ ἀναφανδὰ παρίστατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.

[1] Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 10-12.

[2] See what is said below about the Platonic Politikus, chap. xxx.

[3] Cicero, when called upon in his province of Cilicia to conduct warlike operations against the Parthians, as well as against some refractory mountaineers, improved his military knowledge by studying and commenting on the Cyropædia. Epist. ad Famil. ix. 25. Compare the remarkable observation made by Cicero (Academic. Prior. ii. init.) about the way in which Lucullus made up his deficiency of military experience by reading military books.

good family, and is calculated to teach obedience, not to communicate aptitude for command; while the master of tactics, whose lessons he receives apart, is expressly declared to have known little about the duties of a commander.[1] Kambyses indeed (father of Cyrus) gives to his son valuable general exhortations respecting the multiplicity of exigencies which press upon a commander, and the constant watchfulness, precautions, fertility of invention, required on his part to meet them. We read the like in the conversations of Sokrates in the Memorabilia:[2] but neither Kambyses nor Sokrates are teachers of the art of commanding. For this art, Cyrus is assumed to possess a natural aptitude; like the other elements of his dispositions—his warm sympathies, his frank and engaging manners, his ardent emulation combined with perfect freedom from jealousy, his courage, his love of learning, his willingness to endure any amount of labour for the purpose of obtaining praise, &c., all which Xenophon represents as belonging to him by nature, together with a very handsome person.[3]

Views of Xenophon about public and official training of all citizens.

The Cyropædia is a title not fairly representing the contents of the work, which contains a more copious biography of the hero than any which we read in Plutarch or Suetonius. But the education of Cyrus[4] is the most remarkable part of it, in which the ethico-political theory of Xenophon, generated by Sokratic refining criticism brought to bear on the Spartan drill and discipline, is put forth. Professing to describe the Persian polity, he in reality describes only the Persian education; which is public, and prescribed by law, intended to form the character of individuals so that they shall stand in no need of coercive laws or penalties. Most cities leave the education of youth to be conducted at the discretion of their parents, and think it sufficient to enact and enforce laws forbidding, under penal sanction, theft, murder, and various other acts enumerated as criminal. But Xenophon (like Plato and Aristotle) disapproves of this system.[5] His Persian

[1] Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 12-15.

[2] Compare Cyropæd. i. 6, with Memorab. iii. 1.

[3] Cyropæd. i. 2, 1. φῦναι δὲ ὁ Κῦρος λέγεται, &c. i. 3, 1-2. πάντων τῶν ἡλίκων διαφέρων ἐφαίνετο . . . παῖς φύσει φιλόστοργος, &c.

[4] I have already observed that the phrase of Plato in Legg. iii. p. 694 C may be considered as conveying his denial of the assertion, that Cyrus had received a good education.

[5] Xenophon says the same about the scheme of Lykurgus at Sparta, De Lac. Repub. c. 2.

polity places the citizen even from infancy under official tuition, and aims at forming his first habits and character, as well as at upholding them when formed, so that instead of having any disposition of his own to commit such acts, he shall contract a repugnance to them. He is kept under perpetual training, drill, and active official employment throughout life, but the supervision is most unremitting during boyhood and youth.

Details of (so-called) Persian education—Severe discipline—Distribution of four ages.

There are four categories of age :—boys, up to sixteen—young men or ephêbi, from sixteen to twenty-six—mature men, as far as fifty-one—above that age, elders. To each of these four classes there is assigned a certain portion of the "free agora": *i.e.*, the great square of the city, where no buying or selling or vulgar occupation is allowed—where the regal residence is situated, and none but dignified functions, civil or military, are carried on. Here the boys and the mature men assemble every day at sunrise, continue under drill, and take their meals; while the young men even pass the night on guard near the government house. Each of the four sections is commanded by superintendents or officers: those superintending the boys are Elders, who are employed in administering justice to the boys, and in teaching them what justice is. They hold judicial trials of the boys for various sorts of misconduct: for violence, theft, abusive words, lying, and even for ingratitude. In cases of proved guilt, beating or flogging is inflicted. The boys go there to learn justice (says Xenophon), as boys in Hellas go to school to learn letters. Under this discipline, and in learning the use of the bow and javelin besides, they spend the time until sixteen years of age. They bring their food with them from home (wheaten bread, with a condiment of kardamon, or bruised seed of the nasturtium), together with a wooden cup to draw water from the river: and they dine at public tables under the eye of the teacher. The young men perform all the military and police duty under the commands of the King and the Elders: moreover, they accompany the King when he goes on a hunting expedition—which accustoms them to fatigue and long abstinence, as well as to the encounter of dangerous wild animals. The Elders do not take part in these hunts, nor in any foreign military march, nor are they bound, like the others, to daily attendance in the agora.

They appoint all officers, and try judicially the cases shown up by the superintendents, or other accusers, of all youths or mature men who have failed in the requirements of the public discipline. The gravest derelictions they punish with death: where this is not called for, they put the offender out of his class, so that he remains degraded all his life.[1]

This severe discipline is by law open to all Persians who choose to attend, and the honours of the state are attainable by all equally. But in practice it is confined to a few: for neither boys nor men can attend it continuously, except such as possess an independent maintenance; nor is any one allowed to enter the regiment of youths or mature men, unless he has previously gone through the discipline of boyhood. The elders, by whom the higher functions are exercised, must be persons who have passed without reproach through all the three preceding stages: so that these offices, though legally open to all, are in practice confined to a few—the small class of Homotimoi.[2]

Evidence of the good effect of this discipline—Hard and dry condition of the body.

Such is Xenophon's conception of a perfect Polity. It consists in an effective public discipline and drill, begun in early boyhood and continued until old age. The evidence on which he specially insists to prove its good results relates first to the body. The bodies of the Persians become so dry and hard, that they neither spit, nor have occasion to wipe their noses, nor are full of wind, nor are ever seen to retire for the satisfaction of natural wants.[3] Besides this, the discipline enforces complete habits of obedience, sobriety, justice, endurance of pain and privation.

We may note here both the agreement, and the difference, between Xenophon and Plato, as to the tests applied for measuring the goodness of their respective disciplinarian schemes. In regard to the ethical effects desirable (obedience, sobriety, &c.) both were agreed. But while Plato (in Republic) dwells much besides upon the musical training necessary, Xenophon omits this, and substitutes in its place the working off of all the superfluous moisture of the body.[4]

[1] Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 6-16. καὶ ἤν τις ἢ ἐν ἐφήβοις ἢ ἐν τελείοις ἀνδράσιν ἐλλίπῃ τι τῶν νομίμων, φαίνουσι μὲν οἱ φύλαρχοι ἕκαστον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ βουλόμενος· οἱ δὲ γεραίτεροι ἀκούσαντες ἐκκρίνουσιν· ὁ δὲ ἐκκριθεὶς ἄτιμος τὸν λοιπὸν βίον διατελεῖ.

[2] Cyropæd. i. 2, 14-15.

[3] Cyrop. i. 2, 16.

[4] See below, chap. xxxvii.

Through the two youthful stages of this discipline Cyrus is represented as having passed; undergoing all the fatigues as well as the punishment (he is beaten or flogged by the superintendent[1]) with as much rigour as the rest, and even surpassing all his comrades in endurance and exemplary obedience, not less than in the bow and the javelin. In the lessons about justice he manifests such pre-eminence, that he is appointed by the superintendent to administer justice to other boys: and it is in this capacity that he is chastised for his well-known decision, awarding the large coat to the great boy and the little coat to the little boy, as being more convenient to both,[2] though the proprietorship was opposite: the master impressing upon him, as a general explanation, that the lawful or customary was the Just.[3] Cyrus had been brought as a boy by his mother Mandanê to visit her father, the Median king Astyages. The boy wins the affection of Astyages and all around by his child-like frankness and affectionate sympathy (admirably depicted in Xenophon): while he at the same time resists the corruptions of a luxurious court, and adheres to the simplicity of his Persian training. When Mandanê is about to depart and to rejoin her husband Kambyses in Persis, she is entreated by Astyages to allow Cyrus to remain with him. Cyrus himself also desires to remain: but Mandanê hesitates to allow it: putting to Cyrus, among other difficulties, the question—How will you learn justice here, when the teachers of it are in Persis? To which Cyrus replies—I am already well taught in justice: as you may see by the fact, that my teacher made me a judge over other boys, and compelled me to render account to him of all my proceedings.[4] Besides which, if I am found wanting, my grandfather Astyages will make up the deficient teaching. But (says Mandanê) justice is not the same here under Astyages, as it is in Persis. Astyages has made himself master of all the Medes: while among the Persians equality is accounted justice. Your father Kambyses both performs all that the city directs, and receives nothing more

Exemplary obedience of Cyrus to the public discipline—He had learnt justice well—His award about the two coats—Lesson inculcated upon him by the Justice-Master.

1 Cyrop. i. 3, 17; i. 5, 4.

2 Cyrop. i. 3, 17. This is an ingenious and apposite illustration of the law of property.

3 Cyrop. i. 3, 17. ἔπειτα δὲ ἔφη τὸ μὲν νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ἄνομον, βίαιον.

4 Cyropæd. i. 4, 2.

than what the city allows: the measure for him is, not his own inclination, but the law. You must therefore be cautious of staying here, lest you should bring back with you to Persis habits of despotism, and of grasping at more than any one else, contracted from your grandfather: for if you come back in this spirit, you will assuredly be flogged to death. Never fear, mother (answered Cyrus): my grandfather teaches every one round him to claim less than his due—not more than his due: and he will teach me the same.[1]

Xenophon's conception of the Sokratic problems—He does not recognise the Sokratic order of solution of those problems.

The portion of the Cyropædia just cited deserves especial attention, in reference to Xenophon as a companion and pupil of Sokrates. The reader has been already familiarised throughout this work with the questions habitually propounded and canvassed by Sokrates—What is Justice, Temperance, Courage, &c.? Are these virtues teachable? If they are so, where are the teachers of them to be found?—for he professed to have looked in vain for any teachers.[2] I have farther remarked that Sokrates required these questions to be debated in the order here stated. That is—you must first know what Justice is, before you can determine whether it be teachable or not—nay, before you are in a position to affirm any thing at all about it, or to declare any particular acts to be either just or unjust.[3]

Now Xenophon, in his description of the Persian official discipline, provides a sufficient answer to the second question—Whether justice is teachable—and where are the teachers thereof? It *is* teachable: there are official teachers appointed: and every boy passes through a course of teaching prolonged for several years.—But Xenophon does not at all recognise the Sokratic requirement, that the first question shall be fully canvassed and satisfactorily answered, before the second is approached. The first question is indeed answered in a certain way—though the answer appears here only as an *obiter dictum*, and is never submitted to any Elenchus at all. The master explains—What is Justice?—by telling Cyrus, "That the lawful is just,

[1] Cyrop. i. 3, 17-18. Ὅπως οὖν μὴ ἀπολῇ μαστιγούμενος, ἐπειδὰν οἴκοι ᾖς, ἂν παρὰ τούτου μαθὼν ἥκῃς ἀντὶ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τὸ τυραννικόν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ πλέον οἴεσθαι χρῆναι πάντων ἔχειν.

[2] Xenoph. Memor. i. 16, iv. 4, 5.

[3] See below, ch. xiii., ch. xxii., and ch. xxiii.

and that the lawless is violent". Now if we consider this as preceptorial—as an admonition to the youthful Cyrus how he ought to decide judicial cases—it is perfectly reasonable:—"Let your decisions be conformable to the law or custom of the country". But if we consider it as a portion of philosophy or reasoned truth—as a definition or rational explanation of Justice, advanced by a respondent who is bound to defend it against the Sokratic cross-examination—we shall find it altogether insufficient. Xenophon himself tells us here, that Law or Custom is one thing among the Medes, and the reverse among the Persians: accordingly an action which is just in the one place will be unjust in the other. It is by objections of this kind that Sokrates, both in Plato and Xenophon, refutes explanations propounded by his respondents.[1]

Definition given by Sokrates of Justice—Insufficient to satisfy the exigencies of the Sokratic Elenchus.

Though the explanation of Justice here given is altogether untenable, yet we shall find it advanced by Sokrates himself as complete and conclusive, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, where he is conversing with the Sophist Hippias. That Sophist is represented as at first urging difficulties against it, but afterwards as concurring with Sokrates: who enlarges upon the definition, and extols it as perfectly satisfactory. If

[1] Plato, Republ. v. p. 479 A. *τούτων τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν, ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὃ οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὁσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον;* Compare Republ. i. p. 331 C, and the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydêmus in the Xenophontic Memorab. iv. 2, 13-19, and Cyropædia, i. 6, 27-34, about what is just and good morality towards enemies.

We read in Pascal, Pensées, i. 6, 8-9:—

"On ne voit presque rien de juste et d'injuste, qui ne change de qualité en changeant de climat. Trois degrés d'élévation du pôle renversent toute la jurisprudence. Un méridien décide de la vérité: en peu d'années de possession, les loix fondamentales changent: le droit a ses époques. Plaisante justice, qu'une rivière ou une montagne borne! Vérité au deçà des Pyrénées—erreur au delà!

"Ils confessent que la justice n'est pas dans les coutumes, mais qu'elle reside dans les loix naturelles, connues en tout pays. Certainement ils la soutiendraient opiniâtrement, si la témérité du hasard qui a semé les loix humaines en avait rencontré au moins une qui fut universelle: mais la plaisanterie est telle, que le caprice des hommes s'est si bien diversifié, qu'il n'y en a point.

"Le larcin, l'inceste, le meurtre des enfans et des pères, tout a eu sa place entre les actions vertueuses. Se peut-il rien de plus plaisant, qu'un homme ait droit de me tuer parcequ'il demeure au-delà de l'eau, et que son prince a querelle avec le mien, quoique je n'en aie aucune avec lui?

"L'un dit que l'essence de la justice est l'autorité du législateur: l'autre, la commodité du souverain: l'autre, la coutume présente—et c'est le plus sûr. Rien, suivant la seule raison, n'est juste de soi: tout branle avec le temps. La coutume fait toute l'équité, par cela seul qu'elle est reçue: c'est le fondement mystique de son autorité. Qui la ramène à son principe, l'anéantit."

Sokrates really delivered this answer to Hippias, as a general definition of Justice—we may learn from it how much greater was his negative acuteness in overthrowing the definitions of others, than his affirmative perspicacity in discovering unexceptionable definitions of his own. This is the deficiency admitted by himself in the Platonic Apology—lamented by friends like Kleitophon—arraigned by opponents like Hippias and Thrasymachus. Xenophon, whose intellect was practical rather than speculative, appears not to be aware of it. He does not feel the depth and difficulty of the Sokratic problems, even while he himself enunciates them. He does not appreciate all the conditions of a good definition, capable of being maintained against that formidable cross-examination (recounted by himself) whereby Sokrates humbled the youth Euthydêmus: still less does he enter into the spirit of that Sokratic order of precedence (declared in the negative Platonic dialogues), in the study of philosophical questions:—First define Justice, and find a definition of it such as you can maintain against a cross-examining adversary—before you proceed either to affirm or deny any predicates concerning it. The practical advice and reflexions of Xenophon are, for the most part, judicious and penetrating. But he falls very short when he comes to deal with philosophical theory:—with reasoned truth, and with the Sokratic Elenchus as a test for discriminating such truth from the false, the doubtful, or the not-proven.

Biography of Cyrus—constant military success earned by suitable qualities—Variety of characters and situations.

Cyrus is allowed by his mother to remain amidst the luxuries of the Median court. It is a part of his admirable disposition that he resists all its temptations,[1] and goes back to the hard fare and discipline of the Persians with the same exemplary obedience as before. He is appointed by the Elders to command the Persian contingent which is sent to assist Kyaxares (son of Astyages), king of Media; and he thus enters upon that active military career which is described as occupying his whole life, until his conquest of Babylon, and his subsequent organization of the great Persian empire. His father Kambyses sends him forth with excellent exhortations, many of which are almost in the same words as those which we read

[1] Cyropæd. i. 5, 1.

ascribed to Sokrates in the Memorabilia. In the details of Cyrus's biography which follow, the stamp of Sokratic influence is less marked, yet seldom altogether wanting. The conversation of Sokrates had taught Xenophon how to make the most of his own large experience and observation. His biography of Cyrus represents a string of successive situations, calling forth and displaying the aptitude of the hero for command. The epical invention with which these situations are imagined—the variety of characters introduced, Araspes, Abradates, Pantheia, Chrysantas, Hystaspes, Gadatas, Gobryas, Tigranes, &c.—the dramatic propriety with which each of these persons is animated as speaker, and made to teach a lesson bearing on the predetermined conclusion—all these are highly honourable to the Xenophontic genius, but all of them likewise bespeak the Companion of Sokrates. Xenophon dwells, with evident pleasure, on the details connected with the *rationale* of military proceedings: the wants and liabilities of soldiers, the advantages or disadvantages of different weapons or different modes of marshalling, the duties of the general as compared with those of the soldier, &c. Cyrus is not merely always ready with his orders, but also competent as a speaker to explain the propriety of what he orders.[1] We have the truly Athenian idea, that persuasive speech is the precursor of intelligent and energetic action: and that it is an attribute essentially necessary for a general, for the purpose of informing, appeasing, re-assuring, the minds of the soldiers.[2] This, as well as other duties and functions of a military commander, we find laid down generally in the conversations of Sokrates,[3] who conceives these functions, in their most general aspect, as a branch of the comprehensive art of guiding or governing men. What Sokrates thus enunciates generally, is exemplified in detail throughout the life of Cyrus.

Throughout all the Cyropædia, the heroic qualities and per-

[1] Cyropæd. v. 5, 46. λεκτικώτατος καὶ πρακτικώτατος. Compare the Memorabilia, iv. 6, 1-15.

[2] Memorab. iii. 3, 11; Hipparch. viii. 22; Cyropæd. vi. 2, 13. Compare the impressive portion of the funeral oration delivered by Perikles in Thucydides, ii. 40.

[3] See the four first chapters of the third book of the Xenophontic Memorabilia. The treatise of Xenophon called Ἱππαρχικὸς enumerates also the general duties required from a commander of cavalry: among these, ψευδαυτόμολοι are mentioned (iv. 7). Now the employment, with effect, of a ψευδαυτόμολος, is described with much detail in the Cyropædia. See the case of Araspes (vi. 1, 37, vi. 3, 16).

Generous and amiable qualities of Cyrus. Abradates and Pantheia.

sonal agency of Cyrus are always in the foreground, working with unerring success and determining every thing. He is moreover recommended to our sympathies, not merely by the energy and judgment of a leader, but also by the amiable qualities of a generous man—by the remarkable combination of self-command with indulgence towards others—by considerate lenity towards subdued enemies like Krœsus and the Armenian prince—even by solicitude shown that the miseries of war should fall altogether on the fighting men, and that the cultivators of the land should be left unmolested by both parties.[1] Respecting several other persons in the narrative, too—the Armenian Tigranes, Gadatas, Gobryas, &c.—the adventures and scenes described are touching: but the tale of Abradates and Pantheia transcends them all, and is perhaps the most pathetic recital embodied in the works of Hellenic antiquity.[2] In all these narratives the vein of sentiment is neither Sokratic nor Platonic, but belongs to Xenophon himself.

Scheme of government devised by Cyrus when his conquests are completed —Oriental despotism, wisely arranged.

This last remark may also be made respecting the concluding proceedings of Cyrus, after he has thoroughly completed his conquests, and when he establishes arrangements for governing them permanently. The scheme of government which Xenophon imagines and introduces him as organizing, is neither Sokratic nor Platonic, nor even Hellenic: it would probably have been as little acceptable to his friend Agesilaus, the marked "hater of Persia,"[3] as to any Athenian politician. It is altogether an Oriental despotism, skilfully organized both for the security of the despot and for enabling him to keep a vigorous hold on subjects distant as well as near: such as the younger Cyrus might possibly have attempted, if his brother Artaxerxes had been slain at Kunaxa, instead of himself. "Eam conditionem esse imperandi, ut non aliter ratio constet, quam si uni reddatur"[4]—is a maxim repugnant to Hellenic ideas, and not likely to be rendered welcome even by the regulations of

[1] Cyrop. iii. 1, 10-38, vii. 2, 9-29, v. 4, 26, vi. 1, 37. Ἀλλὰ σὺ μέν, ὦ Κῦρε, καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως εἶ, πρᾷός τε καὶ συγγνώμων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἁμαρτημάτων.

[2] Cyrop. vii. 3.

[3] Xenoph. Agesilaus, vii. 7. εἰ δ' αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσην εἶναι—ἐξέπλευσεν, ὅ, τι δύναιτο κακὸν ποιήσων τὸν βάρβαρον.

[4] Tacit. Annal. i. 6.

detail with which Xenophon surrounds it; judicious as these regulations are for their contemplated purpose. The amiable and popular character which Cyrus has maintained from youth upwards, and by means of which he has gained an uninterrupted series of victories, is difficult to be reconciled with the insecurity, however imposing, in which he dwells as Great King. When we find that he accounts it a necessary precaution to surround himself with eunuchs, on the express ground that they are despised by every one else and therefore likely to be more faithful to their master—when we read also that in consequence of the number of disaffected subjects, he is forced to keep a guard composed of twenty thousand soldiers taken from poor Persian mountaineers[1]—we find realised, in the case of the triumphant Cyrus, much of that peril and insecurity which the despot Hieron had so bitterly deplored in his conversation with Simonides. However unsatisfactory the ideal of government may be, which Plato lays out either in the Republic or the Leges—that which Xenophon sets before us is not at all more acceptable, in spite of the splendid individual portrait whereby he dazzles our imagination. Few Athenians would have exchanged Athens either for Babylon under Cyrus, or for Plato's Magnêtic colony in Krete.

Persian present reality—is described by Xenophon as thoroughly depraved, in striking contrast to the establishment of Cyrus.

The Xenophontic government is thus noway admirable, even as an ideal. But he himself presents it only as an ideal—or (which is the same thing in the eyes of a companion of Sokrates) as a quasi-historical fact, belonging to the unknown and undetermined past. When Xenophon talks of what the Persians *are now*, he presents us with nothing but a shocking contrast to this ideal; nothing but vice, corruption, degeneracy of every kind, exorbitant sensuality, faithlessness and cowardice.[2] His picture of Persia is like that of the Platonic Kosmos, which we can read in the Timæus:[3] a splendid Kosmos in its original plan and construction, but full of defects and evil as it actually exists. The strength and excellence of the Xenophontic orderly despotism dies with its heroic beginner. His two sons (as Plato remarked) do not receive the same elabo-

[1] Xen. Cyrop. vii. 5, 58-70.

[2] Cyrop. viii. 8.

[3] See below, ch. xxxviii.

rate training and discipline as himself: nor can they be restrained, even by the impressive appeal which he makes to them on his death-bed, from violent dissension among themselves, and misgovernment of every kind.[1]

Xenophon has good experience of military and equestrian proceedings—No experience of finance and commerce.

Whatever we may think of the political ideal of Xenophon, his Cyropædia is among the glories of the Sokratic family; as an excellent specimen of the philosophical imagination, in carrying a general doctrine into illustrative details—and of the epical imagination in respect to varied characters and touching incident. In stringing together instructive conversations, moreover, it displays the same art which we trace in the Memorabilia, Œkonomikus, Hieron, &c., and which is worthy of the attentive companion of Sokrates. Whenever Xenophon talks about military affairs, horsemanship, agriculture, house-management, &c., he is within the range of personal experience of his own; and his recommendations, controlled as they thus are by known realities, are for the most part instructive and valuable. Such is the case not merely with the Cyropædia and Œkonomikus, but also in his two short treatises, De Re Equestri and De Officio Magistri Equitum.

But we cannot say so much when he discusses plans of finance.

Discourse of Xenophon on Athenian finance and the condition of Athens. His admiration of active commerce and variety of pursuits.

We read among his works a discourse—composed after his sentence of exile had been repealed, and when he was very old, seemingly not earlier than 355 B.C.[2]—criticising the actual condition of Athens, and proposing various measures for the improvement of the finances, as well as for relief of the citizens from poverty. He begins this discourse by a sentiment thoroughly Sokratic and Platonic, which would serve almost as a continuation of the Cyropædia. The government of a city will be measured by the character and ability of its leaders.[3] He closes it by another sentiment equally Sokratic and Platonic; advising that

[1] Cyropæd. viii. 7, 9-19: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 694 D.

[2] Xenophon, Πόροι—ἢ περὶ Προσόδων. De Vectigalibus. See Schneider's Proleg to this treatise, pp. 138-140.

[3] De Vectig. i. 1. ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦτο ἀεί ποτε νομίζω, οἱοῖοί τινες ἂν οἱ προστάται ὦσι, τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι.

before his measures are adopted, special messengers shall be sent to Delphi and Dodona; to ascertain whether the Gods approve them—and if they approve, to which Gods they enjoin that the initiatory sacrifices shall be offered.[1] But almost everything in the discourse, between the first and last sentences, is in a vein not at all Sokratic—in a vein, indeed, positively anti-Platonic and anti-Spartan. We have already seen that wealth, gold and silver, commerce, influx of strangers, &c., are discouraged as much as possible by Plato, and by the theory (though evaded partially in practice) of Sparta. Now it is precisely these objects which Xenophon, in the treatise before us, does his utmost to foster and extend at Athens. Nothing is here said about the vulgarising influence of trade as compared with farming, which we read in the Œkonomikus: nor about the ethical and pædagogic dictation which pervades so much of the Cyropædia, and reigns paramount throughout the Platonic Republic and Leges. Xenophon takes Athens as she stands, with great variety of tastes, active occupation, and condition among the inhabitants: her mild climate and productive territory, especially her veins of silver and her fine marble: her importing and exporting merchants, her central situation, as convenient entrepôt for commodities produced in the most distant lands:[2] her skilful artisans and craftsmen: her monied capitalists: and not these alone, but also the congregation and affluence of fine artists, intellectual men, philosophers, Sophists, poets, rhapsodes, actors, &c.: last, though not least, the temples adorning her akropolis, and the dramatic representations exhibited at her Dionysiac festivals, which afforded the highest captivation to eye as well as ear, and attracted strangers from all quarters as visitors.[3] Xenophon extols these charms of Athens with a warmth which reminds us of the Periklean funeral oration in Thucydides.[4] He no longer speaks like one whose heart and affections are with the Spartan

[1] De Vect. vi. 2. Compare this with Anabas. iii. 1, 5, where Sokrates reproves Xenophon for his evasive manner of putting a question to the Delphian God. Xenophon here adopts the plenary manner enjoined by Sokrates.

[2] De Vectig. c. i. 2-3.

[3] De Vect. v. 3-4. *Τί δὲ οἱ πολυέλαιοι; τί δὲ οἱ πολυπρόβατοι; τί δὲ οἱ γνώμῃ καὶ ἀργυρίῳ δυνάμενοι χρηματίζεσθαι; Καὶ μὴν χειροτέχναι τε καὶ σοφισταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι· οἱ δὲ ποιηταί, οἱ δὲ τὰ τούτων μεταχειριζόμενοι, οἱ δὲ ἀξιοθεάτων ἢ ἀξιακούστων ἱερῶν ἢ ὁσίων ἐπιθυμοῦντες*, &c.

[4] Thucydid. ii. 34-42; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 12. Compare Xenophon, Republ. Athen. ii. 7, iii. 8.

drill: still less does he speak like Plato—to whom (as we see both by the Republic and the Leges) such artistic and poetical exhibitions were abominations calling for censorial repression—and in whose eyes gold, silver, commerce, abundant influx of strangers, &c., were dangerous enemies of all civic virtue.

Recognised poverty among the citizens. Plan for improvement.

Yet while recognising all these charms and advantages, Xenophon finds himself compelled to lament great poverty among the citizens; which poverty (he says) is often urged by the leading men as an excuse for unjust proceedings. Accordingly he comes forward with various financial suggestions, by means of which he confidently anticipates that every Athenian citizen may obtain a comfortable maintenance from the public.[1]

Advantage of a large number of Metics. How these may be encouraged.

First, he dwells upon the great advantage of encouraging metics, or foreigners resident at Athens, each of whom paid an annual capitation tax to the treasury. There were already many such, not merely Greeks, but Orientals also, Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, &c.:[2] and by judicious encouragement all expatriated men everywhere might be made to prefer the agreeable residence at Athens, thus largely increasing the annual amount of the tax. The metics ought (he says) to be exempted from military service (which the citizens ought to perform and might perform alone), but to be admitted to the honours of the equestrian duty, whenever they were rich enough to afford it: and farther, to be allowed the liberty of purchasing land and building houses in the city. Moreover not merely resident metics, but also foreign merchants who came as visitors, conducting an extensive commerce—ought to be flattered by complimentary votes and occasional hospitalities: while the curators of the harbour, whose function it was to settle disputes among them, should receive prizes if they adjudicated equitably and speedily.[3]

Proposal to raise by voluntary contribu-

All this (Xenophon observes) will require only friendly and considerate demonstrations. His farther schemes are more ambitious, not to be effected without a large outlay. He proposes to raise an ample fund for the

[1] De Vectig. iv. 33. καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ τροφὴν ἀπὸ κοινοῦ γενέσθαι. εἴρηται, ὡς ἂν ἡγοῦμαι κατασκευασθείσης τῆς πόλεως ἱκανὴν ἂν πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις

[2] De Vect. ii. 3-7.

[3] De Vect. iii. 2-6.

purposes of the city, by voluntary contributions; which he expects to obtain not merely from private Athenians and metics, rich and in easy circumstances —but also from other cities, and even from foreign despots, kings, satraps, &c. The tempting inducement will be, that the names of all contributors with their respecting contributions will be inscribed on public tablets, and permanently commemorated as benefactors of the city.[1] Contributors (he says) are found, for the outfit of a fleet, where they expect no return: much more will they come forward here, where a good return will accrue. The fund so raised will be employed under public authority with the most profitable result, in many different ways. The city will build docks and warehouses for bonding goods—houses near the harbour to be let to merchants—merchant-vessels to be let out on freight. But the largest profit will be obtained by working the silver mines at Laureion in Attica. The city will purchase a number of foreign slaves, and will employ them under the superintendence of old free citizens who are past the age of labour, partly in working these mines for public account, each of the ten tribes employing one tenth part of the number—partly by letting them out to private mining undertakers, at so much per diem for each slave: the slaves being distinguished by a conspicuous public stamp, and the undertaker binding himself under penalty always to restore the same number of them as he received.[2] Such competition between the city and the private mining undertakers will augment the total produce, and will be no loss to either, but wholesome for both. The mines will absorb as many workmen as are put into them: for in the production of silver (Xenophon argues) there can never be any glut, as there is sometimes in corn, wine, or oil. Silver is always in demand, and is not lessened in value by increase of quantity. Every one is anxious to get it, and has as much pleasure in hoarding it under ground as in actively employing it.[3] The scheme, thus described, may (if found necessary) be brought into operation by degrees, a certain number of slaves being purchased annually until the full total is made up. From these various financial projects, and

tions a large sum to be employed as capital by the city. Distribution of three oboli per head per day to all the citizens.

[1] De Vect. iii. 11. [2] De Vect. iv. 13-19. [3] De Vect. iv. 4-7.

especially from the fund thus employed as capital under the management of the Senate, the largest returns are expected. Amidst the general abundance which will ensue, the religious festivals will be celebrated with increased splendour — the temples will be repaired, the docks and walls will be put in complete order—the priests, the Senate, the magistrates, the horsemen, will receive the full stipends which the old custom of Athens destined for them.[1] But besides all these, the object which Xenophon has most at heart will be accomplished: the poor citizens will be rescued from poverty. There will be a regular distribution among all citizens, per head and equally. Three oboli, or half a drachma, will be allotted daily to each, to poor and rich alike. For the poor citizens, this will provide a comfortable subsistence, without any contribution on their part: the poverty now prevailing will thus be alleviated. The rich, like the poor, receive the daily triobolon as a free gift: but if they even compute it as interest for their investments, they will find that the rate of interest is full and satisfactory, like the rate on bottomry. Three oboli per day amount in the year of 360 days to 180 drachmæ: now if a rich man has contributed ten minæ (= 1000 drachmæ), he will thus receive interest at the rate of 18 per cent. per annum: if another less rich citizen has contributed one mina (= 100 drachmæ), he will receive interest at the rate of 180 per cent. per annum: more than he could realise in any other investment.[2]

Purpose and principle of this distribution.

Half a drachma, or three oboli, per day, was the highest rate of pay ever received (the rate varied at different times) by the citizens as Dikasts and Ekklesiasts, for attending in judicature or in assembly. It is this amount of pay which Xenophon here proposes to ensure to every citizen, without exception, out of the public treasury; which (he calculates) would be enriched by his project so as easily to bear such a disbursement. He relieves the poor citizens from poverty by making them all pensioners on the public treasury, with or

[1] De Vectig. vi. 1-2. Καὶ ὁ μὲν δῆμος τροφῆς εὐπορήσει, οἱ δὲ πλούσιοι τῆς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον δαπάνης ἀπαλλαγήσονται, περιουσίας δὲ πολλῆς γενομένης, μεγαλοπρεπέστερον μὲν ἔτι ἢ νῦν τὰς ἑορτὰς ἄξομεν, ἱερὰ δ' ἐπισκευάσομεν, τείχη δὲ καὶ νεώρια ἀνορθώσομεν, ἱερεῦσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἱππεῦσι τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν—πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον ὡς τάχιστα τούτοις ἐγχειρεῖν, ἵνα ἔτι ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐπίδωμεν τὴν πόλιν μετ' ἀσφαλείας εὐδαιμονοῦσαν;

[2] De Vectig. iii. 9-12.

without service rendered, or the pretence of service. He strains yet farther the dangerous principle of the Theôrikon, without the same excuse as can be shown for the Theôrikon itself on religious grounds.[1] If such a proposition had been made by Kleon, Hyperbolus, Kleophon, Agyrrhius, &c., it would have been dwelt upon by most historians of Greece as an illustration of the cacoethes of democracy—to extract money, somehow or other, from the rich, for the purpose of keeping the poor in comfort. Not one of the democratical leaders, so far as we know, ever ventured to propose so sweeping a measure: we have it here from the pen of the oligarchical Xenophon.

Visionary anticipations of Xenophon, financial and commercial.

But we must of course discuss Xenophon's scheme as a whole: the aggregate enlargement of revenue, from his various new ways and means, on one side—against the new mode and increased amount of expenditure, on the other side. He would not have proposed such an expenditure, if he had not thoroughly believed in the correctness of his own anticipations, both as to the profits of the mining scheme, and as to the increase of receipts from other sources: such as the multiplication of tax-paying Metics, the rent paid by them for the new houses to be built by the city, the increase of the harbour dues from expanded foreign trade. But of these anticipations, even the least unpromising are vague and uncertain: while the prospects of the mining scheme appear thoroughly chimerical. Nothing is clear or certain except the disbursement. We scarcely understand how Xenophon could seriously have imagined, either that voluntary contributors could have been found to subscribe the aggregate fund as he proposes—or that, if subscribed, it could have yielded the prodigious return upon which he reckons. We must, however, recollect that he had no familiarity with finance, or with the conditions and liabilities of commerce, or with the raising of money from voluntary contributors for any collective purpose. He would not have indulged in similar fancies if the question had been about getting together supplies for an army. Practical Athenian financiers would probably say, in criticising his financial project—what

[1] Respecting the Theôrikon at Athens, see my 'History of Greece,' ch. 88, pp. 492-498.

Heraldus[1] observes upon some views of his opponent Salmasius, about the relations of capital and interest in Attica—"Somnium est hominis harum rerum, etiam cum vigilat, nihil scientis".[2] The financial management of Athens was doubtless defective in

[1] This passage of Heraldus is cited by M. Boeckh in his Public Economy of Athens, B. iv. ch. 21, p. 606, Eng. Trans. In that chapter of M. Boeckh's work (pp. 600-610) some very instructive pages will be found about the Xenophontic scheme here noticed.

I will however mention one or two points on which my understanding of the scheme differs from his. He says (p. 605):—"The author supposes that the profit upon this speculation would amount to three oboli per day, so that the subscribers would obtain a very high per centage on their shares. Xenophon supposes unequal contributions, according to the different amounts of property, agreeable to the principles of a property-tax, but an equal distribution of the receipts for the purpose of favouring and aiding the poor. What Xenophon is speaking of is an income annually arising upon each share, either equal to or exceeding the interest of the loans on bottomry. Where, however, is the security that the undertaking would produce three oboli a day to each subscriber?"

I concur in most of what is here said; but M. Boeckh states the matter too much as if the three oboli per diem were a real return arising from the scheme, and payable to each shareholder upon each *share* as he calls it. This is an accident of the case, not the essential feature. The poorest citizens —for whose benefit, more than for any other object, the scheme is contrived—would not be shareholders at all: they would be too poor to contribute anything, yet each of them would receive his triobolon like the rest. Moreover, many citizens, even though able to pay, might hold back, and decline to pay: yet still each would receive as much. And again, the foreigners, kings, satraps, &c., would be contributors, but would receive nothing at all. The distribution of the triobolon would be made to citizens only. Xenophon does indeed state the proportion of receipt to payments in the cases of some rich contributors, as an auxiliary motive to conciliate them. But we ought not to treat this receipt as if it were a real return yielded by the public mining speculation, or as profit actually brought in.

As I conceive the scheme, the daily triobolon, and the respective contributions furnished, have no premeditated ratio, no essential connection with each other. The daily payment of the triobolon to every citizen indiscriminately, is a new and heavy burden which Xenophon imposes upon the city. But this is only one among many other burdens, as we may see by cap. 6. In order to augment the wealth of the city, so as to defray these large expenses, he proposes several new financial measures. Of these the most considerable was the public mining speculation; but it did not stand alone. The financial scheme of Xenophon, both as to receipts and as to expenditure, is more general than M. Boeckh allows for.

[2] It is truly surprising to read in one of Hume's Essays the following sentence. Essay XII. on Civil Liberty, p. 107 ed. of Hume's Philosophical Works, 1825.

"The Athenians, though governed by a Republic, paid near two hundred per cent for those sums of money which any emergence made it necessary for them to borrow, as we learn from Xenophon."

In the note Hume quotes the following passage from this discourse, De Vectigalibus:—Κτῆσιν δὲ ἀπ' οὐδενὸς ἂν οὕτω καλὴν κτήσαιντο, ὥσπερ ἀφ' οὗ ἂν προτελέσωσιν εἰς τὴν ἀφορμήν. Οἱ δέ γε πλεῖστοι Ἀθηναίων πλείονα λήψονται κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ ὅσα ἂν εἰσενέγκωσιν. Οἱ γὰρ μνᾶν προτελέσαντες, ἐγγὺς δυοῖν μνᾶν πρόσοδον ἕξουσι. Ὁ δοκεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀσφαλέστατόν τε καὶ πολυχρονιώτατον εἶναι.

Hume has been misled by dwelling upon one or two separate sentences. If he had taken into consideration the whole discourse and its declared scope, he would have seen that it affords no warrant for any inference as to the rate of interest paid by the Athenian public when they wanted to borrow. In Xenophon's scheme there is no fixed proportion between what a contributor

many ways: but it would not have been improved in the hands of Xenophon—any more than the administrative and judiciary department of Athens would have become better under the severe regimen of Plato.[1] The merits of the Sokratic companions —and great merits they were—lay in the region of instructive theory.

Xenophon exhorts his countrymen to maintain peace.

Xenophon accompanies his financial scheme with a strong recommendation to his countrymen that they should abstain from warlike enterprises and maintain peace with every one. He expatiates on the manifest advantages, nay, even on the necessity, of continued peace, under the actual poverty of the city: for the purpose of recruiting the exhausted means of the citizens, as well as of favouring his own new projects for the improvement of finance and commerce. While he especially deprecates any attempt on the part of Athens to regain by force her lost headship over the Greeks, he at the same time holds out hopes that this dignity would be spontaneously tendered to her, if, besides abstaining from all violence, she conducted herself with a liberal and conciliatory spirit towards all: if she did her best to adjust differences among other cities, and to uphold the autonomy of the Delphian temple.[2] As far as we can judge, such pacific exhortations were at that time wise and politic. Athens had just then concluded peace (355 B.C.) after the three years of ruinous and unsuccessful war, called the Social War, carried on against her revolted allies Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium. To attempt the recovery of empire by force was most mischievous. There was indeed one purpose, for which she was called upon by a wise forecast to put forth her strength—to check the aggrandisement of Philip in Macedonia. But this was a distant purpose: and the necessity, though it became every year more urgent, was not

to the fund would pay and what he would receive. The triobolon received is a fixed sum to each citizen, whereas the contributions of *each* would be different. Moreover the foreigners and metics would contribute without receiving anything, while the poor citizens would receive their triobolon per head, without having contributed anything.

[1] Aristeides the Rhetor has some forcible remarks in defending Rhetoric and the Athenian statesmen against the bitter criticisms of Plato in the Gorgias: pointing out that Plato himself had never made trial of the difficulty of governing any real community of men, or of the necessities under which a statesman in actual political life was placed (Orat. xlv. Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς, pp. 109-110, Dindorf).

[2] Xenoph. De Vectig. v. 3-8.

so prominently manifest[1] in 355 B.C. as to affect the judgment of Xenophon. At that early day, Demosthenes himself did not see the danger from Macedonia: his first Philippic was delivered in 351 B.C., and even then his remonstrances, highly creditable to his own forecast, made little impression on others. But when we read the financial oration De Symmoriis we appreciate his sound administrative and practical judgment; compared with the benevolent dreams and ample public largess in which Xenophon here indulges.[2]

Difference of the latest compositions of Xenophon and Plato, from their point of view in the earlier.

We have seen that Plato died in 347 B.C., having reached the full age of eighty: Xenophon must have attained the same age nearly, and may perhaps have attained it completely—though we do not know the exact year of his death. With both these two illustrious companions of Sokrates, the point of view is considerably modified in their last compositions as compared to their earlier. Xenophon shows the alteration not less clearly than Plato, though in an opposite direction. His discourse on the Athenian revenues differs quite as much from the Anabasis, Cyropædia, and Œkonomikus—as the Leges and Epinomis differ from any of Plato's earlier works. Whatever we may think of the financial and commercial anticipations of Xenophon, his pamphlet on the Athenian revenues betokens a warm sympathy for his native city—a genuine appreciation of her individual freedom and her many-sided intellectual activity—an earnest interest in her actual career, and even in the extension of her commercial and manufacturing wealth. In these respects it recommends itself to our feelings more than the last Platonic production—Leges and Epinomis—composed nearly at the same time, between 356-347 B.C. While Xenophon in old age, becoming reconciled to his country, forgets his early passion for the Spartan drill and discipline, perpetual, monotonous, unlettered — we find in the senility of Plato a more cramping limitation of the varieties of human agency—a stricter com-

[1] See my 'History of Greece,' ch. 86, p. 325 seq.

I agree with Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, ut suprà, p. 601, that this pamphlet of Xenophon is probably to be referred to the close of the Social War, about 355 B.C.

[2] Respecting the first Philippic, and the Oratio De Symmoriis of Demosthenes, see my 'History of Greece,' ch. 87, pp. 401-431.

pression, even of individual thought and speech, under the infallible official orthodoxy—a more extensive use of the pædagogic rod and the censorial muzzle—than he had ever proposed before.

In thus taking an unwilling leave of the Sokratic family, represented by these two venerable survivors—to both of whom the students of Athenian letters and philosophy are so deeply indebted—I feel some satisfaction in the belief, that both of them died, as they were born, citizens of free Athens and of unconquered Hellas: and that neither of them was preserved to an excessive old age, like their contemporary Isokrates, to witness the extinction of Hellenic autonomy by the battle of Chæroneia.[1]

[1] Compare the touching passage in Tacitus's description of the death of Agricola, c. 44-45. "Festinatæ mortis grande solatium tulit, evasisse postremum illud tempus," &c.

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CHAPTER V.

LIFE OF PLATO.

Scanty information about Plato's life.

OF Plato's biography we can furnish nothing better than a faint outline. We are not fortunate enough to possess the work on Plato's life,[1] composed by his companion and disciple Xenokrates, like the life of Plotinus by Porphyry, or that of Proklus by Marinus. Though Plato lived eighty years, enjoying extensive celebrity—and though Diogenes Laertius employed peculiar care in collecting information about him—yet the number of facts recounted is very small, and of those facts a considerable proportion is poorly attested.[2]

[1] This is cited by Simplikius, Schol. ad Aristot. De Cœlo, 470, a. 27; 474, a. 12, ed. Brandis.

[2] Diogen. Laert. iv. 1. The person to whom Diogenes addressed his biography of Plato was a female: possibly the wife of the emperor Septimius Severus (see Philostr. Vit. Apoll. i. 3), who greatly loved and valued the Platonic philosophy (Diog. Laert. iii. 47). Ménage (in his commentary on the Procemium) supposes the person signified to be Arria: this also is a mere conjecture, and in my judgment less probable. We know that the empress gave positive encouragement to writers on philosophy. The article devoted by Diogenes to Plato is of considerable length, including both biography and exposition of doctrine. He makes reference to numerous witnesses—Speusippus, Aristotle, Hermodôrus, Aristippus, Dikæarchus, Aristoxenus, Klearchus, Herakleides, Theopompus, Timon in his Silli or satirical poem, Pamphila, Hermippus, Neanthes, Antileon, Favorinus, Athenodôrus, Timotheus, Idomeneus, Alexander ἐν διαδοχαῖς καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, Satyrus, Onêtor, Alkimus, Euphorion, Panætius, Myronianus, Polemon, Aristophanes of Byzantium, the Alexandrine critic, Antigonus of Karystus, Thrasyllus, &c.

Of the other biographers of Plato, Olympiodorus and the Auctor Anonymus cite no authorities. Apuleius, in his survey of the doctrine of Plato (De Habitudine doctrinarum Platonis, init. p. 567, ed. Paris), mentions only Speusippus, as having attested the early diligence and quick apprehension of Plato. "Speusippus, domesticis instructus documentis, et pueri ejus acre in percipiendo ingenium, et admirandæ verecundiæ indolem laudat, et pubescentis primitias labore atque amore studendi imbutas refert," &c.

Speusippus had composed a funeral Discourse or Encomium on Plato (Diogen. iii. 1, 2; iv. 1, 11). Unfortunately Diogenes refers to it only once in reference to Plato. We can hardly make out whether any of the authors, whom he cites, had made the life of Plato a subject of attentive study. Hermodôrus is cited by Simplikius as having written a treatise περὶ Πλάτωνος. Aristoxenus, Dikæarchus, and Theopompus—perhaps also Hermippus, and Klearchus—had good means of information.

See K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie, p. 97, not. 45.

Plato was born in Ægina (in which island his father enjoyed an estate as kleruch or out-settled citizen) in the month Thargelion (May) of the year B.C. 427.[1] His family, belonging to the Dême Kollytus, was both ancient and noble, in the sense attached to that word at Athens. He was son of Ariston (or, according to some admirers, of the God Apollo) and Periktionê: his maternal ancestors had been intimate friends or relatives of the law-giver Solon, while his father belonged to a Gens tracing its descent from Kodrus, and even from the God Poseidon. He was also nearly related to Charmides and to Kritias—this last the well-known and violent leader among the oligarchy called the Thirty Tyrants.[2] Plato was first called Aristoklês, after his grandfather; but received when he grew up the name of Plato—on account of the breadth (we are

His birth, parentage, and early education.

[1] It was affirmed distinctly by Hermodôrus (according to the statement of Diogenes Laertius, iii. 6) that Plato was twenty-eight years old at the time of the death of Sokrates: that is, in May, 399 B.C. (Zeller, Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 39, ed. 2nd.) This would place the birth of Plato in 427 B.C. Other critics refer his birth to 428 or 429: but I agree with Zeller in thinking that the deposition of Hermodôrus is more trustworthy than any other evidence before us.

Hermodôrus was a friend and disciple of Plato, and is even said to have made money by publishing Plato's dialogues without permission (Cic., Epist. ad Attic. xiii. 21). Suidas, Ἑρμόδωρος. He was also an author: he published a treatise Περὶ Μαθημάτων (Diog. L., Procem. 2).

See the more recent Dissertation of Zeller, De Hermodoro Ephesio et Hermodoro Platonico, Marburg, 1859, p. 19 seq. He cites two important passages (out of the commentary of Simplikius on Aristot. Physic.) referring to the work of Hermodôrus ὁ Πλάτωνος ἑταιρος—a work Περὶ Πλάτωνος, on Plato.

[2] The statements respecting Plato's relatives are obscure and perplexing: unfortunately the *domestica documenta*, which were within the knowledge of his nephew Speusippus, are no longer accessible to us. It is certain that he had two brothers, Glaukon and Adeimantus: besides which, it would appear from the Parmenides (126 B) that he had a younger half-brother by the mother's side, named Antiphon, and son of Pyrilampes (compare Charmides, p. 158 A, and Plut., De Frat. Amore, 12, p. 484 E). But the age, which this would assign to Antiphon, does not harmonise well with the chronological postulates assumed in the exordium of the Parmenides. Accordingly, K. F. Hermann and Stallbaum are led to believe, that besides the brothers of Plato named Glaukon and Adeimantus, there must also have been two uncles of Plato bearing these same names, and having Antiphon for their younger brother. (See Stallbaum's Prolegg. ad Charm. pp. 84, 85, and Prolegg. ad Parmen., Part iii. pp. 304-307.) This is not unlikely: but we cannot certainly determine the point—more especially as we do not know what amount of chronological inaccuracy Plato might hold to be admissible in the *personnel* of his dialogues.

It is worth mentioning, that in the discourse of Andokides de Mysteriis, persons named Plato, Charmides, Antiphon, are named among those accused of concern in the sacrileges of 415 B.C. —the mutilation of the Hermæ and the mock celebration of the mysteries. Speusippus is also named as among the Senators of the year (Andokides de Myst. p. 13-27, seq.). Whether these persons belonged to the same family as the philosopher Plato, we cannot say. He himself was then only twelve years old.

told) either of his forehead or of his shoulders. Endowed with a robust physical frame, and exercised in gymnastics, not merely in one of the palæstræ of Athens (which he describes graphically in the Charmides) but also under an Argeian trainer, he attained such force and skill as to contend (if we may credit Dikæarchus) for the prize of wrestling among boys at the Isthmian festival.[1] His literary training was commenced under a schoolmaster named Dionysius, and pursued under Drakon, a celebrated teacher of music in the large sense then attached to that word. He is said to have displayed both diligence and remarkable quickness of apprehension, combined too with the utmost gravity and modesty.[2] He not only acquired great familiarity with the poets, but composed poetry of his own—dithyrambic, lyric, and tragic: and he is even reported to have prepared a tragic tetralogy, with the view of competing for victory at the Dionysian festival. We are told that he burned these poems, when he attached himself to the society of Sokrates. No compositions in verse remain under his name, except a few epigrams —amatory, affectionate, and of great poetical beauty. But there is ample proof in his dialogues that the cast of his mind was essentially poetical. Many of his philosophical speculations are nearly allied to poetry, and acquire their hold upon the mind rather through imagination and sentiment than through reason or evidence.

Early relations of Plato with Sokrates.

According to Diogenes[3] (who on this point does not cite his authority), it was about the twentieth year of Plato's age (407 B.C.) that his acquaintance with Sokrates began. It may possibly have begun earlier, but certainly not later—since at the time of the conversation (related by Xenophon) between Sokrates and Plato's younger brother Glaukon, there was already a friendship established between Sokrates and Plato: and that time can hardly be later than 406 B.C., or the beginning of 405 B.C.[4] From 406 B.C. down to 399

[1] Diog. L. iii. 4; Epiktêtus, i. 8-13, εἰ δὲ καλὸς ἦν Πλάτων καὶ ἰσχυρός, &c.

The statement of Sextus Empiricus —that Plato in his boyhood had his ears bored and wore ear-rings—indicates the opulent family to which he belonged. (Sex. Emp. adv. Gramm. s. 258.) Probably some of the old habits of the great Athenian families, as to ornaments worn on the head or hair, were preserved with the children after they had been discontinued with adults. See Thuc. i. 6.

[2] Diog. L. iii. 26.

[3] Ibid. 6.

[4] Xen. Mem. iii. 6, 1. Sokrates was induced by his friendship for Plato and for Charmides the cousin of Plato, to

B.C., when Sokrates was tried and condemned, Plato seems to have remained in friendly relation and society with him: a relation perhaps interrupted during the severe political struggles between 405 B.C. and 403 B.C., but revived and strengthened after the restoration of the democracy in the last-mentioned year.

But though Plato may have commenced at the age of twenty his acquaintance with Sokrates, he cannot have been exclusively occupied in philosophical pursuits between the nineteenth and the twenty-fifth year of his age—that is, between 409-403 B.C. He was carried, partly by his own dispositions, to other matters besides philosophy; and even if such dispositions had not existed, the exigencies of the time pressed upon him imperatively as an Athenian citizen. Even under ordinary circumstances, a young Athenian of eighteen years of age, as soon as he was enrolled on the public register of citizens, was required to take the memorable military oath in the chapel of Aglaurus, and to serve on active duty, constant or nearly constant, for two years, in various posts throughout Attica, for the defence of the country.[1] But the six years from 409-403 B.C. were years of an extraordinary character. They included the most strenuous public efforts, the severest suffering, and the gravest political revolution, that had ever occurred at Athens. Every Athenian citizen was of necessity put upon constant (almost daily) military service; either abroad, or in Attica against the Lacedæmonian garrison established in the permanent fortified post of Dekeleia, within sight of the Athenian Akropolis. So

Plato's youth—service as a citizen and soldier.

admonish the forward youth Glaukon (Plato's younger brother), who thrust himself forward obtrusively to speak in the public assembly before he was twenty years of age. The two discourses of Sokrates—one with the presumptuous Glaukon, the other with the diffident Charmides—are both reported by Xenophon.

These discourses must have taken place before the battle of Ægospotami: for Charmides was killed during the Anarchy, and Glaukon certainly would never have attempted such acts of presumption after the restoration of the democracy, at a time when the tide of public feeling had become vehemently hostile to Kritias, Charmides, and all the names and families connected with the oligarchical rule just overthrown.

I presume the conversation of Sokrates with Glaukon to have taken place in 406 B.C. or 405 B.C.: it was in 405 B.C. that the disastrous battle of Ægospotami occurred.

[1] Read the oath sworn by the Ephêbi in Pollux viii. 105. Æschines tells us that he served his two ephebic years as περίπολος τῆς χώρας, when there was no remarkable danger or foreign pressure. See Æsch. De Fals. Legat. s. 178. See the facts about the Athenian Ephêbi brought together in a Dissertation by W. Dittenberger, p. 9-12.

habitually were the citizens obliged to be on guard, that Athens, according to Thucydides,[1] became a military post rather than a city. It is probable that Plato, by his family and its place on the census, belonged to the Athenian Hippeis or Horsemen, who were in constant employment for the defence of the territory. But at any rate, either on horseback, or on foot, or on shipboard, a robust young citizen like Plato, whose military age commenced in 409, must have borne his fair share in this hard but indispensable duty. In the desperate emergency, which preceded the battle of Arginusæ (406 B.C.), the Athenians put to sea in thirty days a fleet of 110 triremes for the relief of Mitylenê; all the men of military age, freemen, and slaves, embarking.[2] We can hardly imagine that at such a season Plato can have wished to decline service: even if he had wished it, the Strategi would not have permitted him. Assuming that he remained at home, the garrison-duty at Athens must have been doubled on account of the number of departures. After the crushing defeat of the

[1] Thuc. vii. 27: ὀσημέραι ἐξελαυνόντων τῶν ἱππέων, &c. Cf., viii. 69. Antiphon, who is described in the beginning of the Parmenides, as devoted to ἱππική, must have been either brother or uncle of Plato.

[2] Xen. Hell. i. 6, 24. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ γεγενημένα καὶ τὴν πολιορκίαν ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν, ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν καὶ δέκα, εἰσβιβάζοντες τοὺς ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντας ἅπαντας, καὶ δούλους καὶ ἐλευθέρους· καὶ πληρώσαντες τὰς δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐν τριάκοντα ἡμέραις, ἀπῆραν· εἰσέβησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἱππέων πολλοί. In one of the anecdotes given by Diogenes (iii. 24) Plato alludes to his own military service. Aristoxenus (Diog. L. iii. 8) said that Plato had been engaged thrice in military expeditions out of Attica: once to Tanagra, a second time to Corinth, a third time to Delium, where he distinguished himself. Aristoxenus must have had fair means of information, yet I do not know what to make of this statement. All the three places named are notorious for battles fought by Athens; nevertheless chronology utterly forbids the supposition that Plato could have been present either at *the* battle of Tanagra or at *the* battle of Delium. At the battle of Delium Sokrates was present, and is said to have distinguished himself: hence there is ground for suspecting some confusion between his name and that of Plato. It is however possible that there may have been, during the interval between 410-405 B.C., partial invasions of the frontiers of Bœotia by Athenian detachments: both Tanagra and Delium were on the Bœotian frontier. The great battle of Corinth took place in 394 B.C. Plato left Athens immediately after the death of Sokrates in 399 B.C., and visited several foreign countries during the years immediately following; but he may have been at Athens in 394 B.C., and may have served in the Athenian force at Corinth. See Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hell. ad ann. 395 B.C. I do not see how Plato could have been engaged in any battle of Delium *after* the battle of Corinth, for Athens was not then at war with the Bœotians.

At the same time I confess that the account given by or ascribed to Aristoxenus appears to me to have been founded on little positive information, when we compare it with the military duty which Plato must have done between 410-405 B.C.

It is curious that Antisthenes also is mentioned as having distinguished himself at the battle of Tanagra (Diog. vi. 1). The same remarks are applicable to him as have just been made upon Plato

Athenians at Ægospotami, came the terrible apprehension at Athens, then the long blockade and famine of the city (wherein many died of hunger); next the tyranny of the Thirty, who among their other oppressions made war upon all free speech, and silenced even the voice of Sokrates: then the gallant combat of Thrasybulus followed by the intervention of the Lacedæmonians —contingencies full of uncertainty and terror, but ending in the restoration of the democracy. After such restoration, there followed all the anxieties, perils, of reaction, new enactments and provisions, required for the revived democracy, during the four years between the expulsion of the Thirty and the death of Sokrates.

Period of political ambition.

From the dangers, fatigues, and sufferings of such an historical decad, no Athenian citizen could escape, whatever might be his feeling towards the existing democracy, or however averse he might be to public employment by natural temper. But Plato was not thus averse, during the earlier years of his adult life. We know, from his own letters, that he then felt strongly the impulse of political ambition usual with young Athenians of good family;[1] though probably not with any such premature vehemence as his younger brother Glaukon, whose impatience Sokrates is reported to have so judiciously moderated.[2] Whether Plato ever spoke with success in the public assembly, we do not know: he is said to have been shy by nature, and his voice was thin and feeble, ill adapted for the Pnyx.[3] However, when the oligarchy of Thirty was established, after the capture and subjugation of Athens, Plato was not only relieved from the necessity of addressing the assembled people, but also obtained additional facilities for rising into political influence, through Kritias (his near relative) and Charmides, leading men among the new oligarchy. Plato affirms that he had always disapproved the antecedent democracy, and that he entered on the new scheme of government with full hope of seeing justice and wisdom predominant. He was soon undeceived. The government of the Thirty proved a sanguinary and rapacious tyranny,[4] filling him with disappointment and disgust.

1 Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 324-325.
2 Xen., Mem. iii. 6.
3 Diogen. Laert. iii. 5: Ἰσχνόφωνός τε ἦν, &c. iii. 26: αἰδήμων καὶ κόσμιος.
4 History of Greece, vol. viii. ch. 65.

He was especially revolted by their treatment of Sokrates, whom they not only interdicted from continuing his habitual colloquy with young men,[1] but even tried to implicate in nefarious murders, by ordering him along with others to arrest Leon the Salaminian, one of their intended victims: an order which Sokrates, at the peril of his life, disobeyed.

He becomes disgusted with politics.

Thus mortified and disappointed, Plato withdrew from public functions. What part he took in the struggle between the oligarchy and its democratical assailants under Thrasybulus, we are not informed. But when the democracy was re-established, his political ambition revived, and he again sought to acquire some active influence on public affairs. Now however the circumstances had become highly unfavourable to him. The name of his deceased relative Kritias was generally abhorred, and he had no powerful partisans among the popular leaders. With such disadvantages, with anti-democratical sentiments, and with a thin voice, we cannot wonder that Plato soon found public life repulsive;[2] though he admits the remarkable moderation displayed by the restored Demos. His repugnance was aggravated to the highest pitch of grief and indignation by the trial and condemnation of Sokrates (399 B.C.), four years after the renewal of the democracy. At that moment doubtless the Sokratic men or companions were unpopular in a body. Plato, after having yielded his best sympathy and aid at the trial of Sokrates, retired along with several others of them to Megara. He made up his mind that for a man of his views and opinions, it was not only unprofitable, but also unsafe, to embark in active public life, either at Athens or in any other Grecian city. He resolved to devote himself to philosophical speculation,

1 Xen. Mem. i. 2, 36; Plato, Apol. Sokrat. c. 20, p. 32.

2 Ælian (V. H. iii. 27) had read a story to the effect, that Plato, in consequence of poverty, was about to seek military service abroad, and was buying arms for the purpose, when he was induced to stay by the exhortation of Sokrates, who prevailed upon him to devote himself to philosophy at home.

If there be any truth in this story, it must refer to some time in the interval between the restoration of the democracy (403 B.C.) and the death of Sokrates (399 B.C.). The military service of Plato, prior to the battle of Ægospotami (405 B.C.), must have been obligatory, in defence of his country, not depending on his own free choice. It is possible also that Plato may have been for the time impoverished, like many other citizens, by the intestine troubles in Attica, and may have contemplated military service abroad, like Xenophon.

But I am inclined to think that the story is unfounded, and that it arises from some confusion between Plato and Xenophon.

and to abstain from practical politics ; unless fortune should present to him some exceptional case, of a city prepared to welcome and obey a renovator upon exalted principles.[1]

He retires from Athens after the death of Sokrates—his travels.

At Megara Plato passed some time with the Megarian Eukleides, his fellow-disciple in the society of Sokrates, and the founder of what is termed the Megaric school of philosophers. He next visited Kyrênê, where he is said to have become acquainted with the geometrician Theodôrus, and to have studied geometry under him. From Kyrênê he proceeded to Egypt, interesting himself much in the antiquities of the country as well as in the conversation of the priests. In or about 394 B.C.—if we may trust the statement of Aristoxenus about the military service of Plato at Corinth, he was again at Athens. He afterwards went to Italy and Sicily, seeking the society of the Pythagorean philosophers, Archytas, Echekrates, Timæus, &c., at Tarentum and Lokri, and visiting the volcanic manifestations of Ætna. It appears that his first visit to Sicily was made when he was about forty years of age, which would be 387 B.C. Here he made acquaintance with the youthful Dion, over whom he acquired great intellectual ascendancy. By Dion Plato was prevailed upon to visit the elder Dionysius at Syracuse :[2] but that despot, offended by the free spirit of his conversation and admonitions, dismissed him with displeasure, and even caused him to be sold into slavery at Ægina in his voyage home. Though really sold, however, Plato was speedily ransomed by friends. After farther incurring some risk of his life as an Athenian citizen, in consequence of the hostile feelings of the Æginetans, he was conveyed away safely to Athens, about 386 B.C.[3]

It was at this period, about 386 B.C., that the continuous and

[1] The above account of Plato's proceedings, perfectly natural and interesting, but unfortunately brief, is to be found in his seventh Epistle, p. 325-326.

[2] Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 324 A, 327 A.

[3] Plut. Dion. c. 5 ; Corn. Nep., Dion, ii. 3 ; Diog. Laert. iii. 19-20 ; Aristides, Or. xlvi., Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων, p. 305-306, ed. Dindorf.

Cicero (De Fin. v. 29 ; Tusc. Disp. i. 17), and others, had contracted a lofty idea of Plato's Travels, more than the reality seems to warrant. Val. Max. viii. 7, 3 ; Plin. Hist. Nat. xxx. 2.

The Sophist Himerius repeats the same general statements about Plato's early education, and extensive subsequent travels, but without adding any new particulars (Orat. xiv. 21-25).

If we can trust a passage of Tzetzes, cited by Mr. Clinton (F. H. ad B.C. 366) and by Welcker (Trag. Gr. p. 1236), Dionysius the elder of Syracuse had composed (among his various dramas) a tragi-comedy directed against Plato.

His permanent establishment at Athens—386 B.C.

formal public teaching of Plato, constituting as it does so great an epoch in philosophy, commenced. But I see no ground for believing, as many authors assume, that he was absent from Athens during the entire interval between 399-386 B.C. I regard such long-continued absence as extremely improbable. Plato had not been sentenced to banishment, nor was he under any compulsion to stay away from his native city. He was not born "of an oak-tree or a rock" (to use an Homeric phrase, strikingly applied by Sokrates in his Apology to the Dikasts[1]), but of a noble family at Athens, where he had brothers and other connections. A temporary retirement, immediately after the death of Sokrates, might be congenial to his feelings and interesting in many ways; but an absence of moderate length would suffice for such exigencies, and there were surely reasonable motives to induce him to revisit his friends at home. I conceive Plato as having visited Kyrênê, Egypt, and Italy during these thirteen years, yet as having also spent part of this long time at Athens. Had he been continuously absent from that city he would have been almost forgotten, and would scarcely have acquired reputation enough to set up with success as a teacher.[2]

He commences his teaching at the Academy.

The spot selected by Plato for his lectures or teaching was a garden adjoining the precinct sacred to the Hero Hekadêmus or Akadêmus, distant from the gate of Athens called Dipylon somewhat less than a mile, on the road to Eleusis, towards the north. In this precinct there were both walks, shaded by trees, and a gymnasium for bodily exercise; close adjoining, Plato either inherited or acquired a small dwelling-house and garden, his own private property.[3] Here, under the name of the Academy, was founded

[1] Plato, Apol. p. 34 D.

[2] Stallbaum insists upon it as "certum et indubium" that Plato was absent from Athens continuously, without ever returning to it, for the thirteen years immediately succeeding the death of Sokrates. But I see no good evidence of this, and I think it highly improbable. See Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Platon. Politicum, p. 38, 39. The statement of Strabo (xvii. 806), that Plato and Eudoxus passed thirteen years in Egypt, is not admissible.

Ueberweg examines and criticises the statements about Plato's travels. He considers it probable that Plato passed some part of these thirteen years at Athens (Ueber die Aechtheit und Zeitfolge der Platon. Schrift. p. 126, 127). Mr. Fynes Clinton thinks the same. F. H. B.C. 394; Append. c. 21, p. 366.

[3] Diog. Laert. iii. 7, 8; Cic. De Fin. v. 1; C. G. Zumpt, Ueber den Bestand der philosophischen Schulen in Athen, p. 8 (Berlin, 1843). The Academy was

the earliest of those schools of philosophy, which continued for centuries forward to guide and stimulate the speculative minds of Greece and Rome.

We have scarce any particulars respecting the growth of the Academy from this time to the death of Plato, in 347 B.C. We only know generally that his fame as a lecturer became eminent and widely diffused: that among his numerous pupils were included Speusippus, Xenokrates, Aristotle, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Lykurgus, &c.: that he was admired and consulted by Perdikkas in Macedonia and Dionysius at Syracuse: that he was also visited by listeners and pupils from all parts of Greece. Among them was Eudoxus of Knidus, who afterwards became illustrious both in geometry and astronomy. At the age of twenty-three, and in poor circumstances, Eudoxus was tempted by the reputation of the Sokratic men, and enabled by the aid of friends, to visit Athens: where, however, he was coldly received by Plato. Besides preparing an octennial period or octaetêris, and a descriptive map of the Heavens, Eudoxus also devised the astronomical hypothesis of Concentric Spheres—the earliest theory proposed to show that the apparent irregularity in the motion of the Sun and the Planets might be explained, and proved to result from a multiplicity of co-operating spheres or agencies, each in itself regular.[1] This theory of Eudoxus is said

Plato as a teacher—pupils numerous and wealthy, from different cities.

consecrated to Athênê; there was, however, a statue of Eros there, to whom sacrifice was offered, in conjunction with Athênê. Athenæus, xiii. 561.

At the time when Aristophanes assailed Sokrates in the comedy of the Nubes (423 B.C.), the Academy was known and familiar as a place for gymnastic exercise; and Aristophanes (Nub. 995) singles it out as the proper scene of action for the honest and muscular youth, who despises rhetoric and philosophy. Aristophanes did not anticipate that within a short time after the representation of his last comedy, the most illustrious disciple of Sokrates would select the Academy as the spot for his residence and philosophical lectures, and would confer upon the name a permanent intellectual meaning, as designating the earliest and most memorable of the Hellenic schools.

In 369 B.C., when the school of Plato was in existence, the Athenian hoplites, marching to aid the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, were ordered by Iphikrates to make their evening meal in the Academy (Xen. Hell. vi. 5, 49).

The garden, afterwards established by Epikurus, was situated between the gate of Athens and the Academy: so that a person passed by it, when he walked forth from Athens to the Academy (Cic. De Fin. i. 1).

[1] For an account of Eudoxus himself, of his theory of concentric spheres, and the subsequent extensions of it, see the instructive volume of the late lamented Sir George Cornewall Lewis, —Historical Survey of the Ancient Astronomy, ch. iii. sect. 3, p. 146 seq.

M. Boeckh also (in his recent publication, Ueber die vierjährigen Sonnenkreise der Alten, vorzüglich den Eudoxischen, Berlin, 1863) has given an account of the life and career of

to have originated in a challenge of Plato, who propounded to astronomers, in his oral discourse, the problem which they ought to try to solve.[1]

Eudoxus, not with reference to his theory of concentric spheres, but to his Calendar and Lunisolar Cycles or Periods, quadrennial and octennial. I think Boeckh is right in placing the voyage of Eudoxus to Egypt at an *earlier* period of the life of Eudoxus; that is, about 378 B.C.; and not in 362 B.C., where it is placed by Letronne and others. Boeckh shows that the letters of recommendation from Agesilaus to Nektanebos, which Eudoxus took with him, do not necessarily coincide in time with the military expedition of Agesilaus to Egypt, but were more probably of earlier date. (Boeckh, p. 140-148.)

Eudoxus lived 53 years (406-353 B.C., about); being born when Plato was 21, and dying when Plato was 75. He was one of the most illustrious men of the age. He was born in poor circumstances; but so marked was his early promise, that some of the medical school at Knidus assisted him to prosecute his studies—to visit Athens and hear the Sophists, Plato among them—to visit Egypt, Tarentum (where he studied geometry with Archytas), and Sicily (where he studied *τὰ ἰατρικὰ* with Philistion). These facts depend upon the Πίνακες of Kallimachus, which are good authority. (Diog. L. viii. 86.)

After thus preparing himself by travelling and varied study, Eudoxus took up the profession of a Sophist, at Kyzikus and the neighbouring cities in the Propontis. He obtained great celebrity, and a large number of pupils. M. Boeckh says, "Dort lebte er als Sophist, sagt Sotion: das heisst, er lehrte, und hielt Vorträge. Dasselbe bezeugt Philostratos."

I wish to call particular attention to the way in which M. Boeckh here describes a Sophist of the fourth century B.C. Nothing can be more correct. Every man who taught and gave lectures to audiences more or less numerous, was so called. The Platonic critics altogether darken the history of philosophy, by using the word *Sophist* with its modern associations (and the unmeaning abstract *Sophistic* which they derive from it), to represent a supposed school of speculative and deceptive corruptors.

Eudoxus, having been coldly received when young and poor by Plato, had satisfaction in revisiting Athens at the height of his reputation, accompanied by numerous pupils—and in showing himself again to Plato. The two then became friends. Menæchmus and Helikon, geometrical pupils of Eudoxus, received instruction from Plato also; and Helikon accompanied Plato on his third voyage to Sicily (Plato, Epist. xiii. p. 360 D; Plut. Dion, c. 19). Whether Eudoxus accompanied him there also, as Boeckh supposes, is doubtful: I think it improbable.

Eudoxus ultimately returned to his native city of Knidus, where he was received with every demonstration of honour: a public vote of esteem and recognition being passed to welcome him. He is said to have been solicited to give laws to the city, and to have actually done so: how far this may be true, we cannot say. He also visited the neighbouring prince Mausôlus of Karia, by whom he was much honoured.

We know from Aristotle, that Eudoxus was not only illustrious as an astronomer and geometer, but that he also proposed a theory of Ethics, similar in its general formula to that which was afterwards laid down by Epikurus. Aristotle dissents from the theory, but he bears express testimony, in a manner very unusual with him, to the distinguished personal merit and virtue of Eudoxus (Ethic. Nikom. x. 3, p. 1172, b. 16).

[1] Respecting Eudoxus, see Diog. L. viii. 86-91. As the life of Eudoxus probably extended from about 406-353 B.C., his first visit to Athens would be about 383 B.C., some three years after Plato commenced his school. Strabo (xvii. 806), when he visited Heliopolis in Egypt, was shown by the guides certain cells or chambers which were said to have been occupied by Plato and Eudoxus, and was assured that the two had passed thirteen years together in Egypt. This account deserves no credit. Plato and Eudoxus visited Egypt, but not together, and neither of them for so long as thirteen years. Eudoxus stayed there sixteen months (Diog. L. viii. 87). Simplikius, Schol. ad Aristot. De Cœlo, p. 497, 498, ed. Brandis, 498, a. 45. Καὶ πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων Εὔδοξος ὁ Κνίδιος.

Though Plato demanded no money as a fee for admission of pupils, yet neither did he scruple to receive presents from rich men such as Dionysius, Dion, and others.[1] In the jests of Ephippus, Antiphanes, and other poets of the middle comedy, the pupils of Plato in the Academy are described as finely and delicately clad, nice in their persons even to affectation, with elegant caps and canes; which is the more to be noticed because the preceding comic poets derided Sokrates and his companions for qualities the very opposite—as prosing beggars, in mean attire and dirt.[2] Such students must have belonged to opulent

ὡς Εὔδημός τε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῆς Ἀστρολογικῆς Ἱστορίας ἀπεμνημόνευσε καὶ Σωσιγένης παρὰ Εὐδήμου τοῦτο λαβὼν, ἄψασθαι λέγεται τῶν τοιούτων ὑποθέσεων· Πλάτωνος, ὥς φησι Σωσιγένης, πρόβλημα τοῦτο ποιησαμένου τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα ἐσπουδακόσι —τίνων ὑποτεθείσων ὁμαλῶν καὶ τεταγμένων κινήσεων διασωθῇ τὰ περὶ τὰς κινήσεις τῶν πλανωμένων φαινόμενα. The Scholion of Simplikius, which follows at great length, is exceedingly interesting and valuable, in regard to the astronomical theory of Eudoxus, with the modifications introduced into it by Kallippus, Aristotle, and others. All the share in it which is claimed for Plato, is, that he described in clear language the problem to be solved: and even *that* share depends simply upon the statement of the Alexandrine Sosigenes (contemporary of Julius Cæsar), not upon the statement of Eudêmus. At least the language of Simplikius affirms, that Sosigenes copied from Eudêmus the fact, that Eudoxus was the first Greek who proposed a systematic astronomical hypothesis to explain the motions of the planets—(παρ' Εὐδήμου τοῦτο λαβών) not the circumstance, that Plato propounded the problem afterwards mentioned. From whom Sosigenes derived this last information, is not indicated. About his time, various fictions had gained credit in Egypt respecting the connection of Plato with Eudoxus, as we may see by the story of Strabo above cited. If Plato impressed upon others that which is here ascribed to him, he must have done so in *conversation or oral discourse*—for there is nothing in his written dialogues to that effect. Moreover, there is nothing in the dialogues to make us suppose that Plato adopted or approved the theory of Eudoxus. When Plato speaks of astronomy, either in the Republic, or in Leges, or in Epinomis, it is in a totally different spirit—not manifesting any care to save the astronomical phenomena. Both Aristotle himself (Metaphys. Λ. p. 1073 b.) and Simplikius, make it clear that Aristotle warmly espoused and enlarged the theory of Eudoxus. Theophrastus, successor of Aristotle, did the same. But we do not hear that either Speusippus or Xenokrates (successor of Plato) took any interest in the theory. This is one remarkable point of divergence between Plato and the Platonists on one side—Aristotle and the Aristotelians on the other—and much to the honour of the latter: for the theory of Eudoxus, though erroneous, was a great step towards improved scientific conceptions on astronomy, and a great provocative to farther observation of astronomical facts.

[1] Plato, Epistol. xiii. p. 361, 362. We learn from this epistle that Plato received pecuniary remittances not merely from Dionysius, but also from other friends (ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων—361 C); that he employed these not only for choregies and other costly functions of his own, but also to provide dowry for female relatives, and presents to friends (363 A).

[2] See Meineke, Hist. Crit. Comic. Græc. p. 288, 289—and the extracts there given from Ephippus and Antiphanes—apud Athenæum, xi. 509, xii. 544. About the poverty and dirt which was reproached to Sokrates and his disciples, see the fragment of Ameipsias in Meineke, ibid. p. 203. Also Aristoph. Aves, 1555; Nubes, 827; and the Fragm. of Eupolis in Meineke, p. 552—Μισῶ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Σωκράτην, τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην.

families; and we may be sure that they requited their master by some valuable present, though no fee may have been formally demanded from them. Some conditions (though we do not know what) were doubtless required for admission. Moreover the example of Eudoxus shows that in some cases even ardent and promising pupils were practically repelled. At any rate, the teaching of Plato formed a marked contrast with that extreme and indiscriminate publicity which characterised the conversation of Sokrates, who passed his days in the market-place or in the public porticoes or palæstræ; while Plato both dwelt and discoursed in a quiet residence and garden a little way out of Athens. The title of Athens to be considered the training-city of Hellas (as Perikles had called her fifty years before), was fully sustained by the Athenian writers and teachers between 390-347; especially by Plato and Isokrates, the most celebrated and largely frequented. So many foreign pupils came to Isokrates that he affirms most of his pecuniary gains to have been derived from non-Athenians. Several of his pupils stayed with him three or four years. The like is doubtless true about the pupils of Plato.[1]

Visit of Plato to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse, 367 B.C. Second visit to the same—mortifying failure.

It was in the year 367-366 that Plato was induced, by the earnest entreaties of Dion, to go from Athens to Syracuse, on a visit to the younger Dionysius, who had just become despot, succeeding to his father of the same name. Dionysius II., then very young, had manifested some dispositions towards philosophy, and prodigious admiration for Plato: who was encouraged by Dion to hope that he would have influence enough to bring about an amendment or

Meineke thinks, that Aristophanes, in the Ekklesiazusæ, 646, and in the Plutus, 313, intends to ridicule Plato under the name of Aristyllus: Plato's name having been originally Aristokles. But I see no sufficient ground for this opinion.

[1] Perikles in the Funeral Oration (Thuc. ii. 41) calls Athens τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν: the same eulogium is repeated, with greater abundance of words, by Isokrates in his Panegyrical Oration (Or. iv. sect. 56, p. 51).

The declaration of Isokrates, that most of his money was acquired from foreign (non-Athenian) pupils, and the interesting fact that many of them not only stayed with him three or four years but were even then loth to depart, will be found in Orat. xv. De Permutatione, sect. 93-175. Plutarch (Vit. x. Orat. 838 E) goes so far as to say that Isokrates never required any pay from an Athenian pupil.

Nearly three centuries after Plato's decease, Cicero sent his son Marcus to Athens, where the son spent a considerable time, frequenting the lectures of the Peripatetic philosopher Kratippus. Young Cicero, in an interesting

thorough reform of the government at Syracuse. This ill-starred visit, with its momentous sequel, has been described in my 'History of Greece'. It not only failed completely, but made matters worse rather than better: Dionysius became violently alienated from Dion, and sent him into exile. Though turning a deaf ear to Plato's recommendations, he nevertheless liked his conversation, treated him with great respect, detained him for some time at Syracuse, and was prevailed upon, only by the philosopher's earnest entreaties, to send him home. Yet in spite of such uncomfortable experience Plato was induced, after a certain interval, again to leave Athens and pay a second visit to Dionysius, mainly in hopes of procuring the restoration of Dion. In this hope too he was disappointed, and was glad to return, after a longer stay than he wished, to Athens.

Expedition of Dion against Dionysius—sympathies of Plato and the Academy.

It was in 359 B.C. that Dion, aided by friends in Peloponnesus, and encouraged by warm sympathy and co-operation from many of Plato's pupils in the Academy,[1] equipped an armament against Dionysius. Notwithstanding the inadequacy of his force he had the good fortune to make himself master of Syracuse, being greatly favoured by the popular discontent of the Syracusans against the reigning despot: but he did not know how to deal with the people, nor did he either satisfy their aspirations towards liberty, or realise his own engagements. Retaining in his hands a despotic power, similar in the main to that of Dionysius, he speedily became odious, and was assassinated by the treachery of Kallippus, his companion in arms as well as fellow-pupil of the Platonic Academy. The state of Syracuse, torn by the joint evils of

Success, misconduct, and death of Dion.

letter addressed to Tiro (Cic. Epist. Fam. xvi. 23), describes in animated terms both his admiration for the person and abilities, and his delight in the private society, of Kratippus. Several of Plato's pupils probably felt as much or more towards him.

[1] Plutarch, Dion, c. 22.

Xenokrates as well as Speusippus accompanied Plato to Sicily (Diog. L. iv. 6).

To show the warm interest taken, not only by Plato himself but also by the Platonic pupils in the Academy in the conduct of Dion after he had become master of Syracuse, Plutarch quotes both from the letter of Plato to Dion (which now stands fourth among the Epistolæ Platonicæ, p. 320) and also from a letter which he had read, written by Speusippus to Dion; in which Speusippus exhorts Dion emphatically to bless Sicily with good laws and government, "in *order that he may glorify the Academy*"—ὅπως . . . εὐκλεᾶ θήσει τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν (Plutarch, De Adulator. et Amic. c. 29, p. 70 A).

anarchy and despotism, and partially recovered by Dionysius, became more unhappy than ever.

Death of Plato, aged 80, 347 B.C.

The visits of Plato to Dionysius were much censured, and his motives[1] misrepresented by unfriendly critics; and these reproaches were still further embittered by the entire failure of his hopes. The closing years of his long life were saddened by the disastrous turn of events at Syracuse, aggravated by the discreditable abuse of power and violent death of his intimate friend Dion, which brought dishonour both upon himself and upon the Academy. Nevertheless he lived to the age of eighty, and died in 348-347 B.C., leaving a competent property, which he bequeathed by a will still extant.[2] But his foundation, the Academy, did not die with him. It passed to his nephew Speusippus, who succeeded him as teacher, conductor of the school, or Scholarch: and was himself succeeded after eight years by Xenokrates of Chalkêdon: while another pupil of the Academy, Aristotle, after an absence of some years from Athens, returned thither and established a school of his own at the Lykeum, at another extremity of the city.

Scholars of Plato—Aristotle.

The latter half of Plato's life in his native city must have been one of dignity and consideration, though not of any political activity. He is said to have addressed the Dikastery as an advocate for the accused general Chabrias: and we are told that he discharged the expensive and showy functions of Chorêgus, with funds supplied by Dion.[3]

[1] Themistius, Orat. xxiii. (Sophistes) p. 285 C; Aristeides, Orat. xlvi., Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων, p. 234-235; Apuleius, De Habit. Philos. Platon. p. 571.

[2] Diog. Laert. iii. 41-42. Seneca (Epist. 58) says that Plato died on the anniversary of his birth, in the month Thargelion.

[3] Plut. Aristeides, c. 1; Diog. Laert. iii. 23-24. Diogenes says that no other Athenian except Plato dared to speak publicly in defence of Chabrias; but this can hardly be correct, since Aristotle mentions another συνήγορος named Lykoleon (Rhet. iii. 10, p. 1411, b. 6). We may fairly presume that the trial of Chabrias alluded to by Aristotle is the same as that alluded to by Diogenes, that which arose out of the wrongful occupation of Orôpus by the Thebans. If Plato appeared at the trial, I doubt whether it could have occurred in 366 B.C., as Clinton supposes; Plato must have been absent during that year in Sicily.

The anecdote given by Diogenes, in relation to Plato's appearance at this trial, deserves notice. Krobylus, one of the accusers, said to him, "Are *you* come to plead on behalf of another? Are not you aware that the hemlock of Sokrates is in store for *you* also?" Plato replied: "I affronted dangers formerly, when I went on military expedition, for my country, and I am prepared to affront them now in discharge of my duty to a friend" (iii. 24).

This anecdote is instructive, as it exhibits the continuance of the anti-philosophical antipathies at Athens among a considerable portion of the citizens, and as it goes to attest the military service rendered personally by Plato.

Out of Athens also his reputation was very great. When he went to the Olympic festival of B.C. 360, he was an object of conspicuous attention and respect: he was visited by hearers, young men of rank and ambition, from the most distant Hellenic cities; and his advice was respectfully invoked both by Perdikkas in Macedonia and by Dionysius II. at Syracuse. During his last visit to Syracuse, it is said that some of the students in the Academy, among whom Aristotle is mentioned, became dissatisfied with his absence, and tried to set up a new school; but were prevented by Iphikrates and Chabrias, the powerful friends of Plato at Athens. This story is connected with alleged ingratitude on the part of Aristotle towards Plato, and with alleged repugnance on the part of Plato towards Aristotle.[1] The fact itself—that during Plato's absence in Sicily his students sought to provide for themselves instruction and discussion elsewhere—is neither surprising nor blameable. And as to Aristotle, there is ground for believing that he passed for an intimate friend and disciple of Plato, even during the last ten years of Plato's life. For we read that Aristotle, following

Diogenes (iii. 46) gives a long list of hearers; and Athenæus (xi. 506-509) enumerates several from different cities in Greece: Euphræus of Oreus (in Eubœa), who acquired through Plato's recommendation great influence with Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, and who is said to have excluded from the society of that king every one ignorant of philosophy and geometry; Euagon of Lampsakus, Timæus of Kyzikus, Chæron of Pellênê, all of whom tried, and the last with success, to usurp the sceptre in their respective cities; Eudêmus of Cyprus; Kallippus the Athenian, fellow-learner with Dion in the Academy, afterwards his companion in his expedition to Sicily, ultimately his murderer; Herakleides and Python from Ænus in Thrace, Chion and Leonides, also Klearchus the despot from the Pontic Herakleia (Justin, xvi. 5).

Several of these examples seem to have been cited by the orator Democharês (nephew of Demosthenes) in his speech at Athens vindicating the law proposed by Sophokles for the expulsion of the philosophers from Athens (Athenæ. xi. 508 F), a speech delivered about 306 B.C. Plutarch compliments Plato for the active political liberators and tyrannicides who came forth from the Academy: he considers Plato as the real author and planner of the expedition of Dion against Dionysius, and expatiates on the delight which Plato must have derived from it—a supposition very incorrect (Plutarch, Non Posse Suav. p. 1097 B; adv. Kolôten, p. 1126 B-C).

[1] Aristokles, ap. Eusebium, Præp. Evang. xv. 2: Ælian, V. H. iii. 19: Aristeides, Or. 46, Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων, vol. ii. p. 324-325, Dindorf.

The friendship and reciprocity of service between Plato and Chabrias is an interesting fact. Compare Stahr, Aristotelia, vol. i. p. 50 seqq.

Cicero affirms, on the authority of the Epistles of Demosthenes, that Demosthenes describes himself as an assiduous hearer as well as reader of Plato (Cic. Brut. 31, 121; Orat. 4, 15). I think this fact highly probable, but the epistles which Cicero read no longer exist. Among the five Epistles remaining, Plato is once mentioned with respect in the fifth (p. 1490), but this epistle is considered by most critics spurious.

speculations and principles of teaching of his own, on the subject of rhetoric, found himself at variance with Isokrates and the Isokratean school. Aristotle attacked Isokrates and his mode of dealing with the subject: upon which Kephisodôrus (one of the disciples of Isokrates) retaliated by attacking Plato and the Platonic Ideas, considering Aristotle as one of Plato's scholars and adherents.[1]

Little known about Plato's personal history.

Such is the sum of our information respecting Plato. Scanty as it is, we have not even the advantage of contemporary authority for any portion of it. We have no description of Plato from any contemporary author, friendly or adverse. It will be seen that after the death of Sokrates we know nothing about Plato as a man and a citizen, except the little which can be learnt from his few Epistles, all written when he was very old, and relating almost entirely to his peculiar relations with Dion and Dionysius. His dialogues, when we try to interpret them collectively, and gather from them general results as to the character and purposes of the author, suggest valuable arguments and perplexing doubts, but yield few solutions. In no one of the dialogues does Plato address us in his own person. In the Apology alone (which is not a dialogue) is he alluded to even as present: in the Phædon he is mentioned as absent from illness. Each of the dialogues, direct or indirect, is conducted from beginning to end by the persons whom he introduces.[2] Not one of the dialogues affords any positive internal evidence showing the date of its composition. In a few there are allusions to prove that they must have been composed at a period later than others, or later than some given event of known date; but nothing more can be positively established. Nor is there any good extraneous testimony to determine the date of any one among them. For the

[1] Numenius, ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xiv. 6, 9. οἰηθεὶς (Kephisodôrus) κατὰ Πλάτωνα τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐπολέμει μὲν Ἀριστοτέλει, ἔβαλλε δὲ Πλάτωνα, &c. This must have happened in the latter years of Plato's life, for Aristotle must have been at least twenty-five or twenty-six years of age when he engaged in such polemics. He was born in 384 B.C.

[2] On this point Aristotle, in the dialogues which he composed, did not follow Plato's example. Aristotle introduced two or more persons debating a question, but he appeared in his own person to give the solution, or at least to wind up the debate. He sometimes also opened the debate by a proœm or prefatory address in his own person (Cic. ad Attic. iv. 16, 2, xiii. 19, 4). Cicero followed the manner of Aristotle, not that of Plato. His dialogues are rhetorical rather than dramatic.

All the dialogues of Aristotle are lost.

remark ascribed to Sokrates about the dialogue called Lysis (which remark, if authentic, would prove the dialogue to have been composed during the life-time of Sokrates) appears altogether untrustworthy. And the statement of some critics, that the Phædrus was Plato's earliest composition, is clearly nothing more than an inference (doubtful at best, and, in my judgment, erroneous) from its dithyrambic style and erotic subject.[1]

[1] Diog. L. iii. 38. Compare the Prolegomena τῆς Πλάτωνος Φιλοσοφίας, c. 24, in the Appendix Platonica of K. F. Hermann's edition, p. 217.

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CHAPTER VI.

PLATONIC CANON, AS RECOGNISED BY THRASYLLUS.

As we know little about Plato except from his works, the first question to be decided is, Which *are* his real works? Where are we to find a trustworthy Platonic Canon?

Platonic Canon—Ancient and modern discussions.

Down to the close of the last century this question was not much raised or discussed. The catalogue recognised by the rhetor Thrasyllus (contemporary with the Emperor Tiberius) was generally accepted as including none but genuine works of Plato; and was followed as such by editors and critics, who were indeed not very numerous.[1] But the discussions carried on during the present century have taken a different turn. While editors, critics, and translators have been greatly multiplied, some of the most distinguished among them, Schleiermacher at the head, have either professedly set aside, or in practice disregarded, the Thrasyllean catalogue, as if it carried no authority and very faint presumption. They have reasoned upon each dialogue as if its title to be considered genuine were now to be proved for the first

[1] The following passage from Wyttenbach, written in 1776, will give an idea of the state of Platonic criticism down to the last quarter of the last century. To provide a new Canon for Plato seems not to have entered his thoughts.

Wyttenbach, Bibliotheca Critica, vol. i. p. 28. Review of Fischer's edition of Plato's Philêbus and Symposion. "Quæ Ciceroni obtigit interpretum et editorum felicitas, eâ adeo caruit Plato, ut non solum paucos nactus sit qui ejus scripta typis ederent—sed qui ejus orationi nitorem restitueret, eamque a corruptelarum labe purgaret, et sensus obscuros atque abditos ex interiore doctrinâ patefaceret, omnino repererit neminem. Et ex ipso hoc editionum parvo numero—nam sex omnino sunt—nulla est recentior anno superioris seculi secundo: ut mirandum sit, centum et septuaginta annorum spatio neminem ex tot viris doctis extitisse, qui ita suam crisin Platoni adderet, ut intelligentiam ejus veræ eruditionis amantibus aperiret.

"Qui Platonem legant, pauci sunt: qui intelligant, paucissimi; qui vero, vel ex versionibus, vel ex jejuno historiæ philosophicæ compendio, de eo judicent et cum supercilio pronuncient, plurimi sunt."

time ; either by external testimony (mentioned in Aristotle or others), or by internal evidences of style, handling, and thoughts:[1] as if, in other words, the *onus probandi* lay upon any one who believed the printed works of Plato to be genuine—not upon an opponent who disputes the authenticity of any one or more among them, and rejects it as spurious. Before I proceed to examine the conclusions, alike numerous and discordant, which these critics have proclaimed, I shall enquire how far the method which they have pursued is warrantable. Is there any presumption at all—and if so, what amount of presumption—in favour of the catalogue transmitted from antiquity by Thrasyllus, as a canon containing genuine works of Plato and no others?

Upon this question I hold an opinion opposite to that of the Platonic critics since Schleiermacher. The presumption appears to me particularly strong, instead of particularly weak: comparing the Platonic writings with those of other eminent writers, dramatists, orators, historians, of the same age and country.

Canon established by Thrasyllus. Presumption in its favour.

We have seen that Plato passed the last thirty-eight years of his life (except his two short visits to Syracuse) as a writer and lecturer at Athens; that he purchased and inhabited a fixed residence at the Academy, near the city. We know, moreover, that his principal pupils, especially (his nephew) Speusippus and Xenokrates, were constantly with him in this residence during his life ; that after his death the residence became permanently appropriated as a philosophical school for lectures, study, conversation, and friendly meetings of studious men, in which capacity it served for more than two centuries ;[2] that his nephew Speusippus succeeded him there as teacher, and taught there for

Fixed residence and school at Athens—founded by Plato and transmitted to successors.

[1] To see that this is the general method of proceeding, we have only to look at the work of Ueberweg, one of the most recent and certainly one of the ablest among the Platonic critics. Untersuchungen über die Aechtheit und Zeitfolge der Platonischen Schriften, Wien, 1861, p. 130-131.

[2] The teaching and conversation of the Platonic School continued fixed in the spot known as the Academy until the siege of Athens by Sylla in 87 B.C. The teacher was then forced to confine himself to the interior of the city, where he gave lectures in the gymnasium called Ptolemæum. In that gymnasium Cicero heard the lectures of the Scholarch Antiochus, B.C. 79: walking out afterwards to visit the deserted but memorable site of the Academy (Cic. De Fin. v. 1; C. G. Zumpt, Ueber den Bestand der Philosophischen Schulen in Athen, p. 14, Berlin, 1843). The ground of the Academy, when once deserted, speedily became unhealthy, and continues to be so now, as Zumpt mentions that he himself experienced in 1835.

eight years, being succeeded after his death first by Xenokrates (for twenty-five years), afterwards by Polemon, Krantor, Krates, Arkesilaus, and others in uninterrupted series; that the school always continued to be frequented, though enjoying greater or less celebrity according to the reputation of the Scholarch.

Importance of this foundation. Preservation of Plato's manuscripts. School-library.

By thus perpetuating the school which his own genius had originated, and by providing for it permanent support with a fixed domicile, Plato inaugurated a new epoch in the history of philosophy: this example was followed a few years afterwards by Aristotle, Zeno, and Epikurus. Moreover the proceeding was important in another way also, as it affected the preservation and authentication of his own manuscripts and compositions. It provided not only safe and lasting custody, such as no writer had ever enjoyed before, for Plato's original manuscripts, but also a guarantee of some efficacy against any fraud or error which might seek to introduce other compositions into the list. That Plato himself was not indifferent on this head we may fairly believe, since we learn from Dionysius of Halikarnassus, that he was indefatigable in the work of correction: and his disciples, who took the great trouble of noting down themselves what he spoke in his lectures, would not be neglectful as to the simpler duty of preserving his manuscripts.[1] Now Speusippus and Xenokrates (also Aristotle, Hestiæus, the Opuntian Philippus, and the other Platonic pupils) must have had personal knowledge of all that Plato had written, whether finished dialogues, unfinished fragments, or preparatory sketches. They had perfect means of distinguishing his real compositions from forgeries passed off in his name: and they had every motive to expose such forgeries (if any were attempted) wherever they

[1] Simplikius, Schol. Aristotel. Physic. f. 32, p. 334, b. 28, Brandis: λάβοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ παρὰ Σπευσίππου καὶ παρὰ Ξενοκράτους, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἳ παρεγένοντο ἐν τῇ περὶ Τἀγαθοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀκροάσει· πάντες γὰρ συνέγραψαν καὶ διεσώσαντο τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ. In another passage of the same Scholia (p. 362, a. 12) Simplikius mentions Herakleides (of Pontus), Hestiæus, and even Aristotle himself, as having taken notes of the same lectures.

Hermodôrus appears to have carried some of Plato's dialogues to Sicily, and to have made money by selling them. See Cicero ad Atticum, xiii. 21: Suidas et Zenobius—λόγοισιν Ἑρμόδωρος ἐμπορεύεται. See Zeller, Dissert. De Hermodoro, p. 19. In the above-mentioned epistle Cicero compares his own relations with Atticus, to those of Plato with Hermodôrus. Hermodôrus had composed a treatise respecting Plato, from which some extracts were given by Derkyllides (the contemporary of Thrasyllus) as well as by Simplikius (Zeller, De Hermod. p. 20-21).

could, in order to uphold the reputation of their master. If any one composed a dialogue and circulated it under the name of Plato, the school was a known place, and its occupants were at hand to give information to all who enquired about the authenticity of the composition. The original MSS. of Plato (either in his own handwriting or in that of his secretary, if he employed one[1]) were doubtless treasured up in the school as sacred memorials of the great founder, and served as originals from which copies of unquestionable fidelity might be made, whenever the Scholarch granted permission. How long they continued to be so preserved we cannot say: nor do we know what was the condition of the MSS., or how long they were calculated to last. But probably many of the students frequenting the school would come for the express purpose of reading various works of Plato (either in the original MSS., or in faithful copies taken from them) with the exposition of the Scholarch; just as we know that the Roman M. Crassus (mentioned by Cicero), during his residence at Athens, studied the Platonic Gorgias with the aid of the Scholarch Charmadas.[2] The presidency of Speusippus and Xenokrates (taken jointly) lasted for thirty-three years; and even when they were replaced by successors who had enjoyed no personal intimacy with Plato, the motive to preserve the Platonic MSS. would still be operative, and the means of verifying what was really Platonic would still be possessed in the school. The original MSS. would be preserved, along with the treatises or dialogues which each successive Scholarch himself composed; thus forming a permanent and increasing school-library, probably enriched more or less by works acquired or purchased from others.

It appears to me that the continuance of this school—founded by Plato himself at his own abode, permanently domiciliated, and including all the MSS. which he left in it—gives us an amount of assurance for the authenticity of the so-called Platonic compositions, such as

Security provided by the school for distinguishing what were

[1] We read in Cicero, (Academic. Priora, ii. 4, 11) that the handwriting of the Scholarch Philo, when his manuscript was brought from Athens to Alexandria, was recognised at once by his friends and pupils.

[2] Cicero, De Oratore, i. 11, 45-47: "florente Academiâ, quod eam Charmadas et Clitomachus et Æschines obtinebant. . . Platoni, cujus tum Athenis cum Charmadâ diligentius legi Gorgiam," &c.

Plato's genuine writings.

does not belong to the works of other eminent contemporary authors, Aristippus, Antisthenes, Isokrates, Lysias, Demosthenes, Euripides, Aristophanes. After the decease of these last-mentioned authors, who can say what became of their MSS.? Where was any certain permanent custody provided for them? Isokrates had many pupils during his life, but left no school or μουσεῖον after his death. If any one composed a discourse, and tried to circulate it as the composition of Isokrates, among the bundles of judicial orations which were sold by the booksellers[1] as his (according to the testimony of Aristotle)—where was the person to be found, notorious and accessible, who could say: "I possess all the MSS. of Isokrates, and I can depose that this is not among them!" The chances of success for forgery or mistake were decidedly greater, in regard to the works of these authors, than they could be for those of Plato.

Unfinished fragments, and preparatory sketches, preserved and published after Plato's death.

Again, the existence of this school-library explains more easily how it is that unfinished, inferior, and fragmentary Platonic compositions have been preserved. That there must have existed such compositions I hold to be certain. How is it supposable that any author, even Plato, could have brought to completion such masterpieces as Republic, Gorgias, Protagoras, Symposion, &c., without tentative and preparatory sketches, each of course in itself narrow, defective, perhaps of little value, but serving as material to be worked up or worked in? Most of these would be destroyed, but probably not all. If (as I believe) it be the fact, that all the Platonic MSS. were preserved as their author left them, some would probably be published (and some indeed are said to have been published) after his death; and among them would be included more or fewer of these unfinished performances, and sketches projected but abandoned. We can hardly suppose that Plato himself would have published fragments never finished, such as Kleitophon and Kritias[2] —the last ending in the middle of a sentence.

[1] Dionys. Halik. de Isocrate, p. 576 R. δεσμὰς πάνυ πολλὰς δικανικῶν λόγων Ἰσοκρατείων περιφέρεσθαί φησιν ὑπὸ τῶν βιβλιοπωλῶν Ἀριστοτέλης.

[2] Straton, the Peripatetic Scholarch who succeeded Theophrastus, B.C. 287, bequeathed to Lykon by his will both the succession to his school (διατριβήν) and all his books, except what he had written himself (πλὴν ὧν αὐτοὶ γεγρά-

The second philosophical school, begun by Aristotle and perpetuated (after his death in 322 B.C.) at the Lykeum on the eastern side of Athens, was established on the model of that of Plato. That which formed the centre or consecrating point was a Museum or chapel of the Muses: with statues of those goddesses of the place, and also a statue of the founder. Attached to this Museum were a portico, a hall with seats (one seat especially for the lecturing professor), a garden, and a walk, together with a residence, all permanently appropriated to the teacher and the process of instruction.[1] Theophrastus, the friend and immediate

Peripatetic school at the Lykeum —its composition and arrangement.

δαμεν). What is to be done with these latter he does not say. Lykon, in his last will, says:—*καὶ δύο μνᾶς αὐτῷ* (Chares, a manumitted slave) *δίδωμι καὶ τἀμὰ βίβλια τὰ ἀνεγνωσμένα· τὰ δὲ ἀνέκδοτα Καλλίνῳ, ὅπως ἐπιμελῶς αὐτὰ ἐκδῷ*. See Diog. L. v. 62, 73. Here Lykon directs expressly that Kallinus shall edit with care his (Lykon's) unpublished works. Probably Straton may have given similar directions during his life, so that it was unnecessary to provide in the will. *Τὰ ἀνεγνωσμένα* is equivalent to *τὰ ἐκδεδομένα*. Publication was constituted by reading the MSS. aloud before a chosen audience of friends or critics; which readings often led to such remarks as induced the author to take his work back, and to correct it for a second recitation. See the curious sentence extracted from the letter of Theophrastus to Phanias (Diog. L. v. 37). Boeckh and other critics agree that both the Kleitophon and the Kritias were transmitted from antiquity in the fragmentary state in which we now read them: that they were compositions never completed. Boeckh affirms this with assurance respecting the Kleitophon, though he thinks that it is not a genuine work of Plato; on which last point I dissent from him. He thinks that the Kritias is a real work of Plato, though uncompleted (Boeckh in Platonis Minoem, p. 11).

Compare the remarks of M. Littré respecting the unfinished sketches, treatises, and notes not intended for publication, included in the Collectio Hippocratica (Œuvres d' Hippocrate, vol. x. p. liv. seq.)

[1] Respecting the domicile of the Platonic School, and that of the Aristotelian or Peripatetic school which followed it, the particulars given by Diogenes are nearly coincident: we know more in detail about the Peripatetic, from what he cites out of the will of Theophrastus. See iv. 1-6-19, v. 51-53.

The *μουσεῖον* at the Academy was established by Plato himself. Speusippus placed in it statues of the Charities or Graces. Theophrastus gives careful directions in his will about repairing and putting in the best condition, the Peripatetic *μουσεῖον*, with its altar, its statues of the Goddesses, and its statue of the founder Aristotle. The *στοὰ, ἐξέδρα, κῆπος, περίπατος*, attached to both schools, are mentioned: the most zealous students provided for themselves lodgings close adjoining. Cicero, when he walked out from Athens to see the deserted Academy, was particularly affected by the sight of the *exedra*, in which Charmadas had lectured (De Fin. v. 2, 4).

There were periodical meetings, convivial and conversational, among the members both of the Academic and Peripatetic schools; and *ξυμποτικοὶ νόμοι* by Xenokrates and Aristotle to regulate them (Athenæus, v. 184).

Epikurus (in his interesting testament given by Diogen. Laert, x. 16-21) bequeaths to two Athenian citizens his garden and property, in trust for his principal disciple the Mitylenæan Hermarchus, *καὶ τοῖς συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν αὐτῷ, καὶ οἷς ἂν Ἕρμαρχος καταλίπῃ διαδόχοις τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἐνδιατρίβειν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν*. He at the same time directs all his books to be given to Hermarchus: they would form the school-library.

successor of Aristotle, presided over the school for thirty-five years; and his course, during part of that time at least, was prodigiously frequented by students.

Peripatetic school-library, its removal from Athens to Skêpsis—its ultimate restitution in a damaged state to Athens, then to Rome.

Moreover, the school-library at the Lykeum acquired large development and importance. It not only included all the MS. compositions, published or unpublished, of Aristotle and Theophrastus, each of them a voluminous writer — but also a numerous collection (numerous for that day) of other works besides; since both of them were opulent and fond of collecting books. The value of the school-library is shown by what happened after the decease of Theophrastus, when Straton succeeded him in the school (B.C. 287). Theophrastus—thinking himself entitled to treat the library not as belonging to the school but as belonging to himself — bequeathed it at his death to Neleus, a favourite scholar, and a native of Skêpsis (in the Troad), by whom it was carried away to Asia, and permanently separated from the Aristotelian school at Athens. The manuscripts composing it remained in the possession of Neleus and his heirs for more than a century and a half, long hidden in a damp cellar, neglected, and sustaining great damage—until about the year 100 B.C., when they were purchased by a rich Athenian named Apellikon, and brought back to Athens. Sylla, after he had captured Athens (86 B.C.), took for himself the library of Apellikon, and transported it to Rome, where it became open to learned men (Tyrannion, Andronikus, and others), but under deplorable disadvantage—in consequence of the illegible state of the MSS. and the unskilful conjectures and restitutions which had been applied, in the new copies made since it passed into the hands of Apellikon.[1]

If we knew the truth, it might probably appear that the

[1] The will of Theophrastus, as given in Diogenes (v. 52), mentions the bequest of all his books to Neleus. But it is in Strabo that we read the fullest account of this displacement of the Peripatetic school-library, and the consequences which ensued from it (xiii. 608, 609). Νηλεὺς, ἀνὴρ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους ἠκροαμένος καὶ Θεοφράστου, διαδεδεγμένος δὲ τὴν βιβλιοθήκην τοῦ Θεοφράστου, ἐν ᾗ ἦν καὶ ἡ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους· ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ Θεοφράστῳ παρέδωκεν, ᾧπερ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλιπε, πρῶτος, ὧν ἴσμεν, συναγαγὼν βίβλια, καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν.

The kings of Pergamus, a few years after the death of Theophrastus, acquired possession of the town and territory of Skêpsis; so that the heirs of Neleus became numbered among their subjects. These kings (from about the year B.C. 230 downwards) manifested

transfer of the Aristotelian library, from the Peripatetic school at Athens to the distant and obscure town of Skêpsis, was the result of some jealousy on the part of Theophrastus; that he wished to secure to Neleus the honourable and lucrative post of becoming his successor in the school, and conceived that he was furthering that object by bequeathing the library to Neleus. If he entertained any such wish, it was disappointed. The succession devolved upon another pupil of the school, Straton of Lampsakus. But Straton and his successors were forced to get on as well as they could without their library. The Peripatetic school at Athens suffered severely by the loss. Its professors possessed only a few of the manuscripts of Aristotle, and those too the commonest and best known. If a student came with a view to read any of the other Aristotelian works (as Crassus went to read the Gorgias of Plato), the Scholarch was unable to assist him: as far as Aristotle was concerned, they could only expand and adorn, in the way of lecture, a few of his familiar doctrines.[1] We hear that the character of the school was materially altered. Straton deserted the track of Aristotle, and threw himself into speculations of his own (seemingly able and ingenious), chiefly on physical topics.[2] The critical study, arrangement, and exposi-

Inconvenience to the Peripatetic school from the loss of its library.

great eagerness to collect a library at Pergamus, in competition with that of the Ptolemies at Alexandria. The heirs of Neleus were afraid that these kings would strip them of their Aristotelian MSS., either for nothing or for a small price. They therefore concealed the MSS. in a cellar, until they found an opportunity of selling them to a stranger out of the country. (Strabo, l. c.)

This narrative of Strabo is one of the most interesting pieces of information remaining to us about literary antiquity. He had himself received instruction from Tyrannion (xii. 548): he had gone through a course of Aristotelian philosophy (xvi. 757), and he had good means of knowing the facts from the Aristotelian critics, including his master Tyrannion. Plutarch (Vit. Syllæ, c. 26) and Athenæus (i. 3) allude to the same story. Athenæus says that Ptolemy Philadelphus purchased the MSS. from the heirs of Neleus, which cannot be correct.

Some critics have understood the narrative of Strabo, as if he had meant to affirm, that the works of Aristotle had never got into circulation until the time of Apellikon. It is against this supposition that Stahr contends (very successfully) in his work "Aristotelia". But Strabo does not affirm so much as this. He does not say anything to contradict the supposition that there were copies of various books of Aristotle in circulation, during the lives of Aristotle and Theophrastus.

[1] Strabo, xiii. 609. *συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων τοῖς μὲν πάλαι, τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον, οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅλως τὰ βίβλια πλὴν ὀλίγων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν, μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς, ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν.*

[2] The change in the Peripatetic school, after the death of Theophrastus, is pointed out by Cicero, Fin. v. 5, 13. Compare Academ. Poster. i. 9.

tion of Aristotle was postponed until the first century before the Christian era—the Ciceronian age, immediately preceding Strabo.

Advantage to the Platonic school from having preserved its MSS.

This history of the Aristotelian library illustrates forcibly, by way of contrast, the importance to the Platonic school of having preserved its MSS. from the beginning, without any similar interruption. What Plato left in manuscript we may presume to have never been removed: those who came to study his works had the means of doing so: those who wanted to know whether any composition was written by him, what works he had written altogether, or what was the correct reading in a case of obscurity or dispute—had always the means of informing themselves. Whereas the Peripatetic Scholarch, after the death of Theophrastus, could give no similar information as to the works of Aristotle.[1]

Conditions favourable for preserving the genuine works of Plato.

We thus see that the circumstances, under which Plato left his compositions, were unusually favourable (speaking by comparison with ancient authors generally) in regard to the chance of preserving them all, and of keeping them apart from counterfeits. We have now to enquire what information exists as to their subsequent diffusion.

Historical facts as to their preservation.

The earliest event of which notice is preserved, is, the fact stated by Diogenes, that "Some persons, among whom is the *Grammaticus* Aristophanes, distribute the dialogues of Plato into Trilogies; placing as the first Trilogy — Republic, Timæus, Kritias. 2. Sophistes, Politicus, Kratylus. 3. Leges, Minos, Epinomis. Theætêtus, Euthyphron, Apology. 5. Kriton, Phædon, Epistolæ.

[1] An interesting citation by Simplikius (in his commentary on the Physica of Aristotle, fol. 216, a. 7, p. 404, b. 11, Schol. Brandis shows us that Theophrastus, while he was resident at Athens as Peripatetic Scholarch, had custody of the original MSS. of the works of Aristotle and that he was applied to by those who wished to procure correct copies. Eudêmus (of Rhodes) having only a defective copy of the Physica, wrote to request that Theophrastus would cause to be written out a certain portion of the fifth book, and send it to him, μαρτυροῦντος περὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ Θεοφράστου, γράψαντος Εὐδήμῳ περί τινος αὐτοῦ τῶν διημαρτημένων ἀντιγράφων· ὑπὲρ ὧν, φησὶν (sc. Theophrastus) ἐπέστειλας, κελεύων με γράφειν καὶ ἀποστεῖλαι ἐκ τῶν Φυσικῶν, ἤτοι ἐγὼ οὐ συνίημι, ἢ μικρόν τι παντελῶς ἔχει τοῦ ἀνάμεσον τοῦ ὅπερ ἠρεμεῖν καλῶ τῶν ἀκινήτων μόνον, &c.

The other dialogues they place one by one, without any regular grouping."[1]

The name of Aristophanes lends special interest to this arrangement of the Platonic compositions, and enables us to understand something of the date and the place to which it belongs. The literary and critical students (*Grammatici*), among whom he stood eminent, could scarcely be said to exist as a class at the time when Plato died. Beginning with Aristotle, Heraklcides of Pontus, Theophrastus, Demetrius Phalereus, &c., at Athens, during the half century immediately succeeding Plato's decease—these laborious and useful erudites were first called into full efficiency along with the large collection of books formed by the Ptolemies at Alexandria during a period beginning rather before 300 B.C. : which collection served both as model and as stimulus to the libraries subsequently formed by the kings at Pergamus and elsewhere. In those libraries alone could materials be found for their indefatigable application.

Arrangement of them into Trilogies, by Aristophanes.

Of these learned men, who spent their lives in reading, criticising, arranging, and correcting, the MSS. accumulated in a great library, Aristophanes of Byzantium was the most distinguished representative, in the eyes of men like Varro, Cicero, and Plutarch.[2] His life was passed at Alexandria, and seems to have been comprised between 260-184 B.C. ; as far as can be made out. During the latter portion of it he became chief librarian—an appointment

Aristophanes, librarian at the Alexandrine library.

[1] Diog. L. iii. 61-62 : Ἔνιοι δέ, ὧν ἔστι καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικός, εἰς τριλογίας ἐλκουσι τοὺς διαλόγους· καὶ πρώτην μὲν τιθέασιν ἧς ἡγεῖται Πολιτεία, Τίμαιος, Κριτίας· δευτέραν, Σοφιστής, Πολιτικός, Κράτυλος· τρίτην, Νόμοι, Μίνως, Ἐπινομίς· τετάρτην, Θεαίτητος, Εὐθύφρων, Ἀπολογία· πέμπτην, Κρίτων, Φαίδων, Ἐπιστολαί· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα καθ' ἓν καὶ ἀτάκτως.

The word γραμματικὸς, unfortunately, has no single English word exactly corresponding to it.

Thrasyllus, when he afterwards applied the classification by Tetralogies to the works of Demokritus (as he did also to those of Plato) could only include a certain portion of the works in his Tetralogies, and was forced to enumerate the remainder as ἀσύντακτα (Diog. L. ix. 46, 47). It appears that he included all Plato's works in his Platonic Tetralogies.

[2] Varro, De Linguâ Latinâ, v. 9, ed. Müller. "Non solum ad Aristophanis lucernam, sed etiam ad Cleanthis, lucubravi." Cicero, De Fin. v. 19, 50; Vitruvius, Præf. Lib. vii.; Plutarch, "Non posse suaviter vivi sec. Epicurum," p. 1095 E.

Aristophanes composed Argumenta to many of the Attic tragedies and comedies : he also arranged in a certain order the songs of Alkæus and the odes of Pindar. Boeckh (Præfat. ad Scholia Pindari, p. x. xi.) remarks upon the mistake made by Quintilian as well as by others, in supposing that Pindar arranged his own odes. Respecting the wide range of erudition embraced by

which he had earned by long previous studies in the place, as well as by attested experience in the work of criticism and arrangement. He began his studious career at Alexandria at an early age : and he received instruction, as a boy from Zenodotus, as a young man from Kallimachus—both of whom were, in succession, librarians of the Alexandrine library.[1] We must observe that Diogenes does not expressly state the distribution of the Platonic works into trilogies to have been *first proposed* or originated by Aristophanes (as he states that the tetralogies were afterwards proposed by the rhetor Thrasyllus, of which presently) : his language is rather more consistent with the supposition, that it was first proposed by some one earlier, and adopted or sanctioned by the eminent authority of Aristophanes. But at any rate, the distribution was proposed either by Aristophanes himself, or by some one before him and known to him.

Plato's works in the Alexandrine library, before the time of Aristophanes.

This fact is of material importance, because it enables us to infer with confidence, that the Platonic works were included in the Alexandrine library, certainly during the lifetime of Aristophanes, and probably before it. It is there only that Aristophanes could have known them ; his whole life having been passed in Alexandria. The first formal appointment of a librarian to the Alexandrine Museum was made by Ptolemy Philadelphus, at some time after the commencement of his reign in 285 B.C., in the person of Zenodotus ; whose successors were Kallimachus, Eratosthenes, Apollonius, Aristophanes, comprising in all a period of a century.[2]

Aristophanes, see F. A. Wolf, Prolegg. in Homer. pp. 218-220, and Schneidewin, De Hypothes. Traged. Græc. Aristophani vindicandis, pp. 26, 27.

[1] Suidas, vv. Ἀριστοφάνης, Καλλίμαχος. Compare Clinton, Fast. Hellen. B.C. 256-200.

[2] See Ritschl, Die Alexandrinischen Bibliotheken, pp. 16-17, &c. ; Nauck, De Aristophanis Vitâ et Scriptis, cap. i. p. 68 (Halle, 1848). "Aristophanis et Aristarchi opera, cum opibus Bibliothecæ Alexandrinæ digerendis et ad tabulas revocandis arctè conjuncta, in eo substitisse censenda est, ut scriptores, in quovis dicendi genere conspicuos, aut breviori indice comprehenderent, aut uberiore enarratione describerent," &c.

When Zenodotus was appointed, the library had already attained considerable magnitude, so that the post and title of librarian was then conspicuous and dignified. But Demetrius Phalereus, who preceded Zenodotus, began his operations when there was no library at all, and gradually accumulated the number of books which Zenodotus found. Heyne observes justly : "Primo loco Demetrius Phalereus præfuisse dicitur, *forte re verius quam nomine*, tum Zenodotus Ephesius, hic quidem sub Ptolemæo Philadelpho," &c. (Heyne, De Genio Sæculi Ptolemæorum in Opuscul. i. p. 129).

Kallimachus, born at Kyrênê, was a teacher of letters at Alexandria before he was appointed to the service and superintendence of the Alexandrine library or museum. His life seems to have terminated about 230 B.C.: he acquired reputation as a poet, by his hymns, epigrams, elegies, but less celebrity as a *Grammaticus* than Aristophanes: nevertheless the titles of his works still remaining indicate very great literary activity. We read as titles of his works:—

Kallimachus—predecessor of Aristophanes- his published Tables of authors whose works were in the library.

1. The Museum (a general description of the Alexandrine establishment).
2. Tables of the persons who have distinguished themselves in every branch of instruction, and of the works which they have composed—in 120 books.
3. Table and specification of the (Didaskalies) recorded dramatic representations and competitions; with dates assigned, and from the beginning.
4. Table of the peculiar phrases belonging to Demokritus, and of his works.
5. Table and specification of the rhetorical authors.[1]

These tables of Kallimachus (of which one by itself, No. 2, reached to 120 books) must have been an encyclopædia, far more comprehensive than any previously compiled, of Greek authors and literature. Such tables indeed could not have been compiled before the existence of the Alexandrine Museum. They described what Kallimachus had before him in that museum, as we may see by the general title Μουσεῖον prefixed: moreover we may be sure that nowhere else could he have had access to the

Large and rapid accumulation of the Alexandrine Library.

[1] See Blomfield's edition of the Fragm. of Kallimachus, p. 220-221. Suidas, v. Καλλίμαχος, enumerates a large number of titles of poetical, literary, historical, compositions of Kallimachus; among them are—

Μουσεῖον. Πίνακες τῶν ἐν πάσῃ παιδείᾳ διαλαμψάντων, καὶ ὧν συνέγραψαν, ἐν βιβλίοις κ' καὶ ρ'. Πίναξ καὶ ἀναγραφὴ τῶν κατὰ χρόνους καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γενομένων διδασκαλιῶν. Πίναξ τῶν Δημοκρίτου γλωσσῶν καὶ συνταγμάτων. Πίναξ καὶ ἀναγραφὴ των ῥητορικῶν. See also Athenæus, xv. 669. It appears from Dionys. Hal. that besides the Tables of Kallimachus, enumerating and reviewing the authors whose works were contained in the Alexandrine library or museum, there existed also Περγαμηνοὶ Πίνακες, describing the contents of the library at Pergamus (Dion. H. de Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosthene, p. 994; De Dinarcho, pp. 630, 653, 661).

Compare Bernhardy, Grundriss der Griech. Litt. sect. 36, pp. 132-133 seq.

multitude of books required. Lastly, the tables also show how large a compass the Alexandrine Museum and library had attained at the time when Kallimachus put together his compilation: that is, either in the reign of Ptolemy II. Philadelphus (285-247 B.C.), or in the earlier portion of the reign of Ptolemy III., called Euergetes (247-222 B.C.). Nevertheless, large as the library then was, it continued to increase. A few years afterwards, Aristophanes published a work commenting upon the tables of Kallimachus, with additions and enlargements: of which work the title alone remains.[1]

Plato's works—in the library at the time of Kallimachus.

Now, I have already observed, that the works of Plato were certainly in the Alexandrine library, at the time when Aristophanes either originated or sanctioned the distribution of them into Trilogies. Were they not also in the library at the time when Kallimachus compiled his tables? I cannot but conclude that they were in it at that time also. When we are informed that the catalogue of enumerated authors filled so many books, we may be sure that it must have descended, and we know in fact that it did descend, to names far less important and distinguished than that of Plato.[2] The name of Plato himself can hardly have been omitted. Demokritus and his works, especially the peculiar and technical words (*γλῶσσαι*) in them, received special attention from Kallimachus: which proves that the latter was not disposed to pass over the philosophers. But Demokritus, though an eminent philosopher, was decidedly less eminent than Plato: moreover he left behind him no permanent successors, school, or *μουσεῖον*, at Athens, to preserve his MSS. or foster his celebrity. As the library was furnished at that time with a set of the works of Demokritus, so I infer that it could not have been without a set of the works of Plato. That Kallimachus was acquainted

[1] Athenæus, ix. 408. *Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικὸς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Καλλιμάχου πίνακας.*

We see by another passage, Athenæ. viii. 336, that this work included an addition or supplement to the Tables of Kallimachus.

Compare Etymol. Magn. v. *Πίναξ.*

[2] Thus the Tables of Kallimachus included a writer named Lysimachus, a disciple of Theodorus or Theophrastus, and his writings (Athenæ. vi. 252)—a rhetor and poet named Dionysius with the epithet of *χαλκοῦς* (Athenæ. xv. 669)—and even the treatises of several authors on cakes and cookery (Athenæ. xiv. 643). The names of authors absolutely unknown to us were mentioned by him (Athenæ. ii. 70). Compare Dionys. Hal. de Dinarcho, 630, 653, 661.

with Plato's writings (if indeed such a fact requires proof), we know, not only from his epigram upon the Ambrakiot Kleombrotus (whom he affirms to have killed himself after reading the Phædon), but also from a curious intimation that he formally impugned Plato's competence to judge or appreciate poets—alluding to the severe criticisms which we read in the Platonic Republic.[1]

It would indeed be most extraordinary if, among the hundreds of authors whose works must have been specified in the Tables of Kallimachus as constituting the treasures of the Alexandrine Museum,[2] the name of Plato had not been included. Moreover, the distribution of the Platonic compositions into Trilogies, pursuant to the analogy of the Didaskaliæ or dramatic records, may very probably have originated with Kallimachus; and may have been simply approved and continued, perhaps with some modifications, by Aristophanes. At least this seems more consonant to the language of Diogenes Laertius, than the supposition that Aristophanes was the first originator of it.

If we look back to the first commencement of the Alexandrine Museum and library, we shall be still farther convinced that the works of Plato, complete as well as genuine, must have been introduced into it before the days of Kallimachus. Strabo expressly tells us that the first stimulus and example impelling the Ptolemies to found this museum and library, were furnished by the school of Aristotle and Theophrastus at

First formation of the library—intended as a copy of the Platonic and Aristotelian Μουσεῖα at Athens.

[1] Kallimachus, Epigram. 23.

Proklus in Timæum, p. 28 C. p. 64. Schneid. *μάτην οὖν φληναφοῦσι Καλλίμαχος καὶ Δοῦρις, ὡς Πλάτωνος οὐκ ὄντος ἱκανοῦ κρίνειν ποιητάς.*

Eratosthenes, successor of Kallimachus as librarian at Alexandria, composed a work (now lost) entitled Πλατωνικὸν, as well as various treatises on philosophy and philosophers (Eratosthenica, Bernhardy, p. 168, 187, 197; Suidas, v. Ἐρατοσθένης). He had passed some time at Athens, had enjoyed the lessons and conversation of Zeno the Stoic, but expressed still warmer admiration of Arkesilaus and Ariston. He spoke in animated terms of Athens as the great centre of congregation for philosophers in his day. He had composed a treatise, Περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν: but Strabo describes him as mixing up other subjects with philosophy (Strabo, i. p. 15).

[2] About the number of books, or more properly of *rolls (volumina)*, in the Alexandrine library, see the enquiries of Parthey, Das Alexandrinische Museum, p. 76-84. Various statements are made by ancient authors, some of them with very large numbers; and no certainty is attainable. Many rolls would go to form one book. Parthey considers the statement made by Epiphanius not improbable—54,800 rolls in the library under Ptolemy Philadelphus (p. 83).

The magnitude of the library at Alexandria in the time of Eratosthenes,

Athens.[1] I believe this to be perfectly true; and it is farther confirmed by the fact that the institution at Alexandria comprised the same constituent parts and arrangements, described by the same titles, as those which are applied to the Aristotelian and Platonic schools at Athens.[2] Though the terms library, museum, and lecture-room, have now become familiar, both terms and meaning were at that time alike novel. Nowhere, as far as we know, did there exist a known and fixed domicile, consecrated in perpetuity to these purposes, and to literary men who took interest therein. A special stimulus was needed to suggest and enforce the project on Ptolemy Soter. That stimulus was supplied by the Aristotelian school at Athens, which the Alexandrine institution was intended to copy: Μουσεῖον (with ἐξέδρα and περίπατος, a covered portico with recesses and seats, and a walk adjacent), on a far larger scale and with more extensive attributions.[3] We must not however imagine that when this

and the multitude of writings which he consulted in his valuable geographical works, was admitted by his opponent Hipparchus (Strabo, ii. 69).

[1] Strabo, xiii. 608. ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ (βιβλιοθήκην) Θεοφράστῳ παρέδωκεν, ὥπερ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλιπε· πρῶτος, ὧν ἴσμεν, συναγαγὼν βίβλια, καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν.

[2] Strabo (xvii. 793-794) describes the Museum at Alexandria in the following terms—τῶν δὲ βασιλείων μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ Μουσεῖον, ἔχον περίπατον καὶ ἐξέδραν, καὶ οἶκον μέγαν ἐν ᾧ τὸ συσσίτιον τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ Μουσείου φιλολόγων ἀνδρῶν, &c. Vitruvius, v. 11.

If we compare this with the language in Diogenes Laertius respecting the Academic and Peripatetic school residences at Athens, we shall find the same phrases employed—μουσεῖον, ἐξέδρα, &c. (D. L. iv. 19, v. 51-54). Respecting Speusippus, Diogenes tells us (iv. 1)—Χαρίτων τ' ἀγάλματ' ἀνέθηκεν ἐν τῷ μουσείῳ τῷ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ ἱδρυθέντι.

[3] We see from hence what there was peculiar in the Platonic and Aristotelian literary establishments. They included something consecrated, permanent, and intended more or less for public use. The collection of books was not like a private library, destined only for the proprietor and such friends as he might allow—nor was it like that of a bookseller, intended for sale and profit. I make this remark in regard to the Excursus of Bekker, in his Charikles, i. 206, 216, a very interesting note on the book-trade and libraries of ancient Athens. Bekker disputes the accuracy of Strabo's statement that Aristotle was the first person at Athens who collected a library, and who taught the kings of Egypt to do the like. In the literal sense of the words Bekker is right. Other persons before Aristotle had collected books (though I think Bekker makes more of the passages which he cites than they strictly deserve); one example is the youthful Euthydemus in Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 2; and Bekker alludes justly to the remarkable passage in the Anabasis of Xenophon, about books exported to the Hellenic cities in the Euxine (Anabas. vii. 5, 14). There clearly existed in Athens regular professional booksellers; we see that the bookseller read aloud to his visitors a part of the books which he had to sell, in order to tempt them to buy, a feeble foreshadowing of the advertisements and reviews of the present day (Diogen. L. vii. 2). But there existed as yet nothing of the nature of the Platonic and Aristotelian μουσεῖον, whereof the collection of books, varied, permanent, and in-

new museum was first begun, the founders entertained any idea of the vast magnitude to which it ultimately attained.

Favour of Ptolemy Soter towards the philosophers at Athens.

Ptolemy Soter was himself an author,[1] and himself knew and respected Aristotle, not only as a philosopher but also as the preceptor of his friend and commander Alexander. To Theophrastus also, the philosophical successor of Aristotle, Ptolemy showed peculiar honour; inviting him by special message to come and establish himself at Alexandria, which invitation however Theophrastus declined.[2] Moreover Ptolemy appointed Straton (afterwards Scholarch in succession to Theophrastus) preceptor to his youthful son Ptolemy Philadelphus, from whom Straton subsequently received a large present of money:[3] he welcomed at Alexandria the Megaric philosophers, Diodorus Kronus, and Stilpon, and found pleasure in their conversation; he not only befriended, but often confidentially consulted, the Kyrenaic philosopher Theodôrus.[4] Kolôtes, the friend of Epikurus, dedicated a work to Ptolemy Soter. Menander, the eminent comic writer, also received an invitation from him to Egypt.[5]

Demetrius Phalereus—his history and character.

These favourable dispositions, on the part of the first Ptolemy, towards philosophy and the philosophers at Athens, appear to have been mainly instigated and guided by the Phalerean Demetrius: an Athenian citizen of good station, who enjoyed for ten years at Athens (while that city was subject to Kassander) full political ascendancy, but who was expelled about 307 B.C., by the increased force of the popular party, seconded by the successful invasion of

tended for the use of inmates and special visitors, was one important fraction. In this sense it served as a model for Demetrius Phalereus and Ptolemy Soter in regard to Alexandria.

Vitruvius (v. 11) describes the *exhedræ* as seats placed under a covered portico—"in quibus philosophi, rhetores, reliquique qui studiis delectantur, sedentes disputare possint".

[1] Respecting Ptolemy as an author, and the fragments of his work on the exploits of Alexander, see R. Geier, Alexandri M. Histor. Scriptores, p. 4-26.

[2] Diog. L. v. 37. Probably this invitation was sent about 306 B.C., during the year in which Theophrastus was in banishment from Athens, in consequence of the restrictive law proposed by Sophokles against the schools of the philosophers, which law was repealed in the ensuing year.

[3] Diog. L. v. 58. Straton became Scholarch at the death of Theophrastus in 287 B.C. He must have been preceptor to Ptolemy Philadelphus before this time, during the youth of the latter; for he could not have been at the same time Scholarch at Athens, and preceptor of the king at Alexandria.

[4] Diog. L. ii. 102, 111, 115. Plutarch adv. Kolôten, p. 1107. The Ptolemy here mentioned by Plutarch may indeed be Philadelphus.

[5] Meineke, Menand. et Philem. Reliq. Præf. p. xxxii.

Demetrius Poliorkêtês. By these political events Demetrius Phalereus was driven into exile: a portion of which exile was spent at Thebes, but a much larger portion of it at Alexandria, where he acquired the full confidence of Ptolemy Soter, and retained it until the death of that prince in 285 B.C. While active in politics, and possessing rhetorical talent, elegant without being forcible—Demetrius Phalereus was yet more active in literature and philosophy. He employed his influence, during the time of his political power, to befriend and protect both Xenokrates the chief of the Platonic school, and Theophrastus the chief of the Aristotelian. In his literary and philosophical views he followed Theophrastus and the Peripatetic sect, and was himself among their most voluminous writers. The latter portion of his life was spent at Alexandria, in the service of Ptolemy Soter; after whose death, however, he soon incurred the displeasure of Ptolemy Philadelphus, and died, intentionally or accidentally, from the bite of an asp.[1]

He was chief agent in the first establishment of the Alexandrine Library.

The Alexandrine Museum or library first acquired celebrity under the reign of Ptolemy (II.) Philadelphus, by whom moreover it was greatly enlarged and its treasures multiplied. Hence that prince is sometimes entitled the founder. But there can be no doubt that its first initiation and establishment is due to Ptolemy (I.) Soter.[2] Demetrius Phalereus was his adviser and auxiliary,

[1] Diog. L. iv. 14, v. 39, 75, 80; Strabo, ix. 398; Plut., De Exil. p. 601; Apophth. p. 189; Cic., De Fin. v. 19; Pro Rab. 30.

Diogenes says about Demetrius Phalereus, (v. 80) Πλήθει δὲ βιβλίων καὶ ἀριθμῷ στίχων, σχεδὸν ἅπαντας παρελήλακε τοὺς κατ' αὐτὸν Περιπατητικούς, εὐπαίδευτος ὢν καὶ πολύπειρος παρ' ὀντινοῦν.

[2] Mr. Clinton says, Fast. Hell. App. 5, p. 380, 381:

"Athenæus distinctly ascribes the institution of the Μουσεῖον to Philadelphus in v. 203, where he is describing the acts of Philadelphus." This is a mistake: the passage in Athenæus does not specify which of the two first Ptolemies was the founder: it is perfectly consistent with the supposition that Ptolemy Soter founded it. The same may be said about the passage cited by Mr. Clinton from Plutarch; that too does not determine between the two Ptolemies, which was the founder. Perizonius was in error (as Mr. Clinton points out) in affirming that the passage in Plutarch determined the foundation to the first Ptolemy: Mr. Clinton is in error by affirming that the passage in Athenæus determines it to the second. Mr. Clinton has also been misled by Vitruvius and Scaliger (p. 389), when he affirms that the library at Alexandria was not formed until after the library at Pergamus. Bernhardy (Grundriss der Griech. Litt., Part i. p. 359, 367, 369) has followed Mr. Clinton too implicitly in recognising Philadelphus as the founder: nevertheless he too admits (p. 366) that the foundations were laid by Ptolemy Soter, under the advice and assistance of Demetrius Phalereus.

The earliest declared king of the Attalid family at Pergamus acquired

the link of connection between him and the literary or philosophical world of Greece. We read that Julius Cæsar, when he conceived the scheme (which he did not live to execute) of establishing a large public library at Rome, fixed upon the learned Varro to regulate the selection and arrangement of the books.[1] None but an eminent literary man could carry such an enterprise into effect, even at Rome, when there existed the precedent of the Alexandrine library: much more when Ptolemy

the throne in 241 B.C. The library at Pergamus could hardly have been commenced before his time: and it is his successor, Eumenes II. (whose reign began in 197 B.C.), who is mentioned as the great collector and adorner of the library at Pergamus. See Strabo, xiii. 624; Clinton, Fast. Hellen. App. 6, p. 401-403. It is plain that the library at Pergamus could hardly have been begun before the close of the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus in Egypt, by which time the library of Alexandria had already acquired great extension and renown.

[1] Sueton. Jul. Cæs. c. 44. Melissus, one of the Illustres Grammatici of Rome, undertook by order of Augustus, "curam ordinandarum bibliothecarum in Octaviæ porticu". (Sueton. De Illustr. Grammat. c. 21.)

Cicero replies in the following terms to his brother Quintus, who had written to him, requesting advice and aid in getting together for his own use a collection of Greek and Latin books. "De bibliothecâ tuâ Græcâ supplendâ, libris commutandis, Latinis comparandis—valdé velim ista confici, præsertim cum ad meum quoque usum spectent. Sed ego, mihi ipsi ista per quem agam, non habeo. *Neque enim venalia sunt, quæ quidem placeant: et confici nisi per hominem et peritum et diligentem non possunt.* Chrysippo tamen imperabo, et cum Tyrannione loquar." (Cic., Epist. ad Q. Fratr. iii. 4, 5.)

Now the circulation of books was greatly increased, and the book trade far more developed, at Rome when this letter was written (about three centuries after Plato's decease) than it was at Athens during the time of Demetrius Phalereus (320-300 B.C.). Yet we see the difficulty which the two brothers Cicero had in collecting a mere private library for use of the owner simply. *Good books, in a correct and satisfactory condition, were not to be had for money:* it was necessary to get access to the best MSS., and to have special copies made, neatly and correctly: and this could not be done, except under the superintendence of a laborious literary man like Tyrannion, by well taught slaves subordinate to him.

We may understand, from this analogy, the far greater obstacles which the collectors of the Alexandrine museum and library must have had to overcome, when *they* began their work. No one could do it, except a practised literary man such as Demetrius Phalereus: nor even he, except by finding out the best MSS., and causing special copies to be made for the use of the library. Respecting the extent and facility of book-diffusion in the Roman world, information will be found in the late Sir George Cornewall Lewis's *Enquiry into the Credibility of Early Roman History*, vol. i. p. 196, seqq.; also, in the fifth chapter of the work of Adolf Schmidt, *Geschichte der Denk-und Glaubens-Freiheit im ersten Jahrhunderte der Kaiser-herrschaft*, Berlin, 1847; lastly, in a valuable review of Adolf Schmidt's work by Sir George Lewis himself, in Fraser's Magazine for April, 1862, pp. 432-439. Adolf Schmidt represents the multiplication and cheapness of books in that day as something hardly inferior to what it is now—citing many authorities for this opinion. Sir G. Lewis has shown, in my judgment most satisfactorily, that these authorities are insufficient, and that the opinion is incorrect: this might have been shown even more fully, if the review had been lengthened. I perfectly agree with Sir G. Lewis on the main question: yet I think he narrows the case on his own side too much, and that the number of copies of such authors as Virgil and Horace, in circulation at one time, cannot have been so small as he imagines.

commenced his operations at Alexandria, and when there were only the two Μουσεῖα at Athens to serve as precedents. Demetrius, who combined an organising head and political experience, with an erudition not inferior to Varro, regard being had to the stock of learning accessible—was eminently qualified for the task. It procured for him great importance with Ptolemy, and compensated him for that loss of political ascendancy at Athens, which unfavourable fortune had brought about.

Proceedings of Demetrius in beginning to collect the library.

We learn that the ardour of Demetrius Phalereus was unremitting, and that his researches were extended everywhere, to obtain for the new museum literary monuments from all countries within contemporary knowledge.[1] This is highly probable: such universality of literary interest was adapted to the mixed and cosmopolitan character of the Alexandrine population. But Demetrius was a Greek, born about the time of Plato's death (347 B.C.), and identified with the political, rhetorical, dramatic, literary, and philosophical, activity of Athens, in which he had himself taken a prominent part. To collect the memorials of Greek literature would be his first object, more especially such as Aristotle and Theophrastus possessed in their libraries. Without doubt he would procure the works of Homer and the other distinguished poets, epic, lyric, and dramatic, as well as the rhetors, orators, &c. He probably would not leave out the works of the *viri Sokratici* (Antisthenes, Aristippus, Æschines, &c.) and the other philosophers (Demokritus, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, &c.). But there are two authors, whose compositions he would most certainly take pains to obtain—Plato and Aristotle. These were the two commanding names of Grecian philosophy in that

[1] Josephus, Antiquit. xii. 2, 1. Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεύς, ὃς ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν βιβλιοθηκῶν τοῦ βασιλέως, σπουδάζων εἰ δυνατὸν εἴη πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην συνάγειν βίβλια, καὶ συνωνούμενος εἴ τί που μόνον ἀκούσειε σπουδῆς ἄξιον ἢ ἠδύ, τῇ τοῦ βασιλέως προαιρέσει (μάλιστα γὰρ περὶ τὴν συλλογὴν τῶν βιβλίων εἶχε φιλοκάλως) συνηγωνίζετο.

What Josephus affirms here, I apprehend to be perfectly true; though he goes on to state much that is fabulous and apocryphal, respecting the incidents which preceded and accompanied the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures. Josephus is also mistaken in connecting Demetrius Phalereus with Ptolemy Philadelphus. Demetrius Phalereus was disgraced, and died shortly after that prince's accession. His time of influence was under Ptolemy Soter.

Respecting the part taken by Demetrius Phalereus in the first getting up of the Alexandrine Museum, see Valckenaer, Dissertat. De Aristobulo Judaico, p. 52-57; Ritschl, Die Alexandrin. Biblioth. p. 17, 18; Parthey, Das Alexandrinische Museum, p. 70, 71 seq.

day: the founders of the two schools existing in Athens, upon the model of which the Alexandrine Museum was to be constituted.

Among all the books which would pass over to Alexandria as the earliest stock of the new library, I know nothing upon which we can reckon more certainly than upon the works of Plato.[1] For they were acquisitions not only desirable, but also easily accessible. The writings of Aristippus or Demokritus—of Lysias or Isokrates—might require to be procured (or good MSS. thereof, fit to be specially copied) at different places and from different persons, without any security that the collection, when purchased, would be either complete or altogether genuine. But the manuscripts of Plato and of Aristotle were preserved in their respective schools at Athens, the Academic and Peripatetic:[2] a collection complete as well as verifiable. Demetrius could obtain permission, from Theophrastus in the Peripatetic school, from Polemon or Krantor in the Academic school, to have these MSS. copied for him by careful and expert hands. The cost of such copying must doubtless have been considerable; amounting to a sum which few

Certainty that the works of Plato and Aristotle were among the earliest acquisitions made by him for the library.

[1] Stahr, in the second part of his work "Aristotelia," combats and refutes with much pains the erroneous supposition, that there was no sufficient publication of the works of Aristotle, until after the time when Apellikon purchased the MSS. from the heirs of Neleus—*i.e.* B.C. 100. Stahr shows evidence to prove, that the works, at least many of the works, of Aristotle were known and studied before the year 100 B.C.: that they were in the library at Alexandria, and that they were procured for that library by Demetrius Phalereus. Stahr says (Thl. ii. p. 59): "Is it indeed credible—is it even conceivable—that Demetrius, who recommended especially to his regal friend Ptolemy the study of the political works of the philosophers—that Demetrius, the friend both of the Aristotelian philosophy and of Theophrastus, should have left the works of the two greatest Peripatetic philosophers out of his consideration? May we not rather be sure that he would take care to secure their works, before all others, for his nascent library—if indeed he did not bring them with him when he came to Alexandria?" The question here put by Stahr (and farther insisted on by Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, Introd. p. 14) is very pertinent: and I put the like question, with slight change of circumstances, respecting the works of Plato. Demetrius Phalereus was the friend and patron of Xenokrates, as well as of Theophrastus.

[2] In respect to the Peripatetic school, this is true only during the lifetime of Theophrastus, who died 287 B.C. I have already mentioned that after the death of Theophrastus, the MSS. were withdrawn from Athens. But all the operations of Demetrius Phalereus were carried on during the lifetime of Theophrastus; much of them, probably, in concert with Theophrastus, whose friend and pupil he was. The death of Theophrastus, the death of Ptolemy Soter, and the discredit and subsequent death of Demetrius are separated only by an interval of two or three years.

private individuals would have been either able or willing to disburse. But the treasures of Ptolemy were amply sufficient for the purpose:[1] and when he once conceived the project of founding a museum in his new capital, a large outlay, incurred for transcribing from the best MSS. a complete and authentic collection of the works of illustrious authors, was not likely to deter him. We know from other anecdotes,[2] what vast sums the Lykurgus, the contemporary of Demosthenes as an orator, conspicuous for many years in the civil and financial administration of Athens, caused a law to be passed, enacting that an official MS. should be made of the plays of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides. No permission was granted to represent any of these dramas at the Dionysiac festival, except upon condition that the applicant and the actors whom he employed, should compare the MS. on which they intended to proceed, with the official MS. in the hands of the authorised secretary. The purpose was to prevent arbitrary amendments or omissions in these plays, at the pleasure of the ὑποκρίται.

Ptolemy Euergetes borrowed from the Athenians these public and official MSS. of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides—on the plea that he wished to have exact copies of them taken at Alexandria, and under engagement to restore them as soon as this was done. He deposited with them the prodigious sum of fifteen talents, as a guarantee for the faithful restitution. When he got the MSS. at Alexandria, he caused copies of them to be taken on the finest paper. He then sent these copies to Athens, keeping the originals for the Alexandrine library; desiring the Athenians to retain the deposit of fifteen talents for themselves. Ptolemy Euergetes here pays, not merely the cost of the finest copying, but fifteen talents besides, for the possession of official MSS. of the three great Athenian tragedians; whose works in other manuscripts must have been in the library long before.

Respecting these official MSS. of the three great tragedians, prepared during the administration and under the auspices of the rhetor Lykurgus, see Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 841, also Boeckh, Græcæ Tragœd. Principia, pp. 13-15. The time when Lykurgus caused this to be done, must have been nearly coincident with the decease of

[1] We find interesting information, in the letters of Cicero, respecting the *librarii* or copyists whom he had in his service; and the still more numerous and effective band of *librarii* and *anagnostæ* (slaves, mostly home-born) whom his friend Atticus possessed and trained (Corn. Nep., Vit. Attici, c. 13). See Epist. ad Attic. xii. 6; xiii. 21-44; v. 12 seq.

It appears that many of the compositions of Cicero were copied, prepared for publication, and published, by the *librarii* of Atticus: who, in the case of the *Academica*, incurred a loss, because Cicero—after having given out the work to be copied and published, and after progress had been made in doing this—thought fit to alter materially both the form and the speakers introduced (xiii. 13). In regard to the Oration pro Ligario, Atticus sold it well, and brought himself home ("Ligarianam præclaré vendidisti: posthac, quicquid scripsero, tibi præconium deferam." xiii. 12). Cicero (xiii. 21) compares the relation of Atticus towards himself, with that of Hermodôrus towards Plato, as expressed in the Greek verse, λόγοισιν Ἑρμόδωρος [ἐμπορεύεται]. (Suidas, s. v. λόγοισιν Ἑρμ. ἐμπ.)

Private friends, such as Balbus and Cærellia (xiii. 21), considered it a privilege to be allowed to take copies of his compositions at their own cost, through *librarii* employed for the purpose. And we find Galen enumerating this among the noble and dignified ways for an opulent man to expend money, in a remarkable passage, βλέπω γάρ σε οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἔργων δαπανῆσαι τολμῶντα, μηδ' εἰς βιβλίων ὠνὴν καὶ κατασκευὴν καὶ τῶν γραφόντων ἄσκησιν, ἤτοι γε εἰς τάχος διὰ σημείων, ἢ εἰς καλῶν ἀκρίβειαν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀναγινωσκόντων ὀρθῶς. (De Cognoscendis Curandisque Animi Morbis, t. v. p. 48, Kühn.)

[2] Galen, Comm. ad Hippokrat. Ἐπιδημίας, vol. xvii. p. 606, 607, ed. Kühn.

third Ptolemy spent, for the mere purpose of securing better and more authoritative MSS. of works which the Alexandrine library already possessed.

We cannot doubt that Demetrius could obtain permission, if he asked it, from the Scholarchs, to have such copies made. To them the operation was at once complimentary and lucrative; while among the Athenian philosophers generally, the name of Demetrius was acceptable, from the favour which he had shown to them during his season of political power—and that of Ptolemy popular from his liberalities. Or if we even suppose that Demetrius, instead of obtaining copies of the Platonic MSS. from the school, purchased copies from private persons or booksellers (as he must have purchased the works of Demokritus and others)—he could, at any rate, assure himself of the authenticity of what he purchased, by information from the Scholarch.

Large expenses incurred by the Ptolemies for procuring good MSS.

My purpose, in thus calling attention to the Platonic school and the Alexandrine Museum, is to show that the chance for preservation of Plato's works complete and genuine after his decease, was unusually favourable. I think that they existed complete and genuine in the Alexandrine Museum before the time of Kallimachus, and, of course, during that of Aristophanes. If there were in the Museum any other works obtained from private vendors and professing to be Platonic, Kallimachus and Aristophanes had the means of distinguishing these from such as the Platonic school had furnished and could authenticate, and motive enough for keeping them apart from the certified Platonic catalogue. Whether there existed any spurious works of this sort in the

Catalogue of Platonic works, prepared by Aristophanes, is trustworthy.

Plato, 347 B.C. See Boeckh, Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. i. p. 468, ii. p. 244; Welcker, Griech. Trag. iii. p. 908; Korn, De Publico Æschyli, &c., Exemplari, Lykurgo Auctore Confecto, p. 6-9, Bonn, 1863.

In the passage cited above from Galen, we are farther informed, that Ptolemy Euergetes caused inquiries to be made, from the masters of all vessels which came to Alexandria, whether there were any MSS. on board; if there were, the MSS. were brought to the library, carefully copied out, and the copies given to the owners; the original MSS. being retained in the library, and registered in a separate compartment, under the general head of Τὰ ἐκ πλοίων, and with the name of the person from whom the acquisition had been made, annexed. Compare Wolf, Prolegg. ad Homerum, p. clxxv. These statements tend to show the care taken by the Alexandrine librarians, not only to acquire the best MSS., but also to keep good MSS. apart from bad, and to record the person and the quarter from which each acquisition had been made.

Museum, Diogenes Laertius does not tell us; nor, unfortunately, does he set forth the full list of those which Aristophanes, recognising as Platonic, distributed either in triplets or in units. Diogenes mentions only the principle of distribution adopted, and a select portion of the compositions distributed. But as far as his positive information goes, I hold it to be perfectly worthy of trust. I consider that all the compositions recognised by Aristophanes as works of Plato are unquestionably such; and that his testimony greatly strengthens our assurance for the received catalogue, in many of those items which have been most contested by critics, upon supposed internal grounds. Aristophanes authenticates, among others, not merely the Leges, but also the Epinomis, the Minos, and the Epistolæ.

No canonical or exclusive order of the Platonic dialogues, when arranged by Aristophanes.

There is another point also which I conceive to be proved by what we hear about Aristophanes. He (or Kallimachus before him) introduced a new order or distribution of his own —the Trilogies—founded on the analogy of the dramatic Didaskalies. This shows that the Platonic dialogues were not received into the library in any canonical or *exclusive order* of their own, or in any interdependence as first, second, third, &c., essential to render them intelligible as a system. Had there been any such order, Kallimachus and Aristophanes would no more have altered it, than they would have transposed the order of the books in the Republic and Leges. The importance of what is here observed will appear presently, when we touch upon the theory of Schleiermacher.

Other libraries and literary centres, besides Alexandria, in which spurious Platonic works might get footing.

The distributive arrangement, proposed or sanctioned by Aristophanes, applied (as I have already remarked) to the materials in the Alexandrine library only. But this library, though it was the most conspicuous portion, was not the whole, of the Grecian literary aggregate. There were other great regal libraries (such as those of the kings of Pergamus and the Seleukid kings[1]) commenced after the Alexandrine library had already attained importance, and intended

[1] The library of Antiochus the Great, or of his predecessor, is mentioned by Suidas, Εὐφορίων. Euphorion was librarian of it, seemingly about 230-220 B.C. See Clinton, Fast. Hell. B.C. 221.

to rival it: there was also an active literary and philosophising class, in various Grecian cities, of which Athens was the foremost, but in which Rhodes, Kyrênê, and several cities in Asia Minor, Kilikia, and Syria, were included: ultimately the cultivated classes at Rome, and the Western Hellenic city of Massalia, became comprised in the number. Among this widespread literary public, there were persons who neither knew nor examined the Platonic school or the Alexandrine library, nor investigated what title either of them had to furnish a certificate authenticating the genuine works of Plato. It is not certain that even the great library at Pergamus, begun nearly half a century after that of Alexandria, had any such initiatory agent as Demetrius Phalereus, able as well as willing to go to the fountain-head of Platonism at Athens: nor could the kings of Pergamus claim aid from Alexandria, with which they were in hostile rivalry, and from which they were even forbidden (so we hear) to purchase papyrus. Under these circumstances, it is quite possible that spurious Platonic writings, though they obtained no recognition in the Alexandrine library, might obtain more or less recognition elsewhere, and pass under the name of Plato. To a certain extent, such was the case. There existed some spurious dialogues at the time when Thrasyllus afterwards formed his arrangement.

Moreover the distribution made by Aristophanes of the Platonic dialogues into Trilogies, and the order of priority which he established among them was by no means universally accepted. Some rejected altogether the dramatic analogy of Trilogies as a principle of distribution. They arranged the dialogues

Other critics, besides Aristophanes, proposed different arrange-

Galen states (Comm. in Hippok. De Nat. Hom. vol. xv. p. 105, Kühn) that the forgeries of books, and the practice of tendering books for sale under the false names of celebrated authors, did not commence until the time when the competition between the kings of Egypt and the kings of Pergamus for their respective libraries became vehement. If this be admitted, there could have been no forgeries tendered at Alexandria until after the commencement of the reign of Euergetes (B.C. 247-222): for the competition from Pergamus could hardly have commenced earlier than 230 B.C. In the times of Soter and Philadelphus, there would be no such forgeries tendered. I do not doubt that such forgeries were sometimes successfully passed off: but I think Galen does not take sufficient account of the practice (mentioned by himself) at the Alexandrine library, to keep faithful record of the person and quarter from whence each book had been acquired.

ments of the Platonic dialogues.

into three classes:[1] 1. The Direct, or purely dramatic. 2. The Indirect, or narrative (diegematic). 3. The Mixed—partly one, partly the other. Respecting the order of priority, we read that while Aristophanes placed the Republic first, there were eight other arrangements, each recognising a different dialogue as first in order; these eight were, Alkibiades I., Theagês, Euthyphron, Kleitophon, Timæus, Phædrus, Theætêtus, Apology. More than one arrangement began with the Apology. Some even selected the Epistolæ as the proper commencement for studying Plato's works.[2]

Panætius, the Stoic—considered the Phædon to be spurious—earliest known

We hear with surprise that the distinguished Stoic philosopher at Athens, Panætius, rejected the Phædon as not being the work of Plato.[3] It appears that he did not believe in the immortality of the soul, and that he profoundly admired Plato; accordingly, he thought it unworthy of so great a philosopher to

[1] Diog. L. iii. 49. Schone, in his commentary on the Protagoras (pp. 8-12), lays particular stress on this division into the direct or dramatic, and indirect or diegematic. He thinks it probable, that Plato preferred one method to the other at different periods of life: that all of one sort, and all of the other sort, come near together in time.

[2] Diog. L. iii. 62. Albinus, Εἰσαγωγή, c. 4, in K. F. Hermann's Appendix Platonica, p. 149.

[3] See the Epigram out of the Anthology, and the extract from the Scholia on the Categories of Aristotle, cited by Wyttenbach in his note on the beginning of the Phædon. A more important passage (which he has not cited) from the Scholia on Aristotle, is, that of Asklepius on the Metaphysica, p. 991; Scholia, ed. Brandis, p. 576, a. 38. Ὅτι τοῦ Πλάτωνός ἐστιν ὁ Φαίδων, σαφῶς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δηλοῖ—Παναίτιος γάρ τις ἐτόλμησε νοθεῦσαι τὸν διάλογον. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔλεγεν εἶναι θνητὴν τὴν ψυχήν, ἐβούλετο συγκατασπάσαι τὸν Πλάτωνα· ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι σαφῶς ἀπαθανατίζει (Plato) τὴν λογικὴν ψυχήν, τούτου χάριν ἐνόθευσε τὸν διάλογον. Wyttenbach vainly endeavours to elude the force of the passages cited by himself, and to make out that the witnesses did not mean to assert that Panætius had declared the Phædon to be spurious. One of the reasons urged by Wyttenbach is—"Nec illud negligendum, quod dicitur ὑπὸ Παναιτίου τινὸς, à *Panætio quodam* neque per contemptum dici potuisse neque a Syriano neque ab hoc anonymo; quorum neuter eâ fuit doctrinæ inopia, ut Panætii laudes et præstantiam ignoraret." But in the Scholion of Asklepius on the Metaphysica (which passage was not before Wyttenbach), we find the very same expression Παναίτιός τις, and plainly used *per contemptum:* for Asklepius probably considered it a manifestation of virtuous feeling to describe, in contemptuous language, a philosopher who did not believe in the immortality of the soul. We have only to read the still harsher and more contemptuous language which he employs towards the Manicheans, in another Scholion, p. 666, b. 5, Brandis.

Favorinus said (Diog. iii. 37) that when Plato read aloud the Phædon, Aristotle was the only person present who remained to the end: all the other hearers went away in the middle. I have no faith in this anecdote: I consider it, like so many others in Diogenes, as a myth: but the invention of it indicates, that there were many persons who had no sympathy with the Phædon, taking at the bottom the same view as Panætius

waste so much logical subtlety, poetical metaphor, and fable, in support of such a conclusion. Probably he was also guided, in part, by one singularity in the Phædon : it is the only dialogue wherein Plato mentions himself in the third person.[1] If Panætius was predisposed, on other grounds, to consider the dialogue as unworthy of Plato, he might be induced to lay stress upon such a singularity, as showing that the author of the dialogue must be some person other than Plato. Panætius evidently took no pains to examine the external attestations of the dialogue, which he would have found to be attested both by Aristotle and by Kallimachus as the work of Plato. Moreover, whatever any one may think of the cogency of the reasoning—the beauty of Platonic handling and expression is manifest throughout the dialogue. This verdict of Panætius is the earliest example handed down to us of a Platonic dialogue disallowed on internal grounds—that is, because it appeared to the critic unworthy of Plato : and it is certainly among the most unfortunate examples.

example of a Platonic dialogue disallowed upon internal grounds.

But the most elaborate classification of the Platonic works was that made by Thrasyllus, in the days of Augustus or Tiberius, near to, or shortly after, the Christian era : a rhetor of much reputation, consulted and selected as travelling companion by the Emperor Augustus.[2]

Classification of Platonic works by the rhetor Thrasyllus —dramatic —philosophical.

Thrasyllus adopted two different distributions of the Platonic works : one was dramatic, the other philosophical. The two were founded on perfectly distinct principles, and had no inherent connection with each other ; but Thrasyllus combined them together, and noted, in regard to each dialogue, its place in the one classification as well as in the other.

One of these distributions was into Tetralogies, or groups of four each. This was in substitution for the Trilogies introduced by Aristophanes or by Kallimachus, and was founded upon the same dramatic analogy : the

Dramatic principle— Tetralogies.

[1] Plato, Phædon, p. 59. Plato is named also in the Apology : but this is a report, more or less exact, of the real defence of Sokrates.

[2] Diog. L. iii. 56 ; Themistius, Orat. viii. (Πεντετηρικὸς) p. 108 B. It appears that this classification by Thrasyllus was approved, or jointly constructed, by his contemporary Derkyllides. (Albinus, Εἰσαγωγή, c. 4, p. 149, in K. F. Hermann's Appendix Platonica.)

dramas, which contended for the prize at the Dionysiac festivals, having been sometimes exhibited in batches of three, or Trilogies, sometimes in batches of four, or Tetralogies—three tragedies, along with a satirical piece as accompaniment. Because the dramatic writer brought forth four pieces at a birth, it was assumed as likely that Plato would publish four dialogues all at once. Without departing from this dramatic analogy, which seems to have been consecrated by the authority of the Alexandrine Grammatici, Thrasyllus gained two advantages. First, he included ALL the Platonic compositions, whereas Aristophanes, in his Trilogies, had included only a part, and had left the rest not grouped. Thrasyllus included all the Platonic compositions, thirty-six in number, reckoning the Republic, the Leges, and the Epistolæ in bulk, each as one—in nine Tetralogies or groups of four each. Secondly, he constituted his first tetralogy in an impressive and appropriate manner — Euthyphron, Apology, Kriton, Phædon—four compositions really resembling a dramatic tetralogy, and bound together by their common bearing, on the last scenes of the life of a philosopher.[1] In Euthyphron, Sokrates appears as having been just indicted and as thinking on his defence; in the Apology, he makes his defence; in the Kriton, he appears as sentenced by the legal tribunal, yet refusing to evade the sentence by escaping from his prison; in the Phædon, we have the last dying scene and conversation. None of the other tetralogies present an equal bond of connection between

[1] Diog. L. iii. 57. *πρώτην μὲν οὖν τετραλογίαν τίθησι τὴν κοινὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔχουσαν· παραδεῖξαι γὰρ βούλεται ὅποιος ἂν εἴη ὁ τοῦ φιλοσόφου βίος.* Albinus, Introduct. ad Plat. c. 4, p. 149, in K. F. Hermann's Append. Platon.

Thrasyllus appears to have considered the Republic as ten dialogues and the Leges as twelve, each book (of Republic and of Leges) constituting a separate dialogue, so that he made the Platonic works fifty-six in all. But for the purpose of his tetralogies he reckoned them only as thirty-six—nine groups.

The author of the Prolegomena *τῆς Πλάτωνος Φιλοσοφίας* in Hermann's Append. Platon. pp. 218-219, gives the same account of the tetralogies, and of the connecting bond which united the our members of the first tetralogical group: but he condemns altogether the principle of the tetralogical division. He does not mention the name of Thrasyllus. He lived after Proklus (p. 218), that is, after 480 A.D.

The argument urged by Wyttenbach and others—that Varro must have considered the Phædon as *fourth* in the order of the Platonic compositions—an argument founded on a passage in Varro, L. L. vii. 37, which refers to the Phædon under the words *Plato in quarto*—this argument becomes inapplicable in the text as given by O. Müller—not *Varro in quarto* but *Varro in quattuor fluminibus*, &c. Mullach (Democriti Frag. p. 98) has tried unsuccessfully to impugn Müller's text, and to uphold the word *quarto* with the inference resting upon it.

their constituent items; but the first tetralogy was probably intended to recommend the rest, and to justify the system.

In the other distribution made by Thrasyllus,[1] Plato was regarded not as a quasi-dramatist, but as a philosopher. The dialogues were classified with reference partly to their method and spirit, partly to their subject. His highest generic distinction was into :—1. Dialogues of Investigation or Search. 2. Dialogues of Exposition or Construction. The Dialogues of Investigation he sub-divided into two classes :—1. Gymnastic. 2. Agonistic. These were again subdivided, each into two sub-classes; the Gymnastic, into 1. Obstetric. 2. Peirastic. The Agonistic, into 1. Probative. 2. Refutative. Again, the Dialogues of Exposition were divided into two classes: 1. Theoretical. 2. Practical. Each of these classes was divided into two sub-classes: the Theoretical into 1. Physical. 2. Logical. The Practical into 1. Ethical. 2. Political.

Philosophical principle—Dialogues of Search—Dialogues of Exposition.

The following table exhibits this philosophical classification of Thrasyllus :—

[1] The statement in Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Plato, is somewhat obscure and equivocal; but I think it certain that the classification which he gives in iii. 49, 50, 51, of the Platonic dialogues, was made by Thrasyllus. It is a portion of the same systematic arrangement as that given somewhat farther on (iii. 56-61), which is ascribed by name to Thrasyllus, enumerating the Tetralogies. Diogenes expressly states that Thrasyllus was the person who annexed to each dialogue its double denomination, which it has since borne in the published editions—Εὐθύφρων — περὶ ὁσίου — πειραστικός. In the Dialogues of examination or Search, one of these names is derived from the subject, the other from the method, as in the instance of Euthyphron just cited: in the Dialogues of Exposition both names are derived from the subject, first the special, next the general. Φαίδων, ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς, ἠθικός. Παρμενίδης, ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν, λογικός.

Schleiermacher (in the Einleitung prefixed to his translation of Plato, p. 24) speaks somewhat loosely about "the well-known dialectical distributions of the Platonic dialogues, which Diogenes has preserved without giving the name of the author". Diogenes gives only *one* such dialectical (or logical) distribution; and though he does not mention the name of Thrasyllus in direct or immediate connection with it, we may clearly see that he is copying Thrasyllus. This is well pointed out in an acute commentary on Schleiermacher, by Yxem, Logos Protreptikos, Berlin, 1841, p. 12-13.

Diogenes remarks (iii. 50) that the distribution of the dialogues into narrative, dramatic, and mixed, is made τραγικῶς μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσόφως. This remark would seem to apply more precisely to the arrangement of the dialogues into trilogies and tetralogies. His word φιλοσόφως belongs very justly to the logical distribution of Thrasyllus, apart from the tetralogies.

Porphyry tells us that Plotinus did not bestow any titles upon his own discourses. The titles were bestowed by his disciples; who did not always agree, but gave different titles to the same discourse (Porphyry, Vit. Plotin. 4).

TABLE I.

PHILOSOPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKS OF PLATO BY THRASYLLUS.

I. DIALOGUES OF INVESTIGATION. *Searching Dialogues.* Ζητητικοί.	II. DIALOGUES OF EXPOSITION. *Guiding Dialogues.* Ὑφηγητικοί.

I. DIALOGUES OF INVESTIGATION.

Gymnastic.		Agonistic.	
Μαιευτικοί. Obstetric.	Πειραστικοί. Peirastic.	Ἐνδεικτικοί. Probative.	Ἀνατρεπτικοί. Refutative.
Alkibiadês I.	Charmidês.	Protagoras.	Euthydêmus.
Alkibiadês II.	Menon.		Gorgias.
Theagês.	Ion.		Hippias I.
Lachês.	Euthyphron.		Hippias II.
Lysis.			

II. DIALOGUES OF EXPOSITION.

Theoretical.		Practical.	
Φυσικοί. Physical.	Λογικοί. Logical.	Ἠθικοί. Ethical.	Πολιτικοί. Political.
Timæus.	Kratylus.	Apology.	Republic.
	Sophistês.	Kriton.	Kritias.
	Politikus.	Phædon.	Minos.
	Parmenidês.	Phædrus.	Leges.
	Theætêtus.	Symposion.	Epinomis.
		Menexenus.	
		Kleitophon.	
		Epistolæ.	
		Philêbus.	
		Hipparchus.	
		Rivales.	

I now subjoin a second Table, containing the Dramatic Distribution of the Platonic Dialogues, with the Philosophical Distribution combined or attached to it.

TABLE II.

DRAMATIC DISTRIBUTION.—PLATONIC DIALOGUES, AS ARRANGED IN TETRALOGIES BY THRASYLLUS.

	Tetralogy 1.	
1. Euthyphron.....	On Holiness.....	Peirastic or Testing.
2. Apology of Sokrates	Ethical.....	Ethical.
3. Kriton.....	On Duty in Action....	Ethical.
4. Phædon.....	On the Soul.....	Ethical.
	2.	
1. Kratylus.....	On Rectitude in Naming	Logical.
2. Theætêtus.....	On Knowledge.....	Logical.
3. Sophistês.....	On Ens or the Existent	Logical.
4. Politikus.....	On the Art of Governing	Logical.
	3.	
1. Parmenidês.....	On Ideas.....	Logical.
2. Philêbus.....	On Pleasure.....	Ethical.
3. Symposion.....	On Good.....	Ethical.
4. Phædrus.....	On Love.....	Ethical.
	4.	
1. Alkibiadês I.	On the Nature of Man	Obstetric or Evolving.
2. Alkibiadês II.	On Prayer.....	Obstetric.
3. Hipparchus	On the Love of Gain..	Ethical.
4. Erastæ.....	On Philosophy.....	Ethical.
	5.	
1. Theagês.....	On Philosophy.....	Obstetric.
2. Charmidês.....	On Temperance.....	Peirastic.
3. Lachês.....	On Courage.....	Obstetric.
4. Lysis.....	On Friendship	Obstetric.
	6.	
1. Euthydêmus	The Disputatious Man	Refutative.
2. Protagoras.....	The Sophists.....	Probative.
3. Gorgias.....	On Rhetoric	Refutative.
4. Menon.....	On Virtue	Peirastic.

	7.	
1. Hippias I.	On the Beautiful	Refutative.
2. Hippias II.	On Falsehood	Refutative.
3. Ion	On the Iliad	Peirastic.
4. Menexenus	The Funeral Oration	Ethical.
	8.	
1. Kleitophon	The Impulsive	Ethical.
2. Republic	On Justice	Political.
3. Timæus	On Nature	Physical.
4. Kritias	The Atlantid	Ethical.
	9.	
1. Minos	On Law	Political.
2. Leges	On Legislation	Political.
3. Epinomis	The Night-Assembly, or the Philosopher	Political.
4. Epistolæ XIII	... ...	Ethical.

The second Table, as it here stands, is given by Diogenes Laertius, and is extracted by him probably from the work of Thrasyllus, or from the edition of Plato as published by Thrasyllus. The reader will see that each Platonic composition has a place assigned to it in two classifications—1. The dramatic—2. The philosophical—each in itself distinct and independent of the other, but here blended together.

Incongruity and repugnance of the two classifications.

We may indeed say more. The two classifications are not only independent, but incongruous and even repugnant. The better of the two is only obscurely and imperfectly apprehended, because it is presented as an appendage to the worse. The dramatic classification, which stands in the foreground, rests upon a purely fanciful analogy, determining preference for the number *four*. If indeed this objection were urged against Thrasyllus, he might probably have replied that the group of four volumes together was in itself convenient, neither too large nor too small, for an elementary subdivision ; and that the fanciful analogy was an artifice for recommending it to the feelings, better (after all) than selection of another number by haphazard. Be that as it may, however, the fiction was one which Thrasyllus inherited from Aristophanes : and it does some honour to his ability, that he has

built, upon so inconvenient a fiction, one tetralogy (the first), really plausible and impressive.[1] But it does more honour to his ability that he should have originated the philosophical classification; distinguishing the dialogues by important attributes truly belonging to each, and conducting the Platonic student to points of view which ought to be made known to him. This classification forms a marked improvement upon every thing (so far as we know) which preceded it.

Dramatic principle of classification—was inherited by Thrasyllus from Aristophanes.

That Thrasyllus followed Aristophanes in the principle of his classification, is manifest: that he adopted the dramatic ground and principle of classification (while amending its details), not because he was himself guided by it, but because he found it already in use and sanctioned by the high authority of the Alexandrines—is also manifest, because he himself constructed and tacked to it a better classification, founded upon principles new and incongruous with the dramatic. In all this we trace the established ascendancy of the Alexandrine library and its eminent literati. Of which ascendancy a farther illustration appears, when we read in Diogenes Laertius that editions of Plato were published, carrying along with the text the special marks of annotation applied by the Alexandrines to Homer and other poets: the obelus to indicate a spurious passage, the obelus with two dots to denote a passage which had been improperly declared spurious, the X to signify peculiar locutions, the double line or Diplê to mark important or charac-

Authority of the Alexandrine Library—editions of Plato published, with the Alexandrine critical marks.

[1] It is probable that Aristophanes, in distributing Plato into trilogies, was really influenced by the dramatic form of the compositions to put them in a class with real dramas. But Thrasyllus does not seem to have been influenced by such a consideration. He took the number *four* on its own merits, and adopted, as a way of recommending it, the traditional analogy sanctioned by the Alexandrine librarians.

That such was the case, we may infer pretty clearly when we learn, that Thrasyllus applied the same distribution (into tetralogies) to the works of Demokritus, which were *not* dramatic in form. (Diog. L. ix. 45; Mullach, Democ. Frag. p. 100-107, who attempts to restore the Thrasyllean tetralogies.)

The compositions of Demokritus were not merely numerous, but related to the greatest diversity of subjects. To them Thrasyllus could not apply the same logical or philosophical distribution which he applied to Plato. He published, along with the works of Demokritus, a preface, which he entitled Τὰ πρὸ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως τῶν Δημοκρίτου βιβλίων (Diog. L. ix. 41).

Porphyry tells us, that when he undertook, as literary executor, the arrangement and publication of the works of his deceased master Plotinus, he found fifty-four discourses: which

teristic opinions of Plato—and others in like manner. A special price was paid for manuscripts of Plato with these illustrative appendages:[1] which must have been applied either by Alexandrines themselves, or by others trained in their school. When Thrasyllus set himself to edit and re-distribute the Platonic works, we may be sure that he must have consulted one or more public libraries, either at Alexandria, Athens, Rome, Tarsus, or elsewhere. Nowhere else could he find all the works together. Now the proceedings ascribed to him show that he attached himself to the Alexandrine library, and to the authority of its most eminent critics.

Thrasyllus followed the Alexandrine library and Aristophanes, as to genuine Platonic works.

Probably it was this same authority that Thrasyllus followed in determining which were the real works of Plato, and in setting aside pretended works. He accepted the collection of Platonic compositions sanctioned by Aristophanes and recognised as such in the Alexandrine library. As far as our positive knowledge goes, it fully bears out what is here stated: all the compositions recognised by Aristophanes (unfortunately Diogenes does not give a complete enumeration of those which he recognised) are to be found in the catalogue of Thrasyllus. And the evidentiary value of this fact is so much the greater, because the most questionable compositions (I mean, those which modern critics reject or even despise) are expressly included in

he arranged into six Enneads or groups of nine each. He was induced to prefer this distribution, by regard to the perfection of the number six (τελειότητι). He placed in each Ennead discourses akin to each other, or on analogous subjects (Porphyry, Vit. Plotin. 24).

[1] Diog. L. iii. 65, 66. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ σημεῖά τινα τοῖς βιβλίοις αὐτοῦ παρατίθεται, φέρε καὶ περὶ τούτων τι εἴπωμεν, &c. He then proceeds to enumerate the σημεῖα.

It is important to note that Diogenes cites this statement (respecting the peculiar critical marks appended to manuscripts of the Platonic works) from Antigonus of Karystus in his Life of Zeno the Stoic. Now the date of Antigonus is placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in B.C. 225, before the death of Ptolemy III. Euergetes (see Fasti Hellen. B.C. 225, also Appendix, 12, 80). Antigonus must thus have been contemporary both with Kallimachus and with Aristophanes of Byzantium: he notices the marked manuscripts of Plato as something newly edited—(νεωστὶ ἐκδοθέντα): and we may thus see that the work of critical marking must have been performed either by Kallimachus and Aristophanes themselves (one or both) or by some of their contemporaries. Among the titles of the lost treatises of Kallimachus, one is —about the γλῶσσαι or peculiar phrases of Demokritus. It is therefore noway improbable that Kallimachus should have bestowed attention upon the peculiarities of the Platonic text, and the inaccuracies of manuscripts. The library had probably acquired several different manuscripts of the Platonic compositions, as it had of the Iliad and Odyssey, and of the Attic tragedies.

the recognition of Aristophanes, and passed from him to Thrasyllus—Leges, Epinomis, Minos, Epistolæ, Sophistês, Politikus. Exactly on those points on which the authority of Thrasyllus requires to be fortified against modern objectors, it receives all the support which coincidence with Aristophanes can impart. When we know that Thrasyllus adhered to Aristophanes on so many disputable points of the catalogue, we may infer pretty certainly that he adhered to him in the remainder. In regard to the question, Which were Plato's genuine works? it was perfectly natural that Thrasyllus should accept the recognition of the greatest library then existing: a library, the written records of which could be traced back to Demetrius Phalereus. He followed this external authority: he did not take each dialogue to pieces, to try whether it conformed to a certain internal standard—a "platonisches Gefühl"—of his own.

That the question between genuine and spurious Platonic dialogues was tried in the days of Thrasyllus, by external authority and not by internal feeling—we may see farther by the way in which Diogenes Laertius speaks of the spurious dialogues. "The following dialogues (he says) are declared to be spurious *by common consent:* 1. Eryxias or Erasistratus. 2. Akephali or Sisyphus. 3. Demodokus. 4. Axiochus. 5. Halkyon. 6. Midon or Hippotrophus. 7. Phæakes. 8. Chelidon. 9. Hebdomê. 10. Epimenides."[1] There was, then, unanimity, so far as the knowledge of Diogenes Laertius reached, as to genuine and spurious. All the critics whom he valued, Thrasyllus among them, pronounced the above ten dialogues to be spurious: all of them agreed also in accepting the dialogues in the list of Thrasyllus as genuine.[2] Of course the ten spurious dialogues must have been talked of by some persons, or must have got footing in some editions or libraries, as real works of Plato: otherwise there could have been no trial had or sentence passed upon them.

Ten spurious dialogues, rejected by all other critics as well as by Thrasyllus—evidence that these critics followed the common authority of the Alexandrine library.

[1] Diog. L. iii. 62: *νοθεύονται δὲ τῶν διαλόγων ὁμολογουμένως.*

Compare Prolegomena *τῆς Πλάτωνος Φιλοσοφίας*, in Hermann's Appendix Platonica, p. 219.

[2] It has been contended by some modern critics, that Thrasyllus himself doubted whether the Hipparchus was Plato's work. When I consider that dialogue, I shall show that there is no adequate ground for believing that Thrasyllus doubted its genuineness.

But what Diogenes affirms is, that Thrasyllus and all the critics whose opinion he esteemed, concurred in rejecting them. We may surely presume that this unanimity among the critics, both as to all that they accepted and all that they rejected, arose from common acquiescence in the authority of the Alexandrine library.[1] The ten rejected dialogues were not in the Alexandrine library—or at least not among the rolls therein recognised as Platonic.

Thrasyllus did not follow an internal sentiment of his own in rejecting dialogues as spurious.

If Thrasyllus and the others did not proceed upon this evidence in rejecting the ten dialogues, and did not find in them any marks of time such as to exclude the supposition of Platonic authorship—they decided upon what is called internal evidence: a critical sentiment, which satisfied them that these dialogues did not possess the Platonic character, style, manner, doctrines, merits, &c. Now I think it highly improbable that Thrasyllus could have proceeded upon any such sentiment. For when we survey the catalogue of works which he recognised as genuine, we see that it includes the widest diversity of style, manner, doctrine, purpose, and merits: that the disparate epithets, which he justly applies to discriminate the various dialogues, cannot be generalised so as to leave any intelligible "Platonic character" common to all. Now since Thrasyllus reckoned among the genuine works of Plato, compositions so unlike, and so unequal in merit, as the Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias, Lysis, Parmenidês, Symposion, Philêbus, Menexenus, Leges, Epinomis, Hipparchus, Minos, Theagês, Epistolæ, &c., not to mention a composition obviously unfinished, such as the Kritias—he could have little scruple in believing that Plato also composed the Eryxias, Sisyphus, Demodokus, and Halkyon. These last-mentioned dialogues still exist, and can be appreciated.[2] Allowing, for the sake of argument, that we are en-

[1] Diogenes (ix. 49) uses the same phrase in regard to the spurious works ascribed to Demokritus, *τὰ δ' ὁμολογουμένως ἐστὶν ἀλλότρια*. And I believe that he means the same thing by it: that the works alluded to were not recognised in the Alexandrine library as belonging to Demokritus, and were accordingly excluded from the tetralogies (of Demokritus) prepared by Thrasyllus.

[2] The Axiochus, Eryxias, Sisyphus, and Demodokus, are printed as Apocrypha annexed to most editions of Plato, together with two other dialogues entitled De Justo and De Virtute. The Halkyon has generally appeared among the works of Lucian, but K. F. Hermann has recently printed it in his edition of Plato among the Platonic Apocrypha.

titled to assume our own sense of worth as a test of what is really Plato's composition, it is impossible to deny, that if these dialogues are not worthy of the author of Republic and Protagoras, they are at least worthy of the author of the Leges, Epinomis, Hipparchus, Minos, &c. Accordingly, if the internal sentiment of Thrasyllus did not lead him to reject these last four, neither would it lead him to reject the Eryxias, Sisyphus, and Halkyon. I conclude therefore that if he, and all the other critics whom Diogenes esteemed, agreed in rejecting the ten dialogues as spurious—their verdict depended not upon any internal sentiment, but upon the authority of the Alexandrine library.[1]

Results as to the trustworthiness of the Thrasyllean Canon.

On this question, then, of the Canon of Plato's works (as compared with the works of other contemporary authors) recognised by Thrasyllus—I consider that its claim to trustworthiness is very high, as including all the genuine works, and none but the genuine works, of Plato: the following facts being either proved, or fairly presumable.

1. The Canon rests on the authority of the Alexandrine library and its erudite librarians;[2] whose written records went

The Axiochus contains a mark of time (the mention of Ἀκαδημία and Λυκεῖον, p. 367), as F. A. Wolf has observed, proving that it was not composed until the Platonic and Peripatetic schools were both of them in full establishment at Athens—that is, certainly after the death of Plato, and probably after the death of Aristotle. It is possible that Thrasyllus may have proceeded upon this evidence of time, at least as collateral proof, in pronouncing the dialogue not to be the work of Plato. The other four dialogues contain no similar evidence of date.

Favorinus affirmed that Halkyon was the work of an author named Leon.

Some said (Diog. L. iii. 37) that Philippus of Opus, one of the disciples of Plato, transcribed the Leges, which were on waxen tablets (ἐν κηρῷ), and that the Epinomis was his work (τοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἐπινομίδα φασὶν εἶναι). It was probably the work of Philippus only in the sense in which the Leges were his work—that he made a fair and durable copy of parts of it from the wax. Thrasyllus admitted it with the rest as Platonic.

[1] Mullach (Democr. Fragm. p. 100) accuses Thrasyllus of an entire want of critical sentiment, and pronounces his catalogue to be altogether without value as an evidence of genuine Platonic works—because Thrasyllus admits many dialogues, "quos doctorum nostri sæculi virorum acumen è librorum Platonicorum numero exemit".

This observation exactly illustrates the conclusion which I desire to bring out. I admit that Thrasyllus had a critical sentiment different from that of the modern Platonic commentators; but I believe that in the present case he proceeded upon other evidence—recognition by the Alexandrine library. My difference with Mullach is, that I consider this recognition (in a question of genuine or spurious) as more trustworthy evidence than the critical sentiment of modern literati.

[2] Suckow adopts and defends the opinion here stated—that Thrasyllus, in determining which were the genuine works of Plato and which were not

back to the days of Ptolemy Soter, and Demetrius Phalereus, within a generation after the death of Plato.

2. The manuscripts of Plato at his death were preserved in the school which he founded; where they continued for more than thirty years under the care of Speusippus and Xenokrates, who possessed personal knowledge of all that Plato had really written. After Xenokrates, they came under the care of Polemon and the succeeding Scholarchs, from whom Demetrius Phalereus probably obtained permission to take copies of them for the nascent museum or library at Alexandria—or through whom at least (if he purchased from booksellers) he could easily ascertain which were Plato's works, and which, if any, were spurious.

3. They were received into that library without any known canonical order, prescribed system, or interdependence essential to their being properly understood. Kallimachus or Aristophanes devised an order of arrangement for themselves, such as they thought suitable.

genuine, was guided mainly by the authority of the Alexandrine library and librarians (G. F. W. Suckow, Form der Platonischen Schriften, pp. 170-175). Ueberweg admits this opinion as just (Untersuchungen, p. 195).

Suckow farther considers (p. 175) that the catalogue of works of esteemed authors, deposited in the Alexandrine library, may be regarded as dating from the Πίνακες of Kallimachus.

This goes far to make out the presumption which I have endeavoured to establish in favour of the Canon recognised by Thrasyllus, which, however, these two authors do not fully admit.

K. F. Hermann, too (see Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Philos. p. 44), argues sometimes strongly in favour of this presumption, though elsewhere he entirely departs from it.

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CHAPTER VII.

PLATONIC CANON AS APPRECIATED AND MODIFIED BY MODERN CRITICS.

THE Platonic Canon established by Thrasyllus maintained its authority until the close of the last century, in regard to the distinction between what was genuine and spurious. The distribution indeed did not continue to be approved: the Tetralogies were neglected, and the order of the dialogues varied: moreover, doubts were intimated about Kleitophon and Epinomis. But nothing was positively removed from, or positively added to, the total recognised by Thrasyllus. The Neo-Platonists (from the close of the second century B.C., down to the beginning of the sixth century A.D.) introduced a new, mystic, and theological interpretation, which often totally changed and falsified Plato's meaning. Their principles of interpretation would have been strange and unintelligible to the rhetors Thrasyllus and Dionysius of Halikarnassus — or to the Platonic philosopher Charmadas, who expounded Plato to Marcus Crassus at Athens. But they still continued to look for Plato in the nine Tetralogies of Thrasyllus, in each and all of them. So also continued Ficinus, who, during the last half of the fifteenth century, did so much to revive in the modern world the study of Plato. He revived along with it the neo-platonic interpretation. The Argumenta, prefixed to the different dialogues by Ficinus, are remarkable, as showing what an ingenious student, interpreting in that spirit, discovered in them.

The Canon of Thrasyllus continued to be generally acknowledged by the Neo-Platonists, as well as by Ficinus and the succeeding critics after the revival of learning.

But the scholars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, speaking generally—though not neglecting these neo-

platonic refinements, were disposed to seek out, wherever they could find it, a more literal interpretation of the Platonic text, correctly presented and improved. The next great edition of the works of Plato was published by Serranus and Stephens, in the latter portion of the sixteenth century.

Serranus—his six Syzygies—left the aggregate Canon unchanged. Tennemann—importance assigned to the Phædrus.

Serranus distributed the dialogues of Plato into six groups which he called Syzygies. In his first Syzygy were comprised Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Phædon (coinciding with the first Tetralogy of Thrasyllus), as setting forth the defence of Sokrates and of his doctrine. The second Syzygy included the dialogues introductory to philosophy generally, and impugning the Sophists—Theagês, Erastæ, Theætêtus, Sophistês, Euthydêmus, Protagoras, Hippias II. In the third Syzygy were three dialogues considered as bearing on Logic—Kratylus, Gorgias, Ion. The fourth Syzygy contained the dialogues on Ethics generally—Philêbus, Menon, Alkibiadês I.; on special points of Ethics—Alkibiadês II., Charmidês, Lysis, Hipparchus; and on Politics—Menexenus, Politikus, Minos, Republic, Leges, Epinomis. The fifth Syzygy included the dialogues on Physics, and Metaphysics (or Theology)—Timæus, Kritias, Parmenidês, Symposion, Phædrus, Hippias II. In the sixth Syzygy were ranged the thirteen Epistles, the various dialogues which Serranus considered spurious (Kleitophon among them, which he regarded as doubtful), and the Definitions.

Serranus, while modifying the distribution of the Platonic works, left the entire Canon very much as he found it. So it remained throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the scholars who devoted themselves to Plato were content with improvement of the text, philological illustration, and citations from the ancient commentators. But the powerful impulse, given by Kant to the speculative mind of Europe during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, materially affected the point of view from which Plato was regarded. Tennemann, both in his System of the Platonic Philosophy, and in dealing with Plato as a portion of his general history of philosophy, applied the doctrines of Kant largely and even excessively to the exposition of ancient doctrines. Much of his comment is instructive,

greatly surpassing his predecessors. Without altering the Platonic Canon, he took a new view of the general purposes of Plato, and especially he brought forward the dialogue Phædrus into a prominence which had never before belonged to it, as an index or key-note (*ἐνδόσιμον*) to the whole Platonic series. Shortly after Tennemann, came Schleiermacher, who introduced a theory of his own, ingenious as well as original, which has given a new turn to all the subsequent Platonic criticism.

Schleiermacher begins by assuming two fundamental postulates, both altogether new. 1. A systematic unity of philosophic theme and purpose, conceived by Plato in his youth, at first obscurely—afterwards worked out through successive dialogues; each dialogue disclosing the same purpose, but the later disclosing it more clearly and fully, until his old age. 2. A peremptory, exclusive, and intentional order of the dialogues, composed by Plato with a view to the completion of this philosophical scheme. Schleiermacher undertakes to demonstrate what this order was, and to point out the contribution brought by each successive dialogue to the accomplishment of Plato's premeditated scheme.

Schleiermacher—new theory about the purposes of Plato. One philosophical scheme, conceived by Plato from the beginning—essential order and interdependence of the dialogues, as contributing to the full execution of this scheme. Some dialogues not constituent items in the series, but lying alongside of it. Order of arrangement.

To those who understand Plato, the dialogues themselves reveal (so Schleiermacher affirms) their own essential order of sequence—their own mutual relations of antecedent and consequent. Each presupposes those which go before: each prepares for those which follow. Accordingly, Schleiermacher distributes the Platonic dialogues into three groups: the first, or elementary, beginning with Phædrus, followed by Lysis, Protagoras, Lachês, Charmidês, Euthyphron, Parmenidês: the second, or preparatory, comprising Gorgias, Theætêtus, Menon, Euthydêmus, Kratylus, Sophistês, Politikus, Symposion, Phædon, Philêbus: the third, or constructive, including Republic, Timæus, and Kritias. These groups or files are all supposed to be marshalled under Platonic authority: both the entire files as first, second, third—and the dialogues composing each file, carrying their own place in the order, imprinted in visible characters. But to each file, there is attached what

Schleiermacher terms an Appendix, containing one or more dialogues, each a composition by itself, and lying not in the series, but alongside of it (Neben-werke). The Appendix to the first file includes Apologia, Kriton, Ion, Hippias II., Hipparchus, Minos, Alkibiadês II. The Appendix to the second file consists of—Theagês, Erastæ, Alkibiadês I., Menexenus, Hippias I., Kleitophon. That of the third file consists of the Leges. The Appendix is not supposed to imply any common positive character in the dialogues which it includes, but simply the negative attribute of not belonging to the main philosophical column, besides a greater harmony with the file to which it is attached than with the other two files. Some dialogues assigned to the Appendixes are considered by Schleiermacher as spurious ; some however he treats as compositions on special occasions, or adjuncts to the regular series. To this latter category belong the Apologia, Kriton, and Leges. Schleiermacher considers the Charmidês to have been composed during the time of the Anarchy, B.C. 404 : the Phædrus (earliest of all), in Olymp. 93 (B.C. 406), two years before :[1] the Lysis, Protagoras, and Lachês, to lie between them in respect of date.

Theory of Ast—he denies the reality of any pre-conceived scheme—considers the dialogues as distinct philosophical dramas.

Such is the general theory of Schleiermacher, which presents to us Plato in the character of a Demiurgus, contemplating from the first an Idea of philosophy, and constructing a series of dialogues (like a Kosmos of Schleiermacher), with the express purpose of giving embodiment to it as far as practicable. We next come to Ast, who denies this theory altogether. According to Ast, there never was any philosophical system, to the exposition and communication of which each successive dialogue was deliberately intended to contribute : there is no scientific or intentional connection between the dialogues,—no progressive arrangement of first and second, of foundation and superstructure : there is no other unity or connecting principle between them than that which they involve as all emanating from the same age, country, and author, and the same general view of the world (Welt-Ansicht) or critical estimate of man and nature.[2] The dialogues

[1] Schleierm. vol. i. p. 72; vol. ii. p. 8. [2] Ast, Leben und Schriften Platon's, p. 40.

are dramatic (Ast affirms), not merely in their external form, but in their internal character: each is in truth a philosophical drama.[1] Their purpose is very diverse and many-sided: we mistake if we imagine the philosophical purpose to stand alone. If that were so (Ast argues), how can we explain the fact, that in most of the dialogues there is no philosophical result at all? Nothing but a discussion without definite end, which leaves every point unsettled.[2] Plato is poet, artist, philosopher, blended in one. He does not profess to lay down positive opinions. Still less does he proclaim his own opinions as exclusive orthodoxy, to be poured ready-prepared into the minds of recipient pupils. He seeks to urge the pupils to think and investigate for themselves. He employs the form of dialogue, as indispensable to generate in their minds this impulse of active research, and to arm them with the power of pursuing it effectively.[3] But each Platonic dialogue is a separate composition in itself, and each of the greater dialogues is a finished and symmetrical whole, like a living organism.[4]

His order of arrangement. He admits only fourteen dialogues as genuine, rejecting all the rest.

Though Ast differs thus pointedly from Schleiermacher in the enunciation of his general principle, yet he approximates to him more nearly when he comes to detail: for he recognises three classes of dialogues, succeeding each other in a chronological order verifiable (as he thinks) by the dialogues themselves. His first class (in which he declares the poetical and dramatic element to be predominant) consists of Protagoras, Phædrus, Gorgias, Phædon. His second class, distinguished by the dialectic element, includes Theætêtus, Sophistês, Politikus, Parmenidês, Kratylus. His third class, wherein the poetical and dialectic

[1] Ast, ib. p. 46.
[2] Ast, ibid. p. 39.
[3] Ast, ib. p. 42.
[4] Ast, pp. 38, 39. The general view here taken by Ast—dwelling upon the separate individuality as well as upon the dramatic character of each dialogue—calling attention to the purpose of intellectual stimulation, and of reasoning out different aspects of ethical and dialectical questions, as distinguished from endoctrinating purpose—this general view coincides more nearly with my own than that of any other critic. But Ast does not follow it out consistently. If he were consistent with it, he ought to be more catholic than other critics, in admitting a large and undefinable diversity in the separate Platonic manifestations: instead of which, he is the most sweeping of all repudiators, on internal grounds. He is not even satisfied with the Parmenides as it now stands; he insists that what is now the termination was not the real and original termination; but that Plato must have appended to the dialogue an explanation of its ἀπορίαι, puzzles, and antinomies; which explanation is now lost.

element are found both combined, embraces Philêbus, Symposion, Republic, Timæus, Kritias. These fourteen dialogues, in Ast's view, constitute the whole of the genuine Platonic works. All the rest he pronounces to be spurious. He rejects Leges, Epinomis, Menon, Euthydêmus, Lachês, Charmidês, Lysis, Alkibiadês I. and II., Hippias I. and II., Ion, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, Apologia, Kriton, Minos, Epistolæ—together with all the other dialogues which were rejected in antiquity by Thrasyllus. Lastly, Ast considers the Protagoras to have been composed in 408 B.C., when Plato was not more than 21 years of age—the Phædrus in 407 B.C.—the Gorgias in 404 B.C.[1]

Socher agrees with Ast in denying preconceived scheme—his arrangement of the dialogues, differing from both Ast and Schleiermacher—he rejects as spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias, with many others.

Socher agrees with Ast in rejecting the fundamental hypothesis of Schleiermacher — that of a preconceived scheme systematically worked out by Plato. But on many points he differs from Ast no less than from Schleiermacher. He assigns the earliest Platonic composition (which he supposes to be Theagês), to a date preceding the battle of Arginusæ, in 406 B.C., when Plato was about 22-23 years of age.[2] Assuming it as certain that Plato composed dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates, he conceives that the earliest of them would naturally be the most purely Sokratic in respect of theme,—as well as the least copious, comprehensive, and ideal, in manner of handling. During the six and a half years between the battle of Arginusæ and the death of Sokrates, Socher registers the following succession of Platonic compositions :—Theagês, Lachês, Hippias II., Alkibiadês I., Dialogus de Virtute (usually printed with the spurious, but supposed by Socher to be a sort of preparatory sketch for the Menon), Menon, Kratylus, Euthyphron. These three last he supposes to precede very shortly the death of Sokrates. After that event, and very shortly after, were composed the Apologia, Kriton, and Phædon.

These eleven dialogues fill up what Socher regards as the first period of Plato's life, ending when he was somewhat more than thirty years of age. The second period extends to the commence-

[1] Ast, Leben und Schriften Platon's, p.376.

[2] Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 102. These critics adopt 409 B.C. as the year of Plato's birth: I think 407 B.C. is the true year.

ment of his teaching at the Academy, when about 41 or 42 years old (B.C. 386). In this second period were composed Ion, Euthydêmus, Hippias I., Protagoras, Theætêtus, Gorgias, Philêbus—in the order here set forth. During the third period of Plato's life, continuing until he was 65 or more, he composed Phædrus, Menexenus, Symposion, Republic, Timæus. To the fourth and last period, that of extreme old age, belongs the composition of the Leges.[1]

Socher rejects as spurious—Hipparchus, Minos, Kleitophon, Alkibiadês II., Erastæ, Epinomis, Epistolæ, Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias: also Charmidês, and Lysis, these two last however not quite so decisively.

Both Ast and Schleiermacher consider Phædrus and Protagoras as among the earliest compositions of Plato. Herein Socher dissents from them. He puts Protagoras into the second period, and Phædrus into the third. But the most peculiar feature in his theory is, that he rejects as spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias.

Schleiermacher and Ast both consider Phædrus and Protagoras as early compositions—Socher puts Protagoras into the second period, Phædrus into the third.

From Schleiermacher, Ast, and Socher, we pass to K. F. Hermann[2]—and to Stallbaum, who has prefixed Prolegomena to his edition of each dialogue. Both these critics protest against Socher's rejection of the four dialogues last indicated: but they agree with Socher and Ast in denying the reality of any preconceived system, present to Plato's mind in his first dialogue, and advanced by regular steps throughout each of the succeeding dialogues. The polemical tone of K. F. Hermann against this theory, and against Schleiermacher, its author, is strenuous and even unwarrantably bitter.[3] Especially the position laid

K. F. Hermann—Stallbaum—both of them consider the Phædrus as a late dialogue—both of them deny preconceived

[1] Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 301-459-460.

[2] K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie, p. 368, seq. Stallbaum, Disputatio de Platonis Vitâ et Scriptis, prefixed to his edition of Plato's Works, p. xxxii., seq.

[3] Ueberweg (Untersuchungen, pp. 50-52) has collected several citations from K. F. Hermann, in which the latter treats Schleiermacher "wie einen Sophisten, der sich in absichtlicher Unwahrhaftigkeit gefalle, mitunter fast als einen Mann, der innerlich wohl wisse, wie die Sache stehe (nämlich, dass sie so sei, wie Hermann lehrt), der sich aber, etwa aus Lust, seine überlegene Dialektik zu beweisen, Mühe gebe, sie in einem anderen Lichte erscheinen zu lassen; also—τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν—recht in rhetorisch sophistischer Manier."

We know well, from other and inde-

order and system — their arrangements of the dialogues — they admit new and varying philosophical points of view.

down by Schleiermacher—that Phædrus is the earliest of Plato's dialogues, written when he was 22 or 23 years of age, and that the general system presiding over all the future dialogues is indicated therein as even then present to his mind, afterwards to be worked out—is controverted by Hermann and Stallbaum no less than by Ast and Socher. All three concur in the tripartite distribution of the life of Plato. But Hermann thinks that Plato acquired gradually and successively, new points of view, with enlarged philosophical development: and that the dialogues as successively composed are expressions of these varying phases. Moreover, Hermann thinks that such variations in Plato's philosophy may be accounted for by external circumstances. He reckons Plato's first period as ending with the death of Sokrates, or rather at an epoch not long after the death of Sokrates: the second as ending with the commencement of Plato's teaching at the Academy, after his return from Sicily—about 385 B.C.: the third, as extending from thence to his old age. To the first, or Sokratic stadium, Hermann assigns the smaller dialogues: the earliest of which he declares to be—Hippias II., Ion, Alkibiadês I., Lysis, Charmidês, Lachês: after which come Protagoras and Euthydêmus, wherein the batteries are opened against the Sophists, shortly before the death of Sokrates. Immediately after the last mentioned event, come a series of dialogues reflecting the strong and fresh impression left by it upon Plato's mind—Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Euthyphron, Menon, Hippias I.—occupying a sort of transition stage between the first and the second period. We now enter upon the second or dialectic period; passed by Plato greatly at

pendent evidence, what Schleiermacher really was,—that he was not only one of the most accomplished scholars, but one of the most liberal and estimable men of his age. But how different would be our appreciation if we had no other evidence to judge by except the dicta of opponents, and even distinguished opponents, like Hermann! If there be any point clear in the history of philosophy, it is the uncertainty of all judgments, respecting writers and thinkers, founded upon the mere allegations of opponents. Yet the Athenian Sophists, respecting whom we have no independent evidence (except the general fact that they had a number of approvers and admirers), are depicted confidently by the Platonic critics in the darkest colours, upon the evidence of their bitter opponent Plato—and in colours darker than even his evidence warrants. The often-repeated calumny, charged against almost all debaters—τὸ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν—by Hermann against Schleiermacher, by Melêtus against Sokrates, by Plato against the Sophists—is believed only against these last.

Megara, and influenced by the philosophical intercourse which he there enjoyed, and characterised by the composition of Theætêtus, Kratylus, Sophistês, Politikus, Parmenidês.[1] To the third, or constructive period, greatly determined by the influence of the Pythagorean philosophy, belong Phædrus, Menexenus, Symposion, Phædon, Philêbus, Republic, Timæus, Kritias: a series composed during Plato's teaching at the Academy, and commencing with Phædrus, which last Hermann considers to be a sort of (Antritts-Programme) inauguratory composition for the opening of his school of oral discourse or colloquy. Lastly, during the final years of the philosopher, after all the three periods, come the Leges or treatise de Legibus: placed by itself as the composition of his old age.

They reject several dialogues.

Hermann and Stallbaum reject (besides the dialogues already rejected by Thrasyllus) Alkibiadês II., Theagês, Erastæ, Hipparchus, Minos, Epinomis: Stallbaum rejects the Kleitophon: Hermann hesitates, and is somewhat inclined to admit it, as he also admits, to a considerable extent, the Epistles.[2]

Steinhart—agrees in rejecting Schleiermacher's fundamental postulate—his

Steinhart, in his notes and prefaces to H. Müller's translation of the Platonic dialogues, agrees in the main with K. F. Hermann, both in denying the fundamental postulate of Schleiermacher, and in settling the general order of the dialogues, though with some difference as to individual dialogues. He considers Ion as the

[1] K. F. Hermann, Gesch. u. Syst. d. Plat. Phil., p. 496, seq. Stallbaum (p. xxxiii.) places the Kratylus during the lifetime of Sokrates, a little earlier than Euthydêmus and Protagoras, all three of which he assigns to Olymp. 94, 402-400 B.C. See also his Proleg. to Kratylus, tom. v. p. 26.

Moreover, Stallbaum places the Menon and Ion about the same time—a few months or weeks before the trial of Sokrates (Proleg. ad Menonem, tom. vi. pp. 20, 21; Proleg. ad Ionem, tom. iv. p. 289). He considers the Euthyphron to have been actually composed at the moment to which it professes to refer (viz., after Melêtus had preferred his indictment against Sokrates), and with a view of defending Sokrates against the charge of impiety (Proleg. ad Euthyphron. tom. vi. pp. 138-139-142). He places the composition of the Charmidês about six years before the death of Sokrates (Proleg. ad Charm. p. 86). He seems to consider, indeed, that the Menon and Euthydêmus were both written for the purpose of defending Sokrates: thus implying that they too were written *after* the indictment was preferred (Proleg. ad Euthyphron. p. 145).

In regard to the date of the Euthyphron, Schleiermacher also had declared, prior to Stallbaum, that it was *unquestionably* (unstreitig) composed at a period between the indictment and the trial of Sokrates (Einl. zum Euthyphron, vol. ii. p. 53, of his transl. of Plato).

[2] Stallbaum, p. xxxiv. Herman, pp. 424, 425.

arrangement of the dialogues—considers the Phædrus as late in order—rejects several.

earliest, followed by Hippias I., Hippias II., Alkibiadês I., Lysis, Charmidês, Lachês, Protagoras. These constitute what Steinhart calls the ethico-Sokratical series of Plato's compositions, having the common attributes—That they do not step materially beyond the philosophical range of Sokrates himself—That there is a preponderance of the mimic and plastic element—That they end, to all appearance, with unsolved doubts and unanswered questions.[1] He supposes the Charmidês to have been composed during the time of the Thirty, the Lachês shortly afterwards, and the Protagoras about two years before the death of Sokrates. He lays it down as incontestable that the Protagoras was not composed after the death of Sokrates.[2] Immediately prior to this last-mentioned event, and posterior to the Protagoras, he places the Euthydêmus, Menon, Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Kratylus: preparatory to the dialectic series consisting of Parmenidês, Theætêtus, Sophistes, Politikus, the result of Plato's stay at Megara, and contact with the Eleatic and Megaric philosophers. The third series of dialogues, the mature and finished productions of Plato at the Academy, opens with Phædrus. Steinhart rejects as spurious Alkibiades II., Erastæ, Theagês, &c.

Another author, also, Susemihl, coincides in the main with the principles of arrangement adopted by K. F. Hermann for the Platonic dialogues. First in the order of chronological composition he places the shorter dialogues—the exclusively ethical, least systematic; and he ranges them in a series, indicating the progressive development of Plato's mind, with approach towards his final systematic conceptions.[3] Susemihl begins this early series with Hippias II., followed by Lysis, Charmidês, Lachês, Protagoras, Menon, Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Euthyphron. The seven first, ending with the Menon, he conceives to have been published successively during the lifetime of Sokrates: the Menon itself, during the interval between his indictment and

Susemihl—coincides to a great degree with K. F. Hermann—his order of arrangement.

[1] See Steinhart's Proleg. to the Protag. vol. i. p. 430, of Müller's transl. of Plato.

[2] Steinhart, Prolegg. to Charmidês, p. 295.

[3] F. Susemihl, Die Genetische Entwickelung der Platonischen Philosophie, Leipsic, 1855, p. 9.

his death ;[1] the Apologia and Kriton, very shortly after his death ; followed, at no long interval, by Gorgias and Euthyphron.[2] The Ion and Alkibiadês I. are placed by Susemihl among the earliest of the Platonic compositions, but as not belonging to the regular series. He supposes them to have been called forth by some special situation, like Apologia and Kriton, if indeed they be Platonic at all, of which he does not feel assured.[3]

Immediately after Euthyphron, Susemihl places Euthydêmus, which he treats as the commencement of a second series of dialogues : the first series, or ethical, being now followed by the dialectic, in which the principles, process, and certainty of cognition are discussed, though in an indirect and preparatory way. This second series consists of Euthydêmus, Kratylus, Theætêtus, Phædrus, Sophistês, Politikus, Parmenidês, Symposion, Phædon. Through all these dialogues Susemihl professes to trace a thread of connection, each successively unfolding and determining more of the general subject : but all in an indirect, negative, roundabout manner. Allowing for this manner, Susemihl contends that the dialectical counter-demonstrations or Antinomies, occupying the last half of the Parmenidês, include the solution of those difficulties, which have come forward in various forms from the Euthydêmus up to the Sophistês, against Plato's theory of Ideas.[4] The Phædon closes the series of dialectic compositions, and opens the way to the constructive dialogues following, partly ethical, partly physical—Philêbus, Republic, Timæus, Kritias.[5] The Leges come last of all.

Edward Munk—adopts a different principle of arrangement, founded

A more recent critic, Dr. Edward Munk, has broached a new and very different theory as to the natural order of the Platonic dialogues. Upon his theory, they were intended by Plato[6] to depict the life and working of a philosopher, in successive dramatic exhibitions, from youth to old age. The different moments in the life of Sokrates, indicated in each dialogue, mark the

[1] Susemihl, ibid. pp. 40-61-89.
[2] Susemihl, ib. pp. 113-125.
[3] Susemihl, ib. p. 9.
[4] Susemihl, ib. p. 355, seq.
[5] Susemihl, pp. 466-470. The first volume of Susemihl's work ends with the Phædon.
[6] Dr. Edward Munk. Die natürliche Ordnung der Platonischen Schriften, Berlin, 1857. His scheme of arrangement is explained generally, pp. 25-48, &c.

upon the different period which each dialogue exhibits of the life, philosophical growth, and old age, of Sokrates—his arrangement, founded on this principle. He distinguishes the chronological order of composition from the place allotted to each dialogue in the systematic plan.

place which Plato intended it to occupy in the series. The Parmenidês is the first, wherein Sokrates is introduced as a young man, initiated into philosophy by the ancient Parmenidês: the Phædon is last, describing as it does the closing scene of Sokrates. Plato meant his dialogues to be looked at partly in artistic sequence, as a succession of historical dramas —partly in philosophical sequence, as a record of the progressive development of his own doctrine: the two principles are made to harmonize in the main, though sometimes the artistic sequence is obscured for the purpose of bringing out the philosophical, sometimes the latter is partially sacrificed to the former.[1] Taken in the aggregate, the dialogues from Parmenidês to Phædon form a Sokratic cycle, analogous to the historical plays of Shakespeare, from King John to Henry VIII.[2] But Munk at the same time contends that this natural order of the dialogues —or the order in which Plato intended them to be viewed—is not to be confounded with the chronological order of their composition.[3] The Parmenidês, though constituting the opening Prologue of the whole cycle, was not composed first: nor the Phædon last. All of them were probably composed after Plato had attained the full maturity of his philosophy: that is, probably after the opening of his school at the Academy in 386 B.C. But in composing each, he had always two objects jointly in view: he adapted the tone of each to the age and situation in which he wished to depict Sokrates:[4] he commemorated, in each, one of the past phases of his own philosophising mind.

The Cycle taken in its intentional or natural order, is distributed by Munk into three groups, after the Parmenidês as general prologue.[5]

1. Sokratic or Indirect Dialogues.—Protagoras, Charmidês, Lachês, Gorgias, Ion, Hippias I., Kratylus, Euthydêmus, Symposion.

[1] Munk, ib. p. 29.
[2] Munk, ib. p. 27.
[3] Munk, ibid. p. 27.
[4] Munk, ib. p. 54; Preface, p. viii.
[5] Munk, ib. p. 50.

2. Direct or Constructive Dialogues.—Phædrus, Philêbus, Republic, Timæus, Kritias.

3. Dialectic and Apologetic Dialogues.—Menon, Theætêtus, Sophistês, Politikus, Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Phædon.

The Leges and Menexenus stand apart from the Cycle, as compositions on special occasion. Alkibiadês I., Hippias II., Lysis, are also placed apart from the Cycle, as compositions of Plato's earlier years, before he had conceived the general scheme of it.[1]

The first of the three groups depicts Sokrates in the full vigour of life, about 35 years of age: the second represents him an elderly man, about 60: the third, immediately prior to his death.[2] In the first group he is represented as a combatant for truth: in the second as a teacher of truth: in the third, as a martyr for truth.[3]

Views of Ueberweg—attempt to reconcile Schleiermacher and Hermann—admits the preconceived purpose for the later dialogues, composed after the foundation of the school, but not for the earlier.

Lastly, we have another German author still more recent, Frederick Ueberweg, who has again investigated the order and authenticity of the Platonic dialogues, in a work of great care and ability: reviewing the theories of his predecessors, as well as proposing various modifications of his own.[4] Ueberweg compares the different opinions of Schleiermacher and K. F. Hermann, and admits both of them to a certain extent, each concurrent with and limiting the other.[5] The theory of a preconceived system and methodical series, proposed by Schleiermacher, takes its departure from the Phædrus, and postulates as an essential condition that that dialogue shall be recognised as the earliest composition.[6] This condition Ueberweg does not admit. He agrees with Hermann, Stallbaum, and others, in referring the Phædrus to a later date (about 386 B.C.), shortly after Plato had established his school in Athens, when he was rather above forty years of age. At this period (Ueberweg thinks) Plato may be considered as having acquired methodical views which had not been present to him before; and the dialogues

1 Munk, ib. pp. 25-34.
2 Munk, ib. p. 26.
3 Munk, ib. p. 31.
4 Ueberweg, Untersuchungen.
5 Ueberweg, p. 111.
6 Ueberweg, pp. 23-26.

composed after the Phædrus follow out, to a certain extent, these methodical views. In the Phædrus, the Platonic Sokrates delivers the opinion that writing is unavailing as a means of imparting philosophy: that the only way in which philosophy can be imparted is, through oral colloquy adapted by the teacher to the mental necessities, and varying stages of progress, of each individual learner: and that writing can only serve, after such oral instruction has been imparted, to revive it if forgotten, in the memory both of the teacher and of the learner who has been orally taught. For the dialogues composed after the opening of the school, and after the Phædrus, Ueberweg recognises the influence of a preconceived method and of a constant bearing on the oral teaching of the school: for those anterior to that date, he admits no such influence: he refers them (with Hermann) to successive enlargements, suggestions, inspirations, either arising in Plato's own mind, or communicated from without. Ueberweg does not indeed altogether exclude the influence of this non-methodical cause, even for the later dialogues: he allows its operation to a certain extent, in conjunction with the methodical: what he excludes is, the influence of any methodical or preconceived scheme for the earlier dialogues.[1] He thinks that Plato composed the later portion of his dialogues (*i.e.*, those subsequent to the Phædrus and to the opening of his school), not for the instruction of the general reader, but as reminders to his disciples of that which they had already learnt from oral teaching: and he cites the analogy of Paul and the apostles, who wrote epistles not to convert the heathen, but to admonish or confirm converts already made by preaching.[2]

Ueberweg investigates the means which we possess, either from

[1] Ueberweg, pp. 107-110-111. "Sind beide Gesichtspunkte, der einer methodischen Absicht und der einer Selbst-Entwicklung Platon's durchweg mit einander zu verbinden, so liegt es auch in der Natur der Sache und wird auch von einigen seiner Nachfolger (insbesondere nachdrücklich von Susemihl) anerkannt, dass der erste Gesichtspunkt vorzugsweise für die späteren Schriften von der Gründung der Schule an—der andere vorzugsweise für die früheren—gilt."

[2] Ueberweg, pp. 80-86. "Ist unsere obige Deutung richtig, wonach Platon nicht für Fremde zur Belehrung, sondern wesentlich für seine Schüler zur Erinnerung an den mündlichen Unterricht, schrieb (wie die Apostel nicht für Fremde zur Bekehrung, sondern für die christlichen Gemeinden zur Stärke und Läuterung, nachdem denselben der Glaube aus der Predigt gekommen war)—so folgt, dass jede Argumentation, die auf den Phaedrus gegründet wird, nur für die Zeit gelten kann, in welcher bereits die Platonische Schule bestand."

external testimony (especially that of Aristotle) or from internal evidence, of determining the authenticity as well as the chronological order of the dialogues. He remarks that though, in contrasting the expository dialogues with those which are simply enquiring and debating, we may presume the expository to belong to Plato's full maturity of life, and to have been preceded by some of the enquiring and debating—yet we cannot safely presume *all* these latter to be of his early composition. Plato may have continued to compose dialogues of mere search, even after the time when he began to compose expository dialogues.[1]

His opinions as to authenticity and chronology of the dialogues. He rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, Parmenidês: he is inclined to reject Euthyphron and Menexenus.

Ueberweg considers that the earliest of Plato's dialogues are, Lysis, Hippias Minor, Lachês, Charmidês, Protagoras, composed during the lifetime of Sokrates: next the Apologia, and Kriton, not long after his death. All these (even the Protagoras) he reckons among the "lesser Platonic writings".[2] None of them allude to the Platonic Ideas or Objective Concepts. The Gorgias comes next, probably soon after the death of Sokrates, at least at some time earlier than the opening of the school in 386 B.C.[3] The Menon and Ion may be placed about the same general period.[4] The Phædrus (as has been already observed) is considered by Ueberweg to be nearly contemporary with the opening of the school: shortly afterwards Symposion and Euthydêmus:[5] at some subsequent time, Republic, Timæus, Kritias, and Leges. In regard to the four last, Ueberweg does not materially differ from Schleiermacher, Hermann, and other critics: but on another point he differs from them materially, *viz.*: that instead of placing the Theætêtus, Sophistês, and Politikus, in the Megaric period or prior to the opening of the school, he assigns them (as well as the Phædon and Philêbus) to the last twenty years of Plato's life. He places Phædon later than Timæus, and Politikus later than Phædon: he considers that Sophistês, Politikus, and Philêbus are among the latest compositions of Plato.[6] He rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, and Parmenidês: he is

1 Ueberweg, p. 81.
2 Ueberweg, pp. 100-105-296. "Eine Anzahl kleinerer Platonischer Schriften"
3 Ueberweg, pp. 249-267-296.
4 Ueberweg, pp. 226, 227.
5 Ueberweg, p. 265.
6 Ueberweg, pp. 204-292.

inclined to reject Euthyphron. He scarcely recognises Menexenus, in spite of the direct attestation of Aristotle, which attestation he tries (in my judgment very unsuccessfully) to invalidate.[1] He recognises the Kratylus, but without determining its date. He determines nothing about Alkibiadês I. and II.

Other Platonic critics—great dissensions about scheme and order of the dialogues.

The works above enumerated are those chiefly deserving of notice, though there are various others also useful, amidst the abundance of recent Platonic criticism. All these writers, Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, Munk, Ueberweg, have not merely laid down general schemes of arrangement for the Platonic dialogues, but have gone through the dialogues seriatim, each endeavouring to show that his own scheme fits them well, and each raising objections against the schemes earlier than his own. It is indeed truly remarkable to follow the differences of opinion among these learned men, all careful students of the Platonic writings. And the number of dissents would be indefinitely multiplied, if we took into the account the various historians of philosophy during the last few years. Ritter and Brandis accept, in the main, the theory of Schleiermacher: Zeller also, to a certain extent. But each of these authors has had a point of view more or less belonging to himself respecting the general scheme and purpose of Plato, and respecting the authenticity, sequence, and reciprocal illustration of the dialogues.[2]

Contrast of different points of view instructive—but no solution has been obtained.

By such criticisms much light has been thrown on the dialogues in detail. It is always interesting to read the different views taken by many scholars, all careful students of Plato, respecting the order and relations of the dialogues: especially as the views are not merely different but contradictory, so that the weak points of each are put before us as well as the strong. But as to the large problem which these critics have undertaken to solve—though several solutions have been proposed, in favour

[1] Ueberweg, pp. 143-176-222-250.

[2] Socher remarks (Ueber, Platon. p. 225) (after enumerating twenty-two dialogues of the Thrasyllean canon, which he considers the earliest) that of these twenty-two, there are *only two* which have not been declared spurious by some one or more critics. He then proceeds to examine the remainder, among which are Sophistês, Politikus, Parmenidês. He (Socher) declares these three last to be spurious, which no critic had declared before.

of which something may be urged, yet we look in vain for any solution at once sufficient as to proof and defensible against objectors.

The problem incapable of solution. Extent and novelty of the theory propounded by Schleiermacher — slenderness of his proofs.

It appears to me that the problem itself is one which admits of no solution. Schleiermacher was the first who proposed it with the large pretensions which it has since embraced, and which have been present more or less to the minds of subsequent critics, even when they differ from him. He tells us himself that he comes forward as *Restitutor Platonis*, in a character which no one had ever undertaken before.[1] And he might fairly have claimed that title, if he had furnished proofs at all commensurate to his professions. As his theory is confessedly novel as well as comprehensive, it required greater support in the way of evidence. But when I read the Introductions (the general as well as the special) in which such evidence ought to be found, I am amazed to find that there is little else but easy and confident assumption. His hypothesis is announced as if the simple announcement were sufficient to recommend it[2]—as if no other supposition were consistent with the recognised grandeur of Plato as a philosopher—as if any one, dissenting from it, only proved thereby that he did not understand Plato. Yet so far from being of this self-recommending character, the hypothesis is really loaded with the heaviest antecedent improbability. That in 406 B.C., and at the age of 23, in an age when schemes of philosophy elaborated in detail were unknown—Plato should conceive a vast scheme of philosophy, to be worked out underground without ever being proclaimed, through numerous Sokratic dialogues one after the other, each ushering in that which follows and each resting upon that which precedes: that he should have persisted throughout a long life in working out this scheme, adapting the sequence of his dialogues to the successive stages which he had attained, so that none of them could be properly understood unless when

[1] Schleiermacher, Einleitung, pp. 22-29. "Diese natürliche Folge (der Platonischen Gespräche) wieder herzustellen, diess ist, wie jedermann sieht, eine Absicht, welche sich sehr weit entfernt von allen bisherigen Versuchen zur Anordnung der Platonischen Werke," &c.

[2] What I say about Schleiermacher here will be assented to by any one who reads his Einleitung, pp. 10, 11, seq.

studied immediately after its predecessors and immediately before its successors—and yet that he should have taken no pains to impress this one peremptory arrangement on the minds of readers, and that Schleiermacher should be the first to detect it—all this appears to me as improbable as any of the mystic interpretations of Jamblichus or Proklus. Like other improbabilities, it may be proved by evidence, if evidence can be produced: but here nothing of the kind is producible. We are called upon to grant the general hypothesis without proof, and to follow Schleiermacher in applying it to the separate dialogues.

Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes a preconceived scheme, and a peremptory order of interdependence among the dialogues.

Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes two parts. 1. A premeditated philosophical scheme, worked out continuously from the first dialogue to the last. 2. A peremptory canonical order, essential to this scheme, and determined thereby. Now as to the scheme, though on the one hand it cannot be proved, yet on the other hand it cannot be disproved. But as to the canonical order, I think it may be disproved. We know that no such order was recognised in the days of Aristophanes, and Schleiermacher himself admits that before those days it had been lost.[1] But I contend that if it was lost within a century after the decease of Plato, we may fairly presume that it never existed at all, as peremptory and indispensable to the understanding of what Plato meant. A great philosopher such as Plato (so Schleiermacher argues) must be supposed to have composed all his dialogues with some preconceived comprehensive scheme: but a great philosopher (we may add), if he does work upon a preconceived scheme, must surely be supposed to take some reasonable precautions to protect the order essential to that scheme from dropping out of sight. Moreover, Schleiermacher himself admits that there are various dialogues which lie apart from the canonical order and form no part of the grand premeditated scheme. The distinction here made between these outlying compositions (Nebenwerke) and the members of the regular series, is indeed altogether arbitrary: but the admission of it tends still farther to invalidate the fundamental postulate of a grand Demiurgic universe of dia-

[1] Schleiermacher, Einleitung, p. 24.

logues, each dovetailed and fitted into its special place among the whole. The universe is admitted to have breaks: so that the hypothesis does not possess the only merit which can belong to gratuitous hypothesis—that of introducing, if granted, complete symmetry throughout the phenomena.

Assumptions of Schleiermacher respecting the Phædrus inadmissible.

To these various improbabilities we may add another—that Schleiermacher's hypothesis requires us to admit that the Phædrus is Plato's earliest dialogue, composed about 406 B.C., when he was 21 years of age, on my computation, and certainly not more than 23: that it is the first outburst of the inspiration which Sokrates had imparted to him,[1] and that it embodies, though in a dim and poetical form, the lineaments of that philosophical system which he worked out during the ensuing half century. That Plato at this early age should have conceived so vast a system—that he should have imbibed it from Sokrates, who enunciated no system, and abounded in the anti-systematic negative—that he should have been inspired to write the Phædrus (with its abundant veins, dithyrambic,[2] erotic, and transcendental) by the conversation of Sokrates, which exhibited acute dialectic combined with practical sagacity, but neither poetic fervour nor transcendental fancy,—in all this hypothesis of Schleiermacher, there is nothing but an aggravation of improbabilities.

Neither Schleiermacher, nor any other critic, has as yet produced any tolerable proof for an internal theory of the Platonic dialogues.

Against such improbabilities (partly external partly internal) Schleiermacher has nothing to set except internal reasons: that is, when he shall have arranged the dialogues and explained the interdependence as well as the special place of each, the arrangement will impress itself upon all as being the intentional work of Plato himself.[3] But these "internal reasons" (innere Gründe), which are to serve as constructive evidence (in the absence of positive declarations) of Plato's purpose, fail to produce upon other minds the

[1] See Schleiermacher's Einleitung to the Phædrus: "Der Phaidros, der erste Ausbruch seiner Begeisterung vom Sokrates".

[2] If we read Dionysius of Halikarnassus (De Admirab. Vi Dic. in Demosth. pp. 968-971, Reiske), we shall find that rhetor pointing out the Phædrus as a signal example of Plato's departure from the manner and character of Sokrates, and as a specimen of misplaced poetical exaggeration. Dikæarchus formed the same opinion about the Phædrus (Diog. L. iii. 38).

[3] See the general Einleitung, p. 11.

effect which Schleiermacher demands. If we follow them as stated in his Introductions (prefixed to the successive Platonic dialogues), we find a number of approximations and comparisons, often just and ingenious, but always inconclusive for his point: proving, at the very best, what Plato's intention may possibly have been—yet subject to be countervailed by other "internal reasons" equally specious, tending to different conclusions. And the various opponents of Schleiermacher prove just as much and no more, each on behalf of his own mode of arrangement, by the like constructive evidence—appeal to "internal reasons". But the insufficient character of these "internal reasons" is more fatal to Schleiermacher than to any of his opponents: because his fundamental hypothesis—while it is the most ambitious of all and would be the most important, if it could be proved—is at the same time burdened with the strongest antecedent improbability, and requires the amplest proof to make it at all admissible.

Munk's theory is the most ambitious, and the most gratuitous, next to Schleiermacher's.

Dr. Munk undertakes the same large problem as Schleiermacher. He assumes the Platonic dialogues to have been composed upon a preconceived system, beginning when Plato opened his school, about 41 years of age. This has somewhat less antecedent improbability than the supposition that Plato conceived his system at 21 or 23 years of age. But it is just as much destitute of positive support. That Plato intended his dialogues to form a fixed series, exhibiting the successive gradations of his philosophical system—that he farther intended this series to coincide with a string of artistic portraits, representing Sokrates in the ascending march from youth to old age, so that the characteristic feature which marks the place and time of each dialogue, is to be found in the age which it assigns to Sokrates—these are positions for the proof of which we are referred to "internal reasons"; but which the dialogues do not even suggest, much less sanction.

The age assigned to Sokrates in any dialogue is a

In many dialogues, the age assigned to Sokrates is a circumstance neither distinctly brought out, nor telling on the debate. It is true that in the Parmenidês he is noted as young, and is made to conduct himself with the deference of youth, receiving hints and admoni-

tions from the respected veteran of Elea. So too in the Protagoras, he is characterised as young, but chiefly in contrast with the extreme and pronounced old age of the Sophist Protagoras: he does not conduct himself like a youth, nor exhibit any of that really youthful or deferential spirit which we find in the Parmenidês; on the contrary, he stands forward as the rival, cross-examiner, and conqueror of the ancient Sophist. On the contrary, in the Euthydêmus,[1] Sokrates is announced as old; though that dialogue is indisputably very analogous to the Protagoras, both of them being placed by Munk in the earliest of his three groups. Moreover in the Lysis also, Sokrates appears as old;—here Munk escapes from the difficulty by setting aside the dialogue as a youthful composition, not included in the consecutive Sokratic Cycle.[2] What is there to justify the belief, that the Sokrates depicted in the Phædrus (which dialogue has been affirmed by Schleiermacher and Ast, besides some ancient critics, to exhibit decided marks of juvenility) is older than the Sokrates of the Symposion? or that Sokrates in the Philêbus and Republic is older than in the Kratylus or Gorgias? It is true that the dialogues Theætêtus and Euthyphron are both represented as held a little before the death of Sokrates, after the indictment of Melêtus against him had already been preferred. This is a part of the hypothetical situation, in which the dialogists are brought into company. But there is nothing in the two dialogues themselves (or in the Menon, which Munk places in the same category) to betoken that Sokrates is old. Holiness, in the Euthyphron—Knowledge, in the Theætêtus—is canvassed and debated just as Temperance and Courage are debated in the Charmidês and Lachês. Munk lays it down that Sokrates appears as a Martyr for Truth in the Euthyphron, Menon, and Theætêtus—and as a Combatant for Truth in the Lachês, Charmidês, Euthydêmus, &c. But the two groups of dialogues, when compared with each other, will not be found to warrant this distinctive appellation. In the Apologia, Kriton, and Phædon, it may be said with propriety that Sokrates is represented as a martyr for truth: in all three he appears not

circumstance of little moment.

[1] Euthydêmus, c. 4, p. 272. γεγόναμεν ἐγώ τε, γέρων ἀνήρ, καὶ ὑμεῖς.
[2] Lysis, p. 223, ad fin. Καταγέλαστοι See Munk, p. 25.

merely as a talker, but as a personal agent: but this is not true of the other dialogues which Munk places in his third group.

No intentional sequence or interdependence of the dialogues can be made out.

I cannot therefore accede to this "natural arrangement of the Platonic dialogues," assumed to have been intended by Plato, and founded upon the progress of Sokrates as he stands exhibited in each, from youth to age—which Munk has proposed in his recent ingenious volume. It is interesting to be made acquainted with that order of the Platonic dialogues which any critical student conceives to be the "natural order". But in respect to Munk as well as to Schleiermacher, I must remark that if Plato had conceived and predetermined the dialogues, so as to be read in one natural peremptory order, he would never have left that order so dubious and imperceptible, as to be first divined by critics of the nineteenth century, and understood by them too in several different ways. If there were any peremptory and intentional sequence, we may reasonably presume that Plato would have made it as clearly understood as he has determined the sequence of the ten books of his Republic.

Principle of arrangement adopted by Hermann is reasonable—successive changes in Plato's point of view: but we cannot explain either the order or the causes of these changes.

The principle of arrangement proposed by K. F. Hermann (approved also by Steinhart and Susemihl) is not open to the same antecedent objection. Not admitting any preconceived, methodical, intentional, system, nor the maintenance of one and the same philosophical point of view throughout—Hermann supposes that the dialogues as successively composed represent successive phases of Plato's philosophical development and variations in his point of view. Hermann farther considers that these variations may be assigned and accounted for: first pure Sokratism, next the modifications experienced from Plato's intercourse with the Megaric philosophers,—then the influence derived from Kyrênê and Egypt — subsequently that from the Pythagoreans in Italy—and so forth. The first portion of this hypothesis, taken generally, is very reasonable and probable. But when, after assuming that there must have been determining changes in Plato's own mind, we proceed to inquire what these were, and whence they arose, we find a sad lack of evidence for the answer to the question. We

neither know the order in which the dialogues were composed,—nor the date when Plato first began to compose,—nor the primitive philosophical mind which his earliest dialogues represented,—nor the order of those subsequent modifications which his views underwent. We are informed, indeed, that Plato went from Athens to visit Megara, Kyrênê, Egypt, Italy; but the extent or kind of influence which he experienced in each, we do not know at all.[1] I think it a reasonable presumption that the points which Plato had in common with Sokrates were most preponderant in the mind of Plato immediately after the death of his master: and that other trains of thought gradually became more and more intermingled as the recollection of his master became more distant. There is also a presumption that the longer, more elaborate, and more transcendental dialogues (among which must be ranked the Phædrus) were composed in the full maturity of Plato's age and intellect: the shorter and less finished may have been composed either then or earlier in his life. Here are two presumptions, plausible enough when stated generally, yet too vague to justify any special inferences: the rather, if we may believe the statement of Dionysius, that Plato continued to "comb and curl his dialogues until he was eighty years of age".[2]

If we compare K. F. Hermann with Schleiermacher, we see

[1] Bonitz (in his instructive volume, Platonische Studien, Wien, 1858, p. 5) points out how little we know about the real circumstances of Plato's intellectual and philosophical development: a matter which most of the Platonic critics are apt to forget.

I confess that I agree with Strümpell, that it is impossible to determine chronologically, from Plato's writings, and from the other scanty evidence accessible to us, by what successive steps his mind departed from the original views and doctrines held and communicated by Sokrates (Strümpell, Gesch. der Praktischen Philosophie der Griechen, p. 294, Leipsic, 1861).

[2] Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. p. 208; Diog. L. iii. 37; Quintilian, viii. 6.

F. A. Wolf, in a valuable note upon the διασκευασταὶ (Proleg. ad Homer. p. clii.), declares, upon this ground, that it is impossible to determine the time when Plato composed his best dialogues. "Ex his collatis apparet διασκευάζειν a veteribus magistris adscitum esse in potestatem verbi ἐπιδιασκευάζειν: ut in Scenicis propé idem esset quod ἀναδιδάσκειν—h. e. repetito committere fabulam, sed mutando, addendo, detrahendo, emendatam, refictam, et secundis curis elaboratam. Id enim facere solebant illi poetæ sæpissimé: mox etiam alii, ut Apollonius Rhodius. Neque aliter Plato fecit in optimis dialogis suis: *quam ob causam exquirere non licet, quando quisque compositus sit;* quum in scenicis fabulis saltem ex didascaliis plerumque notum sit tempus, quo editæ sunt."

Preller has a like remark (Hist. Phil. ex Font. Loc. Context., sect. 250).

In regard to the habit of correcting compositions, the contrast between Plato and Plotinus was remarkable. Porphyry tells us that Plotinus, when once he had written any matter, could hardly bear even to read it over—much less to review and improve it (Porph. Vit. Plotini, 8).

Hermann's view more tenable than Schleiermacher's.

that Hermann has amended his position by abandoning Schleiermacher's gratuitous hypothesis, of a preconceived Platonic system with a canonical order of the dialogues adapted to that system—and by admitting only a chronological order of composition, each dialogue being generated by the state of Plato's mind at the time when it was composed. This, taken generally, is indisputable. If we perfectly knew Plato's biography and the circumstances around him, we should be able to determine which dialogues were first, second, and third, &c., and what circumstances or mental dispositions occasioned the successive composition of those which followed. But can we do this with our present scanty information? I think not. Hermann, while abandoning the hypothesis of Schleiermacher, has still accepted the large conditions of the problem first drawn up by Schleiermacher, and has undertaken to decide the real order of the dialogues, together with the special occasion and the phase of Platonic development corresponding to each. Herein, I think, he has failed.

Small number of certainties, or even reasonable presumptions, as to date or order of the dialogues.

It is, indeed, natural that critics should form some impression as to earlier and later in the dialogues. But though there are some peculiar cases in which such impression acquires much force, I conceive that in almost all cases it is to a high degree uncertain. Several dialogues proclaim themselves as subsequent to the death of Sokrates. We know from internal allusions that the Theætêtus must have been composed after 394 B.C., the Menexenus after 387 B.C., and the Symposion after 385 B.C. We are sure, by Aristotle's testimony, that the Leges were written at a later period than the Republic; Plutarch also states that the Leges were composed during the old age of Plato, and this statement, accepted by most modern critics, appears to me trustworthy.[1] The Sophistês proclaims itself as a second meeting, by mutual agreement, of the same persons who had conversed in the Theætêtus, with the addition of a new companion, the Eleatic stranger. But we must remark that the subject of the Theætêtus, though left unsettled at the close of that dialogue, is not resumed in the Sophistês: in which last,

[1] Plutarch, Isid. et Osirid. c. 48, p. 370.

moreover, Sokrates acts only a subordinate part, while the Eleatic stranger, who did not appear in the Theætêtus, is here put forward as the prominent questioner or expositor. So too, the Politikus offers itself as a third of the same triplet: with this difference, that while the Eleatic stranger continues as the questioner, a new respondent appears in the person of Sokrates Junior. The Politikus is not a resumption of the same subject as the Sophistês, but a second application of the same method (the method of logical division and subdivision) to a different subject. Plato speaks also as if he contemplated a third application of the same method—the Philosophus: which, so far as we know, was never realised. Again, the Timæus presents itself as a sequel to the Republic, and the Kritias as a sequel to the Timæus: a fourth, the Hermokrates, being apparently announced, as about to follow—but not having been composed.

Here then are two groups of three each (we might call them Trilogies, and if the intended fourth had been realised, Tetralogies), indicated by Plato himself. A certain relative chronological order is here doubtless evident: the Sophistês must have been composed after the Theætêtus and before the Politikus, the Timæus after the Republic and before the Kritias. But this is all that we can infer: for it does not follow that the sequence must have been immediate in point of time: there may have been a considerable interval between the three forming the so-called Trilogy.[1] We may add, that neither in the Theætêtus nor in the Republic, do we find indication that either of them is intended as the first of a Trilogy: the marks

Trilogies indicated by Plato himself.

[1] It may seem singular that Schleiermacher is among those who adopt this opinion. He maintains that the Sophistês does not follow *immediately* upon the Theætêtus; that Plato, though intending when he finished the Theætêtus to proceed onward to the Sophistês, altered his intention, and took up other views instead: that the Menon (and the Euthydêmus) come in between them, in immediate sequel to the Theætêtus (Einleitung zum Menon, vol. iii. p. 326).

Here Schleiermacher introduces a new element of uncertainty, which invalidates yet more seriously the grounds for his hypothesis of a preconceived sequence throughout all the dialogues. In a case where Plato directly intimates an intentional sequence, we are called upon to believe, on "internal grounds" alone, that he altered his intention, and introduced other dialogues. He may have done this: but how are we to prove it? How much does it attenuate the value of his intentions, as proofs of an internal philosophical sequence? We become involved more and more in unsupported hypothesis. I think that K. F. Hermann's objections against Schleiermacher, on the above ground, have much force; and that Ueberweg's reply to them is unsatisfactory. (Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Phil. p. 350. Ueberweg, Untersuchungen, p. 82, seq.)

proving an intended Trilogy are only found in the second and third of the series.

Positive dates of all the dialogues—unknown.

While even the relative chronology of the dialogues is thus faintly marked in the case of a few, and left to fallible conjecture in the remainder—the positive chronology, or the exact year of composition, is not directly marked in the case of any one. Moreover, at the very outset of the enquiry, we have to ask, At what period of life did Plato begin to publish his dialogues? Did he publish any of them during the lifetime of Sokrates? and if so, which? Or does the earliest of them date from a time after the death of Sokrates?

When did Plato begin to compose? Not till after the death of Sokrates.

Amidst the many dissentient views of the Platonic critics, it is remarkable that they are nearly unanimous in their mode of answering this question.[1] Most of them declare, without hesitation, that Plato published several dialogues before the death of Sokrates—that is, before he was 28 years of age—though they do not all agree in determining which these dialogues were. I do not perceive that they produce any external proofs of the least value. Most of them disbelieve (though Stallbaum and Hermann believe) the anecdote about Sokrates and his criticism on the dialogue Lysis.[2] In spite of their unanimity, I cannot but adopt the

[1] Valentine Rose (De Aristotelis Librorum ordine, p. 25, Berlin, 1854), Mullach (Democriti Fragm. p. 99), and R. Schöne (in his Commentary on the Platonic Protagoras), are among the critics known to me, who intimate their belief that Plato published no Sokratic dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates. In discussing the matter, Schöne adverts to two of the three lines of argument brought forward in my text:—1. The too early and too copious "productivity" which the received supposition would imply in Plato. 2. The improbability that the name of Sokrates would be employed in written dialogues, as spokesman, by any of his scholars during his lifetime.

Schöne does not touch upon the improbability of the hypothesis, arising out of the early position and aspirations of Plato himself (Schöne, Ueber Platon's Protagoras, p. 64, Leipsic, 1862).

[2] Diog. Laert. iii. 35; Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Plat. Lys. p. 90; K. F. Hermann, Gesch. u. Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 370. Schleiermacher (Einl. zum Lysis, i. p. 175) treats the anecdote about the Lysis as unworthy of credence. Diogenes (iii. 38) mentions that some considered the Phædrus as Plato's earliest dialogue; the reason being that the subject of it was something puerile: λόγος δὲ πρῶτον γράψαι αὐτὸν τὸν Φαῖδρον· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει μειρακιώδές τι τὸ πρόβλημα. Δικαίαρχος δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς γραφῆς ὅλον ἐπιμέμφεται ὡς φορτικόν. Olympiodorus also in his life of Plato mentions the same report, that the Phædrus was Plato's earliest composition, and gives the same ground of belief, "its dithyrambic character". Even if the assertion were granted, that the Phædrus is the earliest Platonic composition, we could not infer that it was composed during the lifetime of Sokrates. But that assertion cannot be granted. The two statements,

opposite conclusion. It appears to me that Plato composed no Sokratic dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates.

All the information (scanty as it is) which we obtain from the rhetor Dionysius and others respecting the composition of the Platonic dialogues, announces them to have cost much time and labour to their author: a statement illustrated by the great number of inversions of words which he is said to have introduced successively in the first sentence of the Republic, before he was satisfied to let the sentence stand. This corresponds, too, with all that we read respecting the patient assiduity both of Isokrates and Demosthenes.[1] A first-rate Greek composition was understood not to be purchasable at lower cost. I confess therefore to great surprise, when I read in Ast the affirmation that the Protagoras was composed when Plato was only 22 years old—and when I find Schleiermacher asserting, as if it were a matter beyond dispute, that Protagoras, Phædrus, and Parmenidês, all bear evident marks of Plato's youthful age (Jugendlichkeit). In regard to the Phædrus and Parmenidês, indeed, Hermann and other critics contest the view of Schleiermacher; and detect, in those two dialogues, not only no marks of "juvenility," but what they consider plain proofs of maturity and even of late age. But in regard to the Protagoras, most of them agree with Schleiermacher and Ast, in declaring it to be a work of Plato's youth, some time before the death of Sokrates.

Reasons for this opinion. Labour of the composition—does not consist with youth of the author.

above cited, give it only as a report, suggested to those who believed it by the character and subject-matter of the dialogue. I am surprised that Dr. Volquardsen, who in a learned volume, recently published, has undertaken the defence of the theory of Schleiermacher about the Phædrus (Phädros, Erste Schrift Platon's, Kiel, 1862), can represent this as a "*feste historische Ueberlieferung*"—the rather as he admits that Schleiermacher himself placed no confidence in it, and relied upon other reasons (pp. 90-92-93). Comp. Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Phaidros, p. 76.

Whoever will read the Epistle of Dionysius of Halikarnassus, addressed to Cneius Pompeius (pp. 751-765, Reiske), will be persuaded that Dionysius can neither have known, nor even believed, that the Phædrus was the first composition, and a youthful composition, of Plato. If Dionysius had believed this, it would have furnished him with the precise excuse which his letter required. For the purpose of his letter is to mollify the displeasure of Cn. Pompey, who had written to blame him for some unfavourable criticisms on the style of Plato. Dionysius justifies his criticisms by allusions to the Phædrus. If he had been able to add, that the Phædrus was a first composition, and that Plato's later dialogues were comparatively free from the like faults—this would have been the most effective way of conciliating Cn. Pompey.

[1] Timæus said that Alexander the Great conquered the Persian empire in less time than Isokrates required for the composition of his panegyrical oration (Longinus, De Sublim. c. 4).

Now on this point I dissent from them: and since the decision turns upon "internal grounds," each must judge for himself. The Protagoras appears to me one of the most finished and elaborate of all the dialogues: in complication of scenic arrangements, dramatic vivacity, and in the amount of theory worked out, it is surpassed by none—hardly even by the Republic.[1] Its merits as a composition are indeed extolled by all the critics; who clap their hands, especially, at the humiliation which they believe to be brought upon the great Sophist by Sokrates. But the more striking the composition is acknowledged to be, the stronger is the presumption that its author was more than 22 or 24 years of age. Nothing short of good positive testimony would induce me to believe that such a dialogue as the Protagoras could have been composed, even by Plato, before he attained the plenitude of his powers. No such testimony is produced or producible. I extend a similar presumption, even to the Lysis, Lachês, Charmidês, and other dialogues: though with a less degree of confidence, because they are shorter and less artistic, not equal to the Protagoras. All of them, in my judgment, exhibit a richness of ideas and a variety of expression, which suggest something very different from a young novice as the author.

But over and above this presumption, there are other reasons which induce me to believe, that none of the Platonic dialogues were published during the lifetime of Sokrates. My reasons are partly connected with Sokrates, partly with Plato.

Reasons, founded on the personality of Sokrates, and his relations with Plato.

First, in reference to Sokrates—we may reasonably doubt whether any written reports of his actual conversations were published during his lifetime. He was the most constant, public, and indiscriminate of all talkers: always in some frequented place, and desiring nothing so much as a respondent with an audience. Every one who chose to hear him, might do so without payment and with the utmost facility. Why then should any one wish to read written reports of his conversations? especially when we know that the strong interest which they excited in the hearers depended much upon the spontaneity of his

[1] "Als aesthetisches Kunstwerk ist der Dialog Protagoras das meisterhafteste unter den Werken Platon's." (Socher, Ueber Platon, p. 226.)

inspirations, and hardly less upon the singularity of his manner and physiognomy. Any written report of what he said must appear comparatively tame. Again, as to fictitious dialogues (like the Platonic) employing the name of Sokrates as spokesman —such might doubtless be published during his lifetime by derisory dramatists for the purpose of raising a laugh, but not surely by a respectful disciple and admirer for the purpose of giving utterance to doctrines of his own. The greater was the respect felt by Plato for Sokrates, the less would he be likely to take the liberty of making Sokrates responsible before the public for what Sokrates had never said.[1] There is a story in Diogenes —to the effect that Sokrates, when he first heard the Platonic dialogue called Lysis, exclaimed—"What a heap of falsehoods does the young man utter about me!"[2] This story merits no credence as a fact: but it expresses the displeasure which Sokrates would be likely to feel, on hearing that one of his youthful companions had dramatised him as he appears in the Lysis. Xenophon tells us, and it is very probable, that inaccurate oral reports of the real colloquies of Sokrates may have got into circulation. But that the friends and disciples of Sokrates, during his lifetime, should deliberately publish fictitious dialogues, putting their own sentiments into his mouth, and thus contribute to mislead the public—is not easily credible. Still less credible is it that Plato, during the lifetime of Sokrates, should have published such a dialogue as the Phædrus, wherein we find ascribed to Sokrates, poetical and dithyrambic effusions utterly at variance with the real manifestations which Athenians might hear every day from Sokrates in the market-place.[3] So-

[1] Valentine Rose observes, in regard to a dialogue composed by some one else, wherein Plato was introduced as one of the interlocutors, that it could not have been composed until after Plato's death, and that the dialogues of Plato were not composed until after the death of Sokrates. "Platonis autem sermones antequam mortuus fuerit, scripto neminem tradidisse, neque magistri viventis personâ in dialogis abusos fuisse (non magis quam vivum Socratem induxerunt Xenophon, Plato, cæteri Socratici), hoc veterum mori et religioni quivis facile concedet," &c. (V. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, pp. 57, 74, Leipsic, 1863.)—Val. Rose expresses the same opinion (that none of the Sokratic dialogues, either by Plato or the other companions of Sokrates, were written until after the death of Sokrates) in his earlier work, De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et Auctoritate, p. 25.

[2] Diog. L. iii. 35.

[3] In regard to the theory (elaborated by Schleiermacher, recently again defended by Volquardsen), that the Phædrus is the earliest among the Platonic dialogues, composed about 406 B.C., it appears to me inconsistent also with what we know about Lysias. In the Platonic Phædrus, Lysias is pre-

krates in the Platonic Apology, complains of the comic poet Aristophanes for misrepresenting him. Had the Platonic Phædrus been then in circulation, or any other Platonic dialogues, he might with equally good reason have warned the Dikasts against judging of him, a real citizen on trial, from the titular Sokrates whom even disciples did not scruple to employ as spokesman for their own transcendental doctrine, and their own controversial sarcasms.

Reasons, founded the early life, character, and position of Plato.

Secondly, in regard to Plato, the reasons leading to the same conclusion are yet stronger. Unfortunately, we know little of the life of Plato before he attained the age of 28, that is, before the death of Sokrates: but our best means of appreciating it are derived from three sources. 1. Our knowledge of the history of Athens from 409-399 B.C., communicated by Thucydides, Xenophon, &c. 2. The seventh Epistle of Plato himself, written four or five years before his death (about 352 B.C.). 3. A few hints from the Memorabilia of Xenophon.

To these evidences about the life of Plato, it has not been customary to pay much attention. The Platonic critics seem to regard Plato so entirely as a spiritual person ("like a blessed spirit, visiting earth for a short time," to cite a poetical phrase applied to him by Göthe), that they disdain to take account of his relations with the material world, or with society around him. Because his mature life was consecrated to philosophy, they presume that his youth must have been so likewise. But this is a hasty assumption. You cannot thus abstract *any* man from

sented as a λογογράφος of the highest reputation and eminence (p. 228 A, 257 C, and indeed throughout the whole dialogue). Now this is quite inconsistent with what we read from Lysias himself in the indictment which he preferred against Eratosthenes, not long after the restoration of the democracy, 403 B.C. He protests therein strenuously that he had never had judicial affairs of his own, nor meddled with those of others; and he expresses the greatest apprehension from his own ἀπειρία (sects. 4-6). I cannot believe that this would be said by a person whom Phædrus terms δεινότατος ὢν τῶν νῦν γράφειν. Moreover, Lysias, in that same discourse, describes his own position at Athens, anterior to the Thirty: he belonged to a rich metic family, and was engaged along with his brother Polemarchus in a large manufactory of shields, employing 120 slaves (s. 20). A person thus rich and occupied was not likely to become a professed and notorious λογογράφος, though he may have been a clever and accomplished man. Lysias was plundered and impoverished by the Thirty; and he is said to have incurred much expense in aiding the efforts of Thrasybulus. It was after this change of circumstances that he took to rhetoric as a profession; and it is to some one of these later years that the Platonic Phædrus refers.

the social medium by which he is surrounded. The historical circumstances of Athens from Plato's nineteenth year to his twenty-sixth (409-403 B.C.) were something totally different from what they afterwards became. They were so grave and absorbing, that had he been ever so much inclined to philosophy, he would have been compelled against his will to undertake active and heavy duty as a citizen. Within those years (as I have observed in a preceding chapter) fell the closing struggles of the Peloponnesian war; in which (to repeat words already cited from Thucydides) Athens became more a military post than a city—every citizen being almost habitually under arms: then the long blockade, starvation, and capture of the city, followed by the violences of the Thirty, the armed struggle under Thrasybulus, and the perilous, though fortunately successful and equitable, renovation of the democracy. These were not times for a young citizen, of good family and robust frame, to devote himself exclusively to philosophy and composition. I confess myself surprised at the assertion of Schleiermacher and Steinhart, that Plato composed the Charmidês and other dialogues under the Anarchy.[1] Amidst such disquietude and perils he could not have renounced active duty for philosophy, even if he had been disposed to do so.

Plato's early life—active by necessity, and to some extent ambitious.

But, to make the case stronger, we learn from Plato's own testimony, in his seventh Epistle, that he was not at that time disposed to renounce active political life. He tells us himself, that as a young man he was exceedingly eager, like others of the same age, to meddle and distinguish himself in active politics.[2] How natural such eagerness was, to a young citizen of his family and condition, may be seen by the analogy of his younger brother Glaukon, who was prematurely impatient to come forward: as

[1] Steinhart, Einl. zum Laches, vol. i. p. 358, where he says that Plato composed the Charmidês, Lachês, and Protagoras, all in 404 B.C. under the Thirty. Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Charmides, vol. ii. p. 8.

The lines of Lucretius (i. 41) bear emphatically upon this trying season:

Nam neque nos agere hoc patriai tempore iniquo
Possumus æquo animo nec Memmî clara propago
Talibus in rebus communi desse saluti.

[2] Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324 C. Νέος ἐγώ ποτε ὢν πολλοῖς δὴ ταὐτὸν ἔπαθον· ᾠήθην, εἰ θᾶττον ἐμαυτοῦ γενοίμην κύριος, ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως εὐθὺς ἰέναι. Again, 325 E: ὥστε με, τὸ πρῶτον πολλῆς μεστὸν ὄντα ὁρμῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κοινά, &c.

well as by that of his cousin Charmides, who had the same inclination, but was restrained by exaggerated diffidence of character. Now we know that the real Sokrates (very different from the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias) did not seek to deter young men of rank from politics, and to consign them to inactive speculation. Sokrates gives[1] earnest encouragement to Charmides; and he does not discourage Glaukon, but only presses him to adjourn his pretensions until the suitable stock of preliminary information has been acquired. We may thus see that assuming the young Plato to be animated with political aspirations, he would certainly not be dissuaded,—nay, he would probably be encouraged—by Sokrates.

Plato farther tells us that when (after the final capitulation of Athens) the democracy was put down and the government of the Thirty established, he embarked in it actively under the auspices of his relatives (Kritias, Charmides, &c., then in the ascendant), with the ardent hopes of youth[2] that he should witness and promote the accomplishment of valuable reforms. Experience showed him that he was mistaken. He became disgusted with the enormities of the Thirty, especially with their treatment of Sokrates; and he then ceased to co-operate with them. Again, after the year called the Anarchy, the democracy was restored, and Plato's political aspirations revived along with it. He again put himself forward for active public life, though with less ardent hopes.[3] But he became dissatisfied with the march of affairs, and his relationship with the deceased Kritias was now a formidable obstacle to popularity. At length, four years after the restoration of the democracy, came the trial and condemnation of Sokrates. It was that event which finally shocked and disgusted Plato, converting his previous dissatisfaction into an utter despair of obtaining any good results from existing govern-

[1] See the two interesting colloquies of Sokrates, with Glaukon and Charmides (Xenoph. Mem. iii. 6, 7).

Charmides was killed along with Kritias during the eight months called The Anarchy, at the battle fought with Thrasybulus and the democrats (Xen. Hell. ii. 4, 19). The colloquy of Sokrates with Charmides, recorded by Xenophon in the Memorabilia, must have taken place at some time before the battle of Ægospotami; perhaps about 407 or 406 B.C.

[2] Plato, Epist. vii. 324 D. Καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἔπαθον ὑπὸ νεότητος, &c.

[3] Plato, Epist. vii. 325 A. Πάλιν δέ, βραδύτερον μὲν, εἴλκε δέ με ὅμως ἡ περὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κοινὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ ἐπιθυμία.

ments. From thenceforward, he turned away from practice and threw himself into speculation.[1]

This very natural recital, wherein Plato (at the age of 75) describes his own youth between 21 and 28—taken in conjunction with the other reasons just enumerated—impresses upon me the persuasion, that Plato did not devote himself to philosophy, nor publish any of his dialogues, before the death of Sokrates: though he may probably have composed dramas, and the beautiful epigrams which Diogenes has preserved. He at first frequented the society of Sokrates, as many other aspiring young men frequented it (likewise that of Kratylus, and perhaps that of various Sophists[2]), from love of

Plato did not retire from political life until after the restoration of the democracy, nor devote himself to philosophy until after the death of Sokrates.

Plato, Epist. vii. 325 C: Σκοποῦντι δή μοι ταῦτά τε καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πολιτικά, &c. 325 E: Καὶ τοῦ μὲν σκοπεῖν μὴ ἀποστῆναι, πῇ ποτὲ ἄμεινον ἂν γίγνοιτο περί τε αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὴν πᾶσαν πολιτείαν, τοῦ δὲ πράττειν αὖ περιμένειν αἰεὶ καιρούς, τελευτῶντα δὲ νοῆσαι περὶ πασῶν τῶν νῦν πόλεων ὅτι κακῶς ξύμπασαι πολιτεύονται.

I have already stated in the 84th chapter of my History, describing the visit of Plato to Dionysius in Sicily, that I believe the Epistles of Plato to be genuine, and that the seventh Epistle especially contains valuable information. Some critics undoubtedly are of a different opinion, and consider them as spurious. But even among these critics, several consider that the author of the Epistles, though not Plato himself, was a contemporary and well informed: so that his evidence is trustworthy. See K. F. Hermann, Gesammelte Abhandlungen, pp. 282-283. The question has been again discussed recently by Ueberweg (Untersuch. über d. Aechth. u. Zeitf. d. Plat. Schriften, pp. 120-123-125-129), who gives his own opinion that the letters are not by Plato, and produces various arguments to the point. His arguments are noway convincing to me: for the mysticism and pedantry of the Epistles appear to me in full harmony with the Timæus and Leges, and with the Pythagorean bias of Plato's later years, though not in harmony with the Protagoras, and various other dialogues. Yet Ueberweg also declares his full belief that the seventh Epistle is the composition of a well-informed contemporary, and perfectly worthy of credit as to the facts; and K. F. Hermann declares the same! This is enough for my present purpose.

The statement, trusted by all the critics, that Plato's first visit to Syracuse was made when he was about 40 years of age, depends altogether on the assertion of the seventh Epistle. How numerous are the assertions made by Platonic critics respecting Plato, upon evidence far slighter than that of these Epistles! Boeckh considers the seventh Epistle as the genuine work of Plato. Valentine Rose also pronounces it to be genuine, though he does not consider the other Epistles to be so (De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine, p. 25, p. 114, Berlin, 1854). Tennemann admits the Epistles generally to be genuine (System der Platon. Philos. i. p. 106).

It is undeniable that these Epistles of Plato were recognised as genuine and trusted by all the critics of antiquity from Aristophanes downwards. Cicero, Plutarch, Aristeides, &c., assert facts upon the authority of the Epistles. Those who declare the Epistles to be spurious and worthless, ought in consistency to reject the statements which Plutarch makes on the authority of the Epistles: they will find themselves compelled to discredit some of the best parts of his life of Dion. Compare Aristeides, Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς Or. 45, pp. 90-106, Dindorf.

[2] Compare Plat. Protag. 312 A-B, 315 A, where the distinction is pointedly drawn between one who visited Protagoras ἐπὶ τέχνῃ, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, and others who came simply ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει

ethical debate, admiration of dialectic power, and desire to acquire a facility of the same kind in his own speech: not with any view to take up philosophy as a profession, or to undertake the task either of demolishing or constructing in the region of speculation. No such resolution was adopted until after he had tried political life and had been disappointed:—nor until such disappointment had been still more bitterly aggravated by the condemnation of Sokrates. It was under this feeling that Plato first consecrated himself to that work of philosophical meditation and authorship,—of inquisitive travel and converse with philosophers abroad,—and ultimately of teaching in the Academy,—which filled up the remaining fifty years of his life. The death of Sokrates left that venerated name open to be employed as spokesman in his dialogues: and there was nothing in the political condition of Athens after 399 B.C., analogous to the severe and perilous struggle which tasked all the energies of her citizens from 409 B.C. down to the close of the war.

All Plato's dialogues were composed during the fifty-one years after the death of Sokrates.

I believe, on these grounds, that Plato did not publish any dialogues during the life of Sokrates. An interval of fifty-one years separates the death of Sokrates from that of Plato. Such an interval is more than sufficient for all the existing dialogues of Plato, without the necessity of going back to a more youthful period of his age. As to distribution of the dialogues, earlier or later, among these fifty-one years, we have little or no means of judging. Plato has kept out of sight—with a degree of completeness which is really surprising—not merely his own personality, but also the marks of special date and the determining circumstances in which each dialogue was composed. Twice only does he mention his own name, and that simply in passing, as if it were the name of a third person.[1] As to the point

[1] In the Apologia, c. 28, p. 38, Sokrates alludes to Plato as present in court, and as offering to become guarantee, along with others, for his fine. In the Phædon, Plato is mentioned as being sick; to explain why he was not present at the last scene of Sokrates (Phædon, p. 59 B). Diog. L. iii. 37.

The pathos as well as the detail of the narrative in the Phædon makes one imagine that Plato really was present at the scene. But being obliged, by the uniform scheme of his compositions, to provide another narrator, he could not suffer it to be supposed that he was himself present.

I have already remarked that this mention of Plato in the third person (Πλάτων δέ, οἶμαι, ἠσθένει) was probably one of the reasons which induced Panætius to declare the Phædon *not* to be the work of Plato.

of time to which he himself assigns each dialogue, much discussion has been held how far Plato has departed from chronological or historical possibility; how far he has brought persons together in Athens who never could have been there together, or has made them allude to events posterior to their own decease. A speaker in Athenæus[1] dwells, with needless acrimony, on the anachronisms of Plato, as if they were gross faults. Whether they are faults or not, may fairly be doubted: but the fact of such anachronisms cannot be doubted, when we have before us the Menexenus and the Symposion. It cannot be supposed, in the face of such evidence, that Plato took much pains to keep clear of anachronisms: and whether they be rather more or rather less numerous, is a question of no great moment.

I now conclude my enquiry respecting the Platonic Canon. The presumption in favour of that Canon, as laid down by Thrasyllus, is stronger (as I showed in the preceding chapter) than it is in regard to ancient authors generally of the same age: being traceable, in the last resort, through the Alexandrine Museum, to authenticating manuscripts in the Platonic school, and to members of that school who had known and cherished Plato himself.[2] I have reviewed the doctrines of several recent critics who discard this Canon as unworthy of trust, and who set up for themselves a type of what Plato *must have* been, derived from a certain number of items in the Canon—rejecting the remaining items as unconformable to their hypothetical type. The different theories which they have laid down respecting general and systematic purposes of Plato (apart from the purpose of each separate composition), appear

The Thrasyllean Canon is more worthy of trust than the modern critical theories by which it has been condemned.

[1] Athenæus, v. pp. 220, 221. Didymus also attacked Plato as departing from historical truth—ἐπιφυόμενος τῷ Πλάτωνι ὡς παριστοροῦντι—against which the scholiast (ad Leges, i. p. 630) defends him. Grœn van Prinsterer, Prosopogr. Plat. p. 16. The rhetor Aristeides has some remarks of the same kind, though less acrimonious (Orat. xlvii. p. 435, Dind.) than the speaker in Athenæus.

[2] I find this position distinctly asserted, and the authority of the Thrasyllean catalogue, as certifying the genuine works of Plato, vindicated, by Yxem, in his able dissertation on the Kleitophon of Plato (pp. 1-3, Berlin, 1846). But Yxem does not set forth the grounds of this opinion so fully as the present state of the question demands. Moreover, he combines it with another opinion, upon which he insists even at greater length, and from which I altogether dissent—that the tetralogies of Thrasyllus exhibit the genuine order established by Plato himself among the Dialogues.

to me uncertified and gratuitous. The "internal reasons," upon which they justify rejection of various dialogues, are only another phrase for expressing their own different theories respecting Plato as a philosopher and as a writer. For my part I decline to discard any item of the Thrasyllean Canon, upon such evidence as they produce: I think it a safer and more philosophical proceeding to accept the entire Canon, and to accommodate my general theory of Plato (in so far as I am able to frame one) to each and all of its contents.

Unsafe grounds upon which those theories proceed.

Considering that Plato's period of philosophical composition extended over fifty years, and that the circumstances of his life are most imperfectly known to us—it is surely hazardous to limit the range of his varieties, on the faith of a critical repugnance, not merely subjective and fallible, but withal entirely of modern growth: to assume, as basis of reasoning, the admiration raised by a few of the finest dialogues—and then to argue that no composition inferior to this admired type, or unlike to it in doctrine or handling, can possibly be the work of Plato. "The Minos, Theagês, Epistolæ, Epinomis, &c., are unworthy of Plato: nothing so inferior in excellence can have been composed by him. No dialogue can be admitted as genuine which contradicts another dialogue, or which advocates any low or incorrect or un-Platonic doctrine. No dialogue can pass which is adverse to the general purpose of Plato as an improver of morality, and a teacher of the doctrine of Ideas." On such grounds as these we are called upon to reject various dialogues: and there is nothing upon which, generally speaking, so much stress is laid as upon inferior excellence. For my part, I cannot recognise any of them as sufficient grounds of exception. I have no difficulty in believing, not merely that Plato (like Aristophanes) produced many successive novelties, "not at all similar one to the other, and all clever"[1]—but also that among these novelties, there were inferior dialogues as well as superior: that in different dialogues he worked out different, even contradictory, points of view—and among them some which critics declare to be low and objection-

[1] Aristophan. Nubes, 547-8.
'Αλλ' ἀεὶ καινὰς ἰδέας εἰσφέρων σοφίζομαι,
Οὐδὲν ἀλλήλαισιν ὁμοίας, καὶ πάσας δεξιάς.

able: that we have among his works unfinished fragments and abandoned sketches, published without order, and perhaps only after his death.

Opinions of Schleiermacher, tending to show this.

It may appear strange, but it is true, that Schleiermacher, the leading champion of Plato's central purpose and systematic unity from the beginning, lays down a doctrine to the same effect. He says, "Truly, nothing can be more preposterous, than when people demand that all the works even of a great master shall be of equal perfection—or that such as are not equal, shall be regarded as not composed by him". Zeller expresses himself in the same manner, and with as little reserve.[1] These eminent critics here proclaim a general rule which neither they nor others follow out.

I find elsewhere in Schleiermacher, another opinion, not less important, in reference to disallowance of dialogues, on purely

[1] Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Menon, vol. iii. p. 337. "Und wahrlich, nichts ist wohl wunderlicher, als wenn man verlangt, dass alle Werke auch eines grossen Meisters von gleicher Volkommenheit seyn sollten—oder die es nicht sind, soll er nicht verfertigt haben."

Compare Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., vol. ii. p. 322, ed. 2nd.

It is to be remembered that this opinion of Schleiermacher refers only to *completed works* of the same master. You are not authorised in rejecting any completed work as spurious, on the ground that it is not equal in merit to some other. Still less, then, are you authorised in rejecting, on the like ground, an uncompleted work—a professed fragment, or a preliminary sketch. Of this nature are several of the minor items in the Thrasyllean canon.

M. Boeckh, in his Commentary on the dialogue called Minos, has assigned the reasons which induce him to throw out that dialogue, together with the Hipparchus, from the genuine works of Plato (and farther to consider both of them, and the pseudo-Platonic dialogues De Justo and De Virtute, as works of Σίμων ὁ σκυτεύς: with this latter hypothesis I have here no concern). He admits fully that the Minos is of the Platonic age and irreproachable in style—"veteris esse et Attici scr ptoris, probus sermo, antiqui mores totus denique character, spondent" (p. 32). Next, he not only admits that it is like Plato, but urges the *too great likeness* to Plato as one of the points of his case. He says that it is a bad, stupid, and unskilful imitation of different Platonic dialogues: "Pergamus ad alteram partem nostræ argumentationis, eamque etiam firmiorem, de *nimiâ similitudine* Platonicorum aliquot locorum. Nam de hoc quidem conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos, Platonem se ipsum haud posse imitari: ni forté quis dubitet de sanâ ejus mente" (p. 23). In the sense which Boeckh intends, I agree that Plato did not imitate himself: in another sense, I think that he did. I mean that his consummate compositions were preceded by shorter, partial, incomplete sketches, which he afterwards worked up, improved, and remodelled. I do not understand how Plato could have composed such works as Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias, Symposion, Phædrus, Phædon, &c., without having before him many of these preparatory sketches. That some of these sketches should have been preserved is what we might naturally expect; and I believe Minos and Hipparchus to be among them. I do not wonder that they are of inferior merit. One point on which Boeckh (pp. 7, 8) contends that Hipparchus and Minos are unlike to Plato is, that the *collocutor* with Sokrates is anonymous. But we find anonymous talkers in the Protagoras, Sophistês, Politikus, and Leges.

internal grounds Take the Gorgias and the Protagoras. both these two dialogues are among the most renowned of the catalogue both have escaped all suspicion as to legitimacy, even from Ast and Socher, the two boldest of all disfranchising critics. In the Protagoras, Sokrates maintains an elaborate argument to prove, against the unwilling Protagoras, that the Good is identical with the Pleasurable, and the Evil identical with the Painful in the Gorgias, Sokrates holds an argument equally elaborate, to show that Good is essentially different from Pleasurable, Evil from Painful. What the one affirms, the other denies. Moreover, Schleiermacher himself characterises the thesis vindicated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, as "entirely un-Sokratic and un-Platonic".[1] If internal grounds of repudiation are held to be available against the Thrasyllean canon, how can such grounds exist in greater force than those which are here admitted to bear against the Protagoras—That it exhibits Sokrates as contradicting the Sokrates of the Gorgias —That it exhibits him farther as advancing and proving, at great length, a thesis "entirely un-Sokratic and un-Platonic"? Since the critics all concur in disregarding these internal objections, as insufficient to raise even a suspicion against the Protagoras, I cannot concur with them when they urge the like objections as valid and irresistible against other dialogues.

I may add, as farther illustrating this point, that there are few dialogues in the list against which stronger objections on internal grounds can be brought, than Leges and Menexenus. Yet both of them stand authenticated, beyond all reasonable dispute, as genuine works of Plato, not merely by the Canon of Thrasyllus, but also by the testimony of Aristotle.[2]

[1] Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Protag. vol. i. p. 232. "Jene ganz unsokratische und unplatonische Ansicht, dass das Gute nichts anderes ist als das Angenehme."

So also, in the Parmenides, we find a host of unsolved objections against the doctrine of Ideas, upon which in other dialogues Plato so emphatically insists. Accordingly, Socher, resting upon this discrepancy as an "internal ground," declares the Parmenides not to be the work of Plato. But the other critics refuse to go along with this inference. I think they are right in so refusing. But this only shows how little such internal grounds are to be trusted, as evidence to prove spuriousness.

[2] See Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 384: and still more, Zeller, Plat. Studien, pp. 1-131, Tübingen, 1839. In that treatise, where Zeller has set forth powerfully the grounds for denying the genuineness of the Leges, he relied so much upon the strength of this negative case, as to discredit the direct testimony of Ari-

While adhering therefore to the Canon of Thrasyllus, I do not think myself obliged to make out that Plato is either like to himself, or equal to himself, or consistent with himself, throughout all the dialogues included therein, and throughout the period of fifty years during which these dialogues were composed. Plato is to be found in all and each of the dialogues, not in an imaginary type abstracted from some to the exclusion of the rest. The critics reverence so much this type of their own creation, that they insist on bringing out a result consistent with it, either by interpretation specially contrived, or by repudiating what will not harmonise. Such sacrifice of the inherent diversity, and separate individuality, of the dialogues, to the maintenance of a supposed unity of type, style, or purpose, appears to me an error. In fact,[1] there exists, for us, no personal Plato any more than

Any true theory of Plato must recognise all his varieties, and must be based upon all the works in the Canon, not upon some to the exclusion of the rest.

stotle affirming the Leges to be genuine. In his Phil. d. Griech. Zeller altered this opinion, and admitted the Leges to be genuine. But Strümpell adheres to the earlier opinion given by Zeller, and maintains that the partial recantation is noway justified. (Gesch. d. Prakt. Phil. d. Griech p. 457.)

Suckow mentions (Form der Plat. Schriften, 1855, p. 135) that Zeller has in a subsequent work reverted to his former opinion, denying the genuineness of the Leges. Suckow himself denies it also; relying not merely on the internal objections against it, but also on a passage of Isokrates (ad Philippum, p. 84), which he considers to sanction his opinion, but which (in my judgment) entirely fails to bear him out.

Suckow attempts to show (p. 55), and Ueberweg partly countenances the same opinion, that the two passages in which Aristotle alludes to the Menexenus (Rhet. i. 9, 30; iii. 14, 11) do not prove that he (Aristotle) considered it as a work of Plato, because he mentions the name of Sokrates only, and not that of Plato. But this is to require from a witness such precise specification as we cannot reasonably expect. Aristotle, alluding to the Menexenus, says, Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ Ἐπιταφίῳ: just as, in alluding to the Gorgias in another place (Sophist. Elench. 12, p. 173), he says, Καλλικλῆς ἐν τῷ Γοργίᾳ: and again, in alluding to the Phædon, ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης (De Gen. et Corrupt. ii. 9, p. 335): not to mention his allusions in the Politica to the Platonic Republic, under the name of Sokrates. No instance can be produced in which Aristotle cites any Sokratic dialogue, composed by Antisthenes, Æschines, &c., or any other of the Sokratic companions except Plato. And when we read in Aristotle's Politica (ii. 3, 3) the striking compliment paid—Τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι, καὶ τὸ κομψόν, καὶ τὸ καινότομον, καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν· καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπόν—we cannot surely imagine that he intends to designate any other dialogues than those composed by Plato.

[1] The only manifestation of the personal Plato is in the Epistolæ. I have already said that I accept these as genuine, though most critics do not. I consider them valuable illustrations of his character, as far as they go. They are all written after he was more than sixty years of age. And most of them relate to his relations with Dionysius the younger, with Dion, and with Sicilian affairs generally. This was a peculiar and outlying phase of Plato's life, during which (through the instigation of Dion, and at the sacrifice of his own peace of mind) he became involved in the world of political action: he had to deal with

there is a personal Shakespeare. Plato (except in the Epistolæ) never appears before us, nor gives us any opinion as his own: he is the unseen prompter of different characters who converse aloud in a number of distinct dramas—each drama a separate work, manifesting its own point of view, affirmative or negative, consistent or inconsistent with the others, as the case may be. In so far as I venture to present a general view of one who keeps constantly in the dark—who delights to dive, and hide himself, not less difficult to catch than the supposed Sophist in his own dialogue called Sophistês—I shall consider it as subordinate to the dialogues, each and all: and above all, it must be such as to include and acknowledge not merely diversities, but also inconsistencies and contradictions.[1]

real persons, passions, and interests—with the feeble character, literary velleities, and jealous apprehensions of Dionysius—the reforming vehemence and unpopular harshness of Dion—the courtiers, the soldiers, and the people of Syracuse, all moved by different passions of which he had had no practical experience. It could not be expected that, amidst such turbulent elements, Plato as an adviser could effect much: yet I do not think that he turned his chances, doubtful as they were, to the best account. I have endeavoured to show this in the tenth volume of my History of Greece, c. 84. But at all events, these operations lay apart from Plato's true world—the speculation, dialectic, and lectures of the Academy at Athens. The Epistolæ, however, present some instructive points, bearing upon Plato's opinions about writing as a medium of philosophical communication and instruction to learners, which I shall notice in the suitable place.

[1] I transcribe from the instructive work of M. Ernest Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, a passage in which he deprecates the proceeding of critics who presume uniform consistency throughout the works of Aristotle, and make out their theory partly by forcible exegesis, partly by setting aside as spurious all those compositions which oppose them. The remark applies more forcibly to the dialogues of Plato, who is much less systematic than Aristotle:—

"On a combattu l'interprétation d' Ibn-Roschd (Averroès), et soutenu que l'intellect actif n'est pour Aristote qu' une faculté de l'ame. L'intellect passif n'est alors que la faculté de recevoir les φαντάσματα: l'intellect actif n'est que l'induction s'exerçant sur les φαντάσματα et en tirant les idées générales. Ainsi l'on fait concorder la théorie exposée dans le troisième livre du Traité de l'Ame, avec celle des Seconds Analytiques, où Aristote semble réduire le rôle de la raison à l'induction généralisant les faits de la sensation. Certes, je ne me dissimule pas qu' Aristote paraît souvent envisager le νοῦς comme personnel à l'homme. Son attention constante à repéter que l'intellect est identique à l'intelligible, que l'intellect passe à l'acte quand il devient l'objet qu'il pense, est difficile à concilier avec l'hypothèse d'un intellect séparé de l'homme. Mais il est dangereux de faire ainsi coïncider de force les différents aperçus des anciens. Les anciens philosophaient souvent sans se limiter dans un système, traitant le même sujet selon les points de vue qui s'offraient à eux, ou qui leur étaient offerts par les écoles antérieures, sans s'inquiéter des dissonances qui pouvaient exister entre ces divers tronçons de théorie. Il est puéril de chercher à les mettre d'accord avec eux-mêmes, quand eux-mêmes s'en sont peu souciés. Autant vaudrait, comme certains critiques Allemands, déclarer interpolés tous les passages que l'on ne peut concilier avec les autres. Ainsi, la théorie des Seconds Analytiques et celles du troisième livre de l'Ame, sans se contredire expressément, représentent deux aperçus profondément distincts et d'origine différente, sur le fait de l'intelli-

gence." (Averroès et l'Averroïsme, p. 96-98, Paris, 1852.)

There is also in Strümpell (Gesch. der Prakt. Phil. der Griech. vor Aristot. p. 200) a good passage to the same purpose as the above from M. Renan: disapproving this presumption, —that the doctrines of every ancient philosopher must of course be systematic and coherent with each other —as "a phantom of modern times": and pointing out that both Plato and Aristotle founded their philosophy, not upon any one governing ἀρχή alone, from which exclusively consequences are deduced, but upon several distinct, co-ordinate, independent, points of view: each of which is by turns followed out, not always consistently with the others.

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CHAPTER VIII.

PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY.

Variety and abundance visible in Plato's writings.

ON looking through the collection of works enumerated in the Thrasyllean Canon, the first impression made upon us respecting the author is, that which is expressed in the epithets applied to him by Cicero—"varius et multiplex et copiosus". Such epithets bring before us the variety in Plato's points of view and methods of handling—the multiplicity of the topics discussed—the abundance of the premisses and illustrations suggested :[1] comparison being taken with other literary productions of the same age. It is scarcely possible to find any one predicate truly applicable to all of Plato's works. Every predicate is probably true in regard to some :—none in regard to all.

Plato both sceptical and dogmatical.

Several critics of antiquity considered Plato as essentially a sceptic—that is, a Searcher or Enquirer, not reaching any assured or proved result. They denied to him the character of a dogmatist : they maintained that he neither established nor enforced any affirmative doctrines.[2] This latter statement is carried too far. Plato is sceptical in some dialogues, dogmatical in others. And the catalogue of Thrasyllus shows that the sceptical dialogues (Dialogues of Search or Investigation) are more numerous than the dogmatical (Dialogues of Exposition)—as they are also, speaking generally, more animated and interesting.

[1] The rhetor Aristeides, comparing Plato with Æschines (*i.e.* Æschines Socraticus, disciple of Sokrates also), remarks that Æschines was more likely to report what Sokrates really said, from being inferior in productive imagination. Plato (as he truly says Orat. xlvi. Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων, p. 295, Dindorf) τῆς φύσεως χρῆται περιουσίᾳ, &c.

[2] Diogen. Laert. iii. 52. Prolegom. Platon. Philosoph. c. 10, vol. vi. 205, of K. F. Hermann's edition of Plato.

Poetical vein predominant in some compositions, but not in all.

Again, Aristotle declared the writing of Plato to be something between poetry and prose, and even the philosophical doctrine of Plato respecting Ideas, to derive all its apparent plausibility from poetic metaphors. The affirmation is true, up to a certain point. Many of the dialogues display an exuberant vein of poetry, which was declared—not by Aristotle alone, but by many other critics contemporary with Plato—to be often misplaced and excessive—and which appeared the more striking because the dialogues composed by the other Sokratic companions were all of them plain and unadorned.[1] The various mythes, in the Phædrus and elsewhere, are announced expressly as soaring above the conditions of truth and logical appreciation. Moreover, we find occasionally an amount of dramatic vivacity, and of artistic antithesis between the speakers introduced, which might have enabled Plato, had he composed for the drama as a profession, to contend with success for the prizes at the Dionysiac festivals But here again, though this is true of several dialogues, it is not true of others. In the Parmenidês, Timæus, and the Leges, such elements will be looked for in vain. In the Timæus, they are exchanged for a professed cosmical system, including much mystic and oracular affirmation, without proof to support it, and without opponents to test it: in the Leges, for ethical

[1] See Dionys. Hal. Epist. ad Cn. Pomp. 756, De Adm. Vi Dic. Dem. 956, where he recognises the contrast between Plato and τὸ Σωκρατικὸν διδασκαλεῖον πᾶν. His expression is remarkable: Ταῦτα γὰρ οἵ τε κατ' αὐτὸν γενόμενοι πάντες ἐπιτιμῶσιν ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα οὐδὲν δεῖ με λέγειν. Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp. p. 761; also 757. See also Diog. L. iii. 37; Aristotel. Metaph. A. 991, a. 22.

Cicero and Quintilian say the same about Plato's style: "Multum supra prosam orationem, et quam pedestrem Græci vocant, surgit: ut mihi non hominis ingenio, sed quodam Delphico videatur oraculo instinctus". Quintil. x. 1, 81. Cicero, Orator. c. 20. Lucian, Piscator, c. 22.

Sextus Empiricus designates the same tendency under the words τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνειδωλοποίησιν. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. iii. 189.

The Greek rhetors of the Augustan age—Dionysius of Halikarnassus and Kækilius of Kalaktê—not only blamed the style of Plato for excessive, overstrained, and misplaced metaphor, but Kækilius goes so far as to declare a decided preference for Lysias over Plato. (Dionys. Hal. De Vi Demosth. pp. 1025-1037, De Comp. Verb. p. 196 R; Longinus, De Sublimitat. c. 32.) The number of critics who censured the manner and doctrine of Plato (critics both contemporary with him and subsequent) was considerable (Dionys. H. Ep. ad Pomp. p. 757). Dionysius and the critics of his age had before their eyes the contrast of the Asiatic style of rhetoric, prevalent in their time, with the Attic style represented by Demosthenes and Lysias. They wished to uphold the force and simplicity of the Attic, against the tumid, wordy, pretensive Asiatic: and they considered the Phædrus, with other compositions of Plato, as falling under the same censure with the Asiatic. See Theoph. Burckhardt, Cæcili Rhet. Frag., Berlin, 1863, p. 15.

sermons, and religious fulminations, proclaimed by a dictatorial authority.

Form of dialogue—universal to this extent, that Plato never speaks in his own name.

One feature there is, which is declared by Schleiermacher and others to be essential to all the works of Plato—the form of dialogue. Here Schleiermacher's assertion, literally taken, is incontestable. Plato always puts his thoughts into the mouth of some spokesman: he never speaks in his own name. All the works of Plato which we possess (excepting the Epistles, and the Apology, which last I consider to be a report of what Sokrates himself said) are dialogues. But under this same name, many different realities are found to be contained. In the Timæus and Kritias the dialogue is simply introductory to a continuous exposition—in the Menexenus, to a rhetorical discourse: while in the Leges, and even in Sophistês, Politikus, and others, it includes no antithesis nor interchange between two independent minds, but is simply a didactic lecture, put into interrogatory form, and broken into fragments small enough for the listener to swallow at once: he by his answer acknowledging the receipt. If therefore the affirmation of Schleiermacher is intended to apply to all the Platonic compositions, we must confine it to the form, without including the spirit, of dialogue.

No one common characteristic pervading all Plato's works.

It is in truth scarcely possible to resolve all the diverse manifestations of the Platonic mind into one higher unity; or to predicate, about Plato as an intellectual person, anything which shall be applicable at once to the Protagoras, Gorgias, Parmenidês, Phædrus, Symposion, Philêbus, Phædon, Republic, Timæus, and Leges. Plato was sceptic, dogmatist, religious mystic and inquisitor, mathematician, philosopher, poet (erotic as well as satirical), rhetor, artist—all in one;[1] or at least, all in succession, through-

[1] Dikæarchus affirmed that Plato was a compound of Sokrates with Pythagoras. Plutarch calls him also a compound of Sokrates with Lykurgus. (Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 2, p. 718 B.)

Nemesius the Platonist (Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xiv. 5-7-8) repeats the saying of Dikæarchus, and describes Plato as midway between Pythagoras and Sokrates; μεσεύων Πυθαγόρου καὶ Σωκράτους. No three persons could be more disparate than Lykurgus, Pythagoras, and Sokrates. But there are besides various other attributes of Plato, which are not included under either of the heads of this tripartite character.

The Stoic philosopher Sphærus composed a work in three books—Περὶ

out the fifty years of his philosophical life. At one time his exuberant dialectical impulse claims satisfaction, manifesting itself in a string of ingenious doubts and unsolved contradictions: at another time, he is full of theological antipathy against those who libel Helios and Selênê, or who deny the universal providence of the Gods: here, we have unqualified confessions of ignorance, and protestations against the false persuasion of knowledge, as alike widespread and deplorable—there, we find a description of the process of building up the Kosmos from the beginning, as if the author had been privy to the inmost purposes of the Demiurgus. In one dialogue the erotic fever is in the ascendant, distributed between beautiful youths and philosophical concepts, and confounded with a religious inspiration and *furor* which supersedes and transcends human sobriety (Phædrus): in another, all vehement impulses of the soul are stigmatised and repudiated, no honourable scope being left for anything but the calm and passionless Nous (Philêbus, Phædon). Satire is exchanged for dithyramb, and mythe,—and one ethical point of view for another (Protagoras, Gorgias). The all-sufficient dramatising power of the master gives full effect to each of these multifarious tendencies. On the whole—to use a comparison of Plato himself[1]—the Platonic sum total somewhat resembles those fanciful combinations of animals imagined in the Hellenic mythology—an aggregate of distinct and disparate individualities, which look like one because they are packed in the same external wrapper.

Furthermore, if we intend to affirm anything about Plato as a whole, there is another fact which ought to be taken into account.[2] We know him only from his dialogues, and

Λυκούργου καὶ Σωκράτους—(Diog. La. vii. 178). He probably compared therein the Platonic Republic with the Spartan constitution and discipline.

[1] Plato, Republ. ix. 588 C. Οἷαι μυθολογοῦνται παλαιαὶ γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἥ τε Χιμαίρας καὶ ἡ Σκύλλης καὶ Κερβέρου, καὶ ἄλλαι τινὲς συχναὶ λέγονται ξυμπεφυκυῖαι ἰδέαι πολλαὶ εἰς ἓν γενέσθαι . . . . Περίπλασον δὴ αὐτοῖς ἔξωθεν ἑνὸς εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὁρᾷν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξω μόνον ἕλυτρον ὁρῶντι, ἓν ζῷον φαίνεσθαι—ἄνθρωπον.

[2] Trendelenburg not only adopts Schleiermacher's theory of a preconceived and systematic purpose connecting together all Plato's dialogues, but even extends this purpose to Plato's oral lectures: "Id pro certo habendum est, sicut prioribus dialogis quasi præparat (Plato) posteriores, posterioribus evolvit priores—ita et in scholis continuasse dialogos; quæ reliquerit, absolvisse; atque omnibus ad summa principia perductis, intima quasi semina aperuisse". (Trendelenburg, De Ideis et Numeris Platonis, p. 6.)

from a few scraps of information. But Plato was not merely a composer of dialogues. He was lecturer, and chief of a school, besides. The presidency of that school, commencing about 386 B.C., and continued by him with great celebrity for the last half (nearly forty years) of his life, was his most important function. Among his contemporaries he must have exercised greater influence through his school than through his writings.[1] Yet in this character of school-teacher and lecturer, he is almost unknown to us: for the few incidental allusions which have descended to us, through the Aristotelian commentators, only raise curiosity without satisfying it. The little information which we possess respecting Plato's lectures, relates altogether to those which he delivered upon the Ipsum Bonum or Summum Bonum at some time after Aristotle became his

The real Plato was not merely a writer of dialogues, but also lecturer and president of a school. In this last important function he is scarcely at all known to us. Notes of his lectures taken by Aristotle.

This opinion is surely not borne out—it seems even contradicted—by all the information which we possess (very scanty indeed) about the Platonic lectures. Plato delivered therein his Pythagorean doctrines, merging his Ideas in the Pythagorean numerical symbols: and Aristotle, far from considering this as a systematic and intended evolution of doctrine at first imperfectly unfolded, treats it as an additional perversion and confusion, introduced into a doctrine originally erroneous. In regard to the transition of Plato from the doctrine of Ideas to that of Ideal Numbers, see Aristotel. Metaphys. M. 1078, b. 9, 1080, a. 12 (with the commentary of Bonitz, pp. 539-541), A. 987, b. 20.

M. Boeckh, too, accounts for the obscure and enigmatical speaking of Plato in various dialogues, by supposing that he cleared up all the difficulties in his oral lectures. "Platon deutet nur an—spricht meinethalben räthselhaft (in den Gesetzen); aber gerade so räthselhaft spricht er von diesen Sachen im Timaeus: er pflegt mathematische Theoreme nur anzudeuten, nicht zu entwickeln: ich glaube, weil er sie in den Vorträgen ausführte," &c. (Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon, p. 50.)

This may be true about the mathematical theorems; but I confess that I see no proof of it. Though Plato admits that his doctrine in the Timæus is ἀψθης λόγος, yet he expressly intimates that the hearers are instructed persons, able to follow him (Timæus, p. 53 C.).

[1] M. Renan, in his work, 'Averroès et l'Averroïsme,' pp. 257-325, remarks that several of the Italian professors of philosophy, at Padua and other universities, exercised far greater influence through their lectures than through their published works. He says (p. 325-6) respecting Cremonini (Professor at Padua, 1590-1620):—"Il a été jusqu'ici apprécié d'une manière fort incomplète par les historiens de la philosophie. On ne l'a jugé que par ses écrits imprimés, qui ne sont que des dissertations de peu d'importance, et ne peuvent en aucune manière faire comprendre la renommée colossale à laquelle il parvint. Cremonini n'est qu'un professeur: ses *cours* sont sa véritable philosophie. Aussi, tandis que ses écrits imprimés se vendaient fort mal, les rédactions de ses leçons se répandaient dans toute l'Italie et même au delà des monts. On sait que les élèves préfèrent souvent aux textes imprimés, les cahiers qu'ils ont ainsi recueillis de la bouche de leurs professeurs. . . En général, c'est dans les cahiers, beaucoup plus que dans les sources imprimées, qu'il faut étudier l'école de Padoue. Pour Cremonini, cette tâche est facile; car les copies de ses cours sont innombrables dans le nord de l'Italie."

pupil—that is, during the last eighteen years of Plato's life. Aristotle and other hearers took notes of these lectures: Aristotle even composed an express work now lost (De Bono or De Philosophiâ), reporting with comments of his own these oral doctrines of Plato, together with the analogous doctrines of the Pythagoreans. We learn that Plato gave continuous lectures, dealing with the highest and most transcendental concepts (with the constituent elements or factors of the Platonic Ideas or Ideal Numbers: the first of these factors being The One—the second, The Indeterminate Dyad, or The Great and Little, the essentially indefinite), and that they were mystic and enigmatical, difficult to understand.[1]

One remarkable observation, made upon them by Aristotle, has been transmitted to us.[2] There were lectures announced to be, On the Supreme Good. Most of those who came to hear, expected that Plato would enumerate and compare the various matters usually considered *good*—*i.e.* health, strength, beauty, genius, wealth, power,

Plato's lectures on De Bono obscure and

[1] Aristotle (Physic. iv. p. 209, b. 34) alludes to τὰ λεγόμενα ἄγραφα δόγματα of Plato, and their discordance on one point with the Timæus.

Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. f. 104 b. p. 362, a. 11, Brandis. Ἀρχὰς γὰρ καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν ἀόριστόν φασι δυάδα λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα. Τὴν δὲ ἀόριστον δυάδα καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τιθεὶς ἄπειρον εἶναι ἔλεγεν, καὶ τὸ μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἀρχὰς τιθεὶς ἄπειρα εἶναι ἔλεγεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Τἀγαθοῦ λόγοις, οἷς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Ἑστιαῖος καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἑταῖροι παραγενόμενοι ἀνεγράψαντο τὰ ῥηθέντα, αἰνιγματωδῶς ὡς ἐρρήθη· Πορφύριος δὲ διαρθροῦν αὐτὰ ἐπαγγελλόμενος τάδε περὶ αὐτῶν γέγραφεν ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ. Compare another passage of the same Scholia, p. 334, b. 28, p. 371, b. 26. Τὰς ἀγράφους συνουσίας τοῦ Πλάτωνος αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπεγράψατο. 372, a. Τὸ μεθεκτικὸν ἐν μὲν ταῖς περὶ Τἀγαθοῦ συνουσίαις μέγα καὶ μικρὸν ἐκάλει, ἐν δὲ τῷ Τιμαίῳ ὕλην, ἣν καὶ χώραν καὶ τόπον ὠνόμαζε. Comp. 371, a. 5, and the two extracts from Simplikius, cited by Zeller, De Hermodoro, pp. 20, 21. By ἄγραφα δόγματα, or ἄγραφοι συνούσιαι, we are to understand opinions or colloquies not written down (or not communicated to others as writings) *by Plato himself:* thus distinguished from his written dialogues. Aristotle, in the treatise, De Animâ, i. 2, p. 404, b. 18, refers to ἐν τοῖς περὶ Φιλοσοφίας: which Simplikius thus explains περὶ φιλοσοφίας νῦν λέγει τὰ περὶ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ ἐκ τῆς Πλάτωνος ἀναγεγραμμένα συνουσίας, ἐν οἷς ἱστορεῖ τάς τε Πυθαγορείους καὶ Πλατωνικὰς περὶ τῶν ὄντων δόξας. Philoponus reports the same thing: see Trendelenburg's Comm. on De Animâ, p. 226. Compare Alexand. ad Aristot. Met. A. 992, p. 581, a. 2, Schol. Brandis.

[2] Aristoxenus, Harmon. ii. p. 30. Καθάπερ Ἀριστοτελης ἀεὶ διηγεῖτο τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἀκουσάντων παρὰ Πλάτωνος τὴν περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀκρόασιν παθεῖν· προσεῖναι γὰρ ἕκαστον ὑπολαμβάνοντα λήψεσθαί τι τῶν νομιζομένων ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν·—ὅτε δὲ φανείησαν οἱ λόγοι περὶ μαθημάτων καὶ ἀριθμῶν καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀστρολογίας, καὶ τὸ πέρας ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἕν, παντελῶς οἶμαι παράδοξον ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς.

Compare Themistius, Orat. xxi. p. 245 D. Proklus also alludes to this story, and to the fact that most of the πολὺς καὶ παντοῖος ὄχλος, who were attracted to Plato's ἀκρόασις περὶ Τἀγαθοῦ, were disappointed or unable to understand him, and went away. (Proklus ad Platon. Parmen. p. 92, Cousin. 528, Stallb.)

transcendental. Effect which they produced on the auditors.

&c. But these hearers were altogether astonished at what they really heard: for Plato omitting the topics expected, descanted only upon arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy; and told them that The Good was identical with The One (as contrasted with the Infinite or Indeterminate which was Evil).

They were delivered to miscellaneous auditors. They coincide mainly with what Aristotle states about the Platonic Ideas.

We see farther from this remark:—First, that Plato's lectures were often above what his auditors could appreciate—a fact which we learn from other allusions also: Next, that they were not confined to a select body of advanced pupils, who had been worked up by special training into a state fit for comprehending them.[1] Had such been the case, the surprise which Aristotle mentions could never have been felt. And we see farther, that the transcendental doctrine delivered in the lectures De Bono (though we find partial analogies to it in Philêbus, Epinomis, and parts of Republic) coincides more with what Aristotle states and comments upon as Platonic doctrine, than with any reasonings which we find in the Platonic dialogues. It represents the latest phase of Platonism: when the Ideas originally conceived by him as Entities in themselves, had become merged or identified in his mind with the Pythagorean numbers or symbols.

[1] Respecting Plato's lectures, see Brandis (Gesch. der Griech.-Rom. Phil. vol. ii. p. 180 seq., 306-319); also Trendelenburg, Platonis De Ideis et Numeris Doctrina, pp. 3, 4, seq.

Brandis, though he admits that Plato's lectures were continuous discourses, thinks that they were intermingled with discussion and debate: which may have been the case, though there is no proof of it. But Schleiermacher goes further, and says (Einleitung, p. 18), "Any one who can think that Plato in these oral *Vorträgen* employed the Sophistical method of long speeches, shows such an ignorance as to forfeit all right of speaking about Plato". Now the passage from Aristoxenus, given in the preceding note, is our only testimony; and it distinctly indicates a continuous lecture to an unprepared auditory, just as Protagoras or Prodikus might have given. K. F. Hermann protests, with good reason, against Schleiermacher's opinion. (Ueber Plato's schriftstellerische Motive, p. 289.)

The confident declaration just produced from Schleiermacher illustrates the unsound basis on which he and various other Platonic critics proceed. They find, in some dialogues of Plato, a strong opinion proclaimed, that continuous discourse is useless for the purpose of instruction. This was a point of view which, at the time when he composed these dialogues, he considered to be of importance, and desired to enforce. But we are not warranted in concluding that he must always have held the same conviction throughout his long philosophical life, and in rejecting as un-platonic all statements and all compositions which imply an opposite belief. We cannot with reason bind down Plato to a persistence in one and the same type of compositions.

This statement of Aristotle, alike interesting and unquestionable, attests the mysticism and obscurity which pervaded Plato's doctrine in his later years. But whether this lecture on *The Good* is to be taken as a fair specimen of Plato's lecturing generally, and from the time when he first began to lecture, we may perhaps doubt:[1] since we know that as a lecturer and converser he acquired extraordinary ascendency over ardent youth. We see this by the remarkable instance of Dion.[2]

The lectures De Bono may perhaps have been more transcendental than Plato's other lectures.

The only occasions on which we have experience of Plato as speaking in his own person, and addressing himself to definite individuals, are presented by his few Epistles; all of them (as I have before remarked) written after he was considerably above sixty years of age, and nearly all addressed to Sicilians or Italians—Dionysius II., Dion, the friends of Dion after the death of the latter, and Archytas.[3] In so far as these letters bear upon Plato's

Plato's Epistles.—In them only he speaks in his own person.

[1] Themistius says (Orat. xxi. p. 245 D) that Plato sometimes lectured in the Peiræus, and that a crowd then collected to hear him, not merely from the city, but also from the country around: if he lectured De Bono, however, the ordinary hearers became tired and dispersed, leaving only τοὺς συνήθεις ὁμιλητάς.

It appears that Plato in his lectures delivered theories on the principles of geometry. He denied the reality of geometrical points—or at least admitted them only as hypotheses for geometrical reasoning. He maintained that what others called *a point* ought to be called "*an indivisible line*". Xenokrates maintained the same doctrine after him. Aristotle controverts it (see Metaphys. A., 992, b. 20). Aristotle's words in citing Plato's opinion (τούτῳ μὲν οὖν τῷ γένει καὶ διεμάχετο Πλάτων ὡς ὄντι γεωμετρικῷ δόγματι, ἀλλ' ἐκάλει ἀρχὴν γραμμῆς· τοῦτο δὲ πολλάκις ἐτίθει τὰς ἀτόμους γραμμάς) must be referred to Plato's oral lectures; no such opinion occurs in the dialogues. This is the opinion both of Bonitz and Schwegler in their comments on the passage: also of Trendelenburg, De Ideis et Numeris Platonis, p. 66. That geometry and arithmetic were matters of study and reflection both to Plato himself and to many of his pupils in the Academy, appears certain; and perhaps Plato may have had an interior circle of pupils, to which he applied the well-known exclusion—μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω. But we cannot make out clearly what was Plato's own proficiency, or what improvements he may have introduced, in geometry, nor what there is to justify the comparison made by Montucla between Plato and Descartes. In the narrative respecting the Delian problem—the duplication of the cube—Archytas, Menæchmus, and Eudoxus, appear as the inventors of solutions, Plato as the superior who prescribes and criticises (see the letter and epigram of Eratosthenes: Bernhardy, Eratosthenica, pp. 176-184). The three are said to have been blamed by Plato for substituting instrumental measurement in place of geometrical proof (Plutarch, Problem. Sympos. viii. 2, pp. 718, 719; Plutarch, Vit. Marcelli, c. 14). The geometrical construction of the Κόσμος, which Plato gives us in the Timæus, seems borrowed from the Pythagoreans, though applied probably in a way peculiar to himself (see Finger, De Primordiis Geometriæ ap. Græcos, p. 38, Heidelb. 1831).

[2] See Epist. vii. pp. 327, 328.

[3] Of the thirteen Platonic Epistles, Ep. 2, 3, 13, are addressed to the second or younger Dionysius; Ep. 4 to Dion; Ep. 7, 8, to the friends and relatives of Dion after Dion's death. The 13th

manner of lecturing or teaching, they go to attest, first, his opinion that direct written exposition was useless for conveying real instruction to the reader—next, his reluctance to publish any such exposition under his own name, and carrying with it his responsibility. When asked for exposition, he writes intentionally with mystery, so that ordinary persons cannot understand.

Intentional obscurity of his Epistles in reference to philosophical doctrine.

Knowing as we do that he had largely imbued himself with the tenets of the Pythagoreans (who designedly adopted a symbolical manner of speaking—published no writings—for Philolaus is cited as an exception to their rule—and did not care to be understood, except by their own adepts after a long apprenticeship) we cannot be surprised to find Plato holding a language very similar. He declares that the highest principles of his

Epistle appears to be the earliest of all, being seemingly written after the first voyage of Plato to visit Dionysius II. at Syracuse, in 367-366 B.C., and before his second visit to the same place and person, about 363-362 B.C. Epistles 2 and 3 were written after his return from that second visit, in 360 B.C., and prior to the expedition of Dion against Dionysius in 357 B.C. Epistle 4 was written to Dion shortly after Dion's victorious career at Syracuse, about 355 B.C. Epistles 7 and 8 were written not long after the murder of Dion in 354 B.C. The first in order, among the Platonic Epistles, is not written by Plato, but by Dion, addressed to Dionysius, shortly after the latter had sent Dion away from Syracuse. The fifth is addressed by Plato to the Macedonian prince Perdikkas. The sixth, to Hermeias of Atarneus, Erastus, and Koriskus. The ninth and twelfth, to Archytas of Tarentum. The tenth, to Aristodôrus. The eleventh, to Laodamas. I confess that I see nothing in these letters which compels me to depart from the judgment of the ancient critics, who unanimously acknowledged them as genuine. I do not think myself competent to determine *à priori* what the style of Plato's letters *must* have been; what topics he *must* have touched upon, and what topics he *could not* have touched upon. I have no difficulty in believing that Plato, writing a letter on philosophy, may have expressed himself with as much mysticism and obscurity as we now read in Epist. 2 and 7. Nor does it surprise me to find Plato (in Epist. 13) alluding to details which critics, who look upon him altogether as a spiritual person, disallow as mean and unworthy. His recommendation of the geometer, Helikon of Kyzikus, to Dionysius and Archytas, is to me interesting: to make known the theorems of Eudoxus, through the medium of Helikon, to Archytas, was no small service to geometry in those days. I have an interest in learning how Plato employed the money given to him by Dionysius and other friends: that he sent to Dionysius a statue of Apollo by a good Athenian sculptor named Leochares (this sculptor executed a bust of Isokrates also, Plut. Vit. x. Orat. p. 838); and another statue by the same sculptor for the wife of Dionysius, in gratitude for the care which she had taken of him (Plato) when sick at Syracuse; that he spent the money of Dionysius partly in discharging his own public taxes and liturgies at Athens, partly in providing dowries for poor maidens among his friends; that he was so beset by applications, which he could not refuse, for letters of recommendation to Dionysius, as to compel him to signify, by a private mark, to Dionysius, which among the letters he wished to be most attended to. "These latter" (he says) "I shall begin with θεὸς (sing. number), the others I shall begin with θεοὶ (plural)." (Epist. xiii. 361, 362, 363.)

philosophy could not be set forth in writing so as to be intelligible to ordinary persons: that they could only be apprehended by a few privileged recipients, through an illumination kindled in the mind by multiplied debates and much mental effort: that such illumination was always preceded by a painful feeling of want, usually long-continued, sometimes lasting for nearly thirty years, and exchanged at length for relief at some unexpected moment.[1]

Plato during his second visit had had one conversation, and only one, with Dionysius respecting the higher mysteries of philosophy. He had impressed upon Dionysius the prodigious labour and difficulty of attaining truth upon these matters. The despot professed to thirst ardently for philosophy, and the conversation turned upon the Natura Primi—upon the first and highest principles of Nature.[2] Dionysius, after this conversation with Plato, intimated that he had already conceived in his own mind the solution of these difficulties, and the truth upon philosophy in its greatest mysteries. Upon which Plato expressed his satisfaction that such was the case,[3] so as to relieve him from the necessity of farther explanations, though the like had never happened to him with any previous hearer.

Letters of Plato to Dionysius II. about philosophy. His anxiety to confine philosophy to discussion among select and prepared minds.

But Dionysius soon found that he could not preserve the explanation in his mind, after Plato's departure—that difficulties again crowded upon him—and that it was necessary to send a confidential messenger to Athens to entreat farther elucidations. In reply, Plato sends back by the messenger what is now numbered as the second of his Epistles. He writes avowedly in enigmatical language, so that, if the letter be lost, the finder will not be able to understand it; and he enjoins Dionysius to burn it after frequent perusal.[4] He expresses his hope that when Dionysius has debated the

[1] Plato, Epist. ii. pp. 313, 314.

[2] Plat. Epist. ii. 312: *περὶ τῆς τοῦ πρώτου φύσεως.* Epist. vii. 344: *τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἄκρων καὶ πρώτων.*—One conversation only—Epist. vii. 345.

[3] Plato, Epist. ii. 313 B. Plato asserts the same about Dionysius in Epist. vii. 341 B.

[4] Plat. Epist. ii. 312 E: *φραστέον δή σοι δι' αἰνιγμῶν ἵν' ἄν τι ἡ δέλτος ἢ πόντου ἢ γῆς ἐν πτυχαῖς πάθῃ, ὁ ἀναγνοὺς μὴ γνῷ.* 314 C: *ἐρρῶσο καὶ πείθου, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ταύτην νῦν πρῶτον πολλάκις ἀναγνοὺς κατάκαυσον.*

Proklus, in his Commentary on the Timæus (pp. 40, 41), remarks the fondness of Plato for *τὸ αἰνιγματωδές.*

matter often with the best minds near him, the clouds will clear away of themselves, and the moment of illumination will supervene.[1] He especially warns Dionysius against talking about these matters to unschooled men, who will be sure to laugh at them; though by minds properly prepared, they will be received with the most fervent welcome.[2] He affirms that Dionysius is much superior in philosophical debate to his companions; who were overcome in debate with him, not because they suffered themselves designedly to be overcome (out of flattery towards the despot, as some ill-natured persons alleged), but because they could not defend themselves against the Elenchus as applied by Dionysius.[3] Lastly, Plato advises Dionysius to write down nothing, since what has once been written will be sure to disappear from the memory; but to trust altogether to learning by heart, meditation, and repeated debate, as a guarantee for retention in his mind. "It is for that reason" (Plato says)' "that I have never myself written anything upon these subjects. There neither is, nor shall there ever be, any treatise of Plato. The opinions called by the name of Plato are those of Sokrates, in his days of youthful vigour and glory."

He refuses to furnish any written, authoritative exposition of his own philosophical doctrine.

Such is the language addressed by Plato to the younger Dionysius, in a letter written seemingly between 362-357 B.C. In another letter, written about ten years afterwards (353-352 B.C.), to the friends of Dion (after Dion's death), he expresses the like repugnance to the idea of furnishing any written authoritative exposition of his principal doctrines. "There never shall be any expository treatise of mine upon them" (he declares). "Others have tried, Dionysius among the number, to write them down; but they do not know what they attempt. I

[1] Plat. Epist. ii. 313 D.

[2] Plat. Epist. ii. 314 A. εὐλαβοῦ μέντοι μή ποτε ἐκπέσῃ ταῦτα εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπαιδεύτους.

[3] Plat. Epist. ii. 314 D.

[4] Plat. Epist. ii. 314 C. μεγίστη δὲ φυλακὴ τὸ μὴ γράφειν ἀλλ' ἐκμανθάνειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὰ γραφέντα μὴ οὐκ ἐκπεσεῖν. διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πώποτ' ἐγὼ περὶ τούτων γέγραφα, οὐδ' ἔστι σύγγραμμα Πλάτωνος οὐδὲν οὔδ' ἔσται· τὰ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενα, Σωκράτους ἐστὶ καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος.

"Addamus ad superiora" (says Wesseling, Epist. ad Venemam, p. 41, Utrecht, 1748), "Platonem videri semper voluisse, dialogos, in quibus de Philosophiâ, deque Republicâ atque ejus Legibus, inter confabulantes actum fuit, non sui ingenii sed Socratici, fœtus esse".

could myself do this better than any one, and I should consider it the proudest deed in my life, as well as a signal benefit to mankind, to bring forward an exposition of Nature luminous to all.[1] But I think the attempt would be nowise beneficial, except to a few, who require only slight direction to enable them to find it for themselves: to most persons it would do no good, but would only fill them with empty conceit of knowledge, and with contempt for others.[2] These matters cannot be communicated in words as other sciences are. Out of repeated debates on them, and much social intercourse, there is kindled suddenly a light in the mind, as from fire bursting forth, which, when once generated, keeps itself alive."[3]

Plato then proceeds to give an example from geometry, illustrating the uselessness both of writing and of direct exposition. In acquiring a knowledge of the circle, he distinguishes five successive stages. 1. The Name. 2. The Definition, a proposition composed of nouns and verbs. 3. The Diagram. 4. Knowledge, Intelligence, True Opinion, Νοῦς. 5. The Noumenon—Αὐτὸ-Κύκλος—ideal or intelligible circle, the only true object of knowledge.[4] The fourth stage is a purely mental result, not capable of being exposed either in words or figure: it presupposes the three first, but is something distinct from them; and it is the only mental condition immediately cognate and similar to the fifth stage, or the self-existent idea.[5]

He illustrates his doctrine by the successive stages of geometrical teaching. Difficulty to avoid the creeping in of error at each of these stages.

[1] Plato, Epist. vii. 341, B, C. *τί τούτου κάλλιον ἐπέπρακτ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῖς τε ἀνθρώποισι μέγα ὄφελος γράψαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν εἰς φῶς πᾶσι προαγαγεῖν;*

[2] Plat. Epist. vii. 341 E.

[3] Plato, Epist. vii. 341 C. *οὔκουν ἐμόν γε περὶ αὐτῶν ἔστι σύγγραμμα οὐδὲ μή ποτε γένηται· ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἐστιν ὡς ἄλλα μαθήματα, ἀλλ' ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γιγνομένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ συζῆν, ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδήσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει.*

This sentence, as a remarkable one, I have translated literally in the text: that which precedes is given only in substance.

We see in the Republic that Sokrates, when questioned by Glaukon, and urged emphatically to give some solution respecting *ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα*, and *ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις*, answers only by an evasion or a metaphor (Republic, vi. 506 E, vii. 533 A). Now these are much the same points as what are signified in the letter to Dionysius, under the terms *τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἄκρα τῆς φύσεως—ἡ τοῦ πρώτου φύσις* (312 E): as to which Plato, when questioned, replies in a mystic and unintelligible way.

[4] Plato, Epist. vii. 342 A, B. The geometrical illustration which follows is intended merely as an illustration, of general principles which Plato asserts to be true about all other enquiries, physical or ethical.

[5] Plat. Epist. vii. 342 C. *ὡς δὲ ἓν τοῦτο αὖ πᾶν θετέον, οὐκ ἐν φωναῖς*

Now in all three first stages (Plato says) there is great liability to error and confusion. The name is unavoidably equivocal, uncertain, fluctuating: the definition is open to the same reproach, and often gives special and accidental properties along with the universal and essential, or instead of them: the diagram cannot exhibit the essential without some variety of the accidental, nor without some properties even contrary to reality, since any circle which you draw, instead of touching a straight line in one point alone, will be sure to touch it in several points.[1] Accordingly no intelligent man will embody the pure concepts of his mind in fixed representation, either by words or by figures.[2] If we do this, we have the *quid* or essence, which we are searching for, inextricably perplexed by accompaniments of the *quale* or accidents, which we are not searching for.[3] We acquire only a confused cognition, exposing us to be puzzled, confuted, and humiliated, by an acute cross-examiner, when he questions us on the four stages which we have gone through to attain it.[4] Such confusion does not arise from any fault in the mind, but from the defects inherent in each of the four stages of progress. It is only by painful effort, when each of these is naturally good—when the mind itself also is naturally good, and when it has gone through all the stages up and down, dwelling upon each—that true knowledge can be acquired.[5] Persons whose minds are naturally bad, or have become corrupt, morally or intellectually, cannot be taught to see even by Lynkeus himself. In a word, if the mind itself be not cognate to the matter studied, no quickness in learning nor force of memory

οὐδ' ἐν σωμάτων σχήμασιν ἀλλ' ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐνόν, ᾧ δῆλον ἕτερόν τε ὂν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τῆς φύσεως, τῶν τε ἐμπροσθεν λεχθέντων τριῶν. τούτων δὲ ἐγγύτατα μὲν ξυγγενείᾳ καὶ ὁμοιότητι, τοῦ πέμπτου (i. e. τοῦ Αὐτὸ-κύκλου) νοῦς (the fourth stage) πεπλησίακε, τἆλλα δὲ πλέον ἀπέχει.

In Plato's reckoning, ὁ νοῦς is counted as the fourth, in the ascending scale, from which we ascend to the fifth, τὸ νοούμενον, or νοητόν. Ὁ νοῦς and τὸ νοητὸν are cognate or homogeneous—according to a principle often insisted on in ancient metaphysics—like must be known by like. (Aristot. De Animâ i. 2, 404, b. 15.)

[1] Plat. Epist. vii. 343 B. This illustrates what is said in the Republic about the geometrical ὑποθέσεις (vi. 510 E, 511 A; vii. 533 B.)

[2] Plat. Epist. vii. 343 A. ὧν ἕνεκα νοῦν ἔχων οὐδεὶς τολμήσει ποτὲ εἰς αὐτὸ τιθέναι τὰ νενοημένα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς ἀμετακίνητον, ὃ δὴ πάσχει τὰ γεγραμμένα τύποις.

[3] Plat. Epist. vii. 343 C.

[4] Plat. Epist. vii. 343 D.

[5] Plato, Epistol. vii. 343 E. ἡ δὲ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν διαγωγή, ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαίνουσα ἐφ' ἕκαστον, μόγις ἐπιστήμην ἐνέτεκεν εὖ πεφυκότος ᾧ πεφυκότι.

will suffice. He who is a quick learner and retentive, but not cognate or congenial with just or honourable things—he who, though cognate and congenial, is stupid in learning or forgetful —will never effectually learn the truth about virtue or wickedness.[1] These can only be learnt along with truth and falsehood as it concerns entity generally, by long practice and much time.[2] It is only with difficulty,—after continued friction, one against another, of all the four intellectual helps, names and definitions, acts of sight and sense,—after application of the Elenchus by repeated question and answer, in a friendly temper and without spite—it is only after all these preliminaries, that cognition and intelligence shine out with as much intensity as human power admits.[3]

For this reason, no man of real excellence will ever write and publish his views, upon the gravest matters, into a world of spite and puzzling contention. In one word, when you see any published writings, either laws proclaimed by the lawgiver or other compositions by others, you may be sure that, if he be himself a man of worth, these were not matters of first-rate importance in his estimation. If they really were so, and if he has published his views in writing, some evil influence must have destroyed his good sense.[4]

No written exposition can keep clear of these chances of error.

We see by these letters that Plato disliked and disapproved the idea of publishing, for the benefit of readers generally, any written exposition of *philosophia prima*, carrying his own name, and making him responsible for it. His writings are altogether dramatic. All opinions on philosophy are enunciated through one or other of his spokesmen : that portion of the Athenian drama called the Parabasis, in which the Chorus addressed the audience directly and avowedly in the name of the poet, found no favour with Plato. We read indeed in several of his

Relations of Plato with Dionysius II. and the friends of the deceased Dion. Pretensions of Dionysius to understand and expound Plato's doctrines.

[1] Plato, Epistol. vii. 344 A.

[2] Plato, Epist. vii. 344 B. *ἅμα γὰρ αὐτὰ ἀνάγκη μανθάνειν, καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἅμα καὶ ἀληθὲς τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας.*

[3] Plat. Epist. vii. 344 B. *μόγις δὲ τριβόμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα, ὀνόματα καὶ λόγοι, ὄψεις τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις, ἐν εὐμενέσιν ἐλέγχοις ἐλεγχόμενα καὶ ἄνευ φθόνων ἐρωτήσεσι καὶ ἀποκρίσεσι χρωμένων, ἐξέλαμψε φρόνησις περὶ ἕκαστον καὶ νοῦς, συντείνων ὅτι μάλιστ' εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην.*

[4] Plat. Epist. vii. 344, C-D.

dialogues (Phædon, Republic, Timæus, and others) dogmas advanced about the highest and most recondite topics of philosophy: but then they are all advanced under the name of Sokrates, Timæus, &c.—Οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, &c. There never was any written programme issued by Plato himself, declaring the Symbolum Fidei to which he attached his own name.[1] Even in the Leges, the most dogmatical of all his works, the dramatic character and the borrowed voice are kept up. Probably at the time when Plato wrote his letter to the friends of the deceased Dion, from which I have just quoted—his aversion to written expositions was aggravated by the fact, that Dionysius II., or some friend in his name, had written and published a philosophical treatise of this sort, passing himself off as editor of a Platonic philosophy, or of improved doctrines of his own built thereupon, from oral communication with Plato.[2] We must remember that Plato himself (whether with full sincerity or not) had complimented Dionysius for his natural ability and aptitude in philosophical debate:[3] so that the pretension of the latter to come forward as an expositor of Plato appears the less preposterous. On the other hand, such pretension was calculated to raise a belief that Dionysius had been among the most favoured and confidential companions of Plato: which belief Plato, writing as he was to the surviving friends of Dion the enemy of Dionysius, is most anxious to remove, while on the other hand he extols the dispositions and extenuates the faults of his friend Dion. It is to vindicate himself from misconception of his own past proceedings, as well as to exhort with regard to the future, that Plato transmits to Sicily his long seventh and eighth Epistles, wherein are embodied his objections against the usefulness of written exposition intended for readers generally.

[1] The Platonic dialogue was in this respect different from the Aristotelian dialogue. Aristotle, in his composed dialogues, introduced other speakers, but delivered the principal arguments in his own name. Cicero followed his example, in the De Finibus and elsewhere: "Quæ his temporibus scripsi, Ἀριστοτέλειον morem habent: in quo sermo ita inducitur cæterorum, ut penes ipsum sit principatus". (Cic. ad Att. xiii. 19.)

Herakleides of Pontus (Cicero, ibid.), in his composed dialogues, introduced himself as a κωφὸν πρόσωπον. Plato does not even do thus much.

[2] We see this from Epist. vii. 341 B, 344 D, 345 A. Plato speaks of the impression as then prevalent (when he wrote) in the mind of Dionysius:—πότερον Διονύσιος ἀκούσας μόνον ἅπαξ οὕτως εἰδέναι τε οἴεται καὶ ἱκανῶς οἶδεν, &c.

[3] Plat. Epist. ii. 314 D.

These objections (which Plato had often insisted on,[1] and which are also, in part, urged by Sokrates in the Phædrus) have considerable force, if we look to the way in which Plato conceives them. In the first place, Plato conceives the exposition as not merely written but published: as being, therefore, presented to all minds, the large majority being ignorant, unprepared, and beset with that false persuasion of knowledge which Sokrates regarded as universal. In so far as it comes before these latter, nothing is gained, and something is lost; for derision is brought upon the attempt to teach.[2] In the next place, there probably existed, at that time, no elementary work whatever for beginners in any science: the Elements of Geometry by Euclid were published more than a century after Plato's death, at Alexandria. Now, when Plato says that written expositions, then scarcely known, would be useless to the student —he compares them with the continued presence and conversation of a competent teacher; whom he supposes not to rely upon direct exposition, but to talk much "about and about" the subject, addressing the pupil with a large variety of illustrative interrogations, adapting all that was said to his peculiar difficulties and rate of progress, and thus evoking the inherent cognitive force of the pupil's own mind. That any Elements of Geometry (to say nothing of more complicated inquiries) could be written and published, such that an *ἀγεωμέτρητος* might take up the work and learn geometry by means of it, without being misled by equivocal names, bad definitions, and diagrams exhibiting the definition as clothed with special accessories—this is a possibility which Plato contests, and which we cannot wonder at his contesting.[3] The combination of a written treatise, with the oral

Impossibility of teaching by written exposition assumed by Plato; the assumption intelligible in his day.

[1] Plato, Epist. vii. 342. *λόγος ἀληθής, πολλάκις μὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ καὶ πρόσθεν ῥηθείς*, &c.

[2] Plato (Epist. ii. 314 A) remarks this expressly: also in the Phædrus, 275 E, 276 A.

Ἄθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν, μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούσῃ, is the language of the Platonic Sokrates as a speaker in the Theætêtus (155 E).

[3] Some just and pertinent remarks, bearing on this subject, are made by Condorcet, in one of his Academic Éloges: "Les livres ne peuvent remplacer les leçons des maîtres habiles, lorsque les sciences n'ont pas encore fait assez de progrès, pour que les vérités, qui en forment l'ensemble, puissent être distribuées et rapprochées entre elles suivant un ordre systématique: lorsque la méthode d'en chercher de nouvelles n'a pas été réduite à des procédés exacts et simples, à des règles sûres et précises. Avant cette

exposition of a tutor, would have appeared to Plato not only useless but inconvenient, as restraining the full liberty of adaptive interrogation necessary to be exercised, different in the case of each different pupil.

Standard by which Plato tested the efficacy of the expository process—Power of sustaining a Sokratic cross-examination.

Lastly, when we see by what standard Plato tests the efficacy of any expository process, we shall see yet more clearly how he came to consider written exposition unavailing. The standard which he applies is, that the learner shall be rendered able both to apply to others, and himself to endure from others, a Sokratic Elenchus or cross-examination as to the logical difficulties involved in all the steps and helps to learning. Unless he can put to others and follow up the detective questions—unless he can also answer them, when put to himself, pertinently and consistently, so as to avoid being brought to confusion or contradiction—Plato will not allow that he has attained true knowledge.[1] Now, if we try knowledge by a test so severe

époque, il faut être déjà consommé dans une science pour lire avec utilité les ouvrages qui en traitent: et comme cette espèce d'enfance de l'art est le temps où les préjugés y regnent avec le plus d'empire, où les savants sont les plus exposés à donner leurs hypothèses pour de véritables principes, on risquerait encore de s'égarer si l'on se bornait aux leçons d'un seul maître, quand même on aurait choisi celui que la renommée place au premier rang; car ce temps est aussi celui des reputations usurpées. Les voyages sont donc alors le seul moyen de s'instruire, comme ils l'étaient dans l'antiquité et avant la découverte de l'imprimerie." (Condorcet, Éloge de M. Margraaf, p. 349, Œuvres Complets, Paris, 1804, Éloges, vol. ii. Or Ed. Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1847, vol. ii. pp. 598-9.)

[1] Plato, Epist. vii. 343 D. The difficulties which Plato had here in his eye, and which he required to be solved as conditions indispensable to real knowledge—are jumped over in geometrical and other scientific expositions, as belonging not to geometry, &c., but to logic. M. Jouffroy remarks, in the Preface to his translation of Reid's works (p. clxxiv.):—"Toute science particulière qui, au lieu de prendre pour accordées les données *à priori* qu'elle implique, discute l'autorité de ces données—ajoute à son objet propre celui de la logique, confond une autre mission avec la sienne, et par cela même compromet la sienne: car nous verrons tout à-l'heure, et l'histoire de la philosophie montre, quelles difficultés présentent ces problèmes qui sont l'objet propre de la logique; et nous demeurerons convaincus que, si les *différentes sciences avaient eu la prétention de les éclaircir avant de passer outre, toutes peut-être en seraient encore à cette préface*, et aucune n'aurait entamé sa véritable tâche."

Remarks of a similar bearing will be found in the second paragraph of Mr. John Stuart Mill's Essay on Utilitarianism. It has been found convenient to distinguish the logic of a science from the expository march of the same science. But Plato would not have acknowledged ἐπιστήμη, except as including both. Hence his view about the uselessness of written expository treatises.

Aristotle, in a remarkable passage of the Metaphysica (Γ. p. 1005, a. 20 seqq.) takes pains to distinguish the Logic of Mathematics from Mathematics themselves—as a separate province and matter of study. He claims the former as belonging to Philosophia Prima or Ontology. Those principles which mathematicians called Axioms

as this, we must admit that no reading of written expositions will enable the student to acquire it. The impression made is too superficial, and the mind is too passive during such a process, to be equal to the task of meeting new points of view, and combating difficulties not expressly noticed in the treatise which has been studied. The only way of permanently arming and strengthening the mind, is (according to Plato) by long-continued oral interchange and stimulus, multiplied comment and discussion from different points of view, and active exercise in dialectic debate: not aiming at victory over an opponent, but reasoning out each question in all its aspects, affirmative and negative. It is only after a long course of such training—the living word of the competent teacher, applied to the mind of the pupil, and stimulating its productive and self-defensive force—that any such knowledge can be realised as will suffice for the exigencies of the Sokratic Elenchus.[1]

Since we thus find that Plato was unconquerably averse to

were not peculiar to Mathematics (he says), but were affirmations respecting Ens quatenus Ens: the mathematician was entitled to assume them so far as concerned his own department, and his students must take them for granted: but if he attempted to explain or appreciate them in their full bearing, he overstepped his proper limits, through want of proper schooling in Analytica (ὅσα δ' ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν· δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἥκειν προεπισταμένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν—p. 1005, b. 2.) We see from the words of Aristotle that many mathematical enquirers of his time did not recognise (any more than Plato recognised) the distinction upon which he here insists: we see also that the term *Axioms* had become a technical one for the *principia* of mathematical demonstration (περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι καλουμένων ἀξιωμάτων—p. 1005, a. 20); I do not concur in Sir William Hamilton's doubts on this point. (Dissertations on Reid's Works, note A. p. 764.)

The distinction which Aristotle thus brings to notice, seemingly for the first time, is one of considerable importance.

[1] This is forcibly put by Plato, Epistol. vii. 344 B. Compare Plato, Republic, vi. 499 A. Phædrus, 276 A-E. τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον, &c.

Though Plato, in the Phædrus, declares oral teaching to be the only effectual way of producing a permanent and deep-seated effect—as contrasted with the more superficial effect produced by reading a written exposition: yet even oral teaching, when addressed in the form of continuous lecture or sermon (ἄνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς, Phædrus, 277 E; τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἶδος, Sophistês, p. 230), is represented elsewhere as of little effect. To produce any permanent result, you must diversify the point of view—you must test by circumlocutory interrogation—you must begin by dispelling established errors, &c. See the careful explanation of the passage in the Phædrus (277 E), given by Ueberweg, Aechtheit der Platon. Schrift. pp. 16-22. Direct teaching, in many of the Platonic dialogues, is not counted as capable of producing serious improvement.

When we come to the Menon and the Phædon, we shall hear more of the Platonic doctrine—that knowledge was to be evolved out of the mind, not poured into it from without.

Plato never published any of the lectures which he delivered at the Academy.

publication in his own name and with his own responsibility attached to the writing, on grave matters of philosophy—we cannot be surprised that, among the numerous lectures which he must have delivered to his pupils and auditors in the Academy, none were ever published. Probably he may himself have destroyed them, as he exhorts Dionysius to destroy the Epistle which we now read as second, after reading it over frequently. And we may doubt whether he was not displeased with Aristotle and Hestiæus[1] for taking extracts from his lectures De Bono, and making them known to the public: just as he was displeased with Dionysius for having published a work purporting to be derived from conversations with Plato.

Plato would never publish his philosophical opinions in his own name; but he may have published them in the dialogues under the names of others.

That Plato would never consent to write for the public in his own name, must be taken as a fact in his character; probably arising from early caution produced by the fate of Sokrates, combined with preference for the Sokratic mode of handling. But to what extent he really kept back his opinions from the public, or whether he kept them back at all, by design—I do not undertake to say. The borrowed names under which he wrote, and the veil of dramatic fiction, gave him greater freedom as to the thoughts enunciated, and were adopted for the express purpose of acquiring greater freedom. How far the lectures which he delivered to his own special auditory differed from the opinions made known in his dialogues to the general reader, or how far his conversation with a few advanced pupils differed from both—are questions which we have no sufficient means of answering. There probably was a considerable difference. Aristotle alludes to various doctrines of Plato which we cannot find in the Platonic writings: but these doctrines are not such as could have given peculiar offence, if published; they are, rather abstruse and hard to understand. It may also be true (as Tennemann says) that Plato had two distinct modes of handling philo-

[1] Themistius mentions it as a fact recorded (I wish he had told us where or by whom) that Aristotle stoutly opposed the Platonic doctrine of Objective Ideas, even during the lifetime of Plato. ἱστορεῖται δὲ ὅτι καὶ ζῶντος τοῦ Πλάτωνος καρτερώτατα περὶ τούτου τοῦ δόγματος ἐνέστη ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τῷ Πλάτωνι. (Scholia ad Aristotel. Analyt. Poster. p. 228 b. 16 Brandis.)

sophy—a popular and a scientific: but it cannot be true (as the same learned author[1] asserts) that his published dialogues contained the popular and not the scientific. No one surely can regard the Timæus, Parmenidês, Philêbus, Theætêtus, Sophistês, Politikus, &c., as works in which dark or difficult questions are kept out of sight for the purpose of attracting the ordinary reader. Among the dialogues themselves (as I have before remarked) there exist the widest differences; some highly popular and attractive, others altogether the reverse, and many gradations between the two. Though I do not doubt therefore that Plato produced powerful effect both as lecturer to a special audience, and as talker with chosen students—yet in what respect such lectures and conversation differed from what we read in his dialogues, I do not feel that we have any means of knowing.

Groups into which the dialogues admit of being thrown.

In judging of Plato, we must confine ourselves to the evidence furnished by one or more of the existing Platonic compositions, adding the testimony of Aristotle and a few others respecting Platonic views not declared in the dialogues. Though little can be predicated respecting the dialogues collectively, I shall say something about the various groups into which they admit of being thrown, before I touch upon them separately and *seriatim*.

Distribution made by Thrasyllus defective, but still useful—Dialogues of Search, Dialogues of Exposition.

The scheme proposed by Thrasyllus, so far as intended to furnish a symmetrical arrangement of all the Platonic works, is defective, partly because the apportionment of the separate works between the two leading classes is in several cases erroneous—partly because the discrimination of the two leading classes, as well as the sub-division of one of the two, is founded on diversity of Method, while the sub-division of the other class is founded on diversity of Subject. But the scheme is nevertheless useful, as directing our attention to real and im-

[1] See Tennemann, Gesch. d. Phil. vol. ii. p. 205, 215, 221 seq. This portion of Tennemann's History is valuable, as it takes due account of the seventh Platonic Epistle, compared with the remarkable passage in the Phædrus about the inefficacy of written exposition for the purpose of teaching.

But I cannot think that Tennemann rightly interprets the Epistol. vii. I see no proof that Plato had any secret or esoteric philosophy, reserved for a few chosen pupils, and not proclaimed to the public from apprehension of giving offence to established creeds: though I believe such apprehension to have operated as one motive, deterring him from publishing any philosophical exposition under his own name—any Πλάτωνος σύγγραμμα.

portant attributes belonging in common to considerable groups of dialogues. It is in this respect preferable to the fanciful dramatic partnership of trilogies and tetralogies, as well as to the mystical interpretation and arrangement suggested by the Neo-platonists. The Dialogues of Exposition—in which one who knows (or professes to know) some truth, announces and developes it to those who do not know it—are contrasted with those of Search or Investigation, in which the element of knowledge and affirmative communication is wanting. All the interlocutors are at once ignorant and eager to know; all of them are jointly engaged in searching for the unknown, though one among them stands prominent both in suggesting where to look and in testing all that is found, whether it be really the thing looked for. Among the expository dialogues, the most marked specimens are Timæus and Epinomis, in neither of which is there any searching or testing debate at all. Republic, Phædon, Philêbus, exhibit exposition preceded or accompanied by a search. Of the dialogues of pure investigation, the most elaborate specimen is the Theætêtus: Menon, Lachês, Charmidês, Lysis, Euthyphron, &c., are of the like description, yet less worked out. There are also several others. In the Menon, indeed,[1] Sokrates goes so far as to deny that there can be any real teaching, and to contend that what appears teaching is only resuscitation of buried or forgotten knowledge.

Dialogues of Exposition—present affirmative result. Dialogues of Search are wanting in that attribute.

Of these two classes of Dialogues, the Expository are those which exhibit the distinct attribute—an affirmative result or doctrine, announced and developed by a person professing to know, and proved in a manner more or less satisfactory. The other class — the Searching or Investigative—have little else in common except the absence of this property. We find in them debate, refutation, several points of view canvassed and some shown to be untenable; but there is no affirmative result established, or even announced as established, at the close. Often there is even a confession of disappointment. In other respects, the dialogues of this class are greatly diversified among one another: they have only the one

[1] Plato, Menon, p. 81-82.

common attribute—much debate, with absence of affirmative result.

Now the distribution made by Thrasyllus of the dialogues under two general heads (1. Dialogues of Search or Investigation. 2. Dialogues of Exposition) coincides, to a considerable extent, with the two distinct intellectual methods recognised by Aristotle as Dialectic and Demonstrative: Dialectic being handled by Aristotle in the Topica, and Demonstration in the Posterior Analytica. "Dialectic" (says Aristotle) "is tentative, respecting those matters of which philosophy aims at cognizance." Accordingly, Dialectic (as well as Rhetoric) embraces all matters without exception, but in a tentative and searching way, recognising arguments *pro* as well as *con*, and bringing to view the antithesis between the two, without any preliminary assumption or predetermined direction, the questioner being bound to proceed only on the answers given by the respondent: while philosophy comes afterwards, dividing this large field into appropriate compartments, laying down authoritative *principia* in regard to each, and deducing from them, by logical process, various positive results.[1] Plato does not use the term Dialectic exactly in the same sense as Aristotle. He implies by it two things:—1. That the process shall be colloquial, two or more minds engaged in a joint research, each of them animating and stimulating the others. 2. That the matter investigated shall be general—some general question or proposition: that the premisses shall all be general truths, and that the objects kept before the mind shall be Forms or Species, apart from particulars.[2] Here it stands in

The distribution coincides mainly with that of Aristotle—Dialectic, Demonstrative.

[1] Aristot. Metaphys. Γ. 1004, b. 25. ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ, περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική. Compare also Rhet. i. 2, p. 1356, a. 33, i. 4, p. 1359, b. 12, where he treats Dialectic (as well as Rhetoric) not as methods of acquiring instruction on any definite matter, but as inventive and argumentative aptitudes—powers of providing premisses and arguments—δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους. If (he says) you try to convert Dialectic from a method of discussion into a method of cognition, you will insensibly eliminate its true nature and character:—ὅσῳ δ' ἂν τις ἢ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἢ ταύτην, μὴ καθάπερ ἂν δυνάμεις ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμας πειρᾶται κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας, τῷ μεταβαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων εἰς ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων.

The Platonic Dialogues of Search are δυνάμεις τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους. Compare the Prœmium of Cicero to his Paradoxa.

[2] Plato, Republ. vi. 511, vii. 532. Respecting the difference between Plato and Aristotle about Dialectic, see Ravaisson—Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote—iii. 1, 2, p. 248.

contrast with Rhetoric, which aims at the determination of some particular case or debated course of conduct, judicial or political, and which is intended to end in some immediate practical verdict or vote. Dialectic, in Plato's sense, comprises the whole process of philosophy. His Dialogues of Search correspond to Aristotle's Dialectic, being machinery for generating arguments and for ensuring that every argument shall be subjected to the interrogation of an opponent: his Dialogues of Exposition, wherein some definite result is enunciated and proved (sufficiently or not), correspond to what Aristotle calls Demonstration.

Classification of Thrasyllus in its details. He applies his own principles erroneously.

If now we take the main scheme of distributing the Platonic Dialogues, proposed by Thrasyllus—1. Dialogues of Exposition, with an affirmative result; 2. Dialogues of Investigation or Search, without an affirmative result—and if we compare the number of Dialogues (out of the thirty-six in all), which he specifies as belonging to each—we shall find twenty-two specified under the former head, and fourteen under the latter. Moreover, among the twenty-two are ranked Republic and Leges: each of them greatly exceeding in bulk any other composition of Plato. It would appear thus that there is a preponderance both in number and bulk on the side of the Expository. But when we analyse the lists of Thrasyllus, we see that he has unduly enlarged that side of the account, and unduly contracted the other. He has enrolled among the Expository—1. The Apology, the Epistolæ, and the Menexenus, which ought not properly to be ranked under either head. 2. The Theætêtus, Parmenidês, Hipparchus, Erastæ, Minos, Kleitophon—every one of which ought to be transferred to the other head. 3. The Phædrus, Symposion, and Kratylus, which are admissible by indulgence, since they do indeed present affirmative exposition, but in small proportion compared to the negative criticism, the rhetorical and poetical ornament: they belong in fact to both classes, but more preponderantly to one. 4. The Republic. This he includes with perfect justice, for the eight last books of it are expository. Yet the first book exhibits to us a specimen of negative and refutative dialectic which is not surpassed by anything in Plato.

On the other hand, Thrasyllus has placed among the Dialogues

of Search one which might, with equal or greater propriety, be ranked among the Expository—the Protagoras. It is true that this dialogue involves much of negation, refutation, and dramatic ornament: and that the question propounded in the beginning (Whether virtue be teachable?) is not terminated. But there are two portions of the dialogue which are, both of them, decided specimens of affirmative exposition—the speech of Protagoras in the earlier part (wherein the growth of virtue, without special teaching or professional masters, is elucidated)—and the argument of Sokrates at the close, wherein the identity of the Good and the Pleasurable is established.[1]

The classification, as it would stand, if his principles were applied correctly.

If then we rectify the lists of Thrasyllus, they will stand as follows, with the Expository Dialogues much diminished in number:—

Dialogues of Investigation or Search.	*Dialogues of Exposition.*
Ζητητικοί.	*Ὑφηγητικοί.*
1. Theætêtus.	1. Timæus.
2. Parmenidês.	2. Leges.
3. Alkibiadês I.	3. Epinomis.
4. Alkibiadês II.	4. Kritias.
5. Theagês.	5. Republic.
6. Lachês.	6. Sophistês.
7. Lysis.	7. Politikus.
8. Charmidês.	8. Phædon.
9. Menon.	9. Philêbus.
10. Ion.	10. Protagoras.
11. Euthyphron.	11. Phædrus.
12. Euthydêmus.	12. Symposion.
13. Gorgias.	13. Kratylus.
14. Hippias I.	14. Kriton.
15. Hippias II.	
16. Kleitophon.	
17. Hipparchus.	
18. Erastæ.	
19. Minos.	

The Apology, Menexenus, Epistolæ, do not properly belong to either head.

[1] We may remark that Thrasyllus, though he enrols the Protagoras under the class Investigative, and the subclass Agonistic, places it alone in a still lower class which he calls Ἐνδεικτικός. Now, if we turn to the Platonic dialogue Euthydêmus, p. 278 D, we shall see that Plato uses the words ἐνδείξομαι and ὑφηγήσομαι as exact equivalents: so that ἐνδεικτικὸς would have the same meaning as ὑφηγητικός.

Preponderance of the searching and testing dialogues over the expository and dogmatical.

It will thus appear, from a fair estimate and comparison of lists, that the relation which Plato bears to philosophy is more that of a searcher, tester, and impugner, than that of an expositor and dogmatist—though he undertakes both the two functions: more negative than affirmative—more ingenious in pointing out difficulties, than successful in solving them. I must again repeat that though this classification is just, as far as it goes, and the best which can be applied to the dialogues, taken as a whole—yet the dialogues have much which will not enter into the classification, and each has its own peculiarities.

Dialogues of Search—sub-classes among them recognised by Thrasyllus—Gymnastic and Agonistic, &c.

The Dialogues of Search, thus comprising more than half of the Platonic compositions, are again distributed by Thrasyllus into two sub-classes—Gymnastic and Agonistic: the Gymnastic, again, into Obstetric and Peirastic; the Agonistic, into Probative and Refutative. Here, again, there is a pretence of symmetrical arrangement, which will not hold good if we examine it closely. Nevertheless, the epithets point to real attributes of various dialogues, and deserve the more attention, inasmuch as they imply a view of philosophy foreign to the prevalent way of looking at it. Obstetric and Tentative or Testing (Peirastic) are epithets which a reader may understand; but he will not easily see how they bear upon the process of philosophy.

Philosophy, as now understood, includes authoritative teaching, positive results, direct proofs.

The term *philosopher* is generally understood to mean something else. In appreciating a philosopher, it is usual to ask, What authoritative creed has he proclaimed, for disciples to swear allegiance to? What positive system, or positive truths previously unknown or unproved, has he established? Next, by what arguments has he enforced or made them good? This is the ordinary proceeding of an historian of philosophy, as he calls up the roll of successive names. The philosopher is assumed to speak as one having authority; to have already made up his mind; and to be prepared to explain what his mind is. Readers require positive results announced, and positive evidence set before them, in a clear and straightforward manner. They are intolerant of all that is prolix, circuitous, not essential to the

proof of the thesis in hand. Above all, an affirmative result is indispensable.

When I come to the Timæus, and Republic, &c., I shall consider what reply Plato could make to these questions. In the meantime, I may observe that if philosophers are to be estimated by such a scale, he will not stand high on the list. Even in his expository dialogues, he cares little about clear proclamation of results, and still less about the shortest, straightest, and most certain road for attaining them.

The Platonic Dialogues of Search disclaim authority and teaching—assume truth to be unknown to all alike—follow a process devious as well as fruitless.

But as to those numerous dialogues which are not expository, Plato could make no reply to the questions at all. There are no affirmative results:—and there is a process of enquiry, not only fruitless, but devious, circuitous, and intentionally protracted. The authoritative character of a philosopher is disclaimed. Not only Plato never delivers sentence in his own name, but his principal spokesman, far from speaking with authority, declares that he has not made up his own mind, and that he is only a searcher along with others, more eager in the chase than they are.[1] Philosophy is conceived as the search for truth still unknown; not as an explanation of truth by one who knows it, to others who do not know it. The process of search is considered as being in itself profitable and invigorating, even though what is sought be not found. The ingenuity of Sokrates is shown, not by what he himself produces, for he avows himself altogether barren—but by his obstetric aid: that is, by his being able to evolve, from a youthful mind, answers of which it is pregnant, and to test the soundness and trustworthiness of those answers when delivered: by his power, besides, of exposing or refuting unsound answers, and of convincing others of the fallacy of that which they confidently believed themselves to know.

The questioner has no predetermined

To eliminate affirmative, authoritative exposition, which proceeds upon the assumption that truth is already known—and to consider philosophy as a search for unknown truth, carried on by several interlocutors all of them

[1] In addition to the declarations of Sokrates to this effect in the Platonic Apology (pp. 21-23), we read the like in many Platonic dialogues. Gorgias, 506 A. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν (see Routh's note): and even in the Republic, in many parts of which there is much

course, but follows the lead given by the respondent in his answers.

ignorant—this is the main idea which Plato inherited from Sokrates, and worked out in more than one-half of his dialogues. It is under this general head that the subdivisions of Thrasyllus fall—the Obstetric, the Testing or Verifying, the Refutative. The process is one in which both the two concurrent minds are active, but each with an inherent activity peculiar to itself. The questioner does not follow a predetermined course of his own, but proceeds altogether on the answer given to him. He himself furnishes only an indispensable stimulus to the parturition of something with which the respondent is already pregnant, and applies testing questions to that which he hears, until the respondent is himself satisfied that the answer will not hold. Throughout all this, there is a constant appeal to the free, self-determining judgment of the respondent's own mind, combined with a stimulus exciting the intellectual productiveness of that mind to the uttermost.

Relation of teacher and learner. Appeal to authority is suppressed.

What chiefly deserves attention here, as a peculiar phase in the history of philosophy, is, that the relation of teacher and learner is altogether suppressed. Sokrates not only himself disclaims the province and title of a teacher, but treats with contemptuous banter those who assume it. Now "the learner" (to use a memorable phrase of Aristotle[1]) "is under obligation to believe": he must be a passive recipient of that which is communicated to him by the teacher. The relation between the two is that of authority on the one side, and of belief generated by authority on the other. But Sokrates requires from no man implicit trust: nay he deprecates it as dangerous.[2] It is one peculiarity in these Sokratic dialogues, that the sentiment of authority, instead of being invoked and worked up, as is generally done in philosophy, is formally disavowed and practically set aside. "I have not made up my mind: I am not prepared to swear allegiance to any creed: I give you the reasons for and against each: you must decide for yourself."[3]

dogmatism and affirmation: v. p. 450 E. ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἅμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶ, &c.

[1] Aristot. De Sophist. Elenchis, Top. ix. p. 165, b. 2. δεῖ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν μανθάνοντα.

[2] Plato, Protagor. p. 314 B.

[3] The sentiment of the Academic

This process—the search for truth as an unknown—is in the modern world put out of sight. All discussion is conducted by persons who profess to have found it or learnt it, and to be in condition to proclaim it to others. Even the philosophical works of Cicero are usually pleadings by two antagonists, each of whom professes to know the truth, though Cicero does not decide between them: and in this respect they differ from the groping and fumbling of the Platonic dialogues. Of course the search for truth must go on in modern times, as it did in ancient: but it goes on silently and without notice. The most satisfactory theories have been preceded by many infructuous guesses and tentatives. The theorist may try many different hypotheses (we are told that Kepler tried nineteen) which he is forced successively to reject; and he may perhaps end without finding any better. But all these tentatives, verifying tests, doubts, and rejections, are confined to his own bosom or his own study. He looks back upon them without interest, sometimes even with disgust; least of all does he seek to describe them in detail as objects of interest to others. They are probably known to none but himself: for it

In the modern world the search for truth is put out of sight. Every writer or talker professes to have already found it, and to proclaim it to others.

sect—descending from Sokrates and Plato, not through Xenokrates and Polemon, but through Arkesilaus and Karneades—illustrates the same elimination of the idea of authority. "Why are you so curious to know what *I myself* have determined on the point? Here are the reasons *pro* and *con:* weigh the one against the other, and then judge for yourself."

See Sir William Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy—Appendix, p. 681—about mediæval disputations: also Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 4-7. "Sed defendat quod quisque sentit: sunt enim judicia libera: nos institutum tenebimus, nulliusque unius disciplinæ legibus adstricti, quibus in philosophiâ necessario pareamus, quid sit in quâque re maximé probabile, semper requiremus."

Again, Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 5, 10-13. "Qui autem requirunt, quid quâque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosiùs id faciunt quam necesse est. *Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt.* Quin etiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim suum judicium adhibere; id habent ratum, quod ab eo quem probant judicatum vident. . . . Si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum est, quanto majus omnes? Quod facere iis necesse est, quibus propositum est, veri reperiendi causâ, et contra omnes philosophos et pro omnibus dicere. . . Nec tamen fieri potest, ut qui hâc ratione philosophentur, ii nihil habeant quod sequantur. . . Non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii, qui omnibus veris falsa quædam adjuncta esse dicamus, tantâ similitudine ut in iis nulla insit certa judicandi et assentiendi nota. Ex quo exsistit illud, multa esse probabilia, quæ quanquam non perciperentur, tamen quia visum haberent quendam insignem et illustrem, his sapientis vita regeretur."

Compare Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. sect. 2-3-5-9. Quintilian, xii. 2-25.

does not occur to him to follow the Platonic scheme of taking another mind into partnership, and entering upon that distribution of active intellectual work which we read in the Theætêtus. There are cases in which two chemists have carried on joint researches, under many failures and disappointments, perhaps at last without success. If a record were preserved of their parley during the investigation, the grounds for testing and rejecting one conjecture, and for selecting what should be tried after it—this would be in many points a parallel to the Platonic process.

But at Athens in the fourth century, B.C., the search for truth by two or more minds in partnership was not so rare a phenomenon. The active intellects of Athens were distributed between Rhetoric, which addressed itself to multitudes, accepted all established sentiments, and handled for the most part particular issues—and Dialectic, in which a select few debated among themselves general questions.[1] Of this Dialectic, the real Sokrates was the greatest master that Athens ever saw: he could deal as he chose (says Xenophon[2]) with all disputants: he turned them round his finger. In this process, one person set up a thesis, and the other cross-examined him upon it: the most irresistible of all cross-examiners was the real Sokrates. The nine books of Aristotle's Topica (including the book De Sophisticis Elenchis) are composed with the object of furnishing suggestions, and indicating rules, both to the cross-examiner and to the respondent, in such Dialectic debates. Plato does not lay down any rules: but he has given us, in his dialogues of search, specimens of dialectic procedure shaped in his own fashion. Several of his contemporaries, companions of

The search for truth by various interlocutors was a recognised process in the Sokratic age. Acute negative Dialectic of Sokrates.

[1] The habit of supposing a general question to be undecided, and of having it argued by competent advocates before auditors who have not made up their minds—is now so disused (everywhere except in a court of law), that one reads with surprise Galen's declaration that the different competing medical theories were so discussed in his day. His master Pelops maintained a disputation of two days with a rival;—ἠνίκα Πέλοψ μετὰ Φιλίππου τοῦ ἐμπειρικοῦ διελέχθη δυοῖν ἡμερῶν· τοῦ μὲν Πέλοπος, ὡς μὴ δυναμένης τῆς ἰατρικῆς δι' ἐμπειρίας μόνης συστῆναι, τοῦ Φιλίππου δὲ ἐπιδεικνύντος δύνασθαι. (Galen, De Propriis Libris, c. 2, p. 16, Kühn.)

Galen notes (ib. 2, p. 21) the habit of literary men at Rome to assemble in the temple of Pax, for the purpose of discussing logical questions, prior to the conflagration which destroyed that temple.

[2] Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2.

Sokrates, like him, did the same each in his own way : but their compositions have not survived.[1]

Such compositions give something like fair play to the negative arm of philosophy; in the employment of which the Eleate Zeno first became celebrated, and the real Sokrates yet more celebrated. This negative arm is no less essential than the affirmative, to the validity of a body of reasoned truth, such as philosophy aspires to be. To know how to disprove is quite as important as to know how to prove : the one is co-ordinate and complementary to the other. And the man who disproves what is false, or guards mankind against assenting to it,[2] renders a service to philosophy, even though he may not be able to render the ulterior service of proving any truth in its place.

Negative procedure supposed to be represented by the Sophists and the Megarici discouraged and censured by historians of philosophy.

By historians of ancient philosophy, negative procedure is generally considered as represented by the Sophists and the Megarici, and is the main ground for those harsh epithets which are commonly applied to both of them. The negative (they think) can only be tolerated in small doses, and even then merely as ancillary to the affirmative. That is, if you have an affirmative theory to propose, you are allowed to urge such objections as you think applicable against rival theories, but only in order to make room for your own. It seems to be assumed as requiring no proof that the confession of ignorance is an intolerable condition ; which every man ought to be ashamed of in himself, and which no man is justified in

[1] The dialogues composed by Aristotle himself were in great measure dialogues of search, exercises of argumentation *pro* and *con* (Cicero, De Finib. v. 4). "Aristoteles, ut solet, quærendi gratiâ, quædam subtilitatis suæ argumenta excogitavit in Gryllo," &c. (Quintilian, Inst. Orat. ii. 17.)

Bernays indicates the probable titles of many among the lost Aristotelian Dialogues (Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 132, 133, Berlin, 1863), and gives in his book many general remarks upon them.

The observations of Aristotle in the Metaphys. (A. ἐλάττων 993, b. 1-16) are conceived in a large and just spirit. He says that among all the searchers for truth, none completely succeed, and none completely fail : those, from whose conclusions we dissent, do us service by exercising our intelligence—*τὴν γὰρ ἕξιν προήσκησαν ἡμῶν*. The enumeration of *ἀπορίαι* in the following book B of the Metaphysica is a continuation of the same views. Compare Scholia, p. 604, b. 29, Brandis.

[2] The Stoics had full conviction of this. In Cicero's summary of the Stoic doctrine (De Finibus, iii. 21, 72) we read :—"Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, Dialecticam etiam adjungunt (Stoici) et Physicam : easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant : alteram (*sc.* Dialecticam), quod habeat rationem, ne cui falso adsentiamur, neve unquam captiosâ probabilitate fallamur; eaque, quæ de bonis et malis didicerimus, ut tenere tuerique possimus"

inflicting on any one else. If you deprive the reader of one affirmative solution, you are required to furnish him with another which you are prepared to guarantee as the true one. "Le Roi est mort—Vive le Roi": the throne must never be vacant. It is plain that under such a restricted application, the full force of the negative case is never brought out. The pleadings are left in the hands of counsel, each of whom takes up only such fragments of the negative case as suit the interests of his client, and suppresses or slurs over all such other fragments of it as make against his client. But to every theory (especially on the topics discussed by Sokrates and Plato) there are more or less of objections applicable—even the best theory being true only on the balance. And if the purpose be to ensure a complete body of reasoned truth, all these objections ought to be faithfully exhibited, by one who stands forward as their express advocate, without being previously retained for any separate or inconsistent purpose.

Vocation of Sokrates and Plato for the negative procedure: absolute necessity of it as a condition of reasoned truth. Parmenidês of Plato.

How much Plato himself, in his dialogues of search, felt his own vocation as champion of the negative procedure, we see marked conspicuously in the dialogue called Parmenidês. This dialogue is throughout a protest against forward affirmation, and an assertion of independent *locus standi* for the negationist and objector. The claims of the latter must first be satisfied, before the affirmant can be considered as solvent. The advocacy of those claims is here confided to the veteran Parmenides, who sums them up in a formidable total: Sokrates being opposed to him under the unusual disguise of a youthful and forward affirmant. Parmenides makes no pretence of advancing any rival doctrine. The theories which he selects for criticism are the Platonic theory of intelligible Concepts, and his own theory of the Unum: he indicates how many objections must be removed—how many contradictions must be solved—how many opposite hypotheses must be followed out to their results—before either of these theories can be affirmed with assurance. The exigencies enumerated may and do appear insurmountable:[1] but of that Plato takes no account. Such laborious

[1] Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B. δεῖ χανον, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Παρμενίδη, πραγσκοπεῖν—εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάματείαν, &c.
μενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές. Ἀμή- Aristotle declares that no man can

exercises are inseparable from the process of searching for truth, and unless a man has strength to go through them, no truth, or at least no reasoned truth, can be found and maintained.[1]

It will thus appear that among the conditions requisite for philosophy, both Sokrates and Plato regarded the negative procedure as co-ordinate in value with the affirmative, and indispensable as a preliminary stage. But Sokrates went a step farther. He assigned to the negative an intrinsic importance by itself, apart from all implication with the affirmative; and he rested that opinion upon a psychological ground, formally avowed, and far larger than anything laid down by the Sophists. He thought that the natural state of the human mind, among established communities, was not simply ignorance, but ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge—false or uncertified

Sokrates considered the negative procedure to be valuable by itself, and separately. His theory of the natural state of the human mind; not ignorance, but false persuasion of knowledge.

be properly master of any affirmative truth without having examined and solved all the objections and difficulties—the negative portion of the enquiry. To go through all these *ἀπορίας* is the indispensable first stage, and perhaps the enquirer may not be able to advance farther, see Metaphysic. B. 995, a. 26, 996, a. 16—one of the most striking passages in his works. Compare also what he says, De Cœlo, ii. 294, b 10, *διὸ δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα καλῶς ζητήσειν ἐνστατικὸν εἶναι διὰ των οἰκείων ἐνστάσεων τῷ γένει, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ πάσας τεθεωρηκέναι τὰς διαφοράς.*

[1] That the only road to trustworthy affirmation lies through a string of negations, unfolded and appreciated by systematic procedure, is strongly insisted on by Bacon, Novum Organum, ii. 15, "Omnino Deo (formarum inditori et opifici), aut fortasse angelis et intelligentiis competit formas per affirmationem immediate nosse, atque ab initio contemplationis. Sed certe supra hominem est: cui tantum conceditur, procedere primo per negativas, et postremo loco desinere in affirmativas, post omnimodam exclusionem." Compare another Aphorism, i. 46.

The following passage, transcribed from the Lectures of a distinguished physical philosopher of the present day, is conceived in the spirit of the Platonic Dialogues of Search, though Plato would have been astonished at such patient multiplication of experiments:—

"I should hardly sustain your interest in stating the difficulties which at first beset the investigation conducted with this apparatus, or the numberless precautions which the exact balancing of the two powerful sources of heat, here resorted to, rendered necessary. I believe the experiments, made with atmospheric air alone, might be numbered by tens of thousands. Sometimes for a week, or even for a fortnight, coincident and satisfactory results would be obtained: the strict conditions of accurate experimenting would appear to be found, when an additional day's experience would destroy this hope and necessitate a recommencement, under changed conditions, of the whole inquiry. It is this which daunts the experimenter. It is this preliminary fight with the entanglements of a subject so dark, so doubtful, so uncheering, without any knowledge whether the conflict is to lead to anything worth possessing, that renders discovery difficult and rare. But the experimenter, and particularly the *young* experimenter, ought to know that as regards his own moral manhood, he cannot but win, if he only contend aright. *Even with a negative result, the consciousness that he has gone fairly to the bottom of his subject, as far*

belief—false persuasion of knowledge. The only way of dissipating such false persuasion was, the effective stimulus of the negative test, or cross-examining Elenchus; whereby a state of non-belief, or painful consciousness of ignorance, was substituted in its place. Such second state was indeed not the best attainable. It ought to be preliminary to a third, acquired by the struggles of the mind to escape from such painful consciousness; and to rise, under the continued stimulus of the tutelary Elenchus, to improved affirmative and defensible beliefs. But even if this third state were never reached, Sokrates declared the second state to be a material amendment on the first, which he deprecated as alike pernicious and disgraceful.

Declaration of Sokrates in the Apology; his constant mission to make war against the false persuasion of knowledge.

The psychological conviction here described stands proclaimed by Sokrates himself, with remarkable earnestness and emphasis, in his Apology before the Dikasts, only a month before his death. So deeply did he take to heart the prevalent false persuasion of knowledge, alike universal among all classes, mischievous, and difficult to correct—that he declared himself to have made war against it throughout his life, under a mission imposed upon him by the Delphian God; and to have incurred thereby wide-spread hatred among his fellow-citizens. To convict men, by cross-examination, of ignorance in respect to those matters which each man believed himself to know well and familiarly—this was the constant employment and the mission of Sokrates: not to teach—for he disclaimed the capacity of teaching—but to make men feel their own ignorance instead of believing themselves to know. Such cross-examination, conducted usually before an audience, however it might be salutary and indispensable, was intended to humiliate the respondent, and could hardly fail to offend and exasperate him. No one felt satisfaction except some youthful auditors, who admired the acuteness with which it was conducted. "I (declared Sokrates) am distinguished from others, and superior to others, by this character only—that I am conscious of my own

as his means allowed—the feeling that he has not shunned labour, *though that labour may have resulted in laying bare the nakedness of his case*—re-acts upon his own mind, and gives it firmness for future work." (Tyndall, Lectures on Heat, considered as a Mode of Motion, Lect. x. p. 332.)

ignorance: the wisest of men would be he who had the like consciousness; but as yet I have looked for such a man in vain."[1]

In delivering this emphatic declaration, Sokrates himself intimates his apprehension that the Dikasts will treat his discourse as mockery; that they will not believe him to be in earnest; that they will scarcely have patience to hear him claim a divine mission for so strange a purpose.[2] The declaration is indeed singular, and probably many of the Dikasts did so regard it; while those who thought it serious, heard it with repugnance. The separate value of the negative procedure or Elenchus was never before so unequivocally asserted, or so highly estimated. To disabuse men of those false beliefs which they mistook for knowledge, and to force on them the painful consciousness that they knew nothing—was extolled as the greatest service which could be rendered to them, and as rescuing them from a degraded and slavish state of mind.[3]

Opposition of feeling between Sokrates and the Dikasts.

To understand the full purpose of Plato's dialogues of search—testing, exercising, refuting, but not finding or providing—we must keep in mind the Sokratic Apology. Whoever, after reading the Theætêtus, Lachês, Charmidês, Lysis, Parmenidês, &c., is tempted to exclaim—"But, after all, Plato *must* have had in his mind some ulterior doctrine of conviction which he wished to impress, but which he has not clearly intimated," will see, by the Sokratic Apology, that such a presumption is noway justifiable. Plato is a searcher, and has not yet made up his own mind: this is what he himself tells us, and what I literally believe, though few or none of his critics will admit it. His purpose in the dialogues of search,

The Dialogues of Search present an end in themselves. Mistake of supposing that Plato had in his mind an ulterior affirmative end, not declared.

[1] Plat. Apol. S. pp. 23-29. It is not easy to select particular passages for reference; for the sentiments which I have indicated pervade nearly the whole discourse.

[2] Plato, Apol. S. pp. 20-38.

[3] Aristotle, in the first book of Metaphysica (982, b. 17), when repeating a statement made in the Theætêtus of Plato (155 D), that wonder is the beginning, or point of departure, of philosophy—explains the phrase by saying, that wonder is accompanied by a painful conviction of ignorance and sense of embarrassment. ὁ δὲ ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν . . . διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν . . . . οὐ χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν. This painful conviction of ignorance is what Sokrates sought to bring about.

is plainly and sufficiently enunciated in the words addressed by Sokrates to Theætêtus—"Answer without being daunted: for if we prosecute our search, one of two alternatives is certain—either we shall find what we are looking for, or we shall get clear of the persuasion that we know what in reality we do not yet know. Now a recompense like this will leave no room for dissatisfaction."[1]

False persuasion of knowledge—had reference to topics social, political, ethical.

What those topics were, in respect to which Sokrates found this universal belief of knowledge, without the reality of knowledge—we know, not merely from the dialogues of Plato, but also from the Memorabilia of Xenophon. Sokrates did not touch upon recondite matters—upon the Kosmos, astronomy, meteorology. Such studies he discountenanced as useless, and even

[1] Plato, Theætet. 187 C. ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτω δρῶμεν, δυοῖν θάτερον—ἢ εὑρήσομεν ἐφ' ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἧττον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῇ ἴσμεν· καίτοι οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος. Bonitz (in his Platonische Studien, pp. 8, 9, 74, 76, &c.) is one of the few critics who deprecate the confidence and boldness with which recent scholars have ascribed to Plato affirmative opinions and systematic purpose which he does not directly announce. Bonitz vindicates the separate value and separate *locus standi* of the negative process in Plato's estimation, particularly in the example of the Theætêtus. Susemihl, in the preface to his second part, has controverted these views of Bonitz—in my judgment without any success.

The following observations of recent French scholars are just, though they imply too much the assumption that there is always some affirmative jewel wrapped up in Plato's complicated folds. M. Egger observes (Histoire de la Critique chez les Grecs, Paris, 1849, p. 84, ch. ii. sect. 4):

"La philosophie de Platon n'offre pas, en général, un ensemble de parties très rigoureusement liées entre elles. D'abord, il ne l'expose que sous forme dialoguée: et dans ses dialogues, où il ne prend jamais de rôle personnel, on ne voit pas clairement auquel des interlocuteurs il a confié la défense de ses propres opinions. Parmi ces interlocuteurs, Socrate lui-même, le plus naturel et le plus ordinaire interprète de la pensée de son disciple, use fort souvent des libertés de cette forme toute dramatique, pour se jouer dans les distinctions subtiles, pour exagérer certains arguments, pour couper court à une discussion embarrassante, au moyen de quelque plaisanterie, et pour se retirer d'un débat sans conclure; en un mot, il a—ou, ce qui est plus vrai, Platon a, sous son nom—*des opinions de circonstance et des ruses de dialectique*, à travers lesquelles il est souvent difficile de retrouver le fond sérieux de sa doctrine. Heureusement ces difficultés ne touchent pas aux principes généraux du Platonisme. La critique Platonicienne en particulier dans ce qu'elle a de plus original, et de plus élevé, se rattache à la grande théorie des *idées* et de la *réminiscence*. On la retrouve exposée dans plusieurs dialogues avec une clarté qui ne permet ni le doute ni l'incertitude."

I may also cite the following remarks made by M. Vacherot (Histoire Critique de l'École d'Alexandrie, vol. ii. p. 1, Pt. ii. Bk. ii. ch. i) after his instructive analysis of the doctrines of Plotinus. I think the words are as much applicable to Plato as to Plotinus: the rather, as Plato never speaks in his own name, Plotinus always:—"Combien faut-il prendre garde d'ajouter à la pensée du philosophe, et de lui prêter un arrangement artificiel! Ce génie, plein d'enthousiasme et de fougue, n'a jamais connu ni mesure ni plan: jamais il ne s'est astreint à développer régulièrement une théorie, ni à exposer avec

as irreligious.[1] The subjects on which he interrogated were those of common, familiar, every-day talk: those which every one believed himself to know, and on which every one had a confident opinion to give: the respondent being surprised that any one could put the questions, or that there could be any doubt requiring solution. What is justice? what is injustice? what are temperance and courage? what is law, lawlessness, democracy, aristocracy? what is the government of mankind, and the attributes which qualify any one for exercising such government? Here were matters upon which every one talked familiarly, and would have been ashamed to be thought incapable of delivering an opinion. Yet it was upon these matters that Sokrates detected universal ignorance, coupled with a firm, but illusory, persuasion of knowledge. The conversation of Sokrates with Euthydêmus, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia[2]—the first Alkibiadês, Lachês, Charmidês, Euthyphron, &c., of Plato—are among the most marked specimens of such cross-examination or Elenchus—a string of questions, to which there are responses in indefinite number successively given, tested, and exposed as unsatisfactory.

The answers which Sokrates elicited and exposed were simple

suite un ensemble de théories, de manière à en former un système. *Fort incertain dans sa marche, il prend, quitte, et reprend le même sujet, sans jamais paraître avoir dit son dernier mot:* toujours il répand de vives et abondantes clartés sur les questions qu'il traite, mais rarement il les conduit à leur dernière et définitive solution; sa rapide pensée n'effleure pas seulement le sujet sur lequel elle passe, elle le pénètre et le creuse toujours, sans toutefois l'épuiser. Fort inégal dans ses allures, tantôt ce génie s'échappe en inspirations rapides et tumultueuses, tantôt il semble se traîner péniblement, et se perdre dans un dédale de subtiles abstractions, &c."

[1] Xenoph. Memor. i. 1.

[2] Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2. A passage from Paley's preface to his "Principles of Moral Philosophy," illustrates well this Sokratic process: "Concerning the principle of morals, it would be premature to speak: but concerning the manner of unfolding and explaining that principle, I have somewhat which I wish to be remarked. An experience of nine years in the office of a public tutor in one of the Universities, and in that department of education to which these sections relate, afforded me frequent opportunity to observe, that in discoursing to young minds upon topics of morality, it *required much more pains to make them perceive the difficulty than to understand the solution:* that unless the subject was so drawn up to a point as to exhibit the full force of an objection, or the exact place of a doubt, before any explanation was entered upon—in other words, unless some curiosity was excited, before it was attempted to be satisfied—the teacher's labour was lost. When information was not desired, it was seldom, I found, retained. I have made this observation my guide in the following work: that is, I have endeavoured, before I suffered myself to proceed in the disquisition, to put the reader in complete possession of the question: *and to do it in a way that I thought most likely to stir up his own doubts and solicitude about it.*"

To those topics, on which each community possesses established dogmas, laws, customs, sentiments, consecrated and traditional, peculiar to itself. The local creed, which is never formally proclaimed or taught, but is enforced unconsciously by every one upon every one else. Omnipotence of King Nomos.

expressions of the ordinary prevalent belief upon matters on which each community possesses established dogmas, laws, customs, sentiments, fashions, points of view, &c., belonging to itself. When Herodotus passed over to Egypt, he was astonished to find the judgment, feelings, institutions, and practices of the Egyptians, contrasting most forcibly with those of all other countries. He remarks the same (though less in degree) respecting Babylonians, Indians, Scythians, and others; and he is not less impressed with the veneration of each community for its own creed and habits, coupled with indifference or antipathy towards other creeds, disparate or discordant, prevailing elsewhere.[1]

This aggregate of beliefs and predispositions to believe, ethical, religious, æsthetical, social, respecting what is true or false, probable or improbable, just or unjust, holy or unholy, honourable or base, respectable or contemptible, pure or impure, beautiful or ugly, decent or indecent, obligatory to do or obliga-

[1] Herodot. ii. 35-36-64; iii. 38-94, seq. i. 196; iv. 76-77-80. The discordance between the various institutions established among the separate aggregations of mankind, often proceeding to the pitch of reciprocal antipathy—the imperative character of each in its own region, assuming the appearance of natural right and propriety—all this appears brought to view by the inquisitive and observant Herodotus, as well as by others (Xenophon, Cyropæd. i. 3-18): but many new facts, illustrating the same thesis, were noticed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics, when a larger extent of the globe became opened to Hellenic survey. Compare Aristotle, Ethic. Nik. i. 3, 1094, b. 15; Sextus Empiric. Pyrr. Hypotyp. i. sect. 145-156, iii. sect. 198-234; and the remarkable extract from Bardesanes Syrus, cited by Eusebius, Præp. Evang. vi., and published in Orelli's collection, pp. 202-219, Alexandri Aphrodis. et Aliorum De Fato, Zurich, 1824.

Many interesting passages in illustration of the same thesis might be borrowed from Montaigne, Pascal, and others. But the most forcible of all illustrations are those furnished by the Oriental world, when surveyed or studied by intelligent Europeans, as it has been more fully during the last century. See especially Sir William Sleeman's Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official: two volumes which unfold with equal penetration and fidelity the manifestations of established sentiment among the Hindoos and Mahomedans. Vol. i. ch. iv., describing a Suttee on the Nerbudda, is one of the most impressive chapters in the work: the rather as it describes the continuance of a hallowed custom, transmitted even from the days of Alexander. I transcribe also some valuable matter from an eminent living scholar, whose extensive erudition comprises Oriental as well as Hellenic philosophy.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (Premier Mémoire sur le Sânkhya, Paris, 1852, pp. 392-395) observes as follows respecting the Sanscrit system of philosophy called *Sânkhya*, the doctrine expounded and enforced by the philosopher Kapila—and respecting Buddha

tory to avoid, respecting the status and relations of each individual in the society, respecting even the admissible fashions of amusement and recreation—this is an established fact and condition of things, the real origin of which is for the most part unknown, but which each new member of the society is born to and finds subsisting. It is transmitted by tradition from parents to children, and is imbibed by the latter almost unconsciously from what they see and hear around, without any special season of teaching, or special persons to teach. It becomes a part of each person's nature—a standing habit of mind, or fixed set of mental tendencies, according to which, particular experience is

and Buddhism which was built upon the Sânkhya, amending or modifying it. Buddha is believed to have lived about 547 B.C. Both the system of Buddha, and that of Kapila, are atheistic, as described by M. St. Hilaire.

"Le second point où Bouddha se sépare de Kapila concerne la doctrine. L'homme ne peut rester dans l'incertitude que Kapila lui laisse encore. L'âme délivrée, selon les doctrines de Kapila, peut toujours renaître. Il n'y a qu'un moyen, un seul moyen, de le sauver,—c'est de l'anéantir. Le neant seul est un sûr asile: on ne revient pas de celui là.—Bouddha lui promet le néant; et c'est avec cette promesse inouie qu'il a passionné les hommes et converti les peuples. Que cette monstrueuse croyance, partagée aujourd'hui par trois cents millions de sectateurs, révolte en nous les instincts les plus énergiques de notre nature—qu'elle soulève toutes les répugnances et toutes les horreurs de notre âme—qu'elle nous paraisse aussi incompréhensible que hideuse—peu importe. Une partie considérable de l'humanité l'a reçue,—prête même à la justifier par toutes les subtilités de la metaphysique la plus raffinée, et à la confesser dans les tortures des plus affreux supplices et les austérités homicides d'un fanatisme aveugle. Si c'est une gloire que de dominer souverainement, à travers les âges, la foi des hommes,—jamais fondateur de religion n'en eut une plus grande que le Bouddha: car aucun n'eut de prosélytes plus fidèles ni plus nombreux. Mais je me trompe: le Bouddha ne prétendait jamais fonder une réligion. Il n'était que philosophe: et instruit dans toutes les sciences des Brahmans, il ne voulut personnellement que fonder, à leur exemple, un nouveau système. Seulement, les moyens qu'il employait durent mener ses disciples plus loin qu'il ne comptait aller lui même. En s'adressant à la foule, il faut bientôt la discipliner et la régler. De là, cette ordination réligieuse que le Bouddha donnait à ses adeptes, la hiérarchie qu'il établissait entre eux, fondée uniquement, comme la science l'exigeait, sur le mérite divers des intelligences et des vertus—la douce et sainte morale qu'il prêchait,—le détachement de toutes choses en ce monde, si convenable à des ascètes qui ne pensent qu'au salut éternel—le vœu de pauvreté, qui est la première loi des Bouddhistes—et tout cet ensemble de dispositions qui constituent un gouvernement au lieu d'une école.

"Mais ce n'est là que l'extérieur du Bouddhisme: c'en est le développement matériel et nécessaire. Au fond, son principe est celui du Sânkhya: seulement, il l'applique en grand.—C'est la science qui délivre l'homme: et le Bouddha ajoute—Pour que l'homme soit délivré à jamais, il faut qu'il arrive au Nirvâna, c'est à dire, qu'il soit absolument anéanti. Le néant est donc le bout de la science: et le salut eternel, c'est l'anéantissement."

The same line of argument is insisted on by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in his other work—Bouddha et sa réligion, Paris, 1862, ed. 2nd: especially in his Chapter on the Nirvâna: wherein moreover he complains justly of the little notice which authors take of the established beliefs of those varieties of the human race which are found apart from Christian Europe.

interpreted and particular persons appreciated.[1] It is not set forth in systematic proclamation, nor impugned, nor defended: it is enforced by a sanction of its own, the same real sanction or force in all countries, by fear of displeasure from the Gods, and by certainty of evil from neighbours and fellow-citizens. The community hate, despise, or deride, any individual member who proclaims his dissent from their social creed, or even openly calls it in question. Their hatred manifests itself in different ways at different times and occasions, sometimes by burning or excommunication, sometimes by banishment or interdiction[2] from fire and water; at the very least, by exclusion from that amount of forbearance, good-will, and estimation, without which the life of an individual becomes insupportable: for society, though its power to make an individual happy is but limited, has complete power, easily exercised, to make him miserable. The orthodox public do not recognise in any individual citizen a right to scrutinise their creed, and to reject it if not approved by his own rational judgment. They expect that he will embrace it in the natural course of things, by the mere force of authority and contagion—as they have adopted it themselves: as they have adopted also the current language, weights, measures, divisions of time, &c. If he dissents, he is guilty of an offence described in the terms of the indictment preferred against Sokrates—"Sokrates commits crime, inasmuch as he does not believe in the Gods, in whom the city believes, but introduces new religious beliefs," &c.[3] "Nomos (Law and Custom), King of All" (to borrow the phrase which Herodotus cites from Pindar[4]), exercises

[1] This general fact is powerfully set forth by Cicero, in the beginning of the third Tusculan Disputation. Chrysippus the Stoic, "ut est in omni historiâ curiosus," had collected striking examples of these consecrated practices, cherished in one territory, abhorrent elsewhere. (Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 45, 108.)

[2] See the description of the treatment of Aristodêmus, one of the two Spartans who survived the battle of Thermopylæ, after his return home, Herodot. vii. 231, ix. 71. The interdiction from communion of fire, water, eating, sacrifice, &c., is the strongest manifestation of repugnance: so insupportable to the person excommunicated, that it counted for a sentence of exile in the Roman law. (Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton, s. 9. Heineccius, Ant. Rom. i. 16, 9, 10.)

[3] Xenophon. Memor. i. 1, 1. Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων, &c. Plato (Leges, x. 909, 910) and Cicero (Legib. ii. 19-25) forbid καινὰ δαιμόνια, "separatim nemo habessit Deos," &c.

[4] Νόμος πάντων βασιλεύς (Herodot. iii. 38). It will be seen from Herodotus, as well as elsewhere, that the idea really intended to be expressed by the word Νόμος is much larger than what is now commonly understood by *Law*. It is equivalent to that which Epik-

plenary power, spiritual as well as temporal, over individual minds; moulding the emotions as well as the intellect according to the local type—determining the sentiments, the belief, and the predisposition in regard to new matters tendered for belief, of every one—fashioning thought, speech, and points of view, no less than action—and reigning under the appearance of habitual, self-suggested tendencies. Plato, when he assumes the function of Constructor, establishes special officers for enforcing in detail the authority of King Nomos in his Platonic variety. But even

tôtus calls *τὸ δόγμα—πανταχοῦ ἀνίκητον τὸ δόγμα* (Epiktet. iii. 16). It includes what is meant by *τὸ νόμιμον* (Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 13-24), *τὰ νόμιμα, τὰ νομιζόμενα, τα πάτρια, τὰ νόμαια*, including both positive morality, and social æsthetical precepts, as well as civil or political, and even personal habits, such as that of abstinence from spitting or wiping the nose (Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 8, 8-10). The case which Herodotus quotes to illustrate his general thesis is the different treatment which, among different nations, is considered dutiful and respectful towards senior relatives and the corpses of deceased relatives; which matters come under *τἄγραπτα κάσφαλῆ Θεῶν Νόμιμα* (Soph. Antig. 440)—of immemorial antiquity;—

> *Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθὲς ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε*
> *Ζῇ ταῦτα, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου 'φάνη.*

Νόμος and *ἐπιτήδευμα* run together in Plato's mind, dictating every hour's proceeding of the citizen through life (Leges, vii. 807-808-823).

We find Plato, in the Leges, which represents the altered tone and compressive orthodoxy of his old age, extolling the simple goodness (*εὐήθεια*) of our early forefathers, who believed implicitly all that was told them, and were not clever enough to raise doubts, *ὥσπερ ταυῦν* (Legg. iii. 679, 680). Plato dwells much upon the danger of permitting any innovation on the fixed modes of song and dance (Legg. v. 727, vii. 797-800), and forbids it under heavy penalties. He says that the lawgiver both *can* consecrate common talk, and ought to consecrate it *—καθιερῶσαι τὴν φήμην* (Legg. 838), the dicta of *Νόμος Βασιλεύς*.

Pascal describes, in forcible terms, the wide-spread authority of *Νόμος Βασιλεύς*:—"Il ne faut pas se méconnaître, nous sommes automates autant qu'esprit: et delà vient que l'instrument, par lequel la persuasion se fait, n'est pas la seule démonstration. Combien y a-t-il peu de choses démontrées! Les preuves ne convainquent que l'esprit. La coutume fait nos preuves les plus fortes et les plus crues: *elle incline l'automate, qui entraîne l'esprit sans qu'il y pense.* Qui a démontré qu'il sera demain jour, et que nous mourrons—et qu'y a-t-il de plus cru? C'est donc la coutume qui nous en persuade, c'est elle qui fait tant de Chrétiens, c'est elle qui fait les Turcs les Païens, les métiers, les soldats, &c. Enfin, il faut avoir recours à elle quand une fois l'esprit a vu où est la vérité, afin de nous abreuver et nous teindre de cette créance, qui nous échappe à toute heure; car d'en avoir toujours les preuves présentes, c'est trop d'affaire. Il faut acquérir une créance plus facile, qui est celle de l'habitude, qui, sans violence, sans art, sans argument, nous fait croire les choses, et incline toutes nos puissances à cette croyance, en sorte que notre âme y tombe naturellement. Quand on ne croit que par la force de la conviction, et que l'automate est incliné à croire le contraire, ce n'est pas assez." (Pascal, Pensées, ch. xi. p. 237, ed. Louandre, Paris, 1854.)

Herein Pascal coincides with Montaigne, of whom he often speaks harshly enough: "Comme de vray nous n'avons aultre mire de la vérité et de la raison, que l'exemple et idée des opinions et usances du païs où nous sommes: là est tousiours la parfaicte religion, la parfaicte police, parfaict et accomply usage de toutes choses." (Essais de Montaigne, liv. i. ch. 30.) Compare the same train of thought in Descartes (Discours sur la Méthode, pp. 132-139, ed. Cousin).

where no such special officers exist, we find Plato himself describing forcibly (in the speech assigned to Protagoras)[1] the working of that spontaneous ever-present police by whom the authority of King Nomos is enforced in detail—a police not the less omnipotent because they wear no uniform, and carry no recognised title.

Small minority of exceptional individual minds, who do not yield to the esta-

There are, however, generally a few exceptional minds to whom this omnipotent authority of King Nomos is repugnant, and who claim a right to investigate and judge for themselves on many points already settled and foreclosed by the prevalent orthodoxy. In childhood and youth these minds must have gone through

[1] Plat. Protag. 320-328. The large sense of the word Νόμος, as conceived by Pindar and Herodotus, must be kept in mind, comprising positive morality, religious ritual, consecrated habits, the local turns of sympathy and antipathy, &c. M. Salvador observes, respecting the Mosaic Law: "Qu'on écrive tous les rapports publics et privés qui unissent les membres d'un peuple quelconque, et tous les principes sur lesquels ces rapports sont fondés—il en résultera un ensemble complet, un véritable système plus ou moins raisonnable, qui sera l'expression exacte de la manière d'exister de ce peuple. Or, cet ensemble ou ce système est ce que les Hébreux appellent la *tora*, la loi ou la constitution publique—en prenant ce mot dans le sens le plus étendu." (Salvador, Histoire des Institutions de Moïse, liv. i. ch. ii. p. 95.)

Compare also about the sense of the word *Lex*, as conceived by the Arabs, M. Renan, Averroès, p. 286, and Mr. Mill's chapter respecting the all-comprehensive character of the Hindoo law (Hist. of India, ch. iv., beginning): "In the law books of the Hindus, the details of jurisprudence and judicature occupy comparatively a very moderate space. The doctrines and ceremonies of religion; the rules and practice of education; the institutions, duties, and customs of domestic life; the maxims of private morality, and even of domestic economy; the rules of government, of war, and of negotiation; all form essential parts of the Hindu code of law, and are treated in the same style, and laid down with the same authority, as the rules for the distribution of justice."

Mr. Maine, in his admirable work on Ancient Law, notes both the all-comprehensive and the irresistible ascendancy of what is called *Law* in early societies. He remarks emphatically that "the stationary condition of the human race is the rule—the progressive condition the exception—a rare exception in the history of the world". (Chap. i. pp. 16-18-19; chap. ii. pp. 22-24.)

Again, Mr. Maine observes:—"The other liability, to which the infancy of society is exposed, has prevented or arrested the progress of far the greater part of mankind. The rigidity of ancient law, arising chiefly from its early association and identification with religion, has chained down the mass of the human race to those views of life and conduct which they entertained at the time when their institutions were first consolidated into a systematic form. There were one or two races exempted by a marvellous fate from this calamity: and grafts from these stocks have fertilised a few modern societies. But it is still true that over the larger part of the world, the perfection of law has always been considered as consisting in adherence to the ground-plan supposed to have been marked out by the legislator. *If intellect has in such cases been exercised upon jurisprudence, it has uniformly prided itself on the subtle perversity of the conclusions it could build on ancient texts, without discoverable departure from their literal tenor.*" (Maine, Ancient Law, ch. iv. pp. 77-78.)

the ordinary influences,[1] but without the permanent stamp which such influences commonly leave behind. Either the internal intellectual force of the individual is greater, or he contracts a reverence for some new authority, or (as in the case of Sokrates) he believes himself to have received a special mission from the Gods—in one way or other the imperative character of the orthodoxy around him is so far enfeebled, that he feels at liberty to scrutinise for himself the assemblage of beliefs and sentiments around him. If he continues to adhere to them, this is because they approve themselves to his individual reason: unless this last condition be fulfilled, he becomes a dissenter, proclaiming his dissent more or less openly, according to circumstances. Such disengagement from authority traditionally consecrated (*ἐξαλλαγὴ τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων*),[2] and assertion of the right of self-judgment, on the part of a small

blished orthodoxy, but insist on exercising their own judgment.

[1] Cicero, Tusc. D. iii. 2; Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. x. 10, 1179, b. 23. *ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύῃ, ἀλλὰ δέῃ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἤθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα.* To the same purpose Plato, Republ. iii. 402 A, Legg. ii. 653 B, 659 E, Plato and Aristotle (and even Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 2, 3), aiming at the formation of a body of citizens, and a community very different from anything which they saw around them—require to have the means of shaping the early sentiments, love, hatred, &c., of children, in a manner favourable to their own ultimate views. This is exactly what *Νόμος Βασιλεὺς* does effectively in existing societies, without need of special provision for the purpose. See Plato, Protagor. 325, 326.

[2] Plato, Phædrus, 265 A. See Sir Will. Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lect. 29, pp. 88-90. In the Timæus (p. 40 E) Plato interrupts the thread of his own speculations on cosmogony, to take in all the current theogony on the authority of King Nomos. *ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς οἰκεῖα φάσκουσιν ἀπαγγέλλειν ἑπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον.*

Hegel adverts to this severance of the individual consciousness from the common consciousness of the community, as the point of departure for philosophical theory:—"On one hand we are now called upon to find some specific matter for the general form of Good; such closer determination of The Good is the criterion required. On the other hand, the exigencies of the individual subject come prominently forward: this is the consequence of the revolution which Sokrates operated in the Greek mind. So long as the religion, the laws, the political constitution, of any people, are in full force—so long as each individual citizen is in complete harmony with them all—no one raises the question, What has the Individual to do for himself? In a moralised and religious social harmony, each individual finds his destination prescribed by the established routine; while this positive morality, religion, laws, form also the routine of *his own* mind. On the contrary, if the Individual no longer stands on the custom of his nation, nor feels himself in full agreement with the religion and laws—he then no longer finds what he desires, nor obtains satisfaction in the medium around him. When once such discord has become confirmed, the Individual must fall back on his own reflections, and seek his destination there. This is what gives rise to the question—What is the essential scheme for the Individual? To what ought he to conform—what shall he aim at? An *ideal* is thus set up for the Individual. This is, the Wise Man, or the Ideal of the Wise

minority of ἰδιογνώμονες,[1] is the first condition of existence for philosophy or "reasoned truth".

Early appearance of a few free-judging individuals, or freethinkers in Greece.

Amidst the epic and lyric poets of Greece, with their varied productive impulse—as well as amidst the Gnomic philosophers, the best of whom were also poets—there are not a few manifestations of such freely judging individuality. Xenophanes the philosopher, who wrote in poetry, censured severely several of the current narratives about the Gods and Pindar, though in more respectful terms, does the like. So too, the theories about the Kosmos, propounded by various philosophers, Thales, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, &c., were each of them the free offspring of an individual mind. But these were counter-affirmations: novel theories, departing from the common belief, yet accompanied by little or no debate, or attack, or defence: indeed the proverbial obscurity of Herakleitus, and the recluse mysticism of the Pythagoreans, almost excluded discussion. These philosophers (to use the phrase of Aristotle[2]) had

Man, which is, in truth, the separate working of individual self-consciousness, conceived as an universal or typical character." (Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, Part ii. pp. 132, 133.)

[1] This is an expression of the learned Huet, Bishop of Avranches:—"Si quelqu'un me demande maintenant, ce que nous sommes, puisque nous ne voulons être ni Académiciens, ni Sceptiques, ni Eclectiques, ni d'aucune autre Secte, je répondrai que *nous sommes nôtres*—c'est à dire libres: ne voulans soumettre notre esprit à aucune autorité, et n'approuvans que ce qui nous paroit s'approcher plus près de la vérité. Que si quelqu'un, par mocquerie ou par flatterie, nous appelle ἰδιογνώμονας—c'est à dire, attachés à nos propres sentimens, nous n'y répugnerons pas." (Huet, Traité Philosophique de la Foiblesse de l'Esprit Humain, liv. ii. ch. xi. p. 224, ed. 1741.)

[2] Aristot. Metaphys. A. 987, *b.* 32. Eusebius, having set forth the dissentient and discordant opinions of the various Hellenic philosophers, triumphantly contrasts with them the steady adherence of Jews and Christians to one body of truth, handed down by an uniform tradition from father to son, from the first generation of man—ἀπὸ πρώτης ἀνθρωπογονίας. (Præp. Ev. xiv. 3.)

Cicero, in the treatise (not preserved) entitled *Hortensius*—set forth, at some length, an attack and a defence of philosophy; the former he assigned to Hortensius, the latter he undertook in his own name. One of the arguments urged by Hortensius against philosophy, to prove that it was not "vera sapientia," was, that it was both a human invention and a recent novelty, not handed down by tradition *a principio*, therefore not natural to man. "Quæ si secundum hominis naturam est, cum homine ipso cœperit necesse est; si vero non est, nec capere quidem illam posset humana natura. Ubi apud antiquiores latuit amor iste investigandæ veritatis?" (Lactantius, Inst. Divin. iii. 16.) The loss of this Ciceronian pleading (Philosophy *versus* Consecrated Tradition) is much to be deplored. Lactantius and Augustin seem to have used it largely.

The Hermotimus of Lucian, manifesting all his lively Sokratic acuteness, is a dialogue intended to expose the worthlessness of all speculative philosophy. The respondent Hermotimus happens to be a Stoic, but the assailant expressly declares (c. 85) that the arguments would be equally valid against Platonists or Aristotelians. Hermotimus is advised to

no concern with Dialectic: which last commenced in the fifth century B.C., with the Athenian drama and dikastery, and was enlisted in the service of philosophy by Zeno the Eleate and Sokrates.

Rise of Dialectic—Effect of the Drama and the Dikastery.

Both the drama and the dikastery recognise two or more different ways of looking at a question, and require that no conclusion shall be pronounced until opposing disputants have been heard and compared. The Eumenides plead against Apollo, Prometheus against the mandates and dispositions of Zeus, in spite of the superior dignity as well as power with which Zeus is invested: every Athenian citizen, in his character of dikast, took an oath to hear both the litigant parties alike, and to decide upon the pleadings and evidence according to law. Zeno, in his debates with the anti-Parmenidean philosophers, did not trouble himself to parry their thrusts. He assumed the aggressive, impugned the theories of his opponents, and exposed the contradictions in which they involved themselves. The dialectic process, in which there are (at the least) two opposite points of view both represented—the negative and the affirmative—became both prevalent and interesting.

Application of Negative scrutiny to ethical and social topics by Sokrates.

I have in a former chapter explained the dialectic of Zeno, as it bore upon the theories of the anti-Parmenidean philosophers. Still more important was the proceeding of Sokrates, when he applied the like scrutiny to ethical, social, political, religious topics. He did not come forward with any counter-theories: he declared expressly that he had none to propose, and that he was ignorant. He put questions to those who on their side professed to know, and he invited answers from them. His mission, as he himself described it, was, to scrutinise and expose false pretensions to knowledge. Without such scrutiny, he declares life itself to be not worth having. He impugned the common and traditional creed, not in the name of any competing doctrine,

desist from philosophy, to renounce inquiry, to employ himself in some of the necessary affairs of life, and to acquiesce in the common received opinions, which would carry him smoothly along the remainder of his life (ἀξιῶ πράττειν τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, καὶ ὅ σε παραπέμψει ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ βίου, τὰ κοινὰ ταῦτα φρονοῦντα, c. 72). Among the worthless philosophical speculations Lucian ranks geometry: the geometrical definitions (point and line) he declares to be nonsensical and inadmissible (c. 74).

but by putting questions on the familiar terms in which it was confidently enunciated, and by making its defenders contradict themselves and feel the shame of their own contradictions. The persons who held it were shown to be incapable of defending it, when tested by an acute cross-examiner; and their supposed knowledge, gathered up insensibly from the tradition around them, deserved the language which Bacon applies to the science of his day, conducting indirectly to the necessity of that remedial course which Bacon recommends. "Nemo adhuc tantâ mentis constantiâ et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi proposuerit, theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum et æquum ad particularia rursus applicare. Itaque ratio illa quam habemus, ex multâ fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus quas primo hausimus notionibus, farrago quædam est et congeries."[1]

Never before (so far as we know) had the authority of King Nomos been exposed to such an enemy as this dialectic or cross-examination by Sokrates: the prescriptive creed and unconsciously imbibed sentiment ("ratio ex fide, casu, et puerilibus notionibus") being thrown upon their defence against negative scrutiny brought to bear upon them by the inquisitive reason of an individual citizen. In the Apology, Sokrates clothes his own strong intellectual *œstrus* in the belief (doubtless sincerely entertained) of a divine mission. In the Gorgias, the Platonic Sokrates asserts it in naked and simple, yet not less emphatic, language. "You, Polus, bring against me the authority of the multitude, as well as that of the most eminent citizens, all of whom agree in upholding your view. But I, one man standing here alone, do *not* agree with you. And I engage to compel you, my one respondent, to agree with *me*."[2] The autonomy or inde-

Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the right of satisfaction for his own individual reason.

Bacon, Nov. Org. Aph. 97. I have already cited this passage in a note on the 68th chapter of my 'History of Greece,' pp. 612-613; in which note I have also alluded to other striking passages of Bacon, indicating the confusion, inconsistencies, and misapprehensions of the "*intellectus sibi permissus*". In that note, and in the text of the chapter, I have endeavoured to illustrate the same view of the Sokratic procedure as that which is here taken.

[2] Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 A. καὶ νῦν, περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις, ὀλίγου σοὶ πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, ἐὰν βούλῃ κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ—ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου—ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία

pendence of individual reason against established authority, and the title of negative reason as one of the litigants in the process of philosophising, are first brought distinctly to view in the career of Sokrates.

With such a career, we need not wonder that Sokrates, though esteemed and admired by a select band of adherents, incurred a large amount of general unpopularity. The public (as I have before observed) do not admit the claim of independent exercise for individual reason. In the natural process of growth in the human mind, belief does not follow proof, but springs up apart from and independent of it: an immature intelligence believes first, and proves (if indeed it ever seeks proof) afterwards.[1] This mental tendency is farther confirmed by the pressure and authority of King Nomos; who is peremptory in exacting belief, but neither furnishes nor requires proof. The community, themselves deeply persuaded, will not hear with calmness the voice of a solitary reasoner, adverse to opinions thus established; nor do they like to be required to explain, analyse, or reconcile those opinions.[2] They disapprove especially that

Aversion of the Athenian public to the negative procedure of Sokrates. Mistake of supposing that that negative procedure belongs peculiarly to the Sophists and the Megarici.

ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια, ἥντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθαδε ἐκλέξασθαι. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι εἶς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με ἀναγκάζεις, &c.

[1] See Professor Bain's Chapter on Belief; one of the most original and instructive chapters in his volume on the Emotions and the Will, pp. 578-584. [Third Ed., pp. 505-538.]

[2] This antithesis and reciprocal repulsion—between the speculative reason of the philosopher who thinks for himself, and the established traditional convictions of the public—is nowhere more strikingly enforced than by Plato in the sixth and seventh books of the Republic; together with the corrupting influence exercised by King Nomos, at the head of his vehement and unanimous public, over those few gifted natures which are competent to philosophical speculation. See Plato, Rep. vi. 492-493.

The unfavourable feelings with which the attempts to analyse morality (especially when quite novel, as such attempts were in the time of Sokrates) are received in a community—are noticed by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his tract on Utilitarianism, ch. iii. pp. 38-39:—

"The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any supposed moral standard, What is its sanction? What are the motives to obey it? or more specifically, What is the source of its obligation? Whence does it derive its binding force? It is a necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question: which though frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian morality, as if it had some special applicability to that above others, really arises in *regard to all standards*. It arises in fact whenever a person is called on to adopt a standard, or refer morality to any basis on which he has not been accustomed to rest it. For the customary morality, that which education and opinion have consecrated, is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being *in itself* obligatory: and when a person is asked to believe that this morality *derives* its obligation from

dialectic debate which gives free play and efficacious prominence to the negative arm. The like disapprobation is felt even by most of the historians of philosophy; who nevertheless, having an interest in the philosophising process, might be supposed to perceive that nothing worthy of being called *reasoned truth* can exist, without full and equal scope to negative as well as to affirmative.

The same charges which the historians of philosophy bring against the Sophists were brought by contemporary Athenians against Sokrates. They represent the standing dislike of free inquiry, usual with an orthodox public.

These historians usually speak in very harsh terms of the Sophists, as well as of Eukleides and the Megaric sect; who are taken as the great apostles of negation. But the truth is, that the Megarics inherited it from Sokrates, and shared it with Plato. Eukleides cannot have laid down a larger programme of negation than that which we read in the Apology of Sokrates,—nor composed a dialogue more ultra-negative than the Platonic Parmenidês: nor, again, did he depart so widely, in principle as well as in precept, from existing institutions, as Plato in his Republic. The charges which historians of philosophy urge against the Megarics as well as against the persons whom they call the Sophists—such as corruption of youth—perversion of truth and morality, by making the worse appear the better reason—subversion of established beliefs—innovation as well as deception—all these were urged against Sokrates himself by his contemporaries,[1] and

some general principle round which custom has not thrown the same halo, the assertion is to him a paradox. The supposed corollaries seem to have a more binding force than the original theorem: the superstructure seems to stand better without than with what is represented as its foundation. . . . The difficulty has no peculiar application to the doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every attempt to analyse morality, and reduce it to principles: which, unless the principle is already in men's minds invested with as much sacredness as any of its applications, always seems to divest them of a part of their sanctity."

Epiktêtus observes that the refined doctrines acquired by the self-reasoning philosopher, often failed to attain that intense hold on his conviction, which the "rotten doctrines" inculcated from childhood possessed over the conviction of ordinary men. Διὰ τί οὖν ἐκεῖνοι (οἱ πολλοί, οἱ ἰδιῶται) ὑμῶν (τῶν φιλοσόφων) ἰσχυρότεροι; Ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τὰ σαπρὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ δογμάτων λαλοῦσιν; ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ κομψὰ ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν. . . . . Οὕτως ὑμᾶς οἱ ἰδιῶται νικῶσι· Παντραχοῦ γὰρ ἰσχυρὸν τὸ δόγμα· ἀνίκητον τὸ δόγμα. (Epiktêtus, iii. 16.)

[1] Themistius, in defending himself against contemporary opponents, whom he represents to have calumniated him, consoles himself by saying, among other observations, that these arrows have been aimed at all the philosophers successively—Sokrates, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus. Ὁ γὰρ σοφιστὴς καὶ ἀλαζὼν καὶ καινότομος πρῶτον μὲν Σωκράτους ὠνείδη ἦν, ἔπειτα Πλάτωνος ἐφεξῆς, εἶθ' ὕστερον Ἀριστοτέλους

indeed against all the philosophers indiscriminately, as we learn

καὶ Θεοφράστου. (Orat. xxiii. p 346, Dindorf.)

We read in Zeller's account of the Platonic philosophy (Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 368, ed. 2nd):

"Die propädeutische Begründung der Platonischen Philosophie besteht im Allgemeinen darin, dass der unphilosophische Standpunkt aufgelöst, und die Erhebung zum philosophischen in ihrer Nothwendigkeit nachgewiesen wird. Im Besondern können wir drey Stadien dieses Wegs unterscheiden. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet das gewöhnliche Bewusstsein. Indem die *Voraussetzungen, welche Diesem für ein Erstes und Festes gegolten hatten, dialektisch zersetzt werden, so erhalten wir zunächst das negative Resultat der Sophistik.* Erst wenn auch diese überwunden ist, kann der philosophische Standpunkt positiv entwickelt werden."

Zeller here affirms that it was the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias and others) who first applied negative analysis to the common consciousness; breaking up, by their dialectic scrutiny, those hypotheses which had before exercised authority therein, as first principles not to be disputed.

I dissent from this position. I conceive that the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias) did *not* do what Zeller affirms, and that Sokrates (and Plato after him) *did* do it. The negative analysis was the weapon of Sokrates, and not of Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, &c. It was he who declared (see Platonic Apology) that false persuasion of knowledge was at once universal and ruinous, and who devoted his life to the task of exposing it by cross-examination. The conversation of the Xenophontic Sokrates with Euthydêmus (Memor. iv. 2), exhibits a complete specimen of that aggressive analysis, brought to bear on the common consciousness, which Zeller ascribes to the Sophists: the Platonic dialogues, in which Sokrates cross-examines upon Justice, Temperance, Courage, Piety, Virtue, &c., are of the like character; and we know from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1-16) that Sokrates passed much time in such examinations with pre-eminent success.

I notice this statement of Zeller, not because it is peculiar to him (for most of the modern historians of philosophy affirm the same; and his history, which is the best that I know, merely repeats the ordinary view), but because it illustrates clearly the view which I take of the Sophists and Sokrates. Instead of the unmeaning abstract "*Sophistik*," given by Zeller and others, we ought properly to insert the word "*Sokratik*," if we are to have any abstract term at all.

Again—The negative analysis, which these authors call "Sophistik," they usually censure as discreditable and corrupting. To me it appears, on the contrary, both original and valuable, as one essential condition for bringing social and ethical topics under the domain of philosophy or "reasoned truth".

Professor Charles Thurot (in his Études sur Aristote, Paris, 1860, p. 119) takes a juster view than Zeller of the difference between Plato and the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias). "Les Sophistes, comme tous ceux qui dissertent superficiellement sur des questions de philosophie, et en particulier sur la morale et la politique, s'appuyaient sur l'autorité et le témoignage; ils alléguaient les vers des poètes célèbres qui passaient aux yeux des Grecs pour des oracles de sagesse: ils invoquaient l'opinion du commun des hommes. Platon récusait absolument ces deux espèces de témoignages. Ni les poètes ni le commun des hommes ne savent ce qu'ils disent, puisqu'ils ne peuvent en rendre raison. . . . . Aux yeux de Platon, il n'y a d'autre méthode, pour arriver au vrai et pour le communiquer, que la dialectique: qui est à la fois l'art d'interroger et de répondre, et l'art de définir et de diviser."

M. Thurot here declares (in my judgment very truly) that the Sophists appealed to the established ethical authorities, and dwelt upon or adorned the received common-places — that Plato denied these authorities, and brought his battery of negative cross-examination to bear upon them as well as upon their defenders. M. Thurot thus gives a totally different version of the procedure of the Sophists from that which is given by Zeller. Nevertheless he perfectly agrees with Zeller, and with Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates (Plat. Menon, pp. 91-92), in describing the Sophists as a class who made money by deceiving and perverting the minds of hearers (p. 120).

from Sokrates himself in the Apology.[1] They are outbursts of feeling natural to the practical, orthodox citizen, who represents the common sense of the time and place; declaring his antipathy to these speculative, freethinking innovations of theory, which challenges the prescriptive maxims of traditional custom and tests them by a standard approved by herself. The orthodox citizen does not feel himself in need of philosophers to tell him what is truth or what is virtue, nor what is the difference between real and fancied knowledge. On these matters he holds already settled persuasions, acquired from his fathers and his ancestors, and from the acknowledged civic authorities, spiritual and temporal;[2] who are to him exponents of the creed guaranteed by tradition :—

> "Quod sapio, satis est mihi: non ego curo
> Esse quod Arcesilas ærumnosique Solones."

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[1] Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 23 D. ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, &c.

Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον. The rich families in Athens severely reproached their relatives who frequented the society of Sokrates. Xenophon, Sympos. iv. 32.

[2] See this point strikingly set forth by Plato, Politikus, 299: also Plutarch, Ἐρωτικός, c. 13, 756 A.

This is the "auctoritas majorum," put forward by Cotta in his official character of *Pontifex*, as conclusive *per se*; when reasons are produced to sustain it, the reasons fail. (Cic. Nat. Deor. iii. 3, 5, 6, 9.)

The "auctoritas majorum," proclaimed by the Pontifex Cotta, may be illustrated by what we read in Father Paul's History of the Council of Trent, respecting the proceedings of that Council when it imposed the duty of accepting the authoritative interpretation of Scripture :—"Lorsqu'on fut à opiner sur le quatrième Article, presque tous se rendirent à l'avis du Cardinal Pachèco, qui représenta: Que l'Écriture ayant été expliquée par tant de gens éminens en piété et en doctrine, l'on ne pouvoit pas espérer de rien ajouter de meilleur: Que les nouvelles Hérésies etant toutes nées des nouveaux sens qu'on avoit donnés à l'Écriture, il étoit nécessaire d'arrêter la licence des esprits modernes, et de les obliger de se laisser gouverner par les Anciens et par l'Église: Et que si quelqu'un naissoit avec un esprit singulier, on devoit le forcer à le renfermer au dedans de lui-même, et à ne pas troubler le monde en publiant tout ce qu'il pensoit." (Fra Paolo, Histoire du Concile de Trente, traduction Françoise, par Le Courayer, Livre II. p. 284, 285, in 1546, pontificate of Paul III.)

P. 289. "Par le second Décret, il étoit ordonné en substance, de tenir l'Édition Vulgate pour authentique dans les leçons publiques, les disputes, les prédications, et les explications; et défendre à qui que ce fut de la rejeter. On y défendoit aussi d'expliquer la Saint Écriture dans un sens contraire à celui que lui donne la Sainte Église notre Mère, et au consentement unanime des Pères, quand bien même on auroit intention de tenir ces explications secrètes; et on ordonnoit que ceux qui contreviendroient à cette défense fussent punis par les Ordinaires."

He will not listen to ingenious sophistry respecting these consecrated traditions: he does not approve the tribe of fools who despise what they are born to, and dream of distant, unattainable novelties:[1] he cannot tolerate the nice discoursers, ingenious hair-splitters, priests of subtleties and trifles—dissenters from the established opinions, who corrupt the youth, teaching their pupils to be wise above the laws, to despise or even beat their fathers and mothers,[2] and to cheat their creditors—mischievous

[1] Pindar, Pyth. iii. 21.

Ἔστι δὲ φῦλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισι ματαιότατον,
Ὅστις αἰσχύνων ἐπιχώρια παπταίνει τὰ πόρσω,
Μεταμώνια θηρεύων ἀκράντοις ἐλπίσιν.

[2] Οὐδὲν σοφιζόμεσθα τοῖσι δαίμοσι·
Πατρίους παραδοχὰς, ἃς θ' ὁμήλικας χρόνῳ
Κεκτήμεθ', οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ καταβαλεῖ λόγος,
Οὔδ' εἰ δι' ἄκρων τὸ σοφὸν ηὕρηται φρενῶν.
(Euripides, Bacchæ, 200.)

Illud in his rebus vereor, ne forté rearis
Impia te rationis inire elementa, viamque
Endogredi sceleris. (Lucretius, i. 85.)

Compare Valckenaer, Diatrib. Euripp. 38, 39, cap. 5.

About the accusations against Sokrates, of leading the youth to contract doubts and to slight the authority of their fathers, see Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 52; Plato, Gorgias, 522 B, p. 79, Menon, p. 70. A touching anecdote, illustrating this displeasure of the fathers against Sokrates, may be found in Xenophon, Cyropæd. iii. 1, 39, where the father of Tigranes puts to death the σοφιστὴς who had taught his son, because that son had contracted a greater attachment to the σοφιστὴς than to his own father.

Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 9; i. 2, 49. Apolog. So. s. 20; compare the speech of Kleon in Thucyd. iii. 37. Plato, Politikus, p. 299 E.

Timon in the Silli bestows on Sokrates and his successors the title of ἀκριβόλογοι. Diog. Laert. ii. 19. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 8. Aristophan. Nubes, 130, where Strepsiades says—

πῶς οὖν γερὼν ὢν κἀπιλήσμων καὶ βραδὺς
λόγων ἀκριβῶν σχινδαλάμους μαθήσομαι;

Compare 320-359 of the same comedy—σύ τε λεπτοτάτων λήρων ἱερεῦ—also Ranæ, 149, b.

When Euripides (ὁ σκηνικὸς φιλόσοφος) went down to Hades, he is described by Aristophanes as giving clever exhibitions among the malefactors there, with great success and applause. Ranæ, 771—

Ὅτε δὴ κατῆλθ' Εὐριπίδης, ἐπεδείκνυτο
τοῖς λωποδύταις καὶ τοῖς βαλαντιη-
τόμοις . . .
ὅπερ ἔστ' ἐν Ἅιδου πλῆθος· οἱ δ' ἀκρώμενοι
τῶν ἀντιλογιῶν καὶ λυγισμῶν καὶ στροφῶν
ὑπερεμάνησαν, κἀνόμισαν σοφώτατον.

These astute cavils and quibbles of Euripides are attributed by Aristophanes, and the other comic writers, to his frequent conversations with Sokrates. Ranæ, 1490-1500. Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhet. p. 301-355. Valckenaer, Diatribe in Euripid. c. 4. Aristophanes describes Sokrates as having stolen a garment from the palæstra (Nubes, 180); and Eupolis also introduces him as having stolen a wine-ladle (Schol. ad loc. Eupolis, Fragm. Incert. ix. ed. Meineke). The fragment of Eupolis (xi. p. 553, Ἀδολεσχεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκδίδαξον, ὦ σοφιστά) seems to apply to Sokrates. About the sympathy of the people with the attacks of the comic writers on Sokrates, see Lucian, Piscat. c. 25.

The rhetor Aristeides (Orat. xlvi. Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων, pp. 406-407-408, Dindorf), after remarking on the very vague and general manner in which the title Σοφιστὴς was applied among the Greeks (Herodotus having so designated both Solon and Pythagoras), mentions that Androtion not only spoke of the seven wise men as τοὺς ἑπτα σοφιστάς, but also called Sokrates σοφιστὴν τοῦτον τὸν πάνυ: that Lysias called Plato σοφιστήν, and called Æschines (the Sokratic) by the same

instructors, whose appropriate audience are the thieves and malefactors, and who ought to be silenced if they display ability to pervert others.[1] Such feeling of disapprobation and antipathy against speculative philosophy and dialectic—against the *libertas philosophandi*—counts as a branch of virtue among practical and orthodox citizens, rich or poor, oligarchical or democratical, military or civil, ancient or modern. It is an antipathy common to men in other respects very different, to Nikias as well as Kleon, to Eupolis and Aristophanes as well as to Anytus and Demochares. It was expressed forcibly by the Roman Cato (the Censor), when he censured Sokrates as a dangerous and violent citizen; aiming, in his own way, to subvert the institutions and customs of the country, and poisoning the minds of his fellow-citizens with opinions hostile to the laws.[2] How much courage is required in any individual citizen, to proclaim conscientious dissent in the face of wide-spread and established convictions, is recognised by Plato himself, and that too in the most orthodox and intolerant of all his compositions.[3] He (and Aristotle after

title; that Isokrates represented himself, and rhetors and politicians like himself, as φιλοσόφους, while he termed the dialecticians and critics σοφιστάς. Nothing could be more indeterminate than these names, σοφιστὴς and φιλόσοφος. It was Plato who applied himself chiefly to discredit the name σοφιστὴς (ὁ μάλιστα ἐπαναστὰς τῷ ὀνόματι); but others had tried to discredit φιλόσοφος and τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν in like manner. It deserves notice that in the restrictive or censorial law (proposed by Sophokles, and enacted by the Athenians in B.C. 307, but repealed in the following year) against the philosophers and their schools, the philosophers generally are designated as σοφισταί. Pollux, Onomast. ix. 42. ἔστι δὲ καὶ νόμος Ἀττικὸς κατὰ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων γραφείς, ὃν Σοφοκλῆς Ἀμφικλείδου Σουνιεὺς εἶπεν, ἐν ᾧ τινα κατὰ αὐτῶν προειπὼν, ἐπήγαγε, μὴ ἐξεῖναι μηδενὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν διατρῖβην κατασκευάσασθαι.

[1] Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3 C-D. Ἀθηναίοις γὰρ οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμοῦνται, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι.

[2] Plato, Menon pp. 90-92. The antipathy manifested here by Anytus against the Sophists, is the same feeling which led him to indict Sokrates, and which induced also Cato the Censor to hate the character of Sokrates, and Greek letters generally. Plutarch, Cato, 23: ὅλως φιλοσοφίᾳ προσκεκρουκὼς, καὶ πᾶσαν Ἑλληνικὴν μοῦσαν καὶ παιδείαν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας προπηλακίζων· ὅς γε καὶ Σωκράτη φησὶ λάλον καὶ βίαιον γενόμενον ἐπιχειρεῖν, ᾧ τρόπῳ δυνατὸν ἦν, τυραννεῖν τῆς πατρίδος, καταλύοντα τὰ ἔθη, καὶ πρὸς ἐναντίας τοῖς νόμοις δόξας ἕλκοντα καὶ μεθίστανται τοὺς πολίτας. Comp. Cato, Epist. ap. Plin. H. N. xxix. 7.

[3] Plato, Legg. viii. p. 835 C. νῦν δε ἀνθρώπου τολμηροῦ κινδυνεύει δεῖσθαί τινος, ὃς παῤῥησίαν διαφερόντως τιμῶν ἐρεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἄριστ' εἶναι πόλει καὶ πολίταις, ἐν ψυχαῖς διεφθαρμέναις τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἑπόμενον πάσῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τάττων, ἐναντία λέγων ταῖς μεγίσταισιν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ οὐκ ἔχων βοηθὸν ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα, λόγῳ ἑπόμενος μόνῳ μόνος.

Here the dissenter who proclaims his sincere convictions is spoken of with respect: compare the contrary feeling, Leges, ix. 881 A, and in the tenth book generally. In the striking passage of the Republic, referred to in a previous note (vi. 492), Plato declares the lessons taught by the multitude—the contagion

him), far from recognising the infallibility of established King Nomos, were bold enough[1] to try and condemn him, and to imagine (each of them) a new Νόμος of his own, representing the political Art or Theory of Politics—a notion which would not have been understood by Themistokles or Aristeides.

Aversion towards Sokrates aggravated by his extreme publicity of speech. His declaration, that false persuasion of knowledge is universal; must be understood as a basis in appreciating Plato's Dialogues of Search.

The dislike so constantly felt by communities having established opinions, towards free speculation and dialectic, was aggravated in its application to Sokrates, because his dialectic was not only novel, but also public, obtrusive, and indiscriminate.[2] The name of Sokrates, after his death, was employed not merely by Plato, but by all the Sokratic companions, to cover their own ethical speculations: moreover, all of them either composed works or gave lectures. But in either case, readers or hearers were comparatively few in number, and were chiefly persons prompted by some special taste or interest: while Sokrates passed his day in the most public place, eager to interrogate every one, and sometimes forcing his interrogations even upon reluctant hearers.[3] That he could have been allowed to persist in this course of life for thirty years,

of established custom and tradition, communicated by the crowd of earnest assembled believers—to be of overwhelming and almost omnipotent force. The individual philosopher (he says), who examines for himself and tries to stand against it, can hardly maintain himself without special divine aid.

[1] In the dialogue called Politikus, Plato announces formally and explicitly (what the historical Sokrates had asserted before him, Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 10) the exclusive pretensions of the Βασιλεὺς Τεχνικὸς (representing political science, art, or theory) to rule mankind—the illusory nature of all other titles to rule—and the mischievous working of all existing governments. The same view is developed in the Republic and the Leges. Compare also Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. x. p. 1180, b, 27 ad fin.

In a remarkable passage of the Leges (i. 637 D, 638 C), Plato observes, in touching upon the discrepancy between different local institutions at Sparta, Krete, Keos, Tarentum, &c.:—"If natives of different cities argue with each other about their respective institutions, each of them has a good and sufficient reason. This is the custom *with us; with you perhaps it is different.* But we, who are now conversing, do not apply our criticisms to the private citizen; we criticise the lawgiver himself, and try to determine whether his laws are good or bad." ἡμῖν δ' ἐστὶν οὐ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν αὐτῶν κακίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. King Nomos was not at all pleased to be thus put upon his trial.

[2] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3. "Est enim philosophia paucis contenta judicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et suspecta et invisa," &c.

The extreme publicity, and indiscriminate, aggressive conversation of Sokrates, is strongly insisted on by Themistius (Orat. xxvi. p. 384, Ὑπὲρ τοῦ λέγειν) as aggravating the displeasure of the public against him.

[3] Xenophon, Memor. iv. 2, 3-5-40.

when we read his own account (in the Platonic Apology) of the antipathy which he provoked—and when we recollect that the Thirty, during their short dominion, put him under an interdict —is a remarkable proof of the comparative tolerance of Athenian practice.

However this may be, it is from the conversation of Sokrates that the Platonic Dialogues of Search take their rise, and we must read them under those same fundamental postulates which Sokrates enunciates to the Dikasts. "False persuasion of knowledge is almost universal: the Elenchus, which eradicates this, is salutary and indispensable: the dialectic search for truth between two active, self-working minds, both of them ignorant, yet both feeling their own ignorance, is instructive, as well as fascinating, though it should end without finding any truth at all, and without any other result than that of discovering some proposed hypotheses to be untrue." The modern reader must be invited to keep these postulates in mind, if he would fairly appreciate the Platonic Dialogues of Search. He must learn to esteem the mental exercise of free debate as valuable in itself,[1] even though the goal recedes before him in proportion to the steps which he makes in advance. He perceives a lively antithesis of opinions, several distinct and dissentient points of view opened, various tentatives of advance made and broken off. He has the first half of the process of truth-seeking, without the last; and even without full certainty that the last half can be worked out, or that the problem as propounded is one which admits of an affirmative solution.[2] But Plato presumes that the

[1] Aristotel. Topica, i. p. 101, a. 29, with the Scholion of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who remarks that the habit of colloquial debate had been very frequent in the days of Aristotle, and afterwards; but had comparatively ceased in his own time, having been exchanged for written treatises. P. 254, b. Schol. Brandis; also Plato, Parmenid. pp. 135, 136, and the Commentary of Proklus thereupon, p. 776 seqq., and p. 917, ed. Stallbaum.

[2] A passage in one of the speeches composed by Lysias, addressed by a plaintiff in court to the Dikasts, shows how debate and free antithesis of opposite opinions were accounted as essential to the process τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν —καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὤμην φιλοσοφοῦντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀντιλέγειν τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον· οἱ δ' ἄρα οὐκ ἀντέλεγον, ἀλλ' ἀντέπραττον. (Lysias, Or. viii. Κακολογιῶν, s. 12, p. 273; compare Plat. Apolog. p. 28 E.)

Bacon describes his own intellectual cast of mind, in terms which illustrate the Platonic διάλογοι ζητητικοί,—the character of the searcher, doubter, and tester, as contrasted with that of the confident affirmer and expositor:— "Me ipsum autem ad veritatis contemplationes quam ad alia magis fabrefactum deprehendi, ut qui mentem et ad rerum similitudinem (quod maxi-

search will be renewed, either by the same interlocutors or by others. He reckons upon responsive energy in the youthful subject; he addresses himself to men of earnest purpose and stirring intellect, who will be spurred on by the dialectic exercise itself to farther pursuit—men who, having listened to the working out of different points of view, will meditate on these points for themselves, and apply a judicial estimate conformable to the measure of their own minds. Those respondents, who, after having been puzzled and put to shame by one cross-examination, became disgusted and never presented themselves again—were despised by Sokrates as lazy and stupid.[1]

mum est) agnoscendum satis mobilem, et ad differentiarum subtilitates observandas satis fixam et intentam haberem—qui et *quærendi desiderium*, et *dubitandi patientiam*, et *meditandi voluptatem*, et *asserendi cunctationem*, et *resipiscendi facilitatem*, et disponendi sollicitudinem tenerem—quique nec novitatem affectarem, nec antiquitatem admirarer, et omnem impostúram odissem. Quare naturam meam cum veritate quandam familiaritatem et cognationem habere judicavi." (Impetus Philosophici, De Interpretatione Naturæ Proœmium.)

Σωκρατικῶς εἰς ἑκάτερον is the phrase of Cicero, ad Atticum. ii. 3.

[1] Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 40.

Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his Essay on Liberty, has the following remarks, illustrating Plato's Dialogues of Search. I should have been glad if I could have transcribed here many other pages of that admirable Essay: which stands almost alone as an unreserved vindication of the rights of the searching individual intelligence, against the compression and repression of King Nomos (pp. 79-80-81):—

"The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to or defending it against opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefits of its universal recognition. Where this advantage cannot be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a substitute for it: some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion eager for his conversion.

"But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost those they formerly had. The Sokratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this description. They were essentially a discussion of the great questions of life and philosophy, directed with consummate skill to the purpose of convincing any one, who had merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion, that he did not understand the subject—that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed: in order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school-disputations of the middle ages had a similar object. They were intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it—and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. These last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the premisses appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason; and as a discipline to the mind they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the 'Socratici viri'. But the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit; and the present modes of instruction contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other. . . . It is the fashion of the

For him, as well as for Plato, the search after truth counted as the main business of life.

Another matter must here be noticed, in regard to these Dialogues of Search. We must understand how Plato conceived the goal towards which they tend . that is, the state of mind which he calls *knowledge* or *cognition*. Knowledge (in his view) is not attained until the mind is brought into clear view of the Universal Forms or Ideas, and intimate communion with them: but the test (as I have already observed) for determining whether a man has yet attained this end or not, is to ascertain whether he can give to others a full account of all that he professes to know, and can extract from them a full account of all that they profess to know: whether he can perform, in a manner exhaustive as well as unerring, the double and correlative function of asking and answering: in other words, whether he can administer the Sokratic cross-examination effectively to others, and reply to it without faltering or contradiction when administered to himself.[1] Such being the way in which Plato conceives knowledge, we may easily see that it cannot be produced, or even approached, by direct, demonstrative, didactic communication: by simply announcing to the hearer, and lodging in his memory, a theorem to be proved, together with the steps whereby it is proved. He must be made familiar with each subject on many sides, and under several different aspects and analogies: he must have had before him objections with their refutation, and

Result called *knowledge*, which Plato aspires to. Power of going through a Sokratic cross-examination: not attainable except through the Platonic process and method.

present time to disparage negative logic—that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result, but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physical departments of speculation. On any other subject no one's opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents."

[1] See Plato, Republic, vii. 518, B, C, about παιδεία, as developing *τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἑκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*: and 534, about *ἐπιστήμη*, with its test, *τὸ δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον*. Compare also Republic, v. 477, 478, with Theætêt. 175, C, D; Phædon, 76, B; Phædrus, 276; and Sympos. 202 A. *τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι, οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι οὔτε ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν; ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη;*

the fallacious arguments which appear to prove the theorem, but do not really prove it:[1] he must be introduced to the principal counter-theorems, with the means whereby an opponent will enforce them: he must be practised in the use of equivocal terms and sophistry, either to be detected when the opponent is cross-examining him, or to be employed when he is cross-examining an opponent. All these accomplishments must be acquired, together with full promptitude and flexibility, before he will be competent to perform those two difficult functions, which Plato considers to be the test of knowledge. You may say that such a result is indefinitely distant and hopeless: Plato considers it attainable, though he admits the arduous efforts which it will cost. But the point which I wish to show is, that if attainable at all, it can only be attained through a long and varied course of such dialectic discussion as that which we read in the Platonic Dialogues of Search. The state and aptitude of mind called knowledge, can only be generated as a last result of this continued practice (to borrow an expression of Longinus).[2] The Platonic method is thus in perfect harmony and co-ordination with the Platonic result, as described and pursued.

Moreover, not merely method and result are in harmony, but also the topics discussed. These topics were ethical, social, and political: matters especially human[3] (to use the phrase of Sokrates himself) familiar to every man,—handled, unphilosophically, by speakers in the assembly, pleaders in the dikastery, dramatists in the

Platonic process adapted to Platonic topics—man and society.

[1] On this point the scholastic manner of handling in the Middle Ages furnishes a good illustration for the Platonic dialectic. I borrow a passage from the treatise of M. Hauréau, De la Phil. Scolastique, vol. ii. p. 190.

"Saint Thomas pouvait s'en tenir là: nous le comprenons, nous avons tout son système sur l'origine des idées, et nous pouvons croire qu'il n'a plus rien à nous apprendre à ce sujet: mais en scolastique, il ne suffit pas de démontrer, par deux ou trois arguments, réputés invincibles, ce que l'on suppose être la vérité, il faut, en outre, répondre aux objections première, seconde, troisième, &c., &c., de divers interlocuteurs, souvent imaginaires; il faut établir la parfaite concordance de la conclusion énoncée et des conclusions précédentes ou subséquentes; il faut reproduire, à l'occasion de tout problème controversé, l'ensemble de la doctrine pour laquelle on s'est déclaré."

[2] Longinus, De Sublim. s. 6. *καίτοι τὸ πρᾶγμα δύσληπτον· ἡ γὰρ τῶν λόγων κρίσις πολλῆς ἐστι πείρας τελευταῖον ἐπιγέννημα.* Compare what is said in a succeeding chapter about the Hippias Minor. And see also Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lect. 35, p. 224.

[3] Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 12-15. I transcribe the following passage from an article in the Edinburgh Review (April, 1866, pp. 325-326), on the first

theatre. Now it is exactly upon such topics that debate can be made most interesting, varied, and abundant. The facts, multifarious in themselves, connected with man and society, depend upon a variety of causes, co-operating and conflicting. Account must be taken of many different points of view, each of which has a certain range of application, and each of which serves to limit or modify the others: the generalities, even when true, are true only on the balance, and under ordinary circumstances;

edition of the present work: an article not merely profound and striking as to thought, but indicating the most comprehensive study and appreciation of the Platonic writings:—

"The enemy against whom Plato really fought, and the warfare against whom was the incessant occupation of his life and writings, was—not Sophistry, either in the ancient or modern sense of the term, but—*Commonplace*. It was the acceptance of traditional opinions and current sentiments as an ultimate fact; and bandying of the abstract terms which express approbation and disapprobation, desire and aversion, admiration and disgust, as if they had a meaning thoroughly understood and universally assented to. The men of his day (like those of ours) thought that they knew what Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, Honourable and Shameful, were—because they could use the words glibly, and affirm them of this or that, in agreement with existing custom. But what the property was, which these several instances possessed in common, justifying the application of the term, nobody had considered; neither the Sophists, nor the rhetoricians, nor the statesmen, nor any of those who set themselves up, or were set up by others, as wise. Yet whoever could not answer this question was wandering in darkness—had no standard by which his judgments were regulated, and which kept them consistent with one another—no rule which he knew and could stand by for the guidance of his life. Not knowing what Justice and Virtue are, it was impossible to be just and virtuous: not knowing what Good is, we not only fail to reach it, but are certain to embrace evil instead. Such a condition, to any one capable of thought, made life not worth having. The grand business of human intellect ought to consist in subjecting these terms to the most rigorous scrutiny, and bringing to light the ideas that lie at the bottom of them. Even if this cannot be done and real knowledge attained, it is already no small benefit to expel the false opinion of knowledge: to make men conscious of the things most needful to be known, fill them with shame and uneasiness at their own state, and rouse a pungent internal stimulus, summoning up all their energies to attack these greatest of all problems, and never rest until, as far as possible, the true solutions are reached. This is Plato's notion of the condition of the human mind in his time, and of what philosophy could do to help it: and any one who does not think the description applicable, with slight modifications, to the majority of educated minds in our own time and in all times known to us, certainly has not brought either the teachers or the practical men of any time to the Platonic test."

The Reviewer farther illustrates this impressive description by a valuable citation from Max Müller to the same purpose (Lectures on the Science of Language, Second Series, pp. 526-527). "Such terms as Nature, Law, Freedom, Necessity, Body, Substance, Matter, Church, State, Revelation, Inspiration, Knowledge, Belief, &c., are tossed about in the war of words as if every body knew what they meant, and as if every body used them exactly in the same sense; whereas most people, and particularly those who represent public opinion, pick up these complicated terms as children, beginning with the vaguest conceptions, adding to them from time to time—perhaps correcting likewise at haphazard some of their involuntary errors—but never taking stock, never either enquiring into the history of the terms which they handle so freely, or realising the fulness of their meaning according to the strict rules of logical definition."

they are liable to exception, if those circumstances undergo important change. There are always objections, real as well as apparent, which require to be rebutted or elucidated. To such changeful and complicated states of fact, the Platonic dialectic was adapted: furnishing abundant premisses and comparisons, bringing into notice many distinct points of view, each of which must be looked at and appreciated, before any tenable principle can be arrived at. Not only Platonic method and result, but also Platonic topics, are thus well suited to each other. The general terms of ethics were familiar but undefined: the tentative definitions suggested, followed up by objections available against each, included a large and instructive survey of ethical phenomena in all their bearings.

The negative procedure is so conspicuous, and even so preponderant, in the Platonic dialogues, that no historian of philosophy can omit to notice it. But many of them (like Xenophon in describing Sokrates) assign to it only a subordinate place and a qualified application: while some (and Schleiermacher especially) represent all the doubts and difficulties in the negative dialogues as exercises to call forth the intellectual efforts of the reader, preparatory to full and satisfactory solutions which Plato has given in the dogmatic dialogues at the end. The first half of this hypothesis I accept: the last half I believe to be unfounded. The doubts and difficulties were certainly exercises to the mind of Plato himself, and were intended as exercises to his readers; but he has nowhere provided a key to the solution of them. Where he propounds positive dogmas, he does not bring them face to face with objections, nor verify their authority by showing that they afford satisfactory solution of the difficulties exhibited in his negative procedure. The two currents of his speculation, the affirmative and the negative, are distinct and independent of each other. Where the affirmative is especially present (as in Timæus), the negative altogether disappears. Timæus is made to proclaim the most sweeping theories, not one of which the real Sokrates would have suffered to pass without abundant cross-examination: but the Platonic Sokrates hears them with respect-

Plato does not provide solutions for the difficulties which he has raised. The affirmative an negative veins are in him completely distinct. His dogmas are enunciations *à priori* of some impressive sentiment.

ful silence, and commends afterwards. The declaration so often made by Sokrates that he is a searcher, not a teacher—that he feels doubts keenly himself, and can impress them upon others, but cannot discover any good solution of them—this declaration, which is usually considered mere irony, is literally true.[1] The Platonic theory of Objective Ideas separate and absolute, which the commentators often announce as if it cleared up all difficulties —not only clears up none, but introduces fresh ones belonging to itself. When Plato comes forward to affirm, his dogmas are altogether *à priori:* they enunciate preconceptions or hypotheses, which derive their hold upon his belief, not from any aptitude for solving the objections which he has raised, but from deep and solemn sentiment of some kind or other—religious, ethical, æsthetical, poetical, &c., the worship of numerical symmetry or exactness, &c. The dogmas are enunciations of some grand sentiment of the divine, good, just, beautiful, symmetrical, &c.,[2] which Plato follows out into corollaries. But this is a process of itself; and while he is performing it, the doubts previously raised are not called up to be solved, but are forgotten or kept out of sight. It is therefore a mistake to suppose[3] that Plato ties knots in one

[1] See the conversation between Menippus and Sokrates. (Lucian, Dialog. Mortuor. xx.)

[2] Dionysius of Halikarnassus remarks that the topics upon which Plato renounces the character of a searcher, and passes into that of a vehement affirmative dogmatist, are those which are above human investigation and evidence—the transcendental: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος (Plato) τὰ δόγματα οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀποφαίνεται, εἶτα περὶ αὐτῶν διαγωνίζεται· ἀλλ' ἐν μέσῳ τὴν ζήτησιν ποιούμενος πρὸς τοὺς διαλεγομένους, εὐρίσκων μᾶλλον τὸ δέον δόγμα, ἢ φιλονεικῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται· πλὴν ὅσα περὶ τῶν κρειττόνων, ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς, λέγεται. (Dion. Hal. Ars Rhet. c. 10, p. 376, Reiske.)

M. Arago, in the following passage, points to a style of theorising in the physical sciences, very analogous to that of Plato, generally:—

Arago, Biographies, vol. i. p. 149, Vie de Fresnel. "De ces deux explications des phénomènes de la lumière, l'une s'appelle la théorie de l'émission; l'autre est connue sous le nom de système des ondes. On trouve déjà des traces de la première dans les écrits d'Empédocle. Chez les modernes, je pourrais citer parmi ses adhérents Képler, Newton, Laplace. Le système des ondes ne compte pas des partisans moins illustres: Aristote, Descartes, Hooke, Huygens, Euler, l'avaient adopté. . . .

"Au reste, si l'on s'étonnait de voir d'aussi grands génies ainsi divisés, je dirais que de leurs temps la question on litige ne pouvait être résolue; que les expériences nécessaires manquaient; qu'alors les divers systèmes sur la lumière étaient, non *des déductions logiques des faits*, mais, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, de *simples vérités de sentiment;* qu'enfin, le don de l'infaillibilité n'est pas accordé même aux plus habiles, des qu'en sortant du domaine des observations, et se jetant dans celui des conjectures, ils abandonnent la marche sévère et assurée dont les sciences se prévalent de nos jours avec raison, et qui leur a fait faire de si incontestables progrès."

[3] Several of the Platonic critics speak as if they thought that Plato would never suggest any difficulty which he had not, beforehand and ready-made, the means of solving; and

dialogue only with a view to untie them in another; and that the doubts which he propounds are already fully solved in his own mind, only that he defers the announcement of the solution until the embarrassed hearer has struggled to find it for himself.

Some critics, assuming confidently that Plato must have produced a full breadth of positive philosophy to countervail his own negative fertility, yet not finding enough of it in the written dialogues—look for it elsewhere. Tennemann thinks, and his opinion is partly shared by Boeckh and K. F. Hermann, that the direct, affirmative, and highest principles of Plato's philosophy were enunciated only in his lectures: that the core, the central points, the great principles of his system (der Kern) were revealed thus orally to a few select students in plain and broad terms, while the dialogues were intentionally

Hypothesis—that Plato had solved all his own difficulties for himself; but that he communicated the solution only to a few select auditors in oral lectures untenable.

Munk treats the idea which I have stated in the text as ridiculous. "Plato (he observes) must have held preposterous doctrines on the subject of pædagogy. He undertakes to instruct others by his writings, before he has yet cleared up his own ideas on the question; he proposes, in propædeutic writings, enigmas for his scholars to solve, while he has not yet solved them himself; and all this for the praiseworthy *(ironically said)* purpose of correcting in their minds the false persuasion of knowledge." (Die natürliche Ordnung der Platon. Schrift. p. 515.)

That which Munk here derides, appears stated, again and again, by the Platonic Sokrates, as his real purpose. Munk is at liberty to treat it as ridiculous; but the ridicule falls upon Plato himself. The Platonic Sokrates disclaims the pædagogic function, describing himself as nothing more than a fellow searcher with the rest.

So too Munk declares (p. 79-80, and Zeller also, Philos. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 472, ed. 2nd) that Plato could not have composed the Parmenidês, including, as it does, such an assemblage of difficulties and objections against the theory of Ideas, until he possessed the means of solving all of them himself. This is a bold assertion, altogether conjectural; for there is no solution of them given in any of Plato's writings, and the solutions to which Munk alludes as given by Zeller and Steinhart (even assuming them to be satisfactory, which I do not admit) travel much beyond the limits of Plato.

Ueberweg maintains the same opinion (Ueber die Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften, p. 103-104); that Sokrates, in the Platonic Dialogues, though he appears as a Searcher, must nevertheless be looked upon as a matured thinker, who has already gone through the investigation for himself, and solved all the difficulties, but who goes back upon the work of search over again, for the instruction of the interlocutors. "The special talent and dexterity (Virtuosität) which Sokrates displays in conducting the dialogue, can only be explained by supposing that he has already acquired for himself a firm and certain conviction on the question discussed."

This opinion of Ueberweg appears to me quite untenable, as well as inconsistent with a previous opinion which he had given elsewhere (Platonische Welt-seele, p. 69-70)—That the Platonic Ideenlehre was altogether insufficient for explanation. The impression which the Dialogues of Search make upon me is directly the reverse. My difficulty is, to understand how the constructor of all these puzzles, if he has the answer ready

written so as to convey only indirect hints, illustrations, applications of these great principles, together with refutation of various errors opposed to them: that Plato did not think it safe or prudent to make any full, direct, or systematic revelation to the general public.[1] I have already said that I think this opinion untenable. Among the few points which we know respecting the oral lectures, one is, that they were delivered not to a select and prepared few, but to a numerous and unprepared audience: while among the written dialogues, there are some which, far from being popular or adapted to an ordinary understanding, are highly perplexing and abstruse. The Timæus does not confine itself to indirect hints, but delivers positive dogmas about the super-sensible world: though they are of a mystical cast, as we know that the oral lectures De Bono were also.

Characteristic of the oral lectures—That they were delivered in Plato's own name. In what other respects they departed from the dialogues, we cannot say.

Towards filling up this gap, then, the oral lectures cannot be shown to lend any assistance. The cardinal point of difference between them and the dialogues was, that they were delivered by Plato himself, in his own name; whereas he never published any written composition in his own name. But we do not know enough to say, in what particular way this difference would manifest itself. Besides the oral lectures, delivered to a numerous auditory, it is very probable that Plato held special communications upon philosophy with a few advanced pupils. Here however we are completely in the dark. Yet I see nothing, either in these supposed private communications or in the oral lectures, to controvert what was said in the last page—that Plato's affirmative

drawn up in his pocket, can avoid letting it slip out. At any rate, I stand upon the literal declarations, often repeated, of Sokrates; while Munk and Ueberweg contradict them.

For the doubt and hesitation which Plato puts into the mouth of Sokrates (even in the Republic, one of his most expository compositions) see a remarkable passage, Rep. v. p. 450 E. ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἅμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶ, &c.

[1] Tennemann, Gesch. der Philos. ii. pp. 205-220. Hermann, Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller. Motive, pp. 290-294.

Hermann considers this reserve and double doctrine to be unworthy of Plato, and ascribes it to Protagoras and other Sophists, on the authority of a passage in the Theætêtus (152 C), which does not at all sustain his allegation.

Hermann considers "die akroamatischen Lehren als Fortsetzung und Schluss stein der schriftlichen, die dort erst zur vollen Klarheit principieller Auffassung erhoben wurden, ohne jedoch über den nämlichen Gegenstand, soweit die Rede auf denselben kommen musste, etwas wesentlich Verschiedenes zu lehren" (p. 293).

philosophy is not fitted on to his negative philosophy, but grows out of other mental impulses, distinct and apart. Plato (as Aristotle tells us[1]) felt it difficult to determine, whether the march of philosophy was an ascending one toward the *principia* (*ἀρχὰς*), or a descending one down from the *principia*. A good philosophy ought to suffice for both, conjointly and alternately: in Plato's philosophy, there is no road explicable either upwards or downwards, between the two: no justifiable mode of participation (*μέθεξις*) between the two disparate worlds—intellect and sense. The *principia* of Plato take an impressive hold on the imagination: but they remove few or none of the Platonic difficulties; and they only seem to do this because the Sokratic Elenchus, so effective whenever it is applied, is never seriously brought to bear against them.

With persons who complain of prolixity in the dialogue—of threads which are taken up only to be broken off, devious turns and "passages which lead to nothing"—of much talk "about it and about it," without any peremptory decision from an authorised judge—with such complainants Plato has no sympathy. He feels a strong interest in the process of enquiry, in the debate *per se*: and he presumes a like interest in his readers. He has no wish to shorten the process, nor to reach the end and dismiss the question as settled.[2] On the contrary, he claims it as the privilege of phi-

Apart from any result, Plato has an interest in the process of search and debate *per se*. Protracted enquiry is a valuable privilege, not a tiresome obligation.

[1] Aristot. Eth. Nik. i. 4, 5. *εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός.*

[2] As an illustration of that class of minds which take delight in the *search* for truth in different directions, I copy the following passage respecting Dr. Priestley, from an excellent modern scientific biography. "Dr. Priestley had seen so much of the evil of obstinate adherence to opinions which time had rendered decrepit, not venerable—and had been so richly rewarded in his capacity of natural philosopher, by his adventurous explorations of new territories in science—that he unavoidably and unconsciously over-estimated the value of what was novel, and held himself free to change his opinions to an extent not easily sympathised with by minds of a different order. Some men love to *rest* in truth, or at least in settled opinions, and are uneasy till they find repose. They alter their beliefs with great reluctance, and dread the charge of inconsistency, even in reference to trifling matters. Priestley, on the other hand, was a *follower after truth, who delighted in the chase, and was all his life long pursuing, not resting in it.*

On all subjects which interested him he held by certain cardinal doctrines, but he left the outlines of his systems to be filled up as he gained experience, and to an extent very few men have done, disavowed any attempt to reconcile his changing views with each other, or to deprecate the charge of inconsistency. . . . I think it must be acknowledged by all who have

losophical research, that persons engaged in such discussions are noway tied to time; they are not like judicial pleaders, who, with a klepsydra or water-clock to measure the length of each speech, are under slavish dependence on the feelings of the Dikasts, and are therefore obliged to keep strictly to the point.[1] Whoever desires accurate training of mind must submit to go through a long and tiresome circuit.[2] Plato regards the process of enquiry as being in itself, both a stimulus and a discipline, in which the minds both of questioner and respondent are implicated and improved, each being indispensable to the other: he also represents it as a process, carried on under the immediate inspiration of the moment, without reflection or foreknowledge of the result.[3] Lastly, Plato has an interest in the dialogue, not

studied his writings, that in his scientific researches at least he carried this feeling too far; and that often when he had reached a truth in which he might and should have rested, his dread of anything like a too hasty stereotyping of a supposed discovery, induced him to welcome whatever seemed to justify him in renewing the *pursuit* of truth, and thus led him completely astray. Priestley indeed missed many a discovery, the clue to which was in his hands and in his alone, by not knowing where to stop."

(Dr. Geo. Wilson—Life of the Hon. H. Cavendish, among the publications of the Cavendish Society, 1851, p. 110-111.)

[1] Plato, Theætêt. p. 172.

[2] Plato, Republic, v. 450 B. *μέτρον δέ γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν, ὅλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν.* vi. 504 D. *Τὴν μακροτέραν περιϊτέον τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἧττον μανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ.* Also Phædrus, 274 A; Parmenid. p. 135 D, 136 D, *ἀμήχανον πραγματείαν —ἀδολεσχίας*, &c. Compare Politikus, 286, in respect to the charge of prolixity against him.

In the Hermotimus of Lucian, the assailant of philosophy draws one of his strongest arguments from the number of years required to examine the doctrines of all the philosophical sects: the whole of life would be insufficient (Lucian, Hermot. c. 47-48). The passages above cited, especially the first of them, show that Sokrates and Plato would not have been discouraged by this protracted work.

[3] Plato, Republic, iii. 394 D. *Μαντεύομαι* (says Glaukon) *σκοπεῖσθαί σε, εἴτε παραδεξόμεθα τραγῳδίαν τε καὶ κωμῳδίαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἴτε καὶ οὔ.* *Ἴσως* (says Sokrates) *καὶ πλείω ἔτι τούτων· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγέ πω οἶδα, ἀλλ' ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρῃ, ταύτῃ ἰτέον.* *Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη, λέγεις.*

The Republic, from the second book to the close, is one of those Platonic compositions in which Sokrates is most expository.

We find a remarkable passage in Des Cartes, wherein that very self-working philosopher expresses his conviction that the longer he continued enquiring, the more his own mind would become armed for the better appreciation of truth—and in which he strongly protests against any barrier restraining the indefinite liberty of enquiry.

"Et encore qu'il y en ait peut-être d'aussi bien sensés parmi les Perses ou les Chinois que parmi nous, il me semblait que le plus utile étoit, de me régler selon ceux avec lesquels j'aurois à vivre; et que, pour savoir quelles étoient véritablement leurs opinions, je devois plutôt prendre garde à ce qu'ils pratiquaient qu'à ce qu'ils disaient; non seulement à cause qu'en la corruption de nos mœurs, *il y a peu de gens qui veuillent dire tout ce qu'ils croient—mais aussi à cause que plusieurs l'ignorent eux mêmes; car l'action de la pensée, par laquelle on croit une chose étant différente de celle par laquelle on connoit qu'on la croit, elles sont souvent l'une sans l'autre.* Et entre plusieurs opinions

merely as a mental discipline, but as an artistic piece of workmanship, whereby the taste and imagination are charmed. The dialogue was to him what the tragedy was to Sophokles, and the rhetorical discourse to Isokrates. He went on "combing and curling it" (to use the phrase of Dionysius) for as many years as Isokrates bestowed on the composition of the Panegyrical Oration. He handles the dialectic drama so as to exhibit some one among the many diverse ethical points of view, and to show what it involves as well as what it excludes in the way of consequence. We shall not find the ethical point of view always the same: there are material inconsistencies and differences in this respect between one dialogue and another.

But amidst all these differences—and partly indeed by reason of these differences—Plato succeeds in inspiring his readers with much of the same interest in the process of dialectic enquiry which he evidently felt in his own bosom. The charm, with which he invests the process of philosophising, is one main cause of the preservation of his writings from the terrible shipwreck which has overtaken so much of the abundant contemporary literature. It constitutes also one of his principle titles to the gratitude of intellectual men. This is a merit which may be claimed for Cicero also, but hardly for Aristotle, in so far as we can judge from the preserved portion of the Aristotelian writings: whether for the other *viri Socratici* his contemporaries, or in what proportion, we are unable to say. Plato's works charmed and instructed all; so that they were

Plato has done more than any one else to make the process of enquiry interesting to others, as it was to himself.

également reçues, je ne choisissois que les plus modérées; tant à cause que ce sont toujours les plus commodes pour la pratique, et vraisemblablement les meilleures—tous excès ayans coutume d'être mauvais—comme aussi afin de me détourner moins du vrai chemin, en cas que je faillisse, que si, ayant choisi l'un des deux extrêmes, c'eût été l'autre qu'il eut fallu suivre.

"Et particulièrement, je *mettois entre les excès toutes les promesses par lesquelles on retranche quelque chose de sa liberté;* non que je désapprouvasse les lois, qui pour remédier à l'inconstance des esprits foibles, permettent, lorsqu'on a quelque bon dessein (ou même, pour la sureté du commerce, quelque dessein qui n'est qu'indifférent), qu'on fasse des vœux ou des contrats qui obligent à y persévérer: mais à cause que je ne voyois au monde aucune chose qui demeurât toujours en même état, et *que comme pour mon particulier, je me promettois de perfectionner de plus en plus mes jugemens, et non point de les rendre pires, j'eusse pensé commettre une grande faute contre le bon sens, si, parceque j'approuvois alors quelque chose, je me fusse obligé de la prendre pour bonne encore après, lorsqu'elle auroit peut-être cessé de l'être, ou que j'aurois cessé de l'estimer telle.*" Discours de la Méthode, part iii. p. 147-148, Cousin edit.; p. 16, Simon edit.

read not merely by disciples and admirers (as the Stoic and Epikurean treatises were), but by those who dissented from him as well as by those who agreed with him.[1] The process of philosophising is one not naturally attractive except to a few minds: the more therefore do we owe to the colloquy of Sokrates and the writing of Plato, who handled it so as to diffuse the appetite for enquiry, and for sifting dissentient opinions. The stimulating and suggestive influence exercised by Plato—the variety of new roads pointed out to the free enquiring mind—are in themselves sufficiently valuable: whatever we may think of the positive results in which he himself acquiesced.[2]

I have said thus much respecting what is common to the Dialogues of Search, because this is a species of composition now rare and strange. Modern readers do not understand what is meant by publishing an enquiry without any result—a story without an end. Respecting the Dialogues of Exposition, there is not the like difficulty. This is a species of composition, the purpose of which is generally understood. Whether the exposition be clear or obscure—orderly or confused—true or false—we shall see when we come to examine each separately. But these Dialogues of Exposition exhibit Plato in a different character: as the counterpart, not of Sokrates, but of Lykurgus (Republic and Leges) or of Pythagoras (in Timæus).[3]

Process of generalisation always kept in view and illustrated throughout the Platonic Dialogues of Search—ge-

A farther remark which may be made, bearing upon most of the dialogues, relates to matter and not to manner. Everywhere (both in the Dialogues of Search and in those of exposition) the process of generalisation is kept in view and brought into conscious notice, directly or indirectly. The relation of the universal to its particulars, the contrast of the constant and essential with the variable and accidental, are turned

[1] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3, 8.

Cicero farther commends the Stoic Panætius for having relinquished the "tristitiam atque asperitatem" of his Stoic predecessors, Zeno, Chrysippus, &c., and for endeavouring to reproduce the style and graces of Plato and Aristotle, whom he was always commending to his students (De Fin. iv. 28, 79).

[2] The observation which Cicero applies to Varro, is applicable to the Platonic writings also. "Philosophiam multis locis *inchoasti*: ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum" (Academ. Poster. i. 3, 9).

I shall say more about this when I touch upon the Platonic Kleitophon; an unfinished dialogue, which takes up the point of view here indicated by Cicero.

[3] See the citation from Plutarch in an earlier note of this chapter.

and returned in a thousand different ways. The principles of classification, with the breaking down of an extensive genus into species and sub-species, form the special subject of illustration in two of the most elaborate Platonic dialogues, and are often partially applied in the rest. To see the One in the Many, and the Many in the One, is represented as the great aim and characteristic attribute of the real philosopher. The testing of general terms, and of abstractions already embodied in familiar language, by interrogations applying them to many concrete and particular cases—is one manifestation of the Sokratic cross-examining process, which Plato multiplies and diversifies without limit. It is in his writings and in the conversation of Sokrates, that general terms and propositions first become the subject of conscious attention and analysis: and Plato was well aware that he was here opening the new road towards formal logic, unknown to his predecessors, unfamiliar even to his contemporaries. This process is indeed often overlaid in his writings by exuberant poetical imagery and by transcendental hypothesis: but the important fact is, that it was constantly present to his own mind and is impressed upon the notice of his readers.

neral terms and propositions made subjects of conscious analysis.

After these various remarks, having a common bearing upon all, or nearly all, the Platonic dialogues, I shall proceed to give some account of each dialogue separately. It is doubtless both practicable and useful to illustrate one of them by others, sometimes in the way of analogy, sometimes in that of contrast. But I shall not affect to handle them as contributories to one positive doctrinal system—nor as occupying each an intentional place in the gradual unfolding of one preconceived scheme—nor as successive manifestations of change, knowable and determinable, in the views of the author. For us they exist as distinct imaginary conversations, composed by the same author at unknown times and under unknown specialities of circumstance. Of course it is necessary to prefer some one order for reviewing the Dialogues, and for that purpose more or less of hypothesis must be admitted; but I shall endeavour to assume as little as possible.

The Dialogues must be reviewed as Distinct compositions by the same author, illustrating each other, but without assignable interdependence.

The order which I shall adopt for considering the dialogues

Order of the Dialogues, chosen for bringing them under separate review. Apology will come first; Timæus, Kritias, Leges, Epinomis, last.

coincides to a certain extent with that which some other expositors have adopted. It begins with those dialogues which delineate Sokrates, and which confine themselves to the subjects and points of view belonging to him, known as he is upon the independent testimony of Xenophon. First of all will come the Platonic Apology, containing the explicit negative programme of Sokrates, enunciated by himself a month before his death, when Plato was 28 years of age.

Last of all, I shall take those dialogues which depart most widely from Sokrates, and which are believed to be the products of Plato's most advanced age—Timæus, Kritias, and Leges, with the sequel, Epinomis. These dialogues present a glaring contrast to the searching questions, the negative acuteness, the confessed ignorance, of Sokrates: Plato in his old age has not maintained consistency with his youth, as Sokrates did, but has passed round from the negative to the affirmative pole of philosophy.

Kriton and Euthyphron come immediately after Apology. The intermediate dialogues present no convincing grounds for any determinate order.

Between the Apology and the dialogues named as last—I shall examine the intermediate dialogues according as they seem to approximate or recede from Sokrates and the negative dialectic. Here, however, the reasons for preference are noway satisfactory. Of the many dissentient schemes, professing to determine the real order in which the Platonic dialogues were composed, I find a certain plausibility in some, but no conclusive reason in any. Of course the reasons in favour of each one scheme, count against all the rest. I believe (as I have already said) that none of Plato's dialogues were composed until after the death of Sokrates: but at what dates, or in what order, after that event, they were composed, it is impossible to determine. The Republic and Philêbus rank among the constructive dialogues, and may suitably be taken immediately before Timæus: though the Republic belongs to the highest point of Plato's genius, and includes a large measure of his negative acuteness combined with his most elaborate positive combinations. In the Sophistês and Politikus, Sokrates appears only in the character of a listener: in the Parmenidês also, the part assigned to him, instead of being aggressive and victorious,

is subordinate to that of Parmenidês and confined to an unsuccessful defence. These dialogues, then, occupy a place late in the series. On the other hand, Kriton and Euthyphron have an immediate bearing upon the trial of Sokrates and the feelings connected with it. I shall take them in immediate sequel to the Apology.

For the intermediate dialogues, the order is less marked and justifiable. In so far as a reason can be given, for preference as to former and later, I shall give it when the case arises.

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CHAPTER IX.

APOLOGY OF SOKRATES.

ADOPTING the order of precedence above described, for the review of the Platonic compositions, and taking the point of departure from Sokrates or the Sokratic point of view, I begin with the memorable composition called the Apology.

The Apology is the real defence delivered by Sokrates before the Dikasts, reported by Plato, without intentional transformation.

I agree with Schleiermacher[1]—with the more recent investigations of Ueberweg—and with what (until recent times) seems to have been the common opinion,—that this is in substance the real defence pronounced by Sokrates; reported, and of course drest up, yet not intentionally transformed, by Plato.[2] If such be the case, it is likely to have been put together shortly after the trial, and may thus be ranked among the earliest of the Platonic compositions: for I have already intimated my belief that Plato composed no

[1] Zeller is of opinion that the Apology, as well as the Kriton, were put together at Megara by Plato, shortly after the death of Sokrates. (Zeller, De Hermodoro Ephesio, p. 19.)

Schleiermacher, Einl. zur Apologie, vol. ii. pp. 182-185. Ueberweg, Ueber die Aechtheit der Plat. Schrift. p. 246.

Steinhart thinks (Einleitung, pp. 236-238) that the Apology contains more of Plato, and less of Sokrates: but he does not make his view very clear to me. Ast, on the contrary, treats the Apology as spurious and unworthy of Plato. (Ueber Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 477, seq.) His arguments are rather objections against the merits of the composition, than reasons for believing it not to be the work of Plato. I dissent from them entirely: but they show that an acute critic can make out a plausible case, satisfactory to himself, against any dialogue. If it be once conceded that the question of genuine or spurious is to be tried upon such purely internal grounds of critical admiration and complete harmony of sentiment, Ast might have made out a case even stronger against the genuineness of the Phædrus, Symposion, Philêbus, Parmenidês.

[2] See chapter lxviii. of my History of Greece.

The reader will find in that chapter a full narrative of all the circumstances known to us respecting both the life and the condemnation of Sokrates.

A very admirable account may also be seen of the character of Sokrates, and his position with reference to the Athenian people, in the article entitled

dialogues under the name of Sokrates, during the lifetime of Sokrates.

Such, in my judgment, is the most probable hypothesis respecting the Apology. But even if we discard this hypothesis; if we treat the Apology as a pure product of the Platonic imagination (like the dialogues), and therefore not necessarily connected in point of time with the event to which it refers—still there are good reasons for putting it first in the order of review. For it would then be Plato's own exposition, given more explicitly and solemnly than anywhere else, of the Sokratic point of view and life-purpose. It would be an exposition embodying that union of generalising impulse, mistrust of established common-places, and aggressive cross-examining ardour—with eccentric religious persuasion, as well as with perpetual immersion in the crowd of the palæstra and the market-place: which immersion was not less indispensable to Sokrates than repugnant to the feelings of Plato himself. An exposition, lastly, disavowing all that taste for cosmical speculation, and that transcendental dogmatism, which formed one among the leading features of Plato as distinguished from Sokrates. In whichever way we look at the Apology, whether as a real or as an imaginary defence, it contains more of pure Sokratism than any other composition of Plato, and as such will occupy the first place in the arrangement which I adopt.[1]

Even if it be Plato's own composition, it comes naturally first in the review of his dialogues.

Sokrates und Sein Volk, Akademischer Vortrag, by Professor Hermann Köchly; a lecture delivered at Zurich in 1855, and published with enlargements in 1859.

Professor Köchly's article (contained in a volume entitled *Akademische Vorträge*, Zurich, 1859) is eminently deserving of perusal. It not only contains a careful summary of the contemporary history, so far as Sokrates is concerned, but it has farther the great merit of fairly estimating that illustrious man in reference to the actual feeling of the time, and to the real public among whom he moved. I feel much satisfaction in seeing that Professor Köchly's picture, composed without any knowledge of my History of Greece, presents substantially the same view of Sokrates and his contemporaries as that which is taken in my sixty-eighth chapter.

Köchly considers that the Platonic Apology preserves the Sokratic character more faithfully than any of Plato's writings; and that it represents what Sokrates said, as nearly as the "dichterische Natur" of Plato would permit. (Köchly, pp. 302-364.)

[1] Dionysius Hal. regards the Apology, not as a report of what Sokrates really said, nor as approximating thereunto, but as a pure composition of Plato himself, for three purposes combined:—1. To defend and extol Sokrates. 2. To accuse the Athenian public and Dikasts. 3. To furnish a picture of what a philosopher ought to be.—All these purposes are to a certain extent included and merged in a fourth, which I hold to be the true

In my History of Greece, I have already spoken of this impressive discourse as it concerns the relations between Sokrates himself and the Dikasts to whom he addressed it. I here regard it only as it concerns Plato; and as it forms a convenient point of departure for entering upon and appreciating the Platonic dialogues.

General character of the Apology—Sentiments entertained towards Sokrates at Athens.

The Apology of Sokrates is not a dialogue, but a continuous discourse addressed to the Dikasts, containing nevertheless a few questions and answers interchanged between him and the accuser Melêtus in open court. It is occupied, partly, in rebutting the counts of the indictment (*viz.*, 1. That Sokrates did not believe in the Gods or in the Dæmons generally recognised by his countrymen: 2. That he was a corruptor of youth[1]) —partly in setting forth those proceedings of his life out of which such charges had grown, and by which he had become obnoxious to a wide-spread feeling of personal hatred. By his companions, by those who best knew him, and by a considerable number of ardent young men, he was greatly esteemed and admired: by the general public, too, his acuteness as well as his self-sufficing and independent character, were appreciated with a certain respect. Yet he was at the same time disliked, as an aggressive disputant who "tilted at all he met"—who raised questions novel as well as perplexing, who pretended to special intimations from the Gods—and whose views no one could distinctly make out.[2] By the eminent citizens of all varieties—politicians, rhetors, Sophists, tragic and comic poets, artisans, &c.—he had made himself both hated and feared.[3] He empha-

one,—to exhibit what Sokrates was and had been, in relation to the Athenian public.

The comparison drawn by Dionysius between the Apology and the oration De Coronâ of Demosthenes, appears to me unsuitable. The two are altogether disparate, in spirit, in purpose, and in execution. (See Dion H. Ars Rhet. pp. 295-298: De Adm. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1026.)

[1] Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 1. Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων· ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.

Plato, Apolog. c. 3, p. 19 B. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται, ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταὐτὰ ταῦτα διδάσκων.

The reading of Xenophon was conformable to the copy of the indictment preserved in the Metrôon at Athens in the time of Favorinus. There were three distinct accusers—Melêtus, Anytus, and Lykon. Plat. Apol. p. 23-24 B.

[2] Plato, Apol. c. 28, p. 38 A; c. 23, p. 35 A.

[3] Plato, Apol. c. 8-9, pp. 22-23. ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἷαι χαλε-

tically denies the accusation of general disbelief in the Gods, advanced by Melêtus: and he affirms generally (though less distinctly) that the Gods in whom he believed, were just the same as those in whom the whole city believed. Especially does he repudiate the idea, that he could be so absurd as to doubt the divinity of Helios and Selênê, in which all the world believed ;[1] and to adopt the heresy of Anaxagoras, who degraded these Divinities into physical masses. Respecting his general creed, he thus puts himself within the pale of Athenian orthodoxy. He even invokes that very sentiment (with some doubt whether the Dikasts will believe him[2]) for the justification of the obnoxious and obtrusive peculiarities of his life ; representing himself as having acted under the mission of the Delphian God, expressly transmitted from the oracle.

Declaration from the Delphian oracle respecting the wisdom of Sokrates, interpreted by him as a mission to cross-examine the citizens generally—The oracle is proved to be true.

According to his statement, his friend and earnest admirer Chærephon, had asked the question at the oracle of Delphi, whether any one was wiser than Sokrates? The reply of the oracle declared, that no one was wiser. On hearing this declaration from an infallible authority, Sokrates was greatly perplexed: for he was conscious to himself of not being wise upon any matter, great or small.[3] He at length concluded that the declaration of the oracle could be proved true, only on the hypothesis that other persons were less wise than they seemed to be or fancied themselves. To verify this hypothesis, he proceeded to cross-examine the most eminent persons in many different walks — political men, rhetors, Sophists, poets, artisans. On applying his Elenchus, and putting to them testing interrogations, he found them all without exception destitute of any real wisdom, yet fully persuaded that they *were* wise, and incapable of being shaken in that persuasion. The artisans indeed did

πώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι.

[1] Plato, Apol. c. 14, p. 26 D. ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι;

[2] Plato, Apol. c. 5, p. 20 D.

[3] Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 B. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὑτωσί, Τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεὸς καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ. Καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν, &c.

really know each his own special trade; but then, on account of this knowledge, they believed themselves to be wise on other great matters also. So also the poets were great in their own compositions; but on being questioned respecting these very compositions, they were unable to give any rational or consistent explanations: so that they plainly appeared to have written beautiful verses, not from any wisdom of their own, but through inspiration from the Gods, or spontaneous promptings of nature. The result was, that these men were all proved to possess no more real wisdom than Sokrates: but *he* was aware of his own deficiency; while *they* were fully convinced of their own wisdom, and could not be made sensible of the contrary. In this way Sokrates justified the certificate of superiority vouchsafed to him by the oracle. He, like all other persons, was destitute of wisdom; but he was the only one who knew, or could be made to feel, his own real mental condition. With others, and most of all with the most conspicuous men, the false persuasion of their own wisdom was universal and inexpugnable.[1]

False persuasion of wisdom is universal—the God alone is wise.

This then was the philosophical mission of Sokrates, imposed upon him by the Delphian oracle, and in which he passed the mature portion of his life: to cross-examine every one, to expose that false persuasion of knowledge which every one felt, and to demonstrate the truth of that which the oracle really meant by declaring the superior wisdom of Sokrates. "People suppose me to be wise myself (says Sokrates) on those matters on which I detect and prove the non-wisdom of others.[2] But that is a mistake. The God alone is wise: and his oracle declares human wisdom to be worth little or nothing, employing the name of Sokrates as an example. He is the wisest of men, who, like Sokrates, knows well that he is in truth worthless so far as wisdom is concerned.[3] The really disgraceful ignorance is—to think that you know what you do not really know."[4]

"The God has marked for me my post, to pass my life in the

[1] Plato, Apolog. c. 8-9, pp. 22-23.

[2] Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A. οἴονται γάρ με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω.

[3] Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A; c. 17, p. 28 E.

[4] Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 B. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ ο�ίεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν;

search for wisdom, cross-examining myself as well as others: I shall be disgraced, if I desert that post from fear either of death or of any other evil."[1] "Even if you Dikasts acquit me, I shall not alter my course: I shall continue, as long as I hold life and strength, to exhort and interrogate in my usual strain, telling every one whom I meet[2]—You, a citizen of the great and intelligent Athens, are you not ashamed of busying yourself to procure wealth, reputation, and glory, in the greatest possible quantity; while you take neither thought nor pains about truth, or wisdom, or the fullest measure of goodness for your mind? If any one denies the charge, and professes that he *does* take thought for these objects,—I shall not let him off without questioning, cross-examining, and exposing him.[3] And if he appears to me to affirm that he is virtuous without being so in reality, I shall reproach him for caring least about the greater matter, and most about the smaller. This course I shall pursue with every one whom I meet, young or old, citizen or non-citizen: most of all with you citizens, because you are most nearly connected with me. For this, you know, is what the God commands, and I think that no greater blessing has ever happened to the city than this ministration of mine under orders from the God. For I go about incessantly persuading you all, old as well as young, not to care about your bodies, or about riches, so much as about acquiring the largest measure of virtue for your minds. I urge upon you that virtue is not the fruit of wealth,—but that wealth, together with all the other things good for mankind publicly and privately, are the fruits of virtue.[4] If I am a corruptor of youth, it is by these discourses that I corrupt them: and if any one gives a different version of my discourses, he talks idly. Accordingly, men of Athens, I must tell you plainly:—decide with Anytus, or not,—acquit me or not—I shall do nothing different from what I have done, even if I am to die many times over for it."

Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the cross-examining mission imposed upon him by the God.

[1] Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 28 E.

[2] Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 D. οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἰώθα, &c.

[3] Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 E. καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσῃ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετήν, φάναι δέ, ὀνειδιῶ, &c.

[4] Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 30 B. λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τἆλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

Such is the description given by Sokrates of his own profession and standing purpose, imposed upon him as a duty by the Delphian God. He neglected all labour either for profit, or for political importance, or for the public service; he devoted himself, from morning till night, to the task of stirring up the Athenian public, as the gadfly worries a large and high-bred but oversleek horse:[1] stimulating them by interrogation, persuasion, reproach, to render account of their lives and to seek with greater energy the path of virtue. By continually persisting in such universal cross-examination, he had rendered himself obnoxious to the Athenians generally;[2] who were offended when called upon to render account, and when reproached that they did not live rightly. Sokrates predicts that after his death, younger cross-examiners, hitherto kept down by his celebrity, would arise in numbers,[3] and would pursue the same process with greater keenness and acrimony than he had done.

He had devoted his life to the execution of this mission, and he intended to persevere in spite of obloquy or danger.

While Sokrates thus extols, and sanctifies under the authority of the Delphian God, his habitual occupation of interrogating, cross-examining, and stimulating to virtue, the Athenians indiscriminately—he disclaims altogether the function of a teacher. His disclaimer on this point is unequivocal and emphatic. He cannot teach others, because he is not at all wiser than they. He is fully aware that he is not wise on any point, great or small—that he knows nothing at all, so to speak.[4] He can convict others, by their own answers, of real though unconscious ignorance, or

He disclaims the function of a teacher—he cannot teach, for he is not wiser than others. He differs from others by being conscious of his own ignorance.

[1] Plato, Apol. c. 18, p. 30 E. ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπό μύωπός τινος· οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. Also c. 26, p. 36 D.

[2] Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 D; c. 16, p. 28 A; c. 30, p. 39 C.

[3] Plato, Apol. c. 30, p. 39 C. νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε (i. e. ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε) οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου. τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ᾐσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε, &c.

I have already remarked (in chapter lxviii. of my general History of Greece relating to Sokrates) that this prediction was not fulfilled.

[4] Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 B. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα

(under another name) false persuasion of knowledge: and because he can do so, he is presumed to possess positive knowledge on the points to which the exposure refers. But this presumption is altogether unfounded: he possesses no such positive knowledge. Wisdom is not to be found in any man, even among the most distinguished: Sokrates is as ignorant as others; and his only point of superiority is, that he is fully conscious of his own ignorance, while others, far from having the like consciousness, confidently believe themselves to be in possession of wisdom and truth.[1] In this consciousness of his own ignorance Sokrates stands alone; on which special ground he is proclaimed by the Delphian God as the wisest of mankind.

He does not know where competent teachers can be found. He is perpetually seeking for them, but in vain.

Being thus a partner in the common ignorance, Sokrates cannot of course teach others. He utterly disclaims having ever taught, or professed to teach. He would be proud indeed, if he possessed the knowledge of human and social virtue: but he does not know it himself, nor can he find out who else knows it.[2] He is certain that there cannot be more than a few select individuals who possess the art of making mankind wiser or better—just as in the case of horses, none but a few practised trainers know how to make them better, while the handling of these or other animals, by ordinary men, certainly does not improve the animals, and generally even makes them worse.[3] But where any such select few are to be found, who alone can train men—Sokrates is obliged to inquire from others; he cannot divine for himself.[4] He is perpetually going about, with the lantern of cross-examination, in search of a wise man: but he can find only those who pretend to be wise, and whom his cross-examination exposes as pretenders.[5]

ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν, &c. c. 8, p. 22 D. ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνῆδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.

[1] Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A-B. Οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἐγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἀξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.

[2] Plato, Apol. c. 4, p. 20 B-C. τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; . . . ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἠβρυνόμην ἄν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

c. 21, p. 33 A. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην. c. 4, p. 19 E.

[3] Plato, Apol. c. 12, p. 25 B.

[4] Plato, Apol. c. 4, p. 20.

[5] Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 B. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ,

This then is the mission and vocation of Sokrates—1. To cross-examine men, and to destroy that false persuasion of wisdom and virtue which is so widely diffused among them. 2. To reproach them, and make them ashamed of pursuing wealth and glory more than wisdom and virtue.[1]

But Sokrates is not empowered to do more for them. He cannot impart any positive knowledge to heal their ignorance. He cannot teach them what WISDOM OR VIRTUE is.

Such is the substance of the Platonic Apology of Sokrates.

Impression made by the Platonic Apology on Zeno the Stoic.

How strong was the impression which it made, on many philosophical readers, we may judge from the fact, that Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, being a native of Kition in Cyprus, derived from the perusal of the Apology his first inducement to come over to Athens, and devote himself to the study and teaching of philosophy in that city.[2] Sokrates depicts, with fearless sincerity, what he regards as the intellectual and moral deficiencies of his countrymen, as well as the unpalatable medicine and treatment which he was enjoined to administer to them. With equal sincerity does he declare the limits within which that treatment was confined.

But neither of his two most eminent companions can endure

Extent of efficacious influence claimed by Sokrates for himself—exemplified by Plato throughout

to restrict his competence within such narrow limits. Xenophon[3] affirms that Sokrates was assiduous in communicating useful instruction and positive edification to his hearers. Plato sometimes, though more rarely, intimates the same: but for the most part, and in the Dialogues of Search throughout, he keeps

τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. c. 32, p. 41 B.

[1] Plato, Apol. c. 33, p. 41 E.

[2] Themistius, Orat. xxiii. (Sophistês) p. 357, Dindorf. Τὰ δὲ ἀμφὶ Ζήνωνος ἀρίδηλά τέ ἐστι καὶ φδόμενα ὑπὸ πολλῶν, ὅτι αὐτὸν ἡ Σωκράτους ἀπολογία ἐκ Φοινίκης ἤγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ποικίλην.

This statement deserves full belief: it probably came from Zeno himself, a voluminous writer. The father of Zeno was a merchant who traded with Athens, and brought back books for his son to read, Sokratic books among them. Diogen. Laert. vii. 31.

Respecting another statement made by Themistius in the same page, I do not feel so certain. He says that the accusatory discourse pronounced against Sokrates by Anytus was composed by Polykrates, as a λογογράφος, and paid for. This may be the fact: but the words of Isokrates in the Busiris rather lead me to the belief that the κατηγορία Σωκράτους composed by Polykrates was a sophistical exercise, composed to acquire reputation and pupils, not a discourse really delivered in the Dikastery.

[3] Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 64; i. 3, 1; i. 4, 2; iv. 2, 40; iv. 3, 4.

Sokrates within the circle of procedure which the Apology claims for him. These dialogues exemplify in detail the aggressive operations, announced therein by Sokrates in general terms as his missionary life-purpose, against contemporaries of note, very different from each other—against aspiring youths, statesmen, generals, Rhetors, Sophists, orthodox pietists, poets, rhapsodes, &c. Sokrates cross-examines them all, and convicts them of humiliating ignorance: but he does not furnish, nor does he profess to be able to furnish, any solution of his own difficulties. Many of the persons cross-examined bear historical names: but I think it necessary to warn the reader, that all of them speak both language and sentiments provided for them by Plato, and not their own.[1]

the Dialogues of Search—Xenophon and Plato enlarge it.

The disclaimer, so often repeated by Sokrates,—that he possessed neither positive knowledge nor wisdom in his own person,—was frequently treated by his contemporaries as ironical. He was not supposed to be in earnest when he made it. Every one presumed that he must himself know that which he proved others not to know, whatever motive he might have for affecting ignorance.[2] His personal manner and homely vein of illustration seemed to favour the supposition that he was bantering. This interpreta-

Assumption by modern critics, that Sokrates is a positive teacher, employing indirect methods for the inculcation of theories of his own.

[1] It might seem superfluous to give such a warning; but many commentators speak as if they required it. They denounce the Platonic speakers in harsh terms, which have no pertinence, unless supposed to be applied to a real man expressing his own thoughts and feelings.

It is useless to enjoin us, as Stallbaum and Steinhart do, to mark the aristocratical conceit of Menon!—the pompous ostentation and pretensive verbosity of Protagoras and Gorgias!—the exorbitant selfishness of Polus and Kalliklês!—the impudent brutality of Thrasymachus!—when all these persons speak entirely under the prompting of Plato himself.

You might just as well judge of Sokrates by what we read in the Nubes of Aristophanes, or of Meton by what we find in the Aves, as describe the historical characters of the above-named personages out of the Platonic dialogues. They ought to be appreciated as dramatic pictures, drest up by the author for his own purpose, and delivering such opinions as he assigns to them—whether he intends them to be refuted by others, or not.

[2] Plato, Apol. c. 5, p. 20 D; c. 9, p. 23 A.

Aristeides the Rhetor furnishes a valuable confirmation of the truth of that picture of Sokrates, which we find in the Platonic Apology. All the other companions of Sokrates who wrote dialogues about him (not preserved to us), presented the same general features. 1. Avowed ignorance. 2. The same declaration of the oracle concerning him. 3. The feeling of frequent signs from τὸ δαιμόνιον.

Ὁμολογεῖται μέν γε λέγειν αὐτὸν (Sokrates) ὡς ἄρα οὐδὲν ἐπίσταιτο, καὶ πάντες τοῦτό φασιν οἱ συγγενόμενοι· ὁμολογεῖται δ' αὖ καὶ τοῦτο, σοφώτατον εἶναι Σωκράτη τὴν Πυθίαν εἰρηκέναι, &c.

(Aristeides, Orat. xlv. Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς, pp. 23, 24, 25, Dindorf.)

tion of the character of Sokrates appears in the main to be preferred by modern critics. Of course (they imagine) an able man who cross-questions others on the definitions of Law, Justice, Democracy, &c., has already meditated on the subject, and framed for himself unimpeachable definitions of these terms. Sokrates (they suppose) is a positive teacher and theorist, employing a method, which, though indirect and circuitous, is nevertheless calculated deliberately beforehand for the purpose of introducing and inculcating premeditated doctrines of his own. Pursuant to this hypothesis, it is presumed that the positive theory of Sokrates is to be found in his negative cross-examinations,—not indeed set down clearly in any one sentence, so that he who runs may read—yet disseminated in separate syllables or letters, which may be distinguished, picked out, and put together into propositions, by an acute detective examiner. And the same presumption is usually applied to the Sokrates of the Platonic dialogues: that is, to Plato employing Sokrates as spokesman. Interpreters sift with microscopic accuracy the negative dialogues of Plato, in hopes of detecting the ultimate elements of that positive solution which he is supposed to have lodged therein, and which, when found, may be put together so as to clear up all the antecedent difficulties.

Incorrectness of such assumption—the Sokratic Elenchus does not furnish a solution, but works upon the mind of the respondent, stimulating him to seek for a solution of his own.

I have already said (in the preceding chapter) that I cannot take this view either of Sokrates or of Plato. Without doubt, each of them had affirmative doctrines and convictions, though not both the same. But the affirmative vein, with both of them, runs in a channel completely distinct from the negative. The affirmative theory has its roots *aliunde*, and is neither generated, nor adapted, with a view to reconcile the contradictions, or elucidate the obscurities, which the negative Elenchus has exposed. That exposure does indeed render the embarrassed respondent painfully conscious of the want of some rational, consistent, and adequate theoretical explanation: it farther stimulates him to make efforts of his own for the supply of that want. But such efforts must be really his own; the Elenchus gives no farther help: it furnishes problems, but no solutions, nor even any assurance that the problems as presented,

admit of affirmative solutions. Whoever expects that such consummate masters of the negative process as Sokrates and Plato, when they come to deliver affirmative dogmas of their own, will be kept under restraint by their own previous Elenchus, and will take care that their dogmas shall not be vulnerable by the same weapons as they had employed against others—will be disappointed. They do not employ any negative test against themselves. When Sokrates preaches in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, or the Athenian Stranger in the Platonic Leges, they jump over, or suppose to be already solved, the difficulties under the pressure of which other disputants had been previously discredited: they assume all the undefinable common-places to be clearly understood, and all the inconsistent generalities to be brought into harmony. Thus it is that the negative cross-examination, and the affirmative dogmatism, are (both in Sokrates and in Plato) two unconnected operations of thought: the one does not lead to, or involve, or verify, the other.

Value and importance of this process—stimulating active individual minds to theorise each for itself.

Those who depreciate the negative process simply, unless followed up by some new positive doctrine which shall be proof against all such attack—cannot be expected to admire Sokrates greatly, even as he stands rated by himself. Even if I concurred in this opinion, I should still think myself obliged to exhibit him as he really was. But I do not concur in the opinion. I think that the creation and furtherance of individual, self-thinking minds, each instigated to form some rational and consistent theory for itself, is a material benefit, even though no farther aid be rendered to the process except in the way of negative suggestion. That such minds should be made to feel the arbitrary and incoherent character of that which they have imbibed by passive association as ethics and æsthetics,—and that they should endeavour to test it by some rational and consistent standard—would be an improving process, though no one theory could be framed satisfactory to all. The Sokratic Elenchus went directly to this result. Plato followed in the same track, not of pouring new matter of knowledge into the pupil, but of eliciting new thoughts and beliefs out of him, by kindling the latent forces of his intellect. A large proportion of Plato's dialogues have no other purpose or

value. And in entering upon the consideration of these dialogues, we cannot take a better point of departure than the Apology of Sokrates, wherein the speaker, alike honest and decided in his convictions, at the close of a long cross-examining career, re-asserts expressly his devoted allegiance to the negative process, and disclaims with equal emphasis all power over the affirmative.

View taken by Sokrates about death. Other men profess to know what it is, and think it a great misfortune: he does not know.

In that touching discourse, the Universal Cross-Examiner declares a thorough resolution to follow his own individual conviction and his own sense of duty—whether agreeing or disagreeing with the convictions of his countrymen, and whether leading to danger or to death for himself. "Where a man may have posted himself—either under his own belief that it is best, or under orders from the magistrate—there he must stay and affront danger, not caring for death or anything else in comparison with disgrace."[1] As to death, Sokrates knows very little what it is, nor whether it is good or evil. The fear of death, in his view, is only one case of the prevalent mental malady—men believing themselves to know that of which they really know nothing. If death be an extinction of all sensation, like a perpetual and dreamless sleep, he will regard it as a prodigious benefit compared with life: even the Great King will not be a loser by the exchange.[2] If on the contrary death be a transition into Hades, to keep company with those who have died before—Homer, Hesiod, the heroes of the Trojan war, &c.—Sokrates will consider it supreme happiness to converse with and cross-examine the potentates and clever men

[1] Plato, Apol. c. 16, p. 28 D.

[2] Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 A. c. 32, p. 40 D: καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὕπνος, ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾷ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος.

Ast remarks (Plat. Leb. und Schrift. p. 488) that the language of doubt and uncertainty in which Sokrates here speaks of the consequences of death, is greatly at variance with the language which he is made to hold in the Phædon. Ast adduces this as one of his arguments for disallowing the authenticity of the Apology. I do not admit the inference. I am prepared for divergence between the opinions of Sokrates in different dialogues; and I believe, moreover, that the Sokrates of the Phædon is spokesman chosen to argue in support of the main thesis of that dialogue. But it is impossible to deny the variance which Ast points out, and which is also admitted by Stallbaum. Steinhart indeed (Einleitung, p. 246) goes the length of denying it, in which I cannot follow him. The sentiment of Sokrates in the Apology embodies the same alternative uncertainty, as what we read in Marcus Antoninus, v. 33. Τί οὖν; περιμένεις ἴλεως τὴν εἴτε σβέσιν εἴτε μετάστασιν, &c.

of the past—Agamemnon, Odysseus, Sisyphus; thus discriminating which of them are really wise, and which of them are only unconscious pretenders. He is convinced that no evil can ever happen to the good man; that the protection of the Gods can never be wanting to him, whether alive or dead.[1] "It is not lawful for a better man to be injured by a worse. He may indeed be killed, or banished, or disfranchised; and these may appear great evils, in the eye of others. But I do not think them so. It is a far greater evil to do what Melêtus is now doing—trying to kill a man unjustly."[2]

Sokrates here gives his own estimate of comparative good and evil. Death, banishment, disfranchisement, &c., are no great evils: to put another man to death unjustly, is a great evil to the doer: the good man can suffer no evil at all. These are given as the judgments of Sokrates, and as dissentient from most others. Whether they are Sokratic or Platonic opinions, or common to both—we shall find them reappearing in various other Platonic dialogues, hereafter to be noticed. We have also to notice that marked feature in the character of Sokrates[3]—the standing upon his own individual reason and measure of good and evil: nay, even pushing his confidence in it so far, as to believe in a divine voice informing and moving him. This reliance on the individual reason is sometimes recognised, at other times rejected, in the Platonic dialogues. Plato rejects

Reliance of Sokrates on his own individual reason, whether agreeing or disagreeing with others.

[1] Plato, Apol. c. 32, p. 41 A-B.

[2] Plato, Apol. c. 18, p. 30 D.

[3] Plat. Apol. c. 16, p. 28 D. *οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, &c.*

Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 8, 11. *φρόνιμος δέ, ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρω, μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδέεσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν, &c.*

Compare this with Memor. i. 1, 3-4-5, and the Xenophontic Apology, 4, 5, 13, where this *αὐταρκεία* finds for itself a justification in the hypothesis of a divine monitor without.

The debaters in the treatise of Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, upon the question of the Sokratic *δαιμόνιον*, insist upon this resolute persuasion and self-determination as the most indisputable fact in the case (c. 11, p. 581 C). *Αἱ δὲ Σωκράτους ὁρμαὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἔχουσαι καὶ σφοδρότητα φαίνονται πρὸς ἅπαν, ὡς ἂν ἐξ ὀρθῆς καὶ ἰσχυρᾶς ἀφειμέναι κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς.* Compare p. 589 E. The speculations of the speakers upon the *οὐσία* and *δύναμις τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου*, come to little result.

There is a curious passage in Plutarch's life of Coriolanus (c. 32), where he describes the way in which the Gods act upon the minds of particular men, under difficult and trying circumstances. They do not inspire new resolutions or volitions, but they work upon the associative principle, suggesting new ideas which conduct to the appropriate volition—*οὐδ' ὁρμὰς ἐνεργαζόμενον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὁρμῶν ἀγωγούς, &c.*

it in his comments (contained in the dialogue Theætêtus) on the doctrine of Protagoras: he rejects it also in the constructive dialogues, Republic and Leges, where he constitutes himself despotic legislator, prescribing a standard of orthodox opinion; he proclaims it in the Gorgias, and implies it very generally throughout the negative dialogues.

Formidable efficacy of established public beliefs, generated without any ostensible author.

Lastly, we find also in the Apology distinct notice of the formidable efficacy of established public impressions, generated without any ostensible author, circulated in the common talk, and passing without examination from one man to another, as portions of accredited faith. "My accusers Melêtus and Anytus (says Sokrates) are difficult enough to deal with: yet far less difficult than the prejudiced public, who have heard false reports concerning me for years past, and have contracted a settled belief about my character, from nameless authors whom I cannot summon here to be confuted."[1]

It is against this ancient, established belief, passing for knowledge—communicated by unconscious contagion without any rational process—against the "procès jugé mais non plaidé," whereby King Nomos governs—that the general mission of Sokrates is directed. It is against the like belief, in one of its countless manifestations, that he here defends himself before the Dikastery.

[1] Plato, Apol. c. 2, p. 18 C-D.

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CHAPTER X.

KRITON.

THE dialogue called Kriton is, in one point of view, a second part or sequel—in another point of view, an antithesis or corrective—of the Platonic Apology. For that reason, I notice it immediately after the Apology: though I do not venture to affirm confidently that it was composed immediately after: it may possibly have been later, as I believe the Phædon also to have been later.[1]

General purpose of the Kriton.

The Kriton describes a conversation between Sokrates and his friend Kriton in the prison, after condemnation, and two days before the cup of hemlock was administered. Kriton entreats and urges Sokrates (as the sympathising friends had probably done frequently during the thirty days of imprisonment) to make his escape from the prison, informing him that arrangements have already been made for enabling him to escape with ease and safety, and that money as well as good recommendations will be provided, so that he may dwell comfortably either in Thessaly, or wherever else he pleases. Sokrates ought not, in justice to his children and his friends, to refuse the opportunity offered, and thus to throw away his life. Should he do so, it will appear to every one as if his friends had shamefully failed in their duty, when intervention on their part might easily have saved him. He might have avoided the trial altogether: even when on trial, he might easily

Subject of the dialogue —interlocutors.

[1] Steinhart affirms with confidence that the Kriton was composed immediately after the Apology, and shortly after the death of Sokrates (Einleitung, p. 303). The fact may be so, but I do not feel thus confident of it when I look to the analogy of the later Phædon.

have escaped the capital sentence. Here is now a third opportunity of rescue, which if he declines, it will turn this grave and painful affair into mockery, as if he and his friends were impotent simpletons.[1] Besides the mournful character of the event, Sokrates and his friends will thus be disgraced in the opinion of every one.

"Disgraced in the opinion of every one," replies Sokrates? That is not the proper test by which the propriety of your recommendation must be determined. I am now, as I always have been, prepared to follow nothing but that voice of reason which approves itself to me in discussion as the best and soundest.[2]

Answer of Sokrates to the appeal made by Kriton.

We have often discussed this matter before, and the conclusions on which we agreed are not to be thrown aside because of my impending death. We agreed that the opinions general among men ought not to be followed in all cases, but only in some: that the good opinions, those of the wise men, were to be followed—the bad opinions, those of the foolish men, to be disregarded. In the treatment and exercise of the body, we must not attend to the praise, the blame, or the opinion of every man, but only to those of the one professional trainer or physician. If we disregard this one skilful man, and conduct ourselves according to the praise or blame of the unskilful public, our body will become corrupted and disabled, so that life itself will not be worth having.

In like manner, on the question what is just and unjust, honourable or base, good or evil, to which our present subject belongs—we must not yield to the praise and censure of the many, but only to that of the one,

He declares that the judgment of the general

[1] Plato, Krito. c. 5, p. 45 E. ὡς ἐγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρίᾳ τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὡς εἰσῆλθες, ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὥσπερ καταγέλως τῆς πράξεως, κακίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οἵτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἷόν τε ὂν καὶ δυνατόν, εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν.

This is a remarkable passage, as evincing that both the trial and the death of Sokrates, even in the opinion of his own friends, might have been avoided without anything which they conceived to be dishonourable to his character.

Professor Köchly puts this point very forcibly in his *Vortrag*, referred to in my notes on the Platonic Apology, p. 410 seq.

[2] Plato, Krito. c. 6, p. 46 B. ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλα καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται.

whoever he may be, who is wise on these matters.[1] We must be afraid and ashamed of him more than of all the rest. Not the verdict of the many, but that of the one man skilful about just and unjust, and that of truth itself, must be listened to. Otherwise we shall suffer the like debasement and corruption of mind as of body in the former case. Life will become yet more worthless. True—the many may put us to death. But what we ought to care for most, is, not simply to live, but to live well, justly, honourably.[2]

public is not worthy of trust: he appeals to the judgment of the one Expert, who is wise on the matter in debate.

Sokrates thus proceeds :—

The point to be decided, therefore, with reference to your proposition, Kriton, is, not what will be generally said if I decline, but whether it will be just or unjust—right or wrong—if I comply ; that is, if I consent to escape from prison against the will of the Athenians and against the sentence of law.

To decide the point, I assume this principle, which we have often before agreed upon in our reasonings, and which must stand unshaken now.[3]

Principles laid down by Sokrates for determining the question with Kriton. Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? Never in any case to act unjustly.

We ought not in any case whatever to act wrong or unjustly. To act so is in every case both bad for the agent and dishonourable to the agent, whatever may be its consequences. Even though others act wrong to us, we ought not to act wrong to them in return. Even though others do evil to us, we ought not to do evil to them in return.[4]

This is the principle which I assume as true, though I know that very few persons hold it, or ever will hold it. Most men say the contrary—that when other persons do wrong or harm to us, we may do wrong or harm to them in return. This is a cardinal point. Between those who affirm it, and those who

Sokrates admits that few will agree with him, and

[1] Plato, Krito. c. 7, p. 47 C-D. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλὴ ἡμῖν ἐστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἕπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαΐων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους ;

c. 8, p. 48 A. Οὐκ ἄρα πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον ὅ, τι ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅ, τι ὁ ἐπαΐων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια.

[2] Plato, Krito. c. 7-8, pp. 47-48.

[3] Plato, Krito. c. 9, p. 48 E. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, &c.

[4] Plato, Krito. c. 10, p. 49 B. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν, &c.

that most persons hold the opposite opinion: but he affirms that the point is cardinal.

deny it, there can be no common measure or reasoning. Reciprocal contempt is the sentiment with which, by necessity, each contemplates the other's resolutions.[1]

Pleading supposed to be addressed by the Laws of Athens to Sokrates, demanding from him implicit obedience.

Sokrates then delivers a well-known and eloquent pleading, wherein he imagines the Laws of Athens to remonstrate with him on his purpose of secretly quitting the prison, in order to evade a sentence legally pronounced. By his birth, and long residence in Athens, he has entered into a covenant to obey exactly and faithfully what the laws prescribe. Though the laws should deal unjustly with him, he has no right of redress against them—neither by open disobedience, nor force, nor evasion. Their rights over him are even more uncontrolled and indefeasible than those of his father and mother. The laws allow to every citizen full liberty of trying to persuade the assembled public: but the citizen who fails in persuading, must obey the public when they enact a law adverse to his views. Sokrates having been distinguished beyond all others for the constancy of his residence at Athens, has thus shown that he was well satisfied with the city, and with those laws without which it could not exist as a city. If he now violates his covenants and his duty, by breaking prison like a runaway slave, he will forfeit all the reputation to which he has pretended during his long life, as a preacher of justice and virtue.[2]

Purpose of Plato in this pleading—to present the dispositions

This striking discourse, the general drift of which I have briefly described, appears intended by Plato—as far as I can pretend to guess at his purpose—to set forth the personal character and dispositions of Sokrates in a light different from that which they present in the

[1] Plato, Krito. c. 10, p. 49 D. Οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει· Οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. Σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι· καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς.

Compare the opposite impulse, to revenge yourself upon your country from which you believe yourself to have received wrong, set forth in the speech of Alkibiades at Sparta after he had been exiled by the Athenians. Thucyd. vi. 92. τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην.

[2] Plato, Krito. c. 11-17, pp. 50-54.

Apology. In defending himself before the Dikasts, Sokrates had exalted himself into a position which would undoubtedly be construed by his auditors as disobedience and defiance to the city and its institutions. He professed to be acting under a divine mission, which was of higher authority than the enactments of his countrymen: he warned them against condemning him, because his condemnation would be a mischief, not to him, but to them—and because by doing so they would repudiate and maltreat the missionary sent to them by the Delphian God as a valuable present.[1] In the judgment of the Athenian Dikasts, Sokrates by using such language had put himself above the laws; thus confirming the charge which his accusers advanced, and which they justified by some of his public remarks. He had manifested by unmistakable language the same contempt for the Athenian constitution as that which had been displayed in act by Kritias and Alkibiades,[2] with whom his own name was associated as teacher and companion.[3] Xenophon in

of Sokrates in a light different from that which the Apology had presented—unqualified submission instead of defiance

[1] Plato, Apol. c. 17-18, p. 29-30.

[2] This was among the charges urged against Sokrates by Anytus and the other accusers (Xen. Mem. i. 2, 9. *ὑπερορᾷν ἐποίει τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας*). It was also the judgment formed respecting Sokrates by the Roman censor, the elder Cato; a man very much like the Athenian Anytus, constitutional and patriotic as a citizen, devoted to the active duties of political life, but thoroughly averse to philosophy and speculative debate, as Anytus is depicted in the Menon of Plato.—Plutarch, Cato c. 23, a passage already cited in a note on the chapter next but one preceding.

The accusation of "putting himself above the laws," appears in the same way in the Nubes of Aristophanes, 1035-1400, &c. :—

ὡς ἡδὺ καινοῖς πραγμασιν καὶ δεξιοῖς ὁμιλεῖν
καὶ τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων ὑπερ φρονεῖν δύνασθαι.

Compare the rhetor Aristeides—*Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων*, p. 133; vol. iii. p. 480, Dindorf.

[3] The dramatic position of Sokrates has been compared by Köchly, p. 382, very suitably with that of Antigoné, who, in burying her deceased brother, acts upon her own sense of right and family affections, in defiance of an express interdict from sovereign authority. This tragical conflict of obligations, indicated by Aristotle as an ethical question suited for dialectic debate (Topic. i. p. 105, b. 22), was handled by all the three great tragedians; and has been ennobled by Sophokles in one of his best remaining tragedies. The Platonic Apology presents many points of analogy with the Antigoné, while the Platonic Kriton carries us into an opposite vein of sentiment. Sokrates after sentence, and Antigoné after sentence, are totally different persons. The young maiden, though adhering with unshaken conviction to the rectitude of her past disobedience, cannot submit to the sentence of death without complaint and protestation. Though above all fear she is clamorous in remonstrances against both the injustice of the sentence and the untimely close of her career: so that she is obliged to be dragged away by the officers (Soph. Antig. 870-877; compare 497-508, with Plato, Krito. p. 49 C; Apolog. p. 28 D, 29 C). All these points enhance the interest of the piece, and are suited to a destined bride in the flower of her age. But an old philosopher of

his Memorabilia recognises this impression as prevalent among his countrymen against Sokrates, and provides what he thinks a suitable answer to it. Plato also has his way of answering it; and such I imagine to be the dramatic purpose of the Kriton.

This dialogue puts into the mouth of Sokrates a rhetorical harangue forcible and impressive, which he supposes himself to hear from personified Nomos or Athens, claiming for herself and her laws plenary and unmeasured obedience from all her citizens, as a covenant due to her from each. He declares his own heartfelt adhesion to the claim. Sokrates is thus made to express the feelings and repeat the language of a devoted democratical patriot. His doctrine is one which every Athenian audience would warmly applaud—whether heard from speakers in the assembly, from litigants in the Dikastery, or from dramatists in the theatre. It is a doctrine which orators of all varieties (Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Lysis, Isokrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, Lykurgus) would be alike emphatic in upholding: upon which probably Sophists habitually displayed their own eloquence, and tested the talents of their pupils. It may be considered as almost an Athenian common-place. Hence it is all the better fitted for Plato's purpose of restoring Sokrates to harmony with his fellow-citizens. It serves as his protestation of allegiance to Athens, in reply to the adverse impressions prevalent against him. The only singularity which bestows special pertinence on that which is in substance a discourse of venerated common-place, is—that Sokrates proclaims and applies his doctrine of absolute submis-

Harangue of Sokrates, delivered in the name of the Laws, would have been applauded by all the democratical patriots of Athens.

seventy years of age has no such attachment to life remaining. He contemplates death with the eye of calm reason: he has not only silenced "the child within us who fears death" (to use the remarkable phrase of Plato, Phædon, p. 77 E), but he knows well that what remains to him of life must be short; that it will probably be of little value, with diminished powers, mental as well as bodily; and that if passed in exile, it will be of no value at all. To close his life with dignity is the best thing which can happen to him. While by escape from the prison he would have gained little or nothing; he is enabled, by refusing the means of escape, to manifest an ostentatious deference to the law, and to make peace with the Athenian authorities after the opposition which had been declared in his Apology. Both in the Kriton and in the Phædon, Sokrates exhibits the specimen of a man adhering to previous conviction, unaffected by impending death, and by the apprehensions which that season brings upon ordinary minds; estimating all things then as before, with the same tranquil and independent reason.

sion, under the precise circumstances in which many others, generally patriotic, might be disposed to recede from it—where he is condemned (unjustly, in his own persuasion) to suffer death —yet has the opportunity to escape. He is thus presented as a citizen not merely of ordinary loyalty but of extraordinary patriotism. Moreover his remarkable constancy of residence at Athens is produced as evidence, showing that the city was eminently acceptable to him, and that he had no cause of complaint against it.[1]

Throughout all this eloquent appeal addressed by Athens to her citizen Sokrates, the points insisted on are those common to him with other citizens: the marked specialties of his character being left unnoticed. Such are the points suitable to the purpose (rather Xenophontic than Platonic, herein) of the Kriton; when Sokrates is to be brought back within the pale of democratical citizenship, and exculpated from the charge of incivism. But when we read the language of Sokrates both in the Apology and in the Gorgias, we find a very different picture given of the relations between him and Athens. We find him there presented as an isolated and eccentric individual, a dissenter, not only departing altogether from the character and purposes general among his fellow-citizens, but also certain to incur dangerous antipathy, in so far as he publicly proclaimed what he was. The Kriton takes him up as having become a victim to such antipathy: yet as reconciling himself with the laws by voluntarily accepting the sentence; and as persuaded to do so, moreover, by a piece of rhetoric imbued with the most genuine spirit of constitutional democracy. It is the compromise of his long-standing dissent with the reigning orthodoxy, just before his death Ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν.[2]

The harangue insists upon topics common to Sokrates with other citizens, overlooking the specialties of his character.

Still, however, though adopting the democratical vein of sentiment for this purpose, Sokrates is made to adopt it on a ground peculiar to himself. His individuality is thus upheld. He holds the sentence pronounced

Still Sokrates is represented as adopting

[1] Plato, Krito. c. 14, p. 52 B. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἁπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μή σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκε· c. 12, p. 50 D. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡλῖν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι;

[2] Plato, Phædon, p. 117 D.

the resolution to obey, from his own conviction; by a reason which weighs with him, but which would not weigh with others.

against him to have been unjust, but he renounces all use of that plea, because the sentence has been legally pronounced by the judicial authority of the city, and because he has entered into a covenant with the city. He entertains the firm conviction that no one ought to act unjustly, or to do evil to others, in any case; not even in the case in which they have done injustice or evil to him. "This (says Sokrates) is my conviction, and the principle of my reasoning. Few persons do accept it, or ever will: yet between those who do accept it, and those who do not—there can be no common counsel: by necessity of the case, each looks upon the other, and upon the reasonings of the other, with contempt."[1]

The harangue is not a corollary from this Sokratic reason, but represents feelings common among Athenian citizens.

This general doctrine, peculiar to Sokrates, is decisive *per se*, in its application to the actual case, and might have been made to conclude the dialogue. But Sokrates introduces it as a foundation to the arguments urged by the personified Athenian Nomos:—which, however, are not corollaries from it, nor at all peculiar to Sokrates, but represent sentiments held by the Athenian democrats more cordially than they were by Sokrates. It is thus that the dialogue Kriton embodies, and tries to reconcile, both the two distinct elements—constitutional allegiance, and Sokratic individuality.

Emphatic declaration of the authority of individual reason and conscience, for the individual himself.

Apart from the express purpose of this dialogue, however, the general doctrine here proclaimed by Sokrates deserves attention, in regard to the other Platonic dialogues which we shall soon review. The doctrine involves an emphatic declaration of the paramount authority of individual reason and conscience; for the individual himself—but for him alone. "This (says Sokrates) is, and has long been *my* conviction. It is the basis of the whole reasoning. Look well whether you agree to it: for few persons do agree to it, or ever will: and between those who do and those who do not, there can be no common deliberation: they must of necessity despise each other."[1] Here we have the Protagorean dogma, *Homo Mensura*—which Sokrates will be found combating in the Theætêtus—proclaimed by

[1] Plato, Kriton c. 10, p. 49 D.; see p. 428, note i.

Sokrates himself. As things appear to me, so they are to me: as they appear to you, so they are to you. My reason and conscience is the measure for me: yours for you. It is for you to see whether yours agrees with mine.

I shall revert to this doctrine in handling other Platonic dialogues, particularly the Theætêtus.

I have already observed that the tone of the Kriton is rhetorical, not dialectical—especially the harangue ascribed to Athens. The business of the rhetorician is to plant and establish some given point of persuasion, whether as to a general resolution or a particular fact, in the bosoms of certain auditors before him: hence he gives prominence and emphasis to some views of the question, suppressing or discrediting others, and especially keeping out of sight all the difficulties surrounding the conclusion at which he is aiming. On the other hand, the business of the dialectician is, not to establish any foreknown conclusion, but to find out which among all supposable conclusions are untenable, and which is the most tenable or best. Hence all the difficulties attending every one of them must be brought fully into view and discussed: until this has been done, the process is not terminated, nor can we tell whether any assured conclusion is attainable or not.

The Kriton is rhetorical, not dialectical. Difference between Rhetoric and Dialectic.

Now Plato, in some of his dialogues, especially the Gorgias, greatly depreciates rhetoric and its purpose of persuasion: elsewhere he employs it himself with ability and effect. The discourse which we read in the Kriton is one of his best specimens: appealing to pre-established and widespread emotions, veneration for parents, love of country, respect for covenants—to justify the resolution of Sokrates in the actual case: working up these sentiments into fervour, but neglecting all difficulties, limits, and counter-considerations: assuming that the familiar phrases of ethics and politics are perfectly understood and indisputable.

But these last-mentioned elements—difficulties, qualifications, necessity for definitions even of the most hackneyed words—would have been brought into the foreground had Sokrates pursued the dialectical path, which (as we know both from Xenophon and Plato) was his real habit and genius. He was perpetually engaged (says

The Kriton makes powerful appeal to the emotions, but overlooks

the ratiocinative difficulties, or supposes them to be solved.

Xenophon[1]) in dialectic enquiry. "What is the Holy, what is the Unholy? What is the Honourable and the Base? What is the Just and the Unjust? &c." Now in the rhetorical appeal embodied in the Kriton, the important question, What is the Just and the Unjust (*i.e.* Justice and Injustice in general), is assumed to be already determined and out of the reach of dispute. We are called upon to determine what is just and unjust in a particular case, as if we already knew what justice and injustice meant generally: to inquire about modifications of justice, before we have ascertained its essence. This is the fundamental assumption involved in the rhetorical process; which assumption we shall find Plato often deprecating as unphilosophical and preposterous.

So far indeed Sokrates goes in this dialogue, to affirm a

[1] Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 16. Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές· τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν· τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον· τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία· τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία· τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός· τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, &c.

We see in Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 40-46, iv. 2, 37, in the Platonic dialogue Minos and elsewhere, the number of dialectic questions which Sokrates might have brought to bear upon the harangue in the Kriton, had it been delivered by any opponent whom he sought to perplex or confute. What is a law? What are the limits of obedience to the laws? Are there no limits (as Hobbes is so much denounced for maintaining)? While the oligarchy of Thirty were the constituted authority at Athens, they ordered Sokrates himself, together with four other citizens, to go and arrest a citizen whom they considered dangerous to the state, the Salaminian Leon. The other four obeyed the order; Sokrates alone disobeyed, and takes credit for having done so, considering Leon to be innocent. Which was in the right here? the four obedient citizens, or the one disobedient? Might not the four have used substantially the same arguments to justify their obedience, as those which Sokrates hears from personified Athens in the Kriton? We must remember that the Thirty had come into authority by resolutions passed under constitutional forms, when fear of foreign enemies induced the people to sanction the resolutions proposed by a party among themselves. The Thirty also ordered Sokrates to abstain from discourse with young men; he disobeyed (Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 3). Was he right in disobeying?

I have indicated briefly these questions, to show how completely the rhetorical manner of the Kriton submerges all those difficulties, which would form the special matter of genuine Sokratic dialectics.

Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum Kriton, pp. 233, 234) considers the Kriton as a composition of special occasion—Gelegenheitsschrift—which I think is true; but which may be said also, in my judgment, of every Platonic dialogue. The term, however, in Schleiermacher's writing, has a peculiar meaning, viz. a composition for which there is no place in the regular rank and file of the Platonic dialogues, as he marshals them. He remarks the absence of dialectic in the Kriton, and he adduces this as one reason for supposing it not to be genuine

But it is no surprise to me to find Plato rhetorical in one dialogue, dialectical in others. Variety, and want of system, seem to me among his most manifest attributes.

The view taken of the Kriton by Steinhart (Einleit. pp. 291-302), in the first page of his very rhetorical Introduction, coincides pretty much with mine.

positive analogy. That Just and Honourable are, to the mind, what health and strength are to the body :—Unjust and Base, what distemper and weakness are to the body. And he follows this up by saying, that the general public are incompetent to determine what is just or honourable—as they are incompetent to decide what is wholesome or unwholesome. Respecting both one and the other, you must consult some one among the professional Experts, who alone are competent to advise.[1]

Incompetence of the general public or ἰδιῶται—appeal to the professional Expert.

Both these two doctrines will be found recurring often, in our survey of the dialogues. The first of the two is an obscure and imperfect reply to the great Sokratic problem—What is Justice? What is Injustice? but it is an analogy useful to keep in mind, as a help to the exposition of many passages in which Plato is yet more obscure. The second of the two will also recur frequently. It sets out an antithesis of great moment in the Platonic dialogues—"The one specially instructed, professional, theorizing, Expert—*versus* (the ἰδιῶται of the time and place, or) common sense, common sentiment, intuition, instinct, prejudice," &c. (all these names meaning the same objective reality, but diversified according as the speaker may happen to regard the particular case to which he is alluding). This antithesis appears as an answer when we put the question—What is the ultimate authority? where does the right of final decision reside, on problems and disputes ethical, political, æsthetical? It resides (Sokrates here answers) with some one among a few professional Experts. They are the only persons competent.

Procedure of Sokrates after this comparison has been declared—he does not name who the trustworthy Expert is.

I shall go more fully into this question elsewhere. Here I shall merely notice the application which Sokrates makes (in the Kriton) of the general doctrine. We might anticipate that after having declared that none was fit to pronounce upon the Just and the Unjust, except a professional Expert,—he would have proceeded to name some person corresponding to that designation—to justify the title of that person to confidence by such evidences as Plato requires in other dialogues—and then to cite the decision of the judge named, on the case in hand. This is what Sokrates would have done, if the

[1] Plato, Kriton, c. 7, p. 47 D. τοῦ ἑνὸς, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαΐων, &c.

case had been one of health or sickness. He would have said—"I appeal to Hippokrates, Akumenus, &c., as professional Experts on medicine: they have given proof of competence by special study, successful practice, writing, teaching, &c.: they pronounce so and so". He would not have considered himself competent to form a judgment or announce a decision of his own.

Sokrates acts as the Expert himself: he finds authority in his own reason and conscience.

But here, when the case in hand is that of Just and Unjust, the conduct of Sokrates is altogether different. He specifies no professional Expert, and he proceeds to lay down a dogma of his own; in which he tells us that few or none will agree, though it is fundamental, so that dissenters on the point must despise each other as heretics. We thus see that it is he alone who steps in to act himself the part of professional Expert, though he does not openly assume the title. The ultimate authority is proclaimed in words to reside with some unnamed Expert: in fact and reality, he finds it in his own reason and conscience. You are not competent to judge for yourself: you must consult the professional Expert: but your own reason and conscience must signify to you who the Expert is.

The analogy here produced by Plato—of questions about health and sickness—is followed out only in its negative operation; as it serves to scare away the multitude, and discredit the Vox Populi. But when this has been done, no oracular man can be produced or authenticated. In other dialogues, we shall find Sokrates regretting the absence of such an oracular man, but professing inability to proceed without him. In the Kriton, he undertakes the duty himself; unmindful of the many emphatic speeches in which he had proclaimed his own ignorance, and taken credit for confessing it without reserve.

CHAPTER XI.

EUTHYPHRON.

THE dialogue called Euthyphron, over and above its contribution to the ethical enquiries of Plato, has a certain bearing on the character and exculpation of Sokrates. It will therefore come conveniently in immediate sequel to the Apology and the Kriton.

The indictment by Melêtus against Sokrates is assumed to have been formally entered in the office of the King Archon. Sokrates has come to plead to it. In the portico before that office, he meets Euthyphron: a man of ultra-pious pretensions, possessing special religious knowledge (either from revelation directly to himself, or from having been initiated in the various mysteries consecrated throughout Greece), delivering authoritative opinions on doubtful theological points, and prophesying future events.[1]

Situation supposed in the dialogue —interlocutors.

What brings you here, Sokrates (asks Euthyphron), away from your usual haunts? Is it possible that any one can have preferred an indictment against you?

Yes (replies Sokrates), a young man named Melêtus. He takes commendable interest in the training of youth, and has indicted me as a corruptor of youth. He says that I corrupt them by teaching belief in new gods, and unbelief in the true and ancient Gods.

Indictment by Melêtus against Sokrates— Antipathy of the Athenians towards those who spread heretical opinions.

Euthyph.—I understand: it is because you talk about the Dæmon or Genius often communicating with you, that Melêtus calls you an innovator in religion. He knows that such calumnies find ready

[1] Plato, Euthyphr. c. 2, p. 3 D; compare Herodot. ii. 51.

admission with most minds.[1] So also, people laugh at me, when I talk about religion, and when I predict future events in the assembly. It must be from jealousy; because all that I have predicted has come true.

Sokr.—To be laughed at is no great matter. The Athenians do not care much when they regard a man as overwise, but as not given to teach his wisdom to others: but when they regard him besides, as likely to make others such as he is himself, they become seriously angry with him—be it from jealousy, as you say, or from any other cause. You keep yourself apart, and teach no one · for my part, I delight in nothing so much as in teaching all that I know. If they take the matter thus seriously, the result may be very doubtful.[2]

Sokrates now learns what is Euthyphron's business at the archontic office. Euthyphron is prosecuting an indictment before the King Archon, against his own father; as having caused the death of a dependent workman, who in a fit of intoxication had quarrelled with and killed a fellow-servant. The father of Euthyphron, upon this occurrence, bound the homicide hand and foot, and threw him into a ditch: at the same time sending to the Exêgêtês (the canonical adviser, supposed to be conversant with the divine sanctions, whom it was customary to consult when doubts arose about sacred things) to ask what was to be done with him. The incident occurred at Naxos, and the messenger was sent to the Exêgêtês at Athens: before he could return, the prisoner had perished, from hunger, cold, and bonds. Euthyphron has indicted his father for homicide, as having caused the death of the prisoner: who (it would appear) had remained in the ditch, tied hand and foot, without food, and with no more than his ordinary clothing, during the time occupied in the voyage from Naxos to Athens, in obtaining the answer of the Exêgêtês, and in returning to Naxos.

Euthyphron recounts that he is prosecuting an indictment for murder against his own father —Displeasure of his friends at the proceeding.

[1] Plato, Euthyph. c. 2, p. 3 B: *φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν καὶ ὡς καινοὺς ποιοῦντα θεούς, τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς φησιν.* c. 5, p. 5 A: *αὐτοσχεδιάζοντα καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρτάνειν.*

[2] Plato, Euthyphr. c. 3, p. 3 C.-D. *Ἀθηναίοις γὰρ οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἄν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμοῦνται, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι.*

My friends and relatives (says Euthyphron) cry out against me for this proceeding, as if I were mad. They say that my father did not kill the man :[1] that even if he had, the man had committed murder : lastly, that however the case may have been, to indict my own father is monstrous and inexcusable. Such reasoning is silly. The only point to be considered is, whether my father killed the deceased justly or unjustly. If justly there is nothing to be said ; if unjustly, then my father becomes a man tainted with impiety and accursed. I and every one else, who, knowing the facts, live under the same roof and at the same table with him, come under the like curse ; unless I purify myself by bringing him to justice. The course which I am now taking is prescribed by piety or holiness. My friends indeed tell me that it is unholy for a son to indict his father. But I know better than they, what holiness is · and I should be ashamed of myself if I did not.[2]

Euthyphron expresses full confidence that this step of his is both required and warranted by piety or holiness. Sokrates asks him —What is Holiness?

I confess myself (says Sokrates) ignorant respecting the question,[3] and I shall be grateful if you will teach me : the rather as I shall be able to defend myself better against Melêtus. Tell me what is the general constituent feature of *Holiness?* What is that common essence, or same character, which belongs to and distinguishes all holy or pious acts? What is that common opposite essence, which distinguishes all unholy or impious acts?[4]

[1] According to the Attic law every citizen was bound, in case any one of his relatives (*μέχρις ἀνεψιαδῶν*) or any member of his household (*οἰκέτης*) had been put to death, to come forward as prosecutor and indict the murderer. This was binding upon the citizen alike in law and in religion.

Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. p. 1161. Jul. Pollux, viii. 118.

Euthyphron would thus have been considered as acting with propriety, if the person indicted had been a stranger.

[2] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 4. Respecting the *μίασμα*, which a person who had committed criminal homicide was supposed to carry about with him wherever he went, communicating it both to places and to companions, see Antiphon. Tetralog. i. 2, 5, 10 : iii. s. 7, p. 116 ; and De Herodis Cæde s. 81, p. 139. The argument here employed by Euthyphron is used also by the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias, 480 C-D. If a man has committed injustice, punishment is the only way of curing him. That he should escape unpunished is the worst thing that can happen to him. If you yourself, or your father, or your friend, have committed injustice, do not seek to avert the punishment either from yourself or them, but rather invoke it. This is exactly what Euthyphron is doing, and what the Platonic Sokrates (in dialogue Euthyphron) calls in question.

[3] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. *τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν, οἵ γε καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι ;*

[4] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 5 D. Among the various reasons (none of them valid in my judgment) given by

It is holy (replies Euthyphron) to do what I am now doing. to bring to justice the man who commits impiety, either by homicide or sacrilege or any other such crime, whoever he be—even though it be your own father. The examples of the Gods teach us this. Kronus punished his father Uranus for wrong-doing: Zeus, whom every one holds to be the best and justest of the Gods, did the like by *his* father Kronus. I only follow their example. Those who blame my conduct contradict themselves when they talk about the Gods and about me.[1]

Euthyphron alludes to the punishment of Uranus by his son Kronus, and of Kronus by his son Zeus.

Do you really confidently believe these stories (asks Sokrates), as well as many others about the discord and conflicts among the Gods, which are circulated among the public by poets and painters? For my part, I have some repugnance in believing them;[2] it is for this reason probably, I am now to be indicted, and proclaimed as doing wrong. If you tell me that you are persuaded of their truth, I must bow to your superior knowledge. I cannot help doing so, since for my part I pretend to no knowledge whatever about them.

Sokrates intimates his own hesitation in believing these stories of discord among the Gods. Euthyphron declares his full belief in them, as well as in many similar narratives, not in so much circulation.

I am persuaded that these narratives are true (says Euthyphron): and not only they, but many other narratives yet more surprising, of which most persons are ignorant. I can tell you some of them, if you like to hear. You shall tell me another time (replies Sokrates): now let me repeat my question to you respecting holiness.[3]

Ueberweg (Untersuch. p. 251) for suspecting the authenticity of the Euthyphron, one is that τὸ ἀνόσιον is reckoned as an εἶδος as well as τὸ ὅσιον. Ueberweg seems to think this absurd, since he annexes to the word a note of admiration. But Plato expressly gives τὸ ἄδικον as an εἶδος, along with τὸ δίκαιον (Repub. v. 476 A); and one of the objections taken against his theory by Aristotle was, that it would assume substantive Ideas corresponding to negative terms —τῶν ἀποφάσεων ἰδέας. See Aristot. Metaphys. A. 990, b. 13, with the Scholion of Alexander, p. 565, a. 81 r.

[1] Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5-6.

We see here that Euthyphron is made to follow out the precept delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in the Theætêtus and elsewhere—to make himself as like to the Gods as possible—(ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Theætêt. p. 176 B; compare Phædrus, 252 C)—only that he conceives the attributes and proceedings of the Gods differently from Sokrates.

[2] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 A. Ἆρά γε τοῦτ' ἔστιν, οὗ ἕνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι; διὰ ταῦτα δῆ, ὡς ἔοικε, φήσει τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν.

[3] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 C.

Before we pursue this enquiry respecting holiness, which is the portion of the dialogue bearing on the Platonic ethics, I will say one word on the portion which has preceded, and which appears to bear on the position and character of Sokrates. He (Sokrates) has incurred odium from the Dikastery and the public, because he is heretical and incredulous. "He does not believe in those Gods in whom the city believes, but introduces religious novelties"—to use the words of the indictment preferred against him by Melêtus. The Athenian public felt the same displeasure and offence in hearing their divine legends, such as those of Zeus and Kronus,[1] called in question or criticised in an ethical spirit different from their own—as is felt by Jews or Christians when various narratives of the Old Testament are criticised in an adverse spirit, and when the proceedings ascribed to Jehovah are represented as unworthy of a just and beneficent god. We read in Herodotus what was the sentiment of pious contemporaries respecting narratives of divine matters. Herodotus keeps back many of them by design, and announces that he will never recite them except in case of necessity: while in one instance, where he has been betrayed into criticism upon a few of them, as inconsiderate and incredible, he is seized with misgivings, and prays that Gods and heroes will not be offended with him.[2] The freethinkers, among whom Sokrates was numbered, were the persons from whom adverse criticism came. It is these men who are depicted by orthodox opponents as committing lawless acts, and justifying themselves by precedents

Bearing of this dialogue on the relative positions of Sokrates and the Athenian public.

[1] I shall say more about Plato's views on the theological legends generally believed by his countrymen, when I come to the language which he puts into the mouth of Sokrates in the second and third books of the Republic. Eusebius considers it matter of praise when he says "that Plato rejected all the opinions of his countrymen concerning the Gods and exposed their absurdity"—*ὅπως τε πάσας τὰς πατρίους περὶ τῶν θεῶν ὑπολήψεις ἠθέτει, καὶ τὴν ἀποπίαν αὐτῶν διήλεγχεν* (Præp. Evan. xiii. 1)—the very same thing which is averred in the indictment laid by Melêtus against Sokrates.

[2] Herodot. ii. 65: *τῶν δὲ εἵνεκεν ἀνεῖται τὰ ἱρὰ, εἰ λέγοιμι, καταβαίην ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἐς τὰ θεῖα πρήγματα, τὰ ἐγὼ φεύγω μάλιστα ἀπηγεέσθαι. τὰ δὲ καὶ εἰρηκα αὐτῶν ἐπιψαύσας, ἀναγκαίῃ καταλαμβανόμενος εἶπον . . . .* 45. *Λέγουσι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἀνεπισκέπτως οἱ Ἕλληνες· εὐήθης δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὅδε ὁ μῦθός ἐστι, τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέος λέγουσι . . . . ἔτι δὲ ἕνα ἐόντα τὸν Ἡρακλέα, καὶ ἔτι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς δή φασι, κῶς φύσιν ἔχει πολλὰς μυριάδας φονεῦσαι; καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων τοσαῦτα ἡμῖν εἰποῦσι, καὶ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡρώων εὐμένεια εἴη.*

About the *ἱροὶ λόγοι* which he keeps back, see cap. 51, 61, 62, 81, 170, &c.

drawn from the proceedings of Zeus.[1] They are, besides, especially accused of teaching children to despise or even to ill-use their parents.[2]

Dramatic moral set forth by Aristophanes against Sokrates and the freethinkers, is here retorted by Plato against the orthodox champion.

Now in the dialogue here before us, Plato retorts this attack. Euthyphron possesses in the fullest measure the virtues of a believer. He believes not only all that orthodox Athenians usually believed respecting the Gods, but more besides.[3] His faith is so implicit, that he proclaims it as accurate knowledge, and carries it into practice with full confidence; reproaching other orthodox persons with inconsistency and shortcoming, and disregarding the judgment of the multitude, as Sokrates does in the Kriton.[4] Euthyphron stands forward as the champion of the Gods, determined not to leave unpunished the man who has committed impiety, let him be who he may.[5] These lofty religious pretensions impel him, with full persuasion of right, to indict his own father for homicide, under the circumstances above described. Now in the eyes of the Athenian public, there could hardly be any act more abhorrent, than that of a man thus invoking upon his father the severest penalties of law. It would probably be not less abhorrent than that of a son beating his own father. When therefore we read, in the Nubes of Aristophanes, the dramatic moral set forth against Sokrates, "See the consequences to which free-thinking and the new system of education lead[6]—the son Pheidippides beating his own father, and justifying the action as right, by citing the violence of Zeus towards his father Kronus"—we may take the Platonic Euthyphron as an antithesis to this moral, propounded by a defender of Sokrates, "See the consequences to which consistent orthodoxy and implicit faith conduct. The son Euthyphron indicts his own

[1] Aristoph. Nubes, 905-1080.

[2] Aristoph. Nubes, 994-1333-1444. Xenophon, Mem. i. 2, 49. Σωκράτης—τοὺς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε (accusation by Melêtus).

[3] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.

Euthyphron belonged to the class described in Euripides, Hippol. 45:—

Ὅσοι μεν οὖν γραφάς τε τῶν παλαιτέρων
Ἔχουσιν, αὐτοί τ' εἰσὶν ἐν μούσαις ἀεί,
Ἴσασιν, &c.

Compare also Euripid. Herakleidæ, 404.

[4] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p 5 A; c. 6, p. 6 A.

[5] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 5 E. μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μηδ' ἂν ὁστισοῦν τυγχάνῃ ὤν.

[6] Aristoph. Nubes, 937. τὴν καινὴν παίδευσιν, &c.

father for homicide; he vindicates the step as conformable to the proceedings of the gods; he even prides himself on it as championship on their behalf, such as all religious men ought to approve."[1]

[1] Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Euthyphron, vol. ii. pp. 51-54) has many remarks on the Euthyphron in which I do not concur; but his conception of its "unverkennbare apologetische Absicht" is very much the same as mine. He describes Euthyphron as a man "der sich besonders auf das Göttliche zu verstehen vorgab, und die rechtgläubigen aus den alten theologischen Dichtern gezogenen Begriffe tapfer vertheidigte. Diesen nun gerade bei der Anklage des Sokrates mit ihm in Berührung, und durch den unsittlichen Streich, den sein Eifer für die Frömmigkeit veranlasste, in Gegensatz zu bringen—war ein des Platon nicht unwürdiger Gedanke" (p. 54). But when Schleiermacher affirms that the dialogue was indisputably composed (unstreitig) between the indictment and the trial of Sokrates,—and when he explains what he considers the defects of the dialogue, by the necessity of finishing it in a hurry (p. 53), I dissent from him altogether, though Steinhart adopts the same opinion. Nor can I perceive in what way the Euthyphron is (as he affirms) either "a natural out-growth of the Protagoras," or "an approximation and preparation for the Parmenidês" (p. 52). Still less do I feel the force of his reasons for hesitating in admitting it to be a genuine work of Plato.

I have given my reasons, in a preceding chapter, for believing that Plato composed no dialogues at all during the lifetime of Sokrates. But that he should publish such a dialogue while the trial of Sokrates was impending, is a supposition altogether inadmissible, in my judgment. The effect of it would be to make the position of Sokrates much worse on his trial. Herein I agree with Ueberweg (Untersuch. p. 250), though I do not share his doubts of the authenticity of the dialogue.

The confident assertion of Stallbaum surprises me. "Constat enim Platonem eo tempore, quo Socrati tantum erat odium conflatum, ut ei judicii immineret periculum, complures dialogos composuisse; in quibus id egit, ut viri sanctissimi adversarios in eo ipso genere, in quo sibi plurimum sapere videbantur, inscitiæ et ignorantiæ coargueret. Nam Euthyphronem novimus, ad vates ignorantiæ rerum gravissimarum convincendos, esse compositum; ut in quo eos ne pietatis quidem notionem tenere ostenditur. In Menone autem id agitur, ut sophistas et viros civiles non scientiâ atque arte, sed cœco quodam impetu mentis et sorte divinâ duci demonstretur: quod quidem ita fit, ut colloquium ex parte cum Anyto, Socratis accusatore, habeatur. . . . . Nam Menonem quidem et Euthyphronem Plato eo confecit tempore, quo Socratis causa haud ita pridem in judicio versabatur, nec tamen jam tanta ei videbatur imminere calamitas, quanta postea consecuta est. Ex quo sané verisimiliter colligere licet Ionem, cujus simile argumentum et consilium est, circa idem tempus literis consignatum esse." Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Platonis Ionem, pp. 288-289, vol. iv. [Comp. Stallb. ibid., 2nd ed. pp. 339-341].

"Imo uno exemplo Euthyphronis, boni quidem hominis ideoque ne Socrati quidem inimici, sed ejusdem *superstitiosi, vel ut hodie loquuntur, orthodoxi*, qualis Athenis vulgò esset religionis conditio, declarare instituit. Ex quo nobis quidem clarissimé videtur apparere Platonem hoc unum spectavisse, ut judices admonerentur, ne populari superstitioni in sententiis ferendis plus justo tribuerent." Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyphron. T. vi. p. 146.

Steinhart also (in his Einleitung, p. 190) calls Euthyphron "ein rechtgläubiger von reinsten Wasser—ein ueberfrommer, fanatischer, Mann," &c.

In the two preceding pages Stallbaum defends himself against objections made to his view, on the ground that Plato, by composing such dialogues at this critical moment, would increase the unpopularity and danger of Sokrates, instead of diminishing it. Stallbaum contends (p. 145) that neither Sokrates nor Plato nor any of the other Sokratic men, believed that the trial would end in a verdict of guilty: which is probably true about Plato, and would have been borne out by the event if

Sequel of the dialogue—Euthyphron gives a particular example as the reply to a general question.

I proceed now with that which may be called the Platonic purpose in the dialogue—the enquiry into the general idea of Holiness. When the question was first put to Euthyphron, What is the Holy?—he replied, "That which I am now doing."—*Sokr.* That may be: but many other things besides are also holy.—*Euthyph.* Certainly.—*Sokr.* Then your answer does not meet the question. You have indicated one particular holy act, among many. But the question asked was—What is Holiness generally? What is that specific property, by the common possession of which all holy things are entitled to be called holy? I want to know this general Idea, in order that I may keep it in view as a type wherewith to compare each particular case, thus determining whether the case deserves to be called holy or not.[1]

Here we have a genuine specimen of the dialectic interrogatory in which Xenophon affirms[2] Sokrates to have passed his life, and which Plato prosecutes under his master's name. The question is generalised much more than in the Kriton.

Such mistake frequent in dialectic discussion.

It is assumed that there is one specific Idea or essence—one objective characteristic or fact—common to all things called Holy. The purpose of the questioner is, to determine what this Idea is: to provide a good definition of the word. The first mistake made by the respondent is, that he names simply one particular case, coming under the general Idea. This is a mistake often recurring, and often corrected in the Platonic dialogues. Even now, such a mistake is not unfrequent: and in the time of Plato, when general ideas, and the definition of general terms, had been made so little the subject of direct attention, it was doubtless perpetually made. When the question was first put, its bearing

Sokrates had made a different defence. But this does not assist the conclusion which Stallbaum wishes to bring out; for it is not the less true that the dialogues of Plato, if published at that moment, would increase the exasperation against Sokrates, and the chance, whatever it was, that he would be found guilty. Stallbaum refers by mistake to a passage in the Platonic Apology (p. 36 A), as if Sokrates there expressed his surprise at the verdict of guilty, anticipating a verdict of acquittal. The passage declares the contrary: Sokrates expresses his surprise that the verdict of guilty had passed by so small a majority as five; he had expected that it would pass by a larger majority.

[1] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 7, p. 6 E.

[2] Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 16.

would not be properly conceived. And even if the bearing were properly conceived, men would find it easier then, and do find it easier now, to make answer by giving one particular example than to go over many examples, and elicit what is common to all.

First general answer given by Euthyphron—that which is pleasing to the Gods is Holy. Comments of Sokrates thereon.

Euthyphron next replies—That which is pleasing to the Gods is holy: that which is not pleasing, or which is displeasing to the Gods, is unholy.—*Sokr.* That is the sort of answer which I desired to have: now let us examine it. We learn from the received theology, which you implicitly believe, that there has been much discord and quarrel among the Gods. If the Gods quarrel, they quarrel about the same matters as men. Now men do not quarrel about questions of quantity—for such questions can be determined by calculation and measurement: nor about questions of weight—for there the balance may be appealed to. The questions about which you and I and other men quarrel are, What is just or unjust, honourable or base, good or evil? Upon these there is no accessible standard. Some men feel in one way, some in another; and each of us fights for his own opinions.[1] We all indeed agree that the wrong-doer ought to be punished: but we do not agree *who* the wrong-doer is, nor what *is* wrong-doing. The same action which some of us pronounce to be just, others stigmatise as unjust.[2]

So likewise the quarrels of the Gods must turn upon these same matters—just and unjust, right and wrong, good and evil. What one God thinks right, another God thinks wrong. What is pleasing to one God, is displeasing to another. The same action will be both pleasing and displeasing to the Gods.

[1] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 8, p. 7 C-D. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροί γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἶμεν καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα; ἴσως οὐ πρόχειρόν σοί ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ τάδ' ἐστὶ τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. Ἆρ' οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἱκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;

[2] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 9, p. 8 D. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἀμφισβητοῦσι, τὸ τίς ἐστιν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν, καὶ πότε; Πράξεώς τινος περὶ διαφερόμενοι, οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασὶν αὐτὴν πεπρᾶχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως.

According to your definition of holy and unholy, therefore, the same action may be both holy and unholy. Your definition will not hold, for it does not enable me to distinguish the one from the other.[1]

Euthyph.—I am convinced that there are some things which *all* the Gods love, and some things which *all* the Gods hate. That which I am doing, for example—indicting my father for homicide—belongs to the former category. Now that which all the Gods love is the holy: that which they all hate, is the unholy.[2]

Sokr.—Do the Gods love the holy, because it *is* holy? Or is it holy for this reason, because they do love it?

To be loved by the Gods is not the essence of the Holy—they love it because it is holy. In what then does its essence consist? Perplexity of Euthyphron.

Euthyph.—They love it because it is holy.[3] *Sokr.*—Then the holiness is one thing; the fact of being loved by the Gods is another. The latter fact is not of the essence of holiness: it is true, but only as an accident and an accessory. You have yet to tell me what that essential character is, by virtue of which the holy comes to be loved by all the Gods, or to be the subject of various other attributes.[4]

Euthyph.—I hardly know how to tell you what I think. None of my explanations will stand. Your ingenuity turns and twists them in every way. *Sokr.*—If I am

[1] In regard to Plato's ethical enquiries generally, and to what we shall find in future dialogues, we must take note of what is here laid down,—that mankind are in perpetual dispute, and have not yet any determinate standard for just and unjust, right and wrong, honourable and base, good and evil. Plato had told us, somewhat differently, in the Kriton, that on these matters, though the judgment of the many was not to be trusted, yet there was another trustworthy judgment, that of the one wise man. This point will recur for future comment.

[2] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 11, p. 9.

[3] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 12, p. 10 A-D. The manner in which Sokrates conducts this argument is over-subtle. Οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὁρώμενόν γέ ἐστι διὰ τοῦτο ὁρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον διότι ὁρᾶται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρώμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστι, διὰ τοῦτο ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται, φερόμενον.

The difference between the meaning of φέρεται and φερόμενόν ἐστι is not easy to see. The former may mean to affirm the beginning of an action, the latter the continuance: but in this case the inference would not necessarily follow.

Compare Aristotel. Physica, p. 185, b. 25, with the Scholion of Simplikius, p. 330, a. 2nd ed. Bekk. where βαδίζων ἔστι is recognised as equivalent to βαδίζει.

[4] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13, p. 11 A. κινδυνεύεις, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὅ, τί ποτ' ἔστιν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅ, τι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν θεῶν· ὅ, τι δὲ ὄν, οὔπω εἶπες. . . . πάλιν εἰπὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε ὂν τὸ ὅσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, εἴτε ὅτι δὴ πάσχει.

ingenious, it is against my own will;[1] for I am most anxious that some one of the answers should stand unshaken. But I will now put you in the way of making a different answer. You will admit that all which is holy is necessarily just. But is all that is just necessarily holy?

Euthyphron does not at first understand the question. He does not comprehend the relation between two words, generic and specific with reference to each other: the former embracing all that the latter embraces, and more besides (denoting more objects, connoting fewer attributes). This is explained by analogies and particular examples, illustrating a logical distinction highly important to be brought out, at a time when there were no treatises on Logic.[2] So much therefore is made out—That the Holy is a part, or branch, of the Just. But what part? or how is it to be distinguished from other parts or branches of the just? Euthyphron answers. The holy is that portion or branch of the Just which concerns ministration to the Gods: the remaining branch of the Just is, what concerns ministration to men.[3]

Sokrates suggests a new answer. The Holy is one branch or variety of the Just. It is that branch which concerns ministration by men to the Gods.

Sokr.—What sort of ministration? Other ministrations to horses, dogs, working cattle, &c., are intended for the improvement or benefit of those to whom they are rendered:—besides, they can only be rendered by a few trained persons. In what manner does the ministration, called *holiness*, benefit or improve the Gods? *Euthyph.*—In no way: it is of the same nature as that which slaves render to their masters. *Sokr.*—You mean, that it is work done by us for the Gods. Tell me—to what end does the work conduce? What is that end which the Gods accomplish, through our agency as workmen? Physicians employ their slaves for the purpose of restoring the sick to health: shipbuilders put their slaves to the completion of ships. But what are those great works which the Gods bring about by our agency? *Euthyph.*—Their works are numerous and great. *Sokr.*—The like may be

Ministration to the Gods? How? To what purpose?

[1] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13, p. 11 D. ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός, &c.

[2] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13-14, p. 12. τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν· τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.

[3] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 14, p. 12 E.

said of generals: but the summary and main purpose of all that generals do is—to assure victory in war. So too we may say about the husbandman: but the summary of his many proceedings is, to raise corn from the earth. State to me, in like manner, the summary of that which the Gods perform through our agency.[1]

Holiness—rectitude in sacrifice and prayer—right traffic between men and the Gods.

Euthyph.—It would cost me some labour to go through the case fully. But so much I tell you in plain terms. If a man, when sacrificing and praying, knows what deeds and what words will be agreeable to the Gods, that is holiness: this it is which upholds the security both of private houses and public communities. The contrary is unholiness, which subverts and ruins them.[2] *Sokr.*—Holiness, then, is the knowledge of rightly sacrificing and praying to the Gods; that is, of giving to them, and asking from them. To ask rightly, is to ask what we want from them: to give rightly, is to give to them what they want from us. Holiness will thus be an art of right traffic between Gods and men. Still, you must tell me how the Gods are gainers by that which we give to them. That we are gainers by what they give, is clear enough; but what do they gain on their side?

This will not stand—the Gods gain nothing—they receive from men marks of honour and gratitude—they are pleased therewith—the Holy therefore must be that

Euthyph.—The Gods gain nothing. The gifts which we present to them consist in honour, marks of respect, gratitude. *Sokr.*—The holy, then, is that which obtains favour from the Gods: not that which is gainful to them, nor that which they love. *Euthyph.*—Nay: I think they love it especially. *Sokr.*—Then it appears that the holy is what the Gods love? *Euthyph.*—Unquestionably.

Sokr.—But this is the very same explanation which we rejected a short time ago as untenable.[3] It was agreed between us, that to be loved by the Gods was

[1] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 16, pp. 13, 14.

[2] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 16, p. 14 B. Compare this third unsuccessful answer of Euthyphron with the third answer assigned to Hippias (Hipp. Maj. 291 C-E). Both of them appear lengthened, emphatic, as if intended to settle a question which had become vexatious.

[3] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 19, p. 15 C. *μέμνησαι γάρ που, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἀλλήλων.*

not of the essence of holiness, and could not serve as an explanation of holiness: though it might be truly affirmed thereof as an accompanying predicate. Let us therefore try again to discover what holiness is. I rely upon you to help me, and I am sure that you must know, since under a confident persuasion that you know, you are indicting your own father for homicide.

which is pleasing to the Gods.

This is the same explanation which was before declared insufficient. A fresh explanation is required from Euthyphron. He breaks off the dialogue.

Euthyph.—"The investigation must stand over to another time, I have engagements now which call me elsewhere."

So Plato breaks off the dialogue. It is conceived in the truly Sokratic spirit:—an Elenchus applied to implicit and unexamined faith, even though that faith be accredited among the public as orthodoxy: warfare against the confident persuasion of knowledge, upon topics familiar to every one, and on which deep sentiments and confused notions have grown up by association in every one's mind, without deliberate study, systematic teaching, or testing cross-examination. Euthyphron is a man who feels unshaken confidence in his own knowledge, and still more in his own correct religious belief. Sokrates appears in his received character as confessing ignorance, soliciting instruction, and exposing inconsistencies and contradiction in that which is given to him for instruction.

Sokratic spirit of the dialogue—confessed ignorance applying the Elenchus to false persuasion of knowledge.

We must (as I have before remarked) take this ignorance on the part of the Platonic Sokrates not as assumed, but as very real. In no part of the Platonic writings do we find any tenable definition of the Holy and the Unholy, such as is here demanded from Euthyphron. The talent of Sokrates consists in exposing bad definitions, not in providing good ones. This negative function is all that he claims for himself—with deep regret that he can do no more. "Sokrates" (says Aristotle [1]) "put questions, but gave no answers: for he professed not to know." In those dialogues where Plato makes him attempt more (there also, against his own will

The questions always difficult, often impossible to answer. Sokrates is unable to answer them, though he exposes the bad answers of others.

[1] Aristotel. Sophist. Elench. p. 183, b. 7. καὶ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο· ὁμολόγει γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἠρώτα

and protest, as in the Philêbus and Republic), the affirmative Sokrates will be found only to stand his ground because no negative Sokrates is allowed to attack him. I insist upon this the rather, because the Platonic commentators usually present the dialogues in a different light, as if such modesty on the part of Sokrates was altogether simulated : as if he was himself,[1] from the beginning, aware of the proper answer to his own questions, but refrained designedly from announcing it : nay, sometimes, as if the answers were in themselves easy, and as if the respondents who failed must be below par in respect of intelligence. This is an erroneous conception. The questions put by Sokrates, though relating to familiar topics, are always difficult : they are often even impossible to answer, because they postulate and require to be assigned a common objective concept which is not to be found. They only appear easy to one who has never attempted the task of answering under the pressure of cross-examination. Most persons indeed never make any such trial, but go on affirming confidently as if they knew, without trial. It is exactly against such illusory confidence of knowledge that Sokrates directs his questions : the fact belongs to our days no less than to his.[2]

Objections of Theopompus to the Platonic procedure.

The assumptions of some Platonic commentators—that Sokrates and Plato of course knew the answers to their own questions—that an honest and pious man, of ordinary intelligence, has the answer to the question in his heart, though he cannot put it in words—these assumptions were also made by many of Plato's contemporaries, who depreciated his questions as frivolous and unprofitable. The rhetor and historian Theopompus (one of the most eminent among the numerous pupils of Isokrates, and at the same time unfriendly to Plato, though younger in age), thus criticised Plato's requirement, that these familiar terms should be defined : "What ! (said he) have none of us before your time talked about

[1] See Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Euthyphron. p. 140.

[2] Adam Smith observes, in his Essay on the Formation of Languages (p. 20 of the fifth volume of his collected Works), "Ask a man what relation is expressed by the preposition *of:* and if he has not beforehand employed his thoughts a good deal upon these subjects, you may safely allow him a week to consider of his answer".

The Platonic problem assumes, not only that he shall give an answer, but that it shall be an answer which he can maintain against the Elenchus of Sokrates.

the Good and the Just? Or do you suppose that we cannot follow out what each of them is, and that we pronounce the words as empty and unmeaning sounds?"[1] Theopompus was the scholar of Isokrates, and both of them probably took the same view, as to the uselessness of that colloquial analysis which aims at determining the definition of familiar ethical or political words.[2] They considered that Plato and Sokrates, instead of clearing up what was confused, wasted their ingenuity in perplexing what was already clear. They preferred the rhetorical handling (such as we noticed in the Kriton) which works upon ready-made pre-established sentiments, and impresses a strong emotional conviction, but presumes that all the intellectual problems have already been solved.

Objective view of Ethics, distinguished by Sokrates from the subjective.

All this shows the novelty of the Sokratic point of view: the distinction between the essential constituent and the accidental accompaniment,[3] and the search for a definition corresponding to the former: which search was first prosecuted by Sokrates (as Aristotle[4] points out) and was taken up from him by Plato. It was Sokrates who first brought conspicuously into notice the objective, intellectual, scientific view of ethics—as distinguished from the subjective, emotional, incoherent, and uninquiring. I mean that he was the first who proclaimed himself as feeling the want of such an objective view, and who worked upon other minds so as to create the like want in them: I do not mean that he provided satisfaction for this requirement.

Subjective unanimity coincident with objective dissent.

Undoubtedly (as Theopompus remarked) men had used these ethical terms long before the time of Sokrates, and had used them, not as empty and unmeaning, but with a full body of meaning (*i.e.* emotional meaning). Strong and marked emotion had become associated with each term; and the same emotion, similar in

[1] Epiktêtus, ii. 17, 5-10. Τὸ δ' ἐξαπατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὅπερ καὶ Θεόπομπον τὸν ῥήτορα ὅς που καὶ Πλάτωνι ἐγκαλεῖ ἐπὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι ἕκαστα ὁρίζεσθαι. Τί γὰρ λέγει; Οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἔλεγεν ἀγαθὸν ἢ δίκαιον; ἢ μὴ παρακολουθοῦντες τί ἐστι τούτων ἕκαστον, ἀσήμως καὶ κενῶς ἐφθεγγόμεθα τὰς φωνάς;

Respecting Theopompus, compare Dionys. Hal. Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium de Platone, p. 757; also De Præcip. Historicis, p. 782.

[2] Isokrates, Helen. Encom. Or. x. init. De Permut. Or. xv. sect. 90. These passages do not name Sokrates and Plato, but have every appearance of being intended to allude to them.

[3] This distinction is pointedly noticed in the Euthyphron, p. 11 A.

[4] Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 2; M. 1078, b. 28.

character, though not equal in force—was felt by the greater number of different minds. Subjectively and emotionally, there was no difference between one man and another, except as to degree. But it was Sokrates who first called attention to the fact as a matter for philosophical recognition and criticism,—that such subjective and emotional unanimity does not exclude the widest objective and intellectual dissension.[1]

Cross-examination brought to bear upon this mental condition by Sokrates—Position of Sokrates and Plato in regard to it.

As the Platonic Sokrates here puts it in the Euthyphron—all men agree that the person who acts unjustly must be punished; but they dispute very much *who it is* that acts unjustly—*which* of his actions are unjust—or under *what* circumstances they are so. The emotion in each man's mind, as well as the word by which it is expressed, is the same:[2] but the person, or the acts, to which it is applied by each, although partly the same, are often so opposite, as to occasion violent dispute. There is subjective agreement, with objective disagreement. It is upon

[1] It is this distinction between the subjective and the objective which is implied in the language of Epiktêtus, when he proceeds to answer the objection cited from Theopompus (note [1] p. 451): Τίς γάρ σοι λέγει, Θεόπομπε, ὅτι ἐννοίας οὐκ εἴχομεν ἑκαστου τούτων φυσικάς καὶ προλήψεις; Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐφαρμόζειν τὰς προλήψεις ταῖς καταλλήλοις οὐσίαις, μὴ διαρθρώσαντα αὐτάς, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκεψάμενον, ποίαν τινὰ ἑκάστη αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὑποτακτέον.

To the same purpose Epiktêtus, in another passage, i. 22, 4-9: Αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν Ἰουδαίων, καὶ Σύρων, καὶ Αἰγυπτίων, καὶ Ῥωμαίων μάχη· οὐ περὶ τοῦ, ὅτι τὸ ὅσιον πάντων προτιμητέον, καὶ ἐν παντὶ μεταδιωκτέον—ἀλλὰ πότερόν ἐστιν ὅσιον τοῦτο, τὸ χοιρείου φαγεῖν, ἢ ἀνόσιον.

Again, Origen also, in a striking passage of his reply to Celsus (v. p. 263, ed. Spencer; i. p. 614 ed. Delarue), observes that the name *Justice* is the same among all Greeks (he means, the name with the emotional associations inseparable from it), but that the thing designated was very different, according to those who pronounced it:—λεκτέον, ὅτι τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὄνομα ταὐτὸν μὲν ἔστιν παρὰ πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν· ἤδη δὲ ἀποδείκνυται ἄλλη μὲν ἡ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον δικαιοσύνη, ἄλλη δὲ ἡ κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, ἀρνουμένων τὸ τριμερὲς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἄλλη δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος, ἰδιοπραγίαν τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς φάσκοντας εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἄλλη μὲν ἡ Ἐπικούρου ἀνδρία, &c.

"Je n'aime point les mots nouveaux" (said Saint Just, in his Institutions, composed during the sitting of the French Convention, 1793), "je ne connais que le juste et l'injuste: ces mots sont entendus par toutes les consciences. Il faut ramener toutes les définitions à la conscience: l'esprit est un sophiste qui conduit les vertus à l'échafaud." (Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution Française, t. xxxv. p. 277.) This is very much the language which honest and vehement ἰδιῶται of Athens would hold towards Sokrates and Plato.

[2] Plato, Euthyphron, p. 8, C-D, Euripides, Phœnissæ, 499—

εἰ πᾶσι ταὐτὸ καλὸν ἔφυ, σοφόν θ' ἅμα,
οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀμφιλεκτὸς ἀνθρώποις ἔρις·
νῦν δ' οὐθ' ὅμοιον οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἴσον βρότοις,
πλὴν ὀνομάσαι· τὸ δ' ἔργον οὐκ ἔστιν τόδε.

Hobbes expresses, in the following terms, this fact of subjective similarity

this disconformity that the Sokratic cross-examination is brought to bear, making his hearers feel its existence, for the first time, and dispelling their fancy of supposed knowledge as well as of supposed unanimity. Sokrates required them to define the general word—to assign some common objective characteristic, corresponding in all cases to the common subjective feeling represented by the word. But no man could comply with his requirement, nor could he himself comply with it, any more than his respondents. So far Sokrates proceeded, and no farther, according to Aristotle. He never altogether lost his hold on particulars: he assumed that there must be something common to them all, if you could but find out what it was, constituting the objective meaning of the general term. Plato made a step beyond him, though under the name of Sokrates as spokesman. Not being able (any more than Sokrates) to discover or specify any real objective characteristic, common to all the particulars—he objectivised [1] the word itself: that is, he assumed or imagined a new objective Ens of his own, the Platonic Idea, corresponding to the general word: an idea not common to the particulars, but existing apart from them in a sphere of its own—yet nevertheless lending itself in some inexplicable way to be participated by all the particulars. It was only in this way that Plato could explain to himself how knowledge was possible: this universal Ens being the only object of knowledge: particulars being an indefinite variety of fleeting appearances, and as such in themselves unknowable. The imagination of Plato created a new world of Forms, Ideas, Concepts, or objects corresponding to general terms: which he represents as the only objects of knowledge, and as the only realities.

co-existent with great objective dissimilarity among mankind.

"For the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another, whoever looketh into himself and considereth what he does when he does *think*, *opine*, *reason*, *hope*, *fear*, &c., and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of *passions*, which are the same in all men, *desire*, *fear*, *hope*, &c., not the similitude of the *objects* of the passions, which are the things *desired*, *feared*, *hoped*, &c., for these the constitution individual, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of man's heart, blotted and confounded as they are with lying, dissembling, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts."—Introduction to Leviathan.

[1] Aristot. Metaphys. M. 1078, b. 30, 1086, b. 4.

In the Euthyphron, however, we have not yet passed into this Platonic world, of self-existent Forms—objects of conception—concepts detached from sensible particulars. We are still with Sokrates and with ordinary men among the world of particulars, only that Sokrates introduced a new mode of looking at all the particulars, and searched among them for some common feature which he did not find. The Holy (and the Unholy) is a word freely pronounced by every speaker, and familiarly understood by every hearer, as if it denoted something one and the same in all these particulars.[1] What is that something—the common essence or idea? Euthyphron cannot tell; though he agrees with Sokrates that there must be such essence. His attempts to explain it prove failures.

The Holy—it has an essential characteristic—what is this?—not the fact that it is loved by the Gods—this is true, but is not its constituent essence.

The definition of the Holy—that it is what the Gods love—is suggested in this dialogue, but rejected. The Holy is not Holy because the Gods love it: on the contrary, its holiness is an independent fact, and the Gods love it because it is Holy. The Holy is thus an essence, *per se*, common to, or partaken by, all holy persons and things.

So at least the Platonic Sokrates here regards it. But the Xenophontic Sokrates, if we can trust the Memorabilia, would not have concurred in this view: for we read that upon all points connected with piety or religious observance, he followed the precept which the Pythian priestess delivered as an answer to all who consulted the Delphian oracle on similar questions—You will act piously by conforming to the law of the city. Sokrates (we are told) not only acted upon this precept himself, but advised his friends to do the like, and regarded those who acted otherwise as foolish and over-subtle triflers.[2] It is plain that this doctrine disallows all supposition of any general essence, called the Holy, to be discovered and appealed to, as type in cases of doubt; and recognises the equal title of many separate local, dis-

Views of the Xenophontic Sokrates respecting the Holy—different from those of the Platonic Sokrates—he disallows any common absolute general type of the Holy—he recognises an indefinite variety of types, discordant and relative.

[1] Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 D, 6 E.

[2] Compare Xen. Mem. i. 3, 1. ἥ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναιρεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν· Σωκράτης τε οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρήνει, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως πως ποιοῦντας περιέργους καὶ ματαίους ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.

cordant, and variable types, each under the sanction of King Nomos. The procedure of Sokrates in the Euthyphron would not have been approved by the Xenophontic Sokrates. It is in the spirit of Plato, and is an instance of that disposition which he manifests yet more strongly in the Republic and elsewhere, to look for his supreme authority in philosophical theory and not in the constituted societies around him: thus to innovate in matters religious as well as political—a reproach to him among his own contemporaries, an honour to him among various subsequent Christian writers. Plato, not conforming to any one of the modes of religious belief actually prevalent in his contemporary world, postulates a canon, suitable to the exigencies of his own mind, of that which the Gods ought to love and must love. In this respect, as in others, he is in marked contrast with Herodotus—a large observer of mankind, very pious in his own way, curious in comparing the actual practices consecrated among different nations, but not pretending to supersede them by any canon of his own.

Though the Holy, and the Unholy, are pronounced to be each an essence, partaken of by all the particulars so-called; yet what that essence is, the dialogue Euthyphron noway determines. Even the suggestion of Sokrates—that the Holy is a branch of the Just, only requiring to be distinguished by some assignable mark from the other branches of the Just—is of no avail, since the Just itself had been previously declared to be one of the matters in perpetual dispute. It procures for Sokrates however the opportunity of illustrating the logical subordination of terms; the less general comprehended in the more general, and requiring to be parted off by some *differentia* from the rest of what this latter comprehends. Plato illustrates the matter at some length;[1] and apparently with a marked purpose of drawing attention to it. We must keep in mind, that logical distinctions had at that time received neither special attention nor special names—however they may have been unconsciously followed in practice.

The Holy a branch of the Just—not tenable as a definition, but useful as bringing to view the subordination of logical terms.

What I remarked about the Kriton, appears to me also true

[1] Plato, Euthyphron, p. 12.

The Euthyphron represents Plato's way of replying to the charge of impiety preferred by Melêtus against Sokrates—comparison with Xenophon's way of replying.

about the Euthyphron. It represents Plato's manner of replying to the charge of impiety advanced by Melêtus and his friends against Sokrates, just as the four first chapters of the Memorabilia represent Xenophon's manner of repelling the same charge. Xenophon joins issue with the accusers,—describes the language and proceedings of Sokrates, so as to show that he was orthodox and pious, above the measure of ordinary men, in conduct, in ritual, and in language; and expresses his surprise that against such a man the verdict of guilty could have been returned by the Dikasts.[1] Plato handles the charge in the way in which Sokrates himself would have handled it, if he had been commenting on the same accusation against another person—and as he does in fact deal with Melêtus, in the Platonic Apology. Plato introduces Euthyphron, a very religious man, who prides himself upon being forward to prosecute impiety in whomsoever it is found, and who in this case, under the special promptings of piety, has entered a capital prosecution against his own father.[2] The occasion is here favourable to the Sokratic interrogatories, applicable to Melêtus no less than to Euthyphron. "Of course, before you took this grave step, you have assured yourself that you are right, and that you know what piety and impiety are. Pray tell me, for I am ignorant on the subject: that I may know better and do better for the future.[3] Tell me, what is the characteristic essence of piety as well as impiety?" It turns out that the accuser can make no satisfactory answer:—that he involves himself in confusion and contradiction:—that he has brought capital indictments against citizens, without having ever studied or appreciated the offence with which he charges them. Such is the manner in which the Platonic Sokrates is made to deal with Euthyphron, and in which the real Sokrates deals with Melêtus:[4] rendering the questions instrumental to two larger purposes—first, to his habitual crusade against the false per-

[1] Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 4; also iv. 8, 11.

[2] Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 E.

[3] Compare, even in Xenophon, the conversation of Sokrates with Kritias and Chariklês—Memorab. i. 2, 32-38: and his cross-examination of the presumptuous youth Glaukon, Plato's brother (Mem. iii. 7).

[4] Plato, Apol. c. 11, p. 24 C. ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ῥᾳδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, &c.

suasion of knowledge—next, to the administering of a logical or dialectical lesson. When we come to the Treatise De Legibus (where Sokrates does not appear) we shall find Plato adopting the dogmatic and sermonising manner of the first chapters of the Xenophontic Memorabilia. Here, in the Euthyphron and in the Dialogues of Search generally, the Platonic Sokrates is something entirely different.[1]

[1] Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 199) agrees with the opinion of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, that the Euthyphron was composed and published during the interval between the lodging of the indictment and the trial of Sokrates. K. F. Hermann considers it as posterior to the death of Sokrates.

I concur on this point with Hermann. Indeed I have already given my opinion, that not one of the Platonic dialogues was composed before the death of Sokrates.

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